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
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INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ARTS AND SCIENCE

EDITED BY
HOWARD J. ROGERS, A.M., LL.D.
DIRECTOR OF CONGRESSES

VOLUME V

HISTORY OF LANGUAGE

COMPRISING
Lectures on Comparative Language, Semitic
Languages, Indo-Iranian Languages, Greek
Language, Latin Language, English
Language, Romance Languages
and Germanic Languages



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DIVISION B—HISTORICAL SCIENCE (*continued*)

DEPARTMENT V—HISTORY OF LANGUAGE

DEPARTMENT V—HISTORY OF LANGUAGE

(Hall 4, September 20, 2 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GEORGE HEMPL, University of Michigan.

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR T. R. LOUNSBURY, Yale University.

PRESIDENT BENJAMIN IDE WHEELER, University of California.

THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS AND METHODS OF THE HISTORY OF LANGUAGE

BY THOMAS RAYNESFORD LOUNSBURY

Thomas Raynesford Lounsbury, Professor of English, Yale University. b. January 1, 1838, Ovid, New York. A.B. Yale College, 1859; LL.D. *ibid.* 1892; *ibid.* Harvard College, 1893; L.H.D. Lafayette, 1895; *ibid.* Princeton, 1896. Instructor in English, Sheffield Scientific School, Yale University, 1870–71. Edited complete edition of Charles Dudley Warner's Works, with biographical sketch. *Author of Life of James Fenimore Cooper; Studies in Chaucer; History of the English Language; Shakespeare as a Dramatic Artist; Shakespeare and Voltaire; Standard of Pronunciation in English.*

It is only within comparatively recent times that the principles which underlie the development of language have been clearly understood. By those who went before us speech was usually regarded, not as an emanation from us, not as an expression of us, but as something outside of us, a sort of mechanism with which we had to do; which was sometimes good, sometimes bad, but having largely an independent life of its own. Hence it could improve or degenerate without much regard to the character or attainments of those who spoke it. All that it behoved these to do was to improve it, and so far as that could be done, perfect it. When that happy result was reached care was to be taken that no further changes were to be made in it; but preserved as much as possible unimpaired, be transmitted to posterity, and so continue the length of years it was permitted to live.

For along with this belief existed another. Every language, it was supposed, went through the same sort of experience as the individuals to whom it was a possession. It had its period of birth, of growth, and of maturity. Then followed the inevitable decay. This could be retarded, but it could not be averted. The generally accepted view was expressed by Dr. Johnson in the preface to his dictionary. "Life," he said, "may be lengthened by care, though death cannot be ultimately defeated: tongues, like governments, have a natural

tendency to degeneration; we have long preserved our constitution: let us make some struggles for our language."

Undoubtedly traces of this belief still linger among us: but in general it meets no longer with acceptance. We have come to feel, even when we have not come to know, that language has no independent life outside of the life of those who speak it. Their spirit it expresses, their hopes and aspirations it embodies; and as a consequence it is operated upon by the same influences which affect their action in other ways. It shall be my aim in the present address to point out how it is so thoroughly the reflex of man's nature that even the very agencies which affect the character of its vocabulary and the development of its grammatical structure are essentially like those which determine his conduct and career in other respects. My illustration will naturally be drawn from the speech with which I am most familiar; but parallel illustrations will occur to any one to whom the possession of any cultivated tongue belongs by right of birth.

Language is constantly acted upon by numerous influences, all of which are diverse and some of which are not only different but actually hostile. Speech is really a compromise between opposing tendencies in the minds of its users. The peculiar character it exhibits in any given case is a result that has been brought about by these various agencies. The time is too short to treat the subject with exhaustive detail. Here it may be sufficient to give a general idea of its nature by setting forth two or three of these conflicting agencies which are always operating upon the users of speech, whether educated or illiterate, and affect unconsciously their methods of utterance. Then we shall be in a position to consider with more advantage the broad distinctions which prevail between the development of cultivated and uncultivated tongues.

The first, to which I call attention, of these contradictory tendencies that are always manifesting themselves in speech, is the disposition to practice economy of utterance and the antagonistic disposition to indulge in prodigality of utterance. By the former I am not referring to orthœpy, where its effects have been most frequently noted, tending as they do to induce the speaker to spend as little time as possible in the pronunciation of words, and as a result of this economy of effort, modifying their form. It is the material itself of language, the words as they are weaved into the sentence, that comes here under consideration. The one aim that the user of speech has constantly in mind is to express himself as briefly as possible consistent with easy and full comprehension. This is a feeling which affects all men in every conceivable stage of intellectual development. Grammatically speaking, we are all endeavoring to convey our meaning in any given sentence with the fullest economy of utterance. Mark me, I say grammatically speaking, not rhetorically.

The latter is a personal influence acting upon individuals and not upon the body of speakers as a whole.

This practically universal disposition towards economy of utterance has been one — though doubtless not the principal one — of the agencies which have contributed to the development and diffusion of the sign language. In a rudimentary form this prevails everywhere. We see it exemplified daily in numerous gestures in which the movement of some part of the body indicates to the eye what the lips neglect to put into words. But what concerns us here specifically is the effect of this disposition upon the structure of the sentence. No small number of the rules laid down in our grammars are for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the situation produced by the desire of the users of speech to express what they have to say with the least expenditure of effort. Take as one illustration out of many the grammatical construction called apposition. It is called into being for no other purpose than to explain a practice of omitting words for the sake of economy of utterance, which has established itself so generally that it has come to seem normal. Hence we never take into account the fact that it denotes nothing more than the abridgment of a complete dependent phrase. This is but a single fact out of the multitude of facts of this sort which the student of the grammar of every tongue meets on every side. In going through the process we call parsing we are constantly under the necessity of declaring some word to be understood. Its presence is not required for comprehension; but grammar requires it for the explanation of the construction. Language abounds in these short cuts to expression. Every tongue has peculiarities of its own in this respect which other tongues, at least some other tongues, will not tolerate at all. We have a striking illustration of this in English in the constant omission of the relative. In such a sentence as "The man you saw yesterday came to-day," no one, whether speaking or hearing, feels the absence of the pronoun. It is only when we set out to analyze the sentence grammatically that we recognize the need of dragging into light the suppressed relative. This is a usage to which many languages cannot resort; but there is probably not a language on the globe in which a single word is not made to do often the duty of a whole sentence.

But there is another side of the shield. We find a force at work which impels men not to economize effort, but to put it forth in profusion. They are not content with the fewest words or abridged constructions in order to make themselves understood. They amplify, they vary, they employ expressions which abstractly may seem unnecessary. Here again I am not referring to the expansion of the thought in the way of adorning it or illustrating it, which belongs to the domain of rhetoric and not of linguistics proper. But the reason

for the course indicated as being followed is that the user of speech often feels that with the words sufficient to make his meaning comprehended, it may not after all be fully comprehended. He seeks therefore to add to its clearness by the addition of terms and phrases which will not leave the hearer or reader in the slightest doubt. Hence always has come and always will continue to come into speech an army of expressions which we group under the general names of expletives and redundances. These often cause great grief to the grammarian; but the user of speech cannot be deterred from employing them because he recognizes that the first aim of his utterance is to be distinctly understood. These expressions, in consequence, are not really expletives and redundances. So they might be deemed, were men always in a state of mental alertness, so that nothing whatever escapes their attention. But unfortunately the human mind is apt to be inattentive. It often misses the sense, which in theory has been sufficiently expressed to be conveyed fully. Therefore in every tongue and at all periods men resort to strictly superfluous words and expressions to prevent their meaning being missed or overlooked. As one illustration out of scores, take in our own tongue the placing of the preposition *from* before the adverbs *hence*, *thence*, and *whence*. From the fourteenth century to the present day it has been so employed constantly by the best speakers and writers. Strictly speaking, the preposition is unnecessary. There are places, indeed, where its introduction could be deemed no other than an impertinence. There are other places where it adds distinctly to the ease of comprehension.

Nor is clearness the only thing aimed at by the users of speech in the employment of what from one point of view is superfluous. There is equally the desire to impart force to expression. Examples of this abound on every side. "Forever and ever" is a phrase that theoretically conveys no more meaning than the simple "forever"; but it makes more of an impression upon the mind. Linguistically, not morally, the desire to strengthen the expression is the justification of the vast variety of expletives which make up the vocabulary of profanity. When the practice of it is frequent, it defeats its own end; but when sparingly indulged in, especially in situations where great interests are at stake, it conveys an intensity of meaning that the mere words, though carrying the full sense, do not even remotely suggest.

Let us now proceed to the consideration of two other opposing agencies, always operating upon language, which more especially affect the inflectional system. They might be called the principles of unity and diversity; but as these words are susceptible of being misunderstood, I shall call them, from the paths they mainly adopt, the principles of analogy and authority. In the matter of inflection

there always prevails a disposition in the users of speech to reduce everything to a common procedure. A certain form is not only in use, but it is in far the most common use. The principle of analogy at once asserts itself, for it appeals to every speaker. As most of certain classes of words follow one particular inflection, why not make them all assume it? The tendency manifests itself to have the leading form grow at the expense of the others, and to discard from use all forms which are different from it or in conflict with it. It does not often meet with absolute success, to be sure, but it frequently meets with great success; and the effort to make its success complete never ceases. There is no better illustration of this than the history of the declension of the noun in English. When we first come to the knowledge of our tongue during the Anglo-Saxon period, we find that certain vowel declensions which had once existed had very largely passed away. The comparison of other Teutonic languages reveals what they must have been. The survival of occasional forms leads to the unavoidable inference that there was a time when these declensions were flourishing; indeed, they may have been flourishing at the very time itself in some then existing dialect of which no memorials have been preserved. What these declensions had lost, other declensions had gained, especially the one most predominant. Owing to agencies of which I shall speak later, the process of effacement was temporarily arrested, or at least was largely shorn of its strength. But the moment the restraining power of literature was withdrawn in consequence of the Norman Conquest, the principle of analogy resumed and carried out its work on a grand scale. When English in the fourteenth century emerges with a literature so valuable as to possess an authority of its own, not only have the varying vowel declensions been reduced to the common inflection exhibited by one of them, but even to that has been entirely conformed the single but important consonant declension which had once been in wide use. In the case of this last the process has gone on so steadily that English furnishes to-day but the one word *ox*, with its plural *oxen*, as the single genuine survival in common speech of a declension which embraced at one time about half the nouns of the language.

Powerful as is the influence of analogy in reducing diversities to a common unity, there is in existence an opposing agency which furnishes resistance and at times the sturdiest resistance to this leveling tendency. This, which, for the lack of a better name, I have called the principle of authority, cherishes and strives to retain all variant forms of inflection which are actually in existence and makes a determined stand against any change whatever, whether the change would be for the better or the worse. That which is established has authority simply because it is established. This influence varies distinctly with the intellectual status of the users of speech; but it is

more or less in operation at all times. In cultivated tongues it is exceedingly powerful, if not actually dominant. What it saves from the wreck which has been brought about by the principle of analogy, it clings to earnestly, and indeed will never let go, if it can be avoided. Illustrations of this tendency need not be given here; for they will be exemplified in the part of the subject with which we now come to deal.

These are some of the agencies which are always operating upon the internal life of a language. They are largely responsible for the changes which take place slowly or rapidly in methods of expression. So far as we can discover, they are true of the speech of the most illiterate and degraded races; they are certainly true of those which have attained any degree of intellectual development. This leads us to the next topic, the difference in the agencies which act upon cultivated and uncultivated speech.

It is a mere commonplace to say that every living language constantly undergoes change. It may be little or it may be great; it may go on very slowly or very rapidly. These are the accidents of circumstance. But so long as it has life, it must undergo modification or alteration as do the persons who speak it.

These changes belong generally to two classes, those affecting the vocabulary and those affecting the grammatical structure. Both of these agencies are always in operation; but they operate very differently at different periods and under different conditions. Here arises at once the great distinction which exists between the life and growth of cultivated and uncultivated speech, or perhaps it would be better to say more specifically between speech with a literature and speech without one. The processes that are going on in each are precisely the same. Changes are taking place in each both in grammar and vocabulary; but they manifest themselves in ways essentially distinct and they proceed at entirely different rates of movement. The differences, indeed, are so marked that they may be called fundamental. This is not to maintain that there will not be in each class apparent and it may be real exceptions to the rule laid down; it is only the general principle which is here stated.

Now the first point is that in uncultivated speech changes in vocabulary under ordinary conditions take place slowly and on a somewhat petty scale. Very few new words are introduced into the speech, and any extension of meaning in the case of those already existing happens rarely. The reason for this lies on the surface. The users of uncultivated speech are themselves uncultivated. They have comparatively little knowledge and few ideas outside of the range of those which are brought to their attention by their necessities or limited opportunities for observation. Their vocabulary is not ample, to start with, and as time goes on they do not add to it many words.

It is not that any open hostility exists to their adoption. They are not introduced into the speech because they are not needed. The circle of knowledge and of thought being small, the existing stock of terms is amply sufficient to meet all the demands which are made upon it. Consequently the vocabulary suffers little enlargement, and indeed may remain practically stationary for an indefinite period, though it is of course liable to be added to whenever the desire for a new word to express something previously unknown cannot be satisfied by any new meaning which can be attached to an old word or to a combination of old words.

But in the case of the grammatical structure the reverse of this is apt to be true. It is not so necessarily, indeed, but there is no counter-acting agency powerful enough of itself to prevent its being so. The one great object of speech which every man, educated or illiterate, sets always before his eyes is to make himself understood. Now if the speaker in an uncultivated tongue succeeds in effecting this, he has secured all that he cares for. In so doing he may discard old forms, old inflections; or he may unconsciously develop new ones; or he may confuse with one another those which already exist. He may vary his expression essentially from the construction which he himself has been wont to use as well as those he is addressing. But about none of these things does he trouble himself, if he can succeed in making himself comprehended. There is no one to find fault with him; or if such a person could be supposed to exist, the violator of usage does not feel himself under the least obligation to heed the censure he receives. All this implies that in uncultivated speech there is nowhere a standard of authority of any sort which any one feels bound to respect. Consequently changes in grammar are effected easily, if they are effected at all. If outside agencies ever operate upon the users of such a speech, if these are subjected to conquest, if they are brought in frequent contact with the speakers of another tongue, and are under the necessity of communicating with them constantly, modifications of the grammatical structure are likely to take place on a grand scale, though the vocabulary may be affected but slightly. There is no better illustration of this principle than that which has actually happened in the history of our own speech. For more than two hundred years after the Norman Conquest the English added scarcely anything to their stock of words from the language of the men of the race to whom they had become subject, though with them they came into constant contact. On the other hand, during this same period the grammatical structure underwent violent and extensive alteration.

Such are the principles which control the development of unlettered speech. In exceptional circumstances these may undergo modification, and perhaps in some instances reversal; but their

general applicability to the facts of linguistic history cannot well be gainsaid. But the moment a speech comes into the possession of a great literature, this condition of things is changed. The same agencies are at work as in the case of an uncultivated tongue; but they vary distinctly in the influence they exert, and the results in consequence are in striking contrast to those just given.

In cultivated speech addition to the vocabulary goes on extensively, goes on rapidly. Furthermore it goes on with little opposition. The hostility to the introduction of new terms is almost invariably directed against particular words, and in the case of these it is often confined to particular persons. It therefore takes the form of an expression of individual prejudice and not that of general aversion on the part of users of speech. In cultivated speech addition to the vocabulary is in truth a necessity of the situation. The circle of knowledge and thought is constantly enlarging. The new facts learned, the new discoveries made, the new inventions originated, the new ideas entertained, the new distinctions set up, all these demand either the use of old words in new senses or the introduction or formation of new words. The latter is the course most usually followed. It is not, nor is it felt to be objectionable. Men indeed frequently make it a matter of boast that they were the first to hit upon the employment of some term which designates exactly the view of some new fact or theory or condition which all recognize but have found difficult to express. The irruption of a large number of words hitherto unknown into a speech is under the circumstances just mentioned not an indication of the corruption or decay of a language, but an evidence of the intellectual health and vigor of its users. Scores and even hundreds of terms will be proposed for admission which find no permanent lodgment; for speech can ordinarily be trusted to reject that which is really needless, that which adds nothing to clearness or to force of expression; on the other hand, to choose and to hold fast with an instinct which may almost be deemed unerring that which it requires for its best and fullest development.

Consequently in a cultivated tongue the introduction of new words is something that is going on constantly whenever and wherever intellectual life exists. But when to such a tongue comes the consideration of new grammatical forms or constructions, there ensues at once a complete change of front. The attitude, instead of being one of friendliness or acquiescence, is that of violent hostility. The newcomer meets with examination from everybody and with denunciation from many. There is a feeling on the part of the cultivated users of speech that any alteration of grammatical structure cannot be an improvement upon existing usage, as would be conceded by all in the case of the introduction of some new word. Rightly or wrongly the disposition does not prevail to look upon it as a process of evolu-

tion. So far as it goes, it is regarded as revolution, and therefore to be resisted. Accordingly no change can take place in the grammar of a cultivated speech which is not compelled to fight its way to acceptance. It never succeeds without going through a struggle which lasts at least scores of years. If it triumphs, it triumphs because it recommends itself to the users of speech as accomplishing something for expression which had not previously been secured. If once they become thoroughly imbued with that view, vain are the protests of purists and grammarians; for the educated users of speech know better what they want than any or all of their self-constituted instructors.

The reason for this contrast between the attitudes assumed by lettered and unlettered speech is due to a factor which has at all times played an important part in the development of language, but with the wide diffusion of education in modern times is destined to play one still more important. This is the creation of literature. Its existence in any tongue tends immediately to weaken or overthrow entirely other influences which have been operating upon the speech. Few even among scholars have learned to appreciate fully the conservative influence which literature exerts over language. Men used to take the ground that speech was always moving away from its sources; that the longer a tongue continued to live, the more increasingly difficult of comprehension became its earlier form to its later speakers. There is, or at least there may be, a great deal of truth in this view so long as we confine our attention to tongues which can boast of no literary monuments of excellence. It becomes absolutely false, however, after a great literature has been created and has become widely diffused. If the speech then undergoes changes on any great scale, that result will be owing to outside influences and not to any which belong to its own natural development.

Yet this belief about the steady recession of speech from its sources has lasted long after any reason for it has disappeared. Even to-day it can be heard occasionally expressed. It is therefore not surprising to find it once widely prevalent. By the great authors of the time of Queen Anne and the first Georges dismal forebodings were universally entertained and frequently uttered as to the ruin which was to overtake their own writings, in consequence of the changes constantly going on in English speech. Their works, they complained, could not hope to outlast a century, unless the language became what they called fixed, and they were in perpetual distress of mind because some person or some organization could not be induced to undertake and accomplish that impossible feat.

The fact which these men did not perceive at all, and which is none too clearly comprehended now, is that the moment a great literature has been established, the language revolves about it, and,

so long as a healthy national life exists, never moves far away from it. The great authors are read and studied everywhere and at all times. They make familiar to the knowledge of their admirers the words and constructions they employ; and these in turn are reproduced by their imitators. The operation of this influence has been curiously illustrated in the history of our own tongue. To us the language of the Elizabethan age is much nearer than it was to the men of the eighteenth century, mainly because the authors of that earlier age are now much more read. As a result their words and usages have unconsciously become a part of our own intellectual equipment. Very few would be the men found now who would take the view, widely entertained at the beginning of the eighteenth century, that a great deal of Shakespeare's language was not merely archaic but practically obsolete. The numerous imitators of Spenser later in that same century furnished glossaries to their productions, explaining the antiquated or unusual terms they had employed. In some cases this was needed distinctly; for the words they used had never any existence outside of their own pages. But they frequently defined those about whose meaning no man of ordinary education would now entertain a doubt. Even the necessity they seemed to have felt themselves under of explaining the more purely poetic words excites a certain surprise. What poet would think now of apologizing, as did Prior in 1706, for using such obsolete words, as he called them, as *behest* in the carefully defined sense of "command," *band* in that of "army," *I ween* in that of "I think," *prowess* in that of "strength," and *whilom* in that of "heretofore." Some of these very definitions show too that in all cases he did not understand the exact meaning of the word he employed.

But far more than in the vocabulary is the conserving power of literature — especially of a great literature — exhibited in the grammatical structure. The moment it has been in existence long enough to make its influence felt, it at once proceeds to restrict change there within the closest possible limits; or if it permits any to be made with comparative ease, its action is directed in such instances to the selection of one out of two or more forms in common use. Let me illustrate its methods in this particular by a reference to the history of the two conjugations of our tongue. After the Norman Conquest English lost the literature she possessed which had attached to it any authority. Though not entirely disused as a written speech, there existed no standard to which any one felt bound to conform. In consequence a general dissolution of the grammatical structure took place. One of its results was that verbs of the strong conjugation went over to the weak in great numbers. It seemed for a while as if it were merely a question of time when every one of the former would disappear from the language. Analogy was entirely against them. Any new verbs

that came in, and a full half, if not the majority, of the old ones formed their preterite by a syllable usually represented in modern English by *-ed* or *-d*. Why should not this rule be extended to all? This was a feeling that operated constantly upon men before they came into the possession of a literature. So general was the movement, so large were the losses of the strong conjugation, that this early transition has imposed upon the men of later times. There were not wanting in the nineteenth century linguistic scholars of considerable eminence who gravely announced that the strong conjugation was destined to disappear from English speech. As a matter of fact, the moment that literature had been widely enough diffused to exert its full influence, the transition of verbs of the strong conjugation to the weak ceased entirely. Not an instance can be pointed out where a single one of these verbs has gone over since the reign of Queen Elizabeth. Not the least sign of any movement of this nature manifests itself now. On the contrary, the tendency is, if anything, in the reverse direction.

But literature does not content itself with merely arresting change which is going on in grammatical forms. It presents a hostile attitude to anything which takes the shape of grammatical innovation. That which already exists has been found sufficient by the great writers of the past to do all that is required for expression. What then can be the need of new forms, of new constructions, of which they, far greater than we, did not feel the lack? To add anything whatever seems therefore of the nature of an attempt to paint the lily. This is the reason why every effort of the nature of innovation meets, in the case of the grammatical structure, with hostility so general and with denunciation so violent. It is the exhortation of literature to stand fast by the ancient ways.

But the users of speech are always striving for greater clearness and force of expression. If the existing forms and constructions do not exactly meet their requirements, they will cast about for ways to secure what they are aiming at. Let me illustrate this principle by a further example from our speech. For a long period modern English suffered from the lack of a distinct form for the passive which would apply to all verbs. The inflection in common use was made up of the substantive verb with the past participle of another verb. This worked very well in many cases, especially so in the case of words which denoted a continuous action or state of mind. The phrase, "the man is loved or is hated," conveys adequately the sense of the speaker when he is referring to the present time. But when the word employed itself denoted a single act, the form just mentioned meant an action fully completed and not one in process of going on. It was really something past which was indicated and not anything present. The phrase "the man is killed" could not possibly suggest the idea

that the subject of the verb was merely in danger of death; it meant that he was actually dead. The form therefore, as applicable to all verbs, broke down.

There is hardly anything more interesting in the history of our speech than the various devices to which speakers and writers resorted to get round the difficulty the construction of the passive presented, the efforts they put forth to contrive something which would be of universal applicability. The various attempts made give us a peculiarly vivid conception of the infinite pains that are taken in speech, often unconsciously, to render expression clear. All of these efforts were for a long time unsatisfactory. They involved a change of construction or a change of the form of the sentence or they were made ineffective by the clumsiness of circumlocution. At last a way was opened. A construction already existed in the speech which, though fully authorized, belonged in its origin to the class of so-called corruptions. To certain verbs, but especially to the substantive verb, a verbal noun preceded by the preposition *on* or *in* had been added to complete the sense, as, for instance, "he was gone on hunting." The form of the connecting preposition was in the first place corrupted into *a*; finally it was dropped altogether. This caused the verbal noun, when joined to the substantive verb, to be regarded not as a noun, but as the present participle; but a present participle, not in its usual active signification, but in the sense of a passive. Hence arose such expressions as "the dinner is preparing," "the house is building." In these the verb is active in form but passive in meaning. But the goal could not be reached in this way. The form suffered from exactly the same embarrassment which attended the ordinary one with the past participle. Satisfactory with certain verbs, it could not be used with all. The moment an object with life was introduced as the subject, the passive sense disappeared. When we hear it said that "a man is eating," we think of him as the doer of an action and not the object of one. It does not occur to us that he himself is undergoing mastication from others. Here, too, in consequence the form broke down. It was to remedy this condition of things that the verb *to be* was at last united with the compound past participle. This passive form conveyed an unmistakable meaning, and if desired could be applied to any verb whatever. When we are told, to use the previous illustration, that "a man is being eaten," there is not the slightest doubt in the mind of any one as to what is actually taking place.

This particular form first began to be distinctly noticeable towards the end of the eighteenth century. For a while, however, it attracted but little attention. But no sooner did the sentinels who profess to watch over the purity of speech have their attention called to it, than a violent outcry at once arose. Few at the present day have any

conception of the clamor to which this new grammatical form gave rise during the early and middle part of the nineteenth century, and of the denunciation to which it was subjected. According to its assailants its introduction and use was a distinct foreshadowing of the ruin that was impending over the speech. Direful consequences were predicted if the objectionable form should succeed in establishing itself in the language. But the construction was too desirable an acquisition to be allowed to disappear. Its usefulness prevailed over all opposition, and at present it is fully accepted, or meets at least only now and then with a protest from some belated survivor of the conflict which once raged so violently.

It must not be forgotten, however, that the hostility to the introduction of new grammatical forms, though sometimes manifesting itself absurdly, is an undeniably healthy hostility. So long as it continues, the speech can be trusted to remain steadfast to its moorings. It is the existence of this feeling which keeps a language moving not from but about its literature. The vocabulary can be increased almost indefinitely without affecting the character or intelligibility of the tongue which retains in familiar use the words employed by its greatest writers. But the moment its grammatical construction undergoes a violent upheaval, that moment the language is on the road to decay and death. For additions there, unlike those made to the vocabulary, do not range themselves alongside of the ones already in use, or usurp at best merely a part of the domain of signification. A new grammatical form is not long content with standing side by side with an old one. It first displaces it from its supremacy, and then supersedes it altogether: and this means in process of time a complete change in the character of the tongue.

From the hasty consideration which has been given here of the characteristics which attend the development of cultivated speech, we are enabled to draw certain positive conclusions. A language cannot be made either to improve or degenerate of itself. It is nothing but the reflex of the spirit and aims of the men who employ it, and it will rise or fall in accordance with their intellectual and moral condition. Its continued existence, therefore, depends solely upon the fact whether the men to whom it is an inheritance are cultivated enough to enrich its literature, virtuous enough to elevate and maintain its character, and strong enough to uphold and extend its sway. All these conditions are necessary to its permanence, but in modern times the last has attained an importance it never before held. The most insignificant of tongues has, it is true, tremendous vitality: it will cling to life long after the most conclusive reasons have manifested themselves for its death. Yet it is a question whether under modern conditions any language can be sure of continued existence which does not have behind it the support of a great nationality. It is

a question whether the languages of smaller peoples will not recede before the encroachments of their powerful neighbors, just as dialects steadily tend to disappear before the advance of the literary speech.

At all events the danger which once threatened cultivated languages from the limitation of the knowledge of their literature to a comparatively small number of men, has largely disappeared with the invention of printing and the diffusion of education which increasingly reaches every one in the community, the low as well as the high. Forecasts about the future of any speech and its permanence must therefore now be made subject to conditions which never before prevailed. The one thing only, which has been indicated, can be relied upon with certainty. The continuance of any language rests upon the ability, upon the character, upon the strength of the men to whom it belongs. Its literature may be its glory. It may be a source of just pride to the race which has created it or has inherited it. But however rich and varied it be, it cannot of itself preserve its life, though it may retard its death and hallow its memory. No tongue can depend for its continuance upon the achievements of its past. It can exhibit no more than the vigor, the purity, and the vitality of the men who speak it now, or are to speak it hereafter: and if their vigor, their purity, and their vitality disappear, the language as a living speech will not survive their decay.



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THE PROGRESS OF THE HISTORY OF LANGUAGE DURING THE LAST CENTURY

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It cannot be the purpose of this brief address to present even in outline a history of the science of language in the century past; it can undertake only to set forth the chief motives and directions of its development.

A hundred years ago this year Friedrich von Schlegel was in Paris studying Persian and the mysterious, new-found Sanskrit; Franz Bopp was a thirteen-year-old student in the gymnasium at Aschaffenburg; Jakob Grimm was studying law in the University of Marburg. And yet these three were to be the men who should find the paths by which the study of human speech might escape from its age-long wanderings in a wilderness without track or cairn or clue, and issue forth upon oriented highways as a veritable science.

Schlegel the Romanticist, who had peered into Sanskrit literature in the interest of the fantastic humanism modish in his day, happened to demonstrate (*Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Inder*, 1808) beyond cavil the existence of a genetic relationship between the chief members of what we now know as the Indo-European family of languages. Bopp¹ found a way to utilize this demonstrated fact in a quest which, though now recognized as mostly vain, incidentally set in operation the mechanism of comparative grammar. Grimm,² under the promptings of a national enthusiasm, sought after the sources of the German national life, and, finding in language as in lore the roots of the present deep planted in the past, laid the foundations and set forth the method of historical grammar. The grafting of comparative grammar upon the stock of historical grammar gave it wider range and yielded the scientific grammar of the nineteenth century. The method of comparative grammar is merely auxiliary to historical

¹ First work: *Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache*, 1816.

² *Deutsche Grammatik*, vol. 1 (1819).

grammar; it establishes determinations of fact far behind the point of earliest record, and enables historical grammar to push its lines of descent in the form of "dotted lines" far back into the unwritten past.

It was the discovery of Sanskrit to the attention and use of European scholars at the close of the eighteenth century that gave occasion to an effective use of the comparative method and a consequent establishment of a veritable comparative grammar. But in two other distinct ways it exercised a notable influence upon the study of language. First, it offered to observation a language whose structure yielded itself readily to analysis in terms of the adaptation of its formal mechanism to the expression of modifications of thought, and thus gave an encouragement to the dissection of words in the interest of tracing the principles of their formation. Second, the Hindoo national grammar itself presented to Western scholars an illustration of accuracy and completeness in collecting, codifying, and reporting the facts of a language, especially such as related to phonology, inflection, and word-formation, that involved the necessity of a complete revolution in the whole attitude of grammatical procedure. The discovery of Pāṇini and the Prātiçākhyas meant far more to the science of language than the discovery of the Vedas. The grammar of the Greeks had marked a path so clear, and established a tradition so strong, guaranteed in a prestige so high, that the linguistics of the West through all the generations faithfully abode in the way. The grammatical categories once taught and established became the irrefragable moulds of grammatical thought, and constituted a system so complete in its enslaving power that if any man ever suspected himself in bondage he was yet unable to identify his bonds.

The Greeks had addressed themselves to linguistic reflection in connection with their study of the content and the forms of thought; grammar arose as the handmaiden of philosophy. They assumed, without consciously and expressly formulating it as a doctrine, that language is the inseparable shadow of thought, and therefore proceeded without more ado to find in its structure and parts replicas of the substances and moulds of thought. They sought among the facts of language for illustrations of theories; it did not occur to them to collect the facts and organize them to yield their own doctrine. Two distinct practical uses finally brought the chief materials of rules and principles to formulation in the guise of a system of descriptive grammar: first, the interpretation of Homer and the establishment of a correct text; second, the teaching of Greek to aliens, and the establishment of a standard by which to teach. These practical uses came in, however, rather as fortunate opportunities for practical application of an established discipline than as the motives to its creation. With the Hindoos it was the direct reverse. They had a

sacred language and sacred texts rescued from earlier days by means of oral tradition. The meaning of the texts had grown hazy, but the word was holy, and even though it remained but an empty shell to human understanding, it was pleasing to the gods and had served its purpose through the generations to bring gods and men into accord, and must be preserved; likewise the language of ritual and comment thereon, which, as the possession of a limited class, required not only to be protected from overwhelming beneath the floods of the vernacular, but demanded to be extended to the use of wider circles in the dominant castes. Sanskrit had already become a moribund or semi-artificial language before grammar laid hold upon it to continue and extend it. But from the outstart the Hindoo grammarian sat humbly at the feet of language to learn of it, and never assumed to be its master or its guide. Inasmuch as the language had existed and been perpetuated primarily as a thing of the living voice and not of ink and paper, and had been used to reach the ears rather than the eyes of the divine, it followed, in a measure remotely true of no other grammatical endeavor, that the Hindoo grammar was compelled to devote itself to the most exactly accurate report upon the sounds of the language. The niceties of phonetic discrimination represented in the alphabet itself, the refinements of observation involved in the reports on accent and the phenomenon of *pluti*, the formulation of the principles of sentence phonetics in the rules of *sandhi*, the observation on the physiology of speech scattered through the *Prāti-cākhyas* are all brilliant illustrations of the Hindoo's direct approach to the real substance of living speech. None of the national systems of grammar, the Chinese, the Egyptian, the Assyrian, the Greek, or the Arabic, had anything to show remotely comparable to this; and up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, despite all the long endeavors expended on Greek and Hebrew and Latin, nothing remotely like it had been known to the Western world. The Greek grammarians had really never stormed the barriers of written language; they were mostly concerned with establishing and teaching literary forms of the language. Even when they dealt with the dialects, they had the standardized literary types thereof before their eyes rather than the spoken forms ringing in their ears. When the grammars of Colebrooke (1805), of Carey (1806), and of Wilkins (1808) opened the knowledge of Sanskrit to European scholars, it involved nothing short of a grammatical revelation, and prepared the way for an ultimate remodeling of language-study nothing short of a revolution. Though these Hindoo lessons in accurate phonetics as the basis of sure knowledge and safe procedure had their immediate and unmistakable influence upon the scientific work of the first half century, their ¹ full acceptance tarried until the second half was well

¹ Cf. H. Oertel, *Lectures on the Study of Language*, p. 30 ff. (1901).

on its way. Even Jakob Grimm, whose service in promoting the historical study of phonology must be rated with the highest, was still so blind to the necessity of phonetics as to express the view that historical grammar could be excused from much attention to the "bunte wirrwar mundartlicher lautverhältnisse," and though von Raumer in his *Die Aspiration und die Lautverschiebung* (1837) had not only set forth in all clearness the theoretical necessity of a phonetic basis, but had given practical illustration thereof in the material with which he was dealing, it still was possible as late as 1868 for Scherer in his *Geschichte der deutschen Sprache* justly to deplore that "only rarely is a philologist found who is willing to enter upon phonetic discussion." The phonetic treatises of Brücke¹ (1849 and 1866) and of Merkel (1856 and 1866)² failed, though excellent of their kind, to bring the subject within the range of philological interest, and it remained for Eduard Sievers in his *Grundzüge der Lautphysiologie* (1876) and *Grundzüge der Phonetik* (1881), by stating phonetics more in terms of phonology, to bridge the gap and establish phonetics as a constituent and fundamental portion of the science of language. The radical change of character assumed by the science in the last quarter of the century is due as much to the consummation of this union as to any one influence.

But it was not phonetics alone that the Indian grammarians were able to teach to the West; they had developed, in their processes of identifying the roots of words, a scientific phonology that was all but an historical phonology. In some of its applications it was that already, for in explaining the relations to each other of various forms of a given root as employed in different words, even though the explanation was intended to serve the purposes of word-analysis and not of sound-history, the grammarians virtually formulated in repeated instances what we now know as "phonetic laws." The recognition of *guṇa* and *vṛddhi*, which antedates *Pāṇini*, must rank as one of the most brilliant inductive discoveries in the history of linguistic science. The theory involved became the basis of the treatment of the Indo-European vocalism. The first thorough-going formulation, that of Schleicher in his *Compendium* (1861), was conceived entirely in the Hindoo sense, and it was to the opportunity which this formulation offered of overseeing the material and the problems involved that we owe the brilliant series of investigations by Georg Curtius (*Spaltung des a-Lautes*, 1864), Amelung³ (1871,

¹ E. Brücke, *Untersuchungen über die Lautbildung und das natürliche System der Sprachlaute* (1849); *Grundzüge der Physiologie und Systematik der Sprachlaute* (1856).

² C. L. Merkel, *Anatomie und Physiologie des menschlichen Stimm- und Sprachorgans* (1856); *Physiologie der menschlichen Sprache* (1866).

³ A. Amelung, *Die Bildung der Tempusstämme durch Vocalsteigerung im Deutschen*, Berlin, 1871. *Erwiderung*, KZ. xxii, 361 ff., completed July, 1873, published 1874 after the author's death. *Der Ursprung der deutschen a-vocale*, Haupt's Zeitschr. xviii, 161 ff., 1875.

1873, 1875), Osthoff (*N-Deklination*, 1876), Brugmann (*Nasalis sonans*, 1876; *Geschichte der stammabstufenden Declination*, 1876), Collitz (*Ueber die Annahme mehrerer grundsprachlichen a-laute*, 1878), Joh. Schmidt (*Zwei arische a-laute*, 1879), which led up step by step steadily and unerringly to the definite proof that the Indo-European vocalism was to be understood in terms of the Greek rather than the Sanskrit. These articles, written in the period of intensest creative activity the science has known, represent in the cases of four of the scholars mentioned, namely, Curtius, Amelung, Brugmann, Collitz, the masterpieces of the scientific life of each. Though dealing with a single problem, they combined, both through the results they achieved and the method and outlook they embodied, to give character and direction to the science of the next quarter-century. Karl Verner's famous article, *Eine Ausnahme der ersten Lautverschiebung* (KZ. xxiii, 97 ff., July, 1875), which proved of great importance, among other things, in establishing a connection between Indo-European ablaut and accent, belongs to this period; and Brugmann's article, *Nasalis Sonans*, which served more than any other work to clear the way for the now prevailing view of ablaut, was influenced by Verner's article, which was by a few months its predecessor. Both articles, it is worthy of noting, were distinctly influenced by the new phonetic; Verner's, it would appear chiefly by Brücke, Brugmann's, through a suggestion of Osthoff's, by Sievers, whose *Lautphysiologie* had just appeared within the same year. The full effect upon Western science of the introduction of the Indian attitude toward language-study appears therefore to have been realized only with the last quarter of the century.

More prompt than the response of European science to the teachings of Hindoo phonetics and phonology had been the acceptance of the Hindoo procedure in word-analysis, especially with relation to suffixes and inflectional endings. The centuries of study of Greek and Latin had yielded no clue to any classification or assorting of this material according to meaning or function. The medieval explanation of *dominicus* as *domini custos* was as good as any. Besnier in his essay, *La science des Etymologies* (1694), counted it the mark of a sound etymologist that he restrict his attention to the roots of words, for to bother with the other parts would be "useless and ludicrous." And when Horne Tooke in the *Diversions of Purley*, II, 429 (1786-1805), just before the sunrise, wrote the startling words, "All those common terminations in any language . . . are themselves separate words with distinct meanings," and (II, 454) "Adjectives with such terminations (that is, *-ly*, *-ous*, *-ful*, *-some*, *-ish*, etc.) are, in truth, all compound words"; and when he flung out like a challenge the analysis of Latin *ibo*, "I shall go," as three letters containing three words, namely, *i* "go," *b* (= *βούλωμαι*) "will," *o* (= *ego*) "I," no one seems to

have been near enough to the need of such instruction to know whether or not he was to be taken seriously; for the words bore no fruit, and only years afterward when Bopp's doctrine had been recognized were they disinterred as antiquarian curiosities. Eleven years later, in the full light of the Sanskrit grammar, Bopp published his *Conjugationssystem*, and the clue had been found. To be sure Bopp was misguided in his belief that he could identify each element of a word-ending with a significant word, and assign to it a distinct meaning, but he had found the key to an analysis having definite historical value and permitting the identification of such entities as mode-sign, tense-sign, personal endings, etc. The erroneous portion of his doctrine based upon his conception of the Indo-European as an agglutinative type of speech dragged itself as an incumbrance through the first half-century of the science, and, though gasping, still lived in the second edition of Curtius's *Verbum* (1877). This, along with many other mechanical monstrosities of its kind, was gradually banished from the linguistic arena by the saner views of the life-habits of language, which had their rise from linguistic psychology as a study of the relations of language to the hearing as well as speaking individual and the relations of the individual to the speech community, and which asserted themselves with full power in the seventies. We shall have occasion to return to this subject later.

Bopp had from the beginning devoted himself to language-study, not as an end in itself, but as we know from his teacher and sponsor Windischmann,¹ as well as infer from the direction and spirit of his work, he hoped to be able "in this way to penetrate into the mysteries of the human mind and learn something of its nature and its laws." He was therefore unmistakably of the school of the Greeks, not of the Hindoos; for the Greek grammarian in facing language asks the question "why," grammar being to him philosophy, whereas the Hindoo asks the question, "what," grammar being to him a science after the manner of what we call the "natural sciences." There is indeed but slight reason for the common practice of dating the beginning of the modern science of language with Bopp, aside from the one simple result of his activity, which must in strict logic be treated as merely incidental thereto, namely, that he gave a practical illustration of the possibility of applying the comparative method for widening the scope and enriching the results of historical grammar.

As Bopp had tried to use the comparative method in determining the true and original meanings of the formative elements, so did his later contemporary, August Friedrich Pott² (1802-87), undertake to use it in finding out the original meaning of words. The search for

¹ Introduction to Bopp's *Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache*, p. 4, 1816.

² A. F. Pott, *Etymologische Forschungen*, 2 vols. Lemgo, 1833-36; 2d ed. 6 vols. 1859-76.

the etymology or real meaning of words had been a favorite and mostly bootless exercise of all European grammarians from the Greek philosophers down, having its original animus and more or less confessedly its continuing power in the broadly human, though barely on occasion half-formulated conviction, that words and their values by some mysterious tie naturally belong to each other. In the instinct to begin his task Pott was still with the traditions of the Greeks and the Græco-Europeans, but in developing it he was guided into new paths by two forces that had arisen since the century opened. Under the guidance of the comparative method whereby the vocabularies of demonstrably cognate languages now assumed a determinate relation to each other, he came unavoidably to the recognition of certain normal correspondences of sounds between the different tongues. On the other hand, in almost entire independence hereof, Jakob Grimm in the pursuit of his historical method had formulated the regularities of the mutation of consonants in the Teutonic dialects, and had set them forth in a second edition of the first volume of his grammar, appearing in 1822. In all this was contained a strong encouragement as well as warning to apply these new definite tests to every etymological postulate, and therewith arose, under Pott's hands, the beginnings of a scientific etymology. It was a first promise of deliverance from a long wilderness of caprice.

The positivistic attitude which had been gradually infused into language-study under the influence of the Hindoo grammar finally reached its extremest expression in the works of August Schleicher (1821-68). The science of language he treated under the guise of a natural science. Language appeared as isolated from the speaking individual or the speaking community to an extent unparalleled in any of his predecessors or successors, and was viewed as an organism having a life of its own and laws of growth or decline within itself. Following the analogies of the natural sciences and trusting to the inferred laws of growth, he ventured to reconstruct from the scattered data of the cognate Indo-European languages the visible form of the mother speech. His confidence in the character of language as a natural growth made him the first great systematizer and organizer of the materials of Indo-European comparative grammar (*Compendium der vergleichenden Grammatik*, 1861); as confidence in the unerring uniformity of the action of the laws of sound made Karl Brugmann the second (*Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik*, 1886-92).

It is not by accident that the first one to voice outright the dogma of the absoluteness (*Ausnahmslosigkeit*) of the laws of sound was a pupil of Schleicher, August Leskien (*Die Declination in Slavisch-litauischen und Germanischen*, xxviii, 1876). The use of this dogma as a norm and test in the hands of a signally active and gifted body

of scholars who followed the leadership of Leskien and were known under the title of the *Leipziger Schule* or the *Junggrammatiker*, and the adherence to it in practice of many others who did not accept the theory involved, — a use which was undoubtedly greatly stimulated by Verner's discovery (1875) that a great body of supposed exceptions to Grimm's law were in reality obedient to law — gave to the science in the two following decades not only an abundance of results, but an objectivity of attitude and procedure and a firmness of structure that may fairly be said to represent the consummation of that positivist tendency which we have sought to identify with the influence of Hindoo grammar.

This movement, however, derived its impulse by no means exclusively through Schleicher. A new stream had meanwhile blended its waters with the current. The psychology of language as a study of the relations of language to the speaking individual, that is, of the conditions under which language is received, retained, and reproduced, and of the relations of the individual to his speech community, had been brought into play preëminently through the labors of Heymann Steinthal,¹ who though as a psychologist, a follower of Herbart, must be felt to represent in general as a linguist the attitude toward language-study first established by Wilhelm v. Humboldt. William D. Whitney shows in his writings on general linguistics the influence of Steinthal, as well as good schooling in the grammar of the Hindoos and much good common sense. His lectures on Language and the Study of Language (1867) and the Life and Growth of Language (1875) helped chase many a goblin from the sky. Scherer's *Geschichte der deutschen Sprache* (1868) combined, more than any book of its day, the influences of new lines of endeavor, and especially gave hearing to the new work in the psychology as well as the physiology of speech. To this period (1865-80), under the influence of the combination of the psychological with the physiological point of view, belongs the establishment of scientific common sense in the treatment of language. By virtue of this, as it were, binocular vision, language was thrown up into relief, isolated, and objectivised as it had never been before. Old half-mystical notions, such as the belief in a period of upbuilding in language and a period of decay, all savoring of Hegel, and the consequent fallacy that ancient languages display a keener speech-consciousness than the modern, speedily faded away. The centre of interest transferred itself from ancient and written types of speech to the modern and living. Men came to see that vivi-

¹ H. Steinthal, *Der Urprung der Sprache, im Zusammenhang mit den letzten Fragen alles Wissens*, 1851; *Charakteristik der hauptsächlichsten Typen des Sprachbaues*, 1860; *Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, 1881; *Gesch. der Sprachw. bei den Griechen und Römern*, 1863; 1890-91. Also editor with Lazarus of the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, from 1859.

section rather than morbid anatomy must supply the methods and spirit of linguistic research. The germs of a new idea affecting the conditions under which cognate languages may be supposed to have differentiated out of a mother speech, and conceived in terms of the observed relations of dialects to language, were infused by Johannes Schmidt's *Verwandschafts-verhältnisse der indogerman. Sprachen* (1872). The rigid formulas of Schleicher's *Stammbaum* melted away before Schmidt's *Wellentheorie* and its line of successors down to the destructive theories of Kretschmer's *Einleitung in die Geschichte der griech. Sprache* (1896). Herein, as in many another movement of the period, we trace the results of applying the lessons of living languages to the understanding of the old. A remarkable document thoroughly indicative of what was moving in the spirit of the times was the Introduction to Osthoff and Brugmann's *Morphologische Untersuchungen*, vol. I (1878). But the gospel of the period, and its theology, for that matter, was most effectively set forth in Hermann Paul's *Principien der Sprachgeschichte* (1st ed. 1880), a work that has had more influence upon the science than any since Jakob Grimm's *Deutsche Grammatik*. Paul was the real successor of Steinthal. He also represented the strictest sect of the positivists in historical grammar. As a consequence of the union in Paul of the two tendencies, his work acquires its high significance. He established the reaction from Schleicher's treatment of language-science as a natural science; he showed it to be beyond peradventure one of the social sciences, and set forth the life conditions of language as a socio-historical product.

The work of the period dominated by Paul and the neo-grammarians, as well as the theories of method proclaimed, shows, however, that the two factors just referred to had not reached in the scientific thought and practice of the day a perfect blending. A well-known book of Osthoff's bears the title *Das physiologische und psychologische Moment in der sprachlichen Formenbildung* (1879). The title is symptomatic of the times. The physiological and the psychological were treated as two rival interests vying for the control of language. What did not conform to the phonetic laws, in case it were not a phenomenon of mixture, was to be explained if possible as due to analogy. This dualism could be expected to be but a temporary device, like the setting up of Satan over against God, in order to account for the existence of sin. A temporary device it has proved itself to be. The close of the first century of the modern science of language is tending toward a unitary conception of the various forms of historical change in language. The process by which the language of the individual adjusts itself to the community speech differs in kind no whit from that by which dialect yields to the standard language of the larger community. The process by which the products of form-association

or analogy establish themselves in language¹ differs no whit in kind from that by which new pronunciations of words, that is, new sounds, make their way to general acceptance. The process by which loan-elements from an alien tongue adjust themselves to use in a given language differs psychologically and fundamentally no whit from either of the four processes mentioned. In fact, they all, all five, are phenomena of "mixture in language."² The process, furthermore, by which a sound-change in one word tends to spread from word to word and displace the old throughout the entire vocabulary of the language is also a process of "mixture,"³ and depends for its momentum in last analysis upon a proportionate analogy after the same essential model as that by which an added sound or a suffix is carried by analogy from word to word. All the movements of historical change in language respond to the social motive; they all represent in some form the absorption of the individual into the community mass. It has therewith become evident that there is nothing physiological in language that is not psychologically conditioned and controlled. So then it appears that the modern science of language has fairly shaken itself free again from the natural sciences and from such influences of their method and analogies as were intruded upon it by Schleicher and his period (1860-80), and after a century of groping and experiment has definitely oriented and found itself as a social science dealing with an institution which represents more intimately and exactly than any other the total life of man in the historically determined society of men.

Within the history of the science of language the beginning of the nineteenth century establishes beyond doubt a most important frontier. To appreciate how sharp is the contrast between hither and yonder we have only to turn to any part or phase of the work yonder, — the derivation of Latin from Greek, or mayhap to be most utterly scientific, from the Æolic dialect of Greek, the sage libration of the claims of Dutch as against Hebrew to be the original language of mankind, the bondage to the forms of Greek and Latin grammar, as

¹ Gustaf E. Karsten, *The Psychological Basis of Phonetic Law and Analogy*, Public. Mod. Lang. Assoc. ix, 312 ff. (1894), first sought a unitary psychological statement for the two impulses. We are here, however, speaking of the establishment of the results of the impulses in linguistic use.

² See O. Bremer, *Deutsche Phonetik*, Vorwort x ff. (1893); B. I. Wheeler, *Causes of Uniformity in Phonetic Change*, Transac. Amer. Philol. Assoc. xxiii, 1 ff. (1901).

³ A point of view involving the recognition of a more recondite form of speech-mixture is that first suggested by G. I. Ascoli (*Sprachwissenschaftliche Briefe*, pp. 17 ff. 1881-86; trsl. 1887), whereby the initiation of phonetic and syntactical changes in language, and ultimately the differentiation of dialects and even of languages, may assume relation to languages of the substratum, as they may be termed, that is, prior and disused languages of peoples or tribes who have through the fate of conquest or assimilation been absorbed into another speech community. Notably has this point of view been urged by H. Hirt (*Indog. Forschungen*, iv 36 ff. 1894) and by Wechsler (*Giebt es Lautgesetze*, pp. 99 ff.). With this point of view the science of language will have largely to deal, we are persuaded, in the second century of its existence.

well as to the traditional point of view of the philosophical grammar of the Greeks, the subordination of grammar to logic, the hopeless etymologies and form analyses culminating in the phantasies of Hemsterhuis and Valckenaeer, the lack of any guiding clue for the explanation of how sound or form came to be what it is, and the curse of arid sterility that rested upon every effort. All the ways were blind and all the toil was vain. On the hither side, however, there is everywhere a new leaven working in the mass. What was that leaven? To identify if possible what it was has been the purpose of this review. I think we have seen it was not the influence of the natural sciences, certainly not directly; wherever that influence found direct application, it led astray. It was not in itself the discovery of the comparative method, for that proved but an auxiliary to a greater. If a founder must be proclaimed for the modern science of language, that founder was clearly Jakob Grimm, not Franz Bopp.

The leaven in question was comprised of two elements. One was found in the establishment of historical grammar, for this furnished the long-needed clue; the other was found in the discovery of Hindoo grammar, for this disclosed the fruitful attitude for linguistic observation. Historical grammar furnished the missing clue, because it represented the form of language as created what it is, not by the thought struggling for expression, but by historical conditions antecedent to it. Hindoo grammar furnished the method of observation because by its fundamental instinct it asked the question *how* in a given language does one say a given thing, rather than *why* does a given form embody the thought it does.

The germinal forces which have made this century of the science of language are not without their parallels in the century of American national life we are met to celebrate to-day. Jakob Grimm was of the school of the Romanticists, and he gained his conception of historical grammar from his ardor to derive the institutions of his people direct from their sources in the national life. The acquaintance of European scholars with the grammar of India arose from a counter-spirit in the world of the day whereby an expansion of intercourse and rule was bringing to the wine-press fruits plucked in many various fields of national life. Thus did the spirit of national particularism reconcile itself, in the experience of a science, with the fruits of national expansion. After like sort has the American nation in its development for the century following upon the typical event of 1803 combined the widening of peaceful interchange and common standards of order with strong insistence upon the right of separate communities in things pertaining separately to them to determine their lives out of the sources thereof. Therein has the nation given fulfillment to the prophetic hope of its great democratic imperialist Thomas Jefferson,¹

¹ Letter to Mr. Madison, 1809.

"I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire *and* self-government."

The linguistic science of the second century will build upon the plateau leveled by the varied toils and experiences of the first. More than ever those who are to read the lessons of human speech will gain their power through intimate sympathetic acquaintance with the historically conceived material of the individual language. But though the wide rangings of the comparative method have for the time abated somewhat of their interest and their yield, it will remain that he who would have largest vision must gain perspective by frequent resort to the extra-mural lookouts. Language is an offprint of human life, and to the student of human speech nothing linguistic can be ever foreign.

SECTION A — COMPARATIVE LANGUAGE

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(Hall 4, September 21, 10 a. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR FRANCIS A. MARCH, Lafayette College.

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR CARL D. BUCK, University of Chicago.

PROFESSOR HANS OERTEL, Yale University.

SECRETARY: PROFESSOR E. W. FAY, University of Texas, Austin, Tex.

THE Chairman of the Section of Comparative Language was Professor Francis A. March of Lafayette College, who stated, in opening the Section, that the scientific study of language takes its facts largely from ancient languages, and interprets them as human institutions by means of which society is organized and man developed. Comparative philology rejoices in unfolding the history of nations. It has sought to find its laws in the forces of nature, the bodily organization, and external habits of life, the influences of climate, the law of least effort working throughout like the law of gravitation. Its success has been as wonderful as that of the astronomers, and it will be a pleasure to hear of it to-day.

THE RELATIONS OF COMPARATIVE GRAMMAR TO OTHER BRANCHES OF LEARNING

BY CARL DARLING BUCK

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IN considering the relations of comparative grammar to other branches of learning it is essential to bear in mind that the term is used in a wider and a narrower sense, and is applied to more than one recognized field of scientific inquiry. Comparative grammar in the widest sense, or general comparative grammar, does not restrict itself to the study of some one group of related languages, but deals with all the known languages of the earth. It classifies them in groups, as far as possible according to genetic relationship, but also according to general structure, and compares not only the general mechanism for expressing relations, but the very distinctions and relations which find linguistic expression at all.

Comparative grammar in a narrower sense is used of the grammatical study of a group of genetically related languages, and in this application represents as many distinct fields of inquiry as there are well-defined groups of cognate languages. There is the comparative grammar of the Indo-European languages, of the Semitic languages, of the Finno-Hungarian languages, of the Malay-Polynesian languages, etc., etc. But the term Comparative Grammar is often applied still more specifically to the study of one of these groups of languages, namely, the Indo-European. It is obvious that this has no exclusive right to the title, and is more properly designated Indo-European Comparative Grammar. Yet the use of the broader term in this connection has a certain justification in the fact that it is in the field of the Indo-European languages that the methods and principles of comparative grammar were first established and have reached their highest development.

I believe I shall not go far amiss if, while not unmindful of its broader aspects, I shall consider comparative grammar mainly from the point of view of its application to a group of related

languages, as especially exemplified in Indo-European Comparative Grammar.¹

The Relation of Comparative Grammar to the Study of an Individual Language

The most intimate relation which comparative grammar sustains is to the study of an individual language. No one to whom language is an object of intrinsic interest, and not merely a means to an end, is satisfied with purely descriptive grammar, the bare statement of the facts of a given language, however essential this is as a foundation for historical investigation. And even he who believes it the function of the grammarian of an individual language to state only facts, and prides himself on the avoidance of anything even remotely savoring of comparative grammar — and there are still some eminent scholars who maintain such an attitude — is almost certain to deceive himself as to what constitutes a fact. If in recording a form *a* and a somewhat different form *b* appearing at another time or place with the same meaning as *a*, he states that *a becomes b*, he is going beyond the facts and introducing what is none the less an hypothesis because it seems so obvious. Indeed, comparative grammar may furnish conclusive evidence that both *a* and *b* are independent inheritances from the parent speech. The moment that one begins to deal with the relations of facts to one another, with their historical development, it becomes impossible to treat a given language as an isolated set of phenomena, and to ignore the evidence of the other languages of the same family. What is obscure from the point of view of a single language may become clear when the evidence of the sister languages is taken into account. If the comparative method is essential in the history of other human institutions such as art or religion, how pre-eminently is this true of language, for in no other sphere of intellectual activity is there such continuity of development as in language, which in *this* respect is more analogous to the biological sciences.

¹ I have employed the term Comparative Grammar throughout as the one, of those in actual use, which best conforms to the classification of the sciences represented in the programme of the Congress, and is the most suitable for the intended subject of discussion in this Section. But as the name of what is actually the Indo-Europeanist's field of interest, I prefer Indo-European Comparative Philology (Indo-European Philology would be sufficient, since Indo-European implies that it is comparative, but the term Comparative may well be retained in deference to the familiar Comparative Philology). It is true that Philology in the term Comparative Philology was originally intended in its narrower and secondary application to purely linguistic study, so that Comparative Philology and Comparative Grammar were identical. But since Philology is also used in English, as always in German, in its wider application to the study of the whole intellectual activity of a people, no matter how manifested, we may so understand it also in Indo-European Comparative Philology, which will then embrace a branch of inquiry which holds a legitimate, though quite subordinate, position in the Indo-Europeanist's field of interest; namely, the comparative study of Indo-European institutions, to which reference will be made below.

The history of a given language belonging to a well-defined family can be regarded only as a section of a long and continuous development.

Between historical grammar and comparative grammar there is no essential difference. One may for convenience apply the term historical grammar preferably to the study of the actually quotable material belonging to different periods of the same language, and the term comparative grammar where the evidence of cognate languages is introduced. But both alike are historical and comparative. A given form, meaning, or construction is traced back step by step to the earliest stage of which there is historical evidence. And it is with the object of taking a still further step in the same direction, of penetrating the prehistoric period, that one resorts to the comparison of the cognate languages. There can be no more fundamental misconception of the purpose and value of comparative grammar than is shown in the utterance of one of Germany's most eminent Hellenists in the preface to a Greek grammar which is unrivaled for its collection of facts, though marred by too many antiquated explanations. His words are substantially as follows: "The function of comparative grammar is to compare, that is, to recognize the like and the unlike in related languages, from which the explanation of the forms of the individual language often results of itself, but not always, and when it does not, the comparative grammarian has nevertheless fulfilled his duty by the correct comparison. I do not regard it as the business of comparative grammar to reconstruct the Indo-European, that is, a language which is wholly hypothetical and of which no one knows or ever will know when and where and by what sort of a people it was spoken. How does such a language concern us? Still I will not object if one wishes to write a grammar or even a lexicon of Indo-European." Presumably it is the representative of a science, and not one who is not even in sympathy with it, who is most competent to define its scope, and it is safe to say that no professed representative of comparative grammar will accept any such limitation of its function as is prescribed in the words quoted.

Comparison is only a means to an end. The recognition that a certain Greek form is the equivalent of a certain Latin form, or a Sanskrit form of a Greek, may be interesting, but of what importance in itself? Its value lies in the conclusions it enables us to draw as to the parent form. The form of any one language will admit of various possible origins, but the range of possibilities will not be the same for each language, and by a process of exclusion we reduce these to the one (or sometimes more than one) which satisfies the requirements of all the related languages. Often the evidence is so complete and conclusive that we feel as certain of the actual existence of the parent form thus reconstructed as of the existence of the historical forms

coming from it. If we say, for example, that the Indo-European form for "is" was **ésti*, there is every reason to believe that we are coming as near the exact truth as when we say that the Greek form was *ἔστι*, the Latin *est*, the Gothic *ist*, etc. To be sure, we are ignorant of the precise physiological character of each sound in the Indo-European **ésti*, we do not pretend to know the exact quality of the *e*, or whether the *t* was a pure dental or an alveolar, like our English *t*. But the finer nuances of pronunciation are unknown also in the case of the Greek or Latin form. All that one claims for the assumed **ésti* is that it represents the parent form as nearly as our ordinary written symbols ever represent the spoken form. However, the assumed Indo-European forms differ widely not only in the degree of certainty which attends their reconstruction, but also in the degree of accuracy intended by them,¹ and, while every such reconstructed form implies a belief in its existence on the part of the one who employs it, they are in general best regarded as convenient formulæ, furnishing the means of expressing briefly the combined evidence and its interpretation, but subject to change with the progress of the science. Such formulæ are indispensable to such a highly organized science as the Indo-European Comparative Grammar of the present day, and from the fact that but little use is made of them in Semitic Comparative Grammar the Indo-Europeanist is prone to infer, subject to correction, that it is still on a stage of development parallel to Indo-European Comparative Grammar of the time of Bopp.

I have said that the comparison of related forms was not an end in itself, but a means of reconstructing the parent form. But I do not wish to imply that these parent forms are of great intrinsic interest or that the reconstruction of the parent speech is the ultimate aim. No one is ambitious to speak this hypothetical language, nor does it, as Bopp fondly hoped, furnish the key to the problems of primitive linguistic development. Indeed, this language which we arrive at by reconstruction is itself a highly developed form of speech, which has behind it thousands of years of history which is forever inaccessible to us.

Its value lies rather in the light which is thereby reflected on the history of each individual language belonging to the group. Each language contributes its share of evidence for the reconstruction of the parent speech, and each in turn is illuminated by it. The real

¹ For example, in the reconstructed **pātē(r)*, "father" (Skt. *pita*, Grk. *πατήρ*, Lat. *pater*, etc.), no such degree of accuracy is claimed for the first vowel as for that of **ésti*. Indeed, the *ə* is merely a convenient symbol for a certain vowel which appears, in a whole series of words, in Sanskrit as *i*, in the European languages as *a*, but which must have differed originally both from *i* (which is *i* in European as well as in Sanskrit) and from *a* (which is *a* in Sanskrit as well as in European), and which moreover appears as the reduced grade of a long vowel. The usefulness of the symbol is not impaired by the fact that the original pronunciation of the vowel cannot be determined.

object throughout is to trace the development of a linguistic phenomenon from its earliest attainable stage to its latest expression. Comparative grammar is simply a history of a group of related languages, and when that is said, its relation to the history of an individual language of the group is obvious. They are not different sciences, one merely auxiliary to the other, but represent a wider and a narrower range of the same subject. Whatever differentiation exists is consequent only upon a division of labor. The historian of the Greek language, for example, is, from the purely linguistic standpoint, a specialist within the Indo-European field. And if the wider outlook of comparative grammar is essential to the intelligent study of the history of the individual language, it is no less true that comparative grammar depends for its very existence upon the investigation of the special facts and conditions of each language. The material presents itself in various forms, and its critical employment involves an acquaintance with paleography, epigraphy, metres, numismatics, history of private and public institutions, in fact, every branch of philology in its wider sense. The errors to which the historian of a single language ignorant of the results of comparative grammar is liable are no whit more serious than the dangers which await the comparative grammarian who deals with material of which he has only a superficial knowledge, whose familiarity with a given language is limited to turning the pages of the grammar and lexicon. The comparative grammarian covers so wide a field that it is obviously impossible for him to possess an intimate, detailed, acquaintance with all the languages of the group. He may be expected to know something of all, at least in their earlier stages, and a good deal about some. He should have the broader philological training in some of the fields, in classical philology, Indic or Indo-Iranian philology, Germanic, Celtic, or Slavic philology, if only to make him fully conscious of his limitations and need of coöperation in the others. And his selection of such a field will depend upon his individual tastes. But at best he must rely to a considerable degree upon the investigations of those whose interest is largely concentrated on the individual language.

In all this I hope I shall not be understood as ascribing to the student of one language the rôle of a handmaiden who gathers materials only to lay them at the feet of the comparative grammarian. It is true that no special investigation however minute can fail to be of some interest and value to the comparative grammarian, but its author is certainly not debarred from drawing his own conclusions simply because he is not a professed comparative grammarian. Each language offers numerous problems of its own, which involve processes taking place within the historical period, and which can be

solved upon the basis of internal evidence, if only one attacks them with that better insight into the principles of linguistic development and greater precision of method which has been gained by the assistance of comparative grammar. Indeed, it can be said of many specific matters which belong properly to comparative grammar and which the comparison of cognate forms first made clear, that precisely the same result would now be reached even if these cognate forms were not in existence. Only without the help of comparative grammar we should never have attained that knowledge of the characteristics of each language which makes this possible.

To demand that every student of a special language should be a comparative grammarian or that every comparative grammarian should have equal knowledge of each language with a specialist, would be to deprecate that division of labor which is absolutely essential in such a wide field of investigation. But what can and should be expected is the fullest coöperation, each recognizing that both are working within the same general field and that neither can with safety ignore the other's results.

The Relation of Comparative Grammar to Physiology

The comparative grammarian has to do primarily with the history of *spoken* language. It is true that except in its latest stages the material is available only in its written form. The invention of the phonograph unfortunately came some thousands of years too late to admit of our possessing reproductions of the speech of the Vedic Hindus, of the Homeric Greeks, of the early Romans, the Goths or the Norsemen, the Celts and the Slavs. One might as well ask outright for a reproduction of the parent Indo-European, or even of the primitive language or languages of the earth. The school-boy who is taught the proper "pronunciation of the letters" may conceive of speech-sounds as invented to represent these letters, and even the fathers of comparative grammar had not shaken off the domination of the written symbol when they discussed what is now called phonology under the head of "History of the Letters." But now at least there is no failure to recognize that the written language is something secondary, merely an attempt, at best only crude and inadequate, to represent the spoken language, which is the real object of investigation. Spoken language is made up of a succession of speech-sounds, and the changes with which the historian of language has to deal, so far as they concern the form rather than the content, consist in large part of certain shiftings of the individual speech-sounds which are found to occur with a degree of uniformity which makes their study the very foundation of all comparative

grammar. These speech-sounds are molecular vibrations produced by the organs of speech and perceived by the organs of hearing. The historian of language must know something of the nature and mechanism of these organs, of the organic and acoustic character of the sounds, of the processes or more often combination of processes involved in their changes. The branch of science which deals with such matters, known as practical phonetics or the physiology of sound, is an application of physiology and physics to linguistic material, and in its latest development, experimental phonetics, has reached a degree of refinement never suspected as possible. Direct visual observation, which can be employed only to a limited extent, is supplemented by mechanical devices of all sorts, ranging from the simple artificial palate, upon which is marked the exact position and area of the tongue contact, to the various instruments used to record the manifold vibrations of a vowel, from which a curve of vibration is plotted, the extent of each vibration measured in millimetres and transferred by a formula to time measurement to the hundred thousandth of a second. In many cases the knowledge gained experimentally is of undoubted interest and value to the historian of language. On the other hand, some of the experimental investigations are so refined that one cannot conceal one's skepticism as to their availability for the history of language. Certainly they go beyond the present interest of linguistic students and appeal more to physicists and physiologists. "The physical definition of a vowel will consist of the mathematical expression for the course of the molecular vibrations which it involves" are the words of one of the principal exponents of experimental phonetics in this country. The comparative grammarian cannot yet foresee the time when his comparison of vowels will be so minute as to be based on a study of their vibration curves, even if this were not impossible for any language not actually spoken to-day. Yet he should be the last to depreciate any investigations which deal, from whatever point of view, with the material which is his chief concern.

The Relation of Comparative Grammar to Psychology

The advent of comparative grammar and the historical method forever put an end to the rôle which speculative philosophy had so long played in linguistic discussions, from the time of the Greeks, who debated the origin and nature of speech while still ignorant of even the crudest analysis of the forms of their own language, to the *grammaire générale* or universal grammar of the eighteenth century, to Gottfried Hermann, who decided that the number of original cases must have been six, as in Latin, corresponding to Kant's categories

of logic. But a daughter of philosophy, modern psychology, has taken its place and established itself in a relation with the historical study of language which is as vital and as fruitful of the best results to both sciences as the old relation was artificial and barren of anything but vague speculations which only disguised the ignorance of the time as to linguistic development. One of the chief characteristics of the language-study of the last fifty years is the increased attention paid to the psychological factors in language, and never has the relation between linguistics and psychology been so close as at the present moment. There is no better external evidence of this than the two large volumes which one of the most eminent psychologists has devoted to the psychology of language and the attention which has been given them by students of language, or the numerous special investigations of problems in language psychology, whether written by one who is primarily a comparative grammarian or by one who is primarily a psychologist, or, as in some cases, under the joint authorship of a representative of each science.

In one sense all linguistic phenomena are psychological. Even the regular phonetic changes which we have treated as involving physiological relations have of course their psychological background, are, in other words, psycho-physical.¹

But the historian of language is constantly dealing with matters which involve purely psychological factors. Language is a register of associations on the grandest scale. One of the most important functions of the general comparative grammarian is to compare the distinctions and relations which find expression in the grammatical categories of different groups of languages. These grammatical categories show the various ways in which objects and their relations group themselves in the minds of different peoples. What in one language is an important grammatical distinction may be ignored in another. For example, gender, which plays such a rôle in our own family of languages, follows only one of the many lines of division between objects which find grammatical expression in this or that language, such as between objects animate and inanimate, human and non-human, high or low in rank, beneficent or otherwise. Again,

¹ In certain classes of phonetic changes the psychological element seems to be the more obvious factor, notably in the assimilation, dissimilation, or metathesis of non-contiguous sounds, which are most common in rapid or careless speech and in a state of fatigue, and which are essentially pathological, momentary lapses due to imperfect attention, only occasionally gaining general currency. Or since such changes are by far the most common in the cases of liquids *l* and *r* (e.g. *marble* from French *marbre*, Latin *marmor*, *pilgrim* from late Latin *pelegrinus*, earlier *peregrinus*, etc.; in New Orleans one hears a certain confection called indifferently *praline* or *plarine*), shall we not rather say that the physical relationship of these sounds in their formation is such as to require greater attention than other sounds for their proper adjustment to one another, so that even here the physical element is equally fundamental? The question at least illustrates the impossibility of separating the factors sharply.

some kind of formal distinction between singular and plural is common to practically all languages, but some have also a special form for the dual, which is the linguistic expression of association between objects occurring in pairs. Had familiar objects occurring in sets of five, like the fingers and toes, been as numerous as those occurring in pairs, the hands, feet, ears, eyes, etc., their association with one another might equally well have reflected itself in another grammatical category. Not that we are to imagine any conscious effort in the beginning to differentiate objects occurring in pairs and to provide their names with endings significant of this. It is rather that, given an expression, let us say, for "the hands," not in itself indicative of their number, the expression for "feet," "eyes," etc., whether in their initial creation or later, would be assimilated to this, until finally from a sufficient number of such forms there would arise a consciousness of the significance of the common element, which now becomes a "dual ending." But this consciousness of the significance of the dual is only the prelude to its gradual loss as a distinct formal category. For with the increasing clearness in the perception of relations, the difference between one object and more than one comes to be felt as the all-important one and the dual is sooner or later merged in the plural.

The vocabulary is also significant of modes of thinking. It has often been noted that people on a low stage of civilization show what seems a high degree of differentiation, as when they have separate words for washing, according as they mean washing the hands, washing the face, etc. But in reality this is only a lack of generalization, characteristic of what is termed fragmentary thinking. The savage does not differentiate the concept *wash* into *wash the hands*, *wash the face*, etc., but the notions of washing the hands, the face, etc., are distinct, concrete concepts, not yet put into relation with one another and generalized under the abstract *wash*.

But aside from the psychological significance of such general linguistic phenomena, the every-day problems of the comparative grammarian in the narrower sense are, to a large degree, psychological. For whether he is dealing with forms or with syntax, he finds that the history of the individual word or construction is affected by its associations. Changes in the form of a word are by no means confined to those caused by the regular phonetic processes, but are frequently due to the influence of forms which are for any reason associated with it in the mind. All the phenomena classed under Analogy, Leveling, or Contamination are examples of associative interference. If the child says *teached* for *taught*, if *blowed* for *blew* is not uncommon, and if we all now say *snowed* for an earlier *snew*, it is owing to the influence of the great body of words in

which the relation between present and past is that seen in *love*, *loved*, as *vice versa* the child's *think*, *thunk* is due to the unconscious association with *drink*, *drunk*, *sink*, *sunk*, etc., as *dove*, *strove* after *drove* are not uncommon in place of *dived*, *strived*, as we all now say *dug* for earlier *digged*, probably after *stuck*, *struck*, etc. The historical grammar of any language is replete with examples of such functional analogy or external grammatical leveling. Or, the leveling may be between different inflectional forms of the same word, that is internal grammatical leveling, as when we say *hoofs*, *roofs*, instead of *hooves*, *rooves* (like *calves*, *halves*, *shelves*), under the influence of the singular *hoof*, *roof*, or as Latin *honor* beside earlier *honōs* owes its *r* to *honōris*, *honōri*, etc., where the intervocalic *r* for *s* is due to regular phonetic change. Other changes are due to the association between congeneric words, such as words of relationship, of color, of sound, numerals, etc., as in Homeric *νιάσι* after *παρράσι*, etc., Sanskrit *pātyur* (genitive of *pāti*-, when used in the sense of "husband") after *pitūr* (genitive of *pitar*-, "father"), etc., late Latin *Octember* after *September*, *November*, English colloquial *Febuary* for *February* after *January*, though in this last example the dissimilating influence of the second *r* has also been a factor (cf. *libary* for *library*). Associations of this kind are not only productive of changes in existing words, but are influential in the creation of new words, and to them is due in large part the growth of significant suffixes.

The vocabulary of every language is full of contaminations, like *Popocrat* from *Populist* and *Democrat*, like Modern Greek *διάτνας* from *διάβολος*, "devil," and *Σατανᾶς*, "Satan." Some indeed are conscious inventions of authors striving for humorous or picturesque effect, like Stockton's *whirlicane* (*whirlwind* and *hurricane*). But most of them are in their origin as naïve as the child's *begincement*, in which *beginning* and *commencement* are merged. Current slang is full of examples, as *hustle* (*hasten* and *bustle*, *rustle*, etc.), *swipe* (*sweep* and *wipe*), *stunt* (*stint* and *stump*). But there are plenty of thoroughly respectable words which have originated in the same way, as German *bin*, O. H. G. *bim*, which represents a merging of the two forms seen in English *be* and *am*.

The manifold changes of meaning which words undergo in the course of their history are also mainly due to associative processes. A concept represents a complexity of elements, any one of which may at one time or another be the centre of associations. With the shifting of the dominant element come new associations. When *crescent* was first applied to the crescent moon, the dominant element was, as the origin of the word shows, the notion of growing, but this was replaced by the notion of shape, forming a new centre of asso-

ciations, so that we say "the bay forms a crescent," etc., or even "the crescent-shaped moon." In *horn*, as applied to an instrument for producing sound by blowing, the dominant element was at first the material, but ceased to be so before we could speak of a *tin horn*, etc. Language is full of "faded metaphors," that is, metaphors which have become so commonplace as no longer to be felt as such (and which therefore are no longer metaphors in the stylistic sense), representing all conceivable types of associations, as between various sense-perceptions (we speak of a *sweet smell* or a *sweet voice* as freely as of a *sweet taste*), between physical and mental activities or conditions (*understand*, *forget*, that is, *for-get* the opposite of *get*, *horror*, originally a *bristling up of the hair*, *glad* cognate with German *glatt*, "smooth"), between abstract and concrete (*kindness* as a quality or a concrete act), subjective and objective (*glad* of a person, and *glad tidings*, *fear* cognate with German *Gefahr*, "danger"), transitive and intransitive (*show* cognate with German *schauen*), and so on without limit. The most frequent changes in meaning are those which are classified, from the logical standpoint, under the head of specialization, as *hound*, formerly *dog* (cf. German *Hund*), *poison* from Latin *pōtiō*, "drink," German *Gift*, "poison," originally "gift," — or generalization, as *barn*, originally "a storehouse for barley," *butcher*, originally "one who kills he-goats" (French *boucher*, from *bouc* = *buck*), *smell* and *reek*, both referring originally to the odor of something burning (cf. *smoulder* and German *Rauch*), *equipped*, originally "furnished with horses," etc. Specialization means the restriction of scope through the enlargement of content, caused by the absorption of associated elements, as when from a *hunting-hound*, that is, a "hunting-dog," *hound* has absorbed the content of *hunting*, thus restricting its scope. Generalization, on the other hand, means the enlargement of scope through the narrowing of the content by the ignoring of certain of its elements, as when in *barn* the notion of barley is lost sight of.

The most scientific classification of semantic changes is without much doubt the strictly psychological one, according to the character of the associative processes involved, although the comparative grammarian will probably prefer a more external grouping as the best means of presenting the material.

Syntactical changes exhibit associative processes very similar to those seen in the history of individual words. One construction is modified by another which has some point of contact with it, or there may be complete contaminations of two constructions. A given inflectional form or phrase may change its force to any extent by the gradual shifting of the dominant element.

But it is unnecessary to illustrate further the intimate connection

between psychology and comparative grammar, and we may consider for a moment how far it is possible to define the respective functions of each in the study of language. It is the part of comparative grammar to present the facts of language in their historical relations, to show what changes language has actually undergone, and under what immediate linguistic influences. The psychological processes of which the linguistic changes are the outward sign it is the part of psychology to interpret and define. The psychology of language is of course a branch of general psychology, and is in a sense the application of general psychological principles to linguistic phenomena. At the same time it is justly claimed for the newest psychology of language that it does not represent a sort of external application to linguistic phenomena of a preconceived system of psychology, but that its principles are deduced from its linguistic phenomena themselves. In other words, it does not regard itself merely as an auxiliary to language history, furnishing it with a set of principles determined from other sources, but it holds that language is in itself one of the most worthy objects of psychological investigation, one of the most promising sources of psychological truth. From this point of view, according to which language is an object of intrinsic interest no less to the psychologist than to the historian of language, the relation between the two sciences is closer than ever before. And if we have correctly defined their respective functions, it does not by any means follow that the representatives of each confine themselves strictly within these limits. The comparative grammarian may supplement his historical investigation of certain linguistic phenomena by a consideration of the more immediate psychological factors involved. Nor will the psychologist feel debarred from all independent assumptions as to historical relations. Such overlapping of their activities is not only permissible but desirable, for it should lead to increased sympathy and coöperation.

The Relation to Ethnology and History

The vital relation of language and history was recognized by Leibnitz in the seventeenth century, and his deep interest and activity in collecting linguistic material was determined by its value in the study of ethnological relations. And when in the beginning of the nineteenth century comparative grammar was established on a scientific footing, the possibilities of the new science made a deep impression upon Alexander von Humboldt, whose words (*Kosmos*, II, p. 142), slightly abridged, are as follows: "Compared among themselves and separated into families according to their inner structure, languages have become (and this is one of the most brilliant achieve-

ments of the studies of recent times), a rich source of historical knowledge. They lead us to a distant past to which no tradition reaches. The comparative study of languages shows how widely separated peoples are related with one another and have migrated from a common home. It points out the course of migrations; it recognizes in the greater or less degree of change, in the stability of certain forms or in their advanced decay which people has kept closer to the speech once spoken in the common home."

No comparative grammarian of to-day would venture to express the relation of linguistic evidence to ethnology in such unqualified terms. The application of linguistic evidence is not as simple as was once believed, it has its limitations, and is not capable alone of laying bare all the events of prehistoric times. Yet I for one do not believe that anything in our present views of its application has actually diminished its importance. Whatever value we attach to other factors, it remains true that language furnishes the most tangible evidence and will always hold the first place in any ethnological discussion.

It is true, of course, that language is not always a key to race. History furnishes numerous examples of the adoption by one people of the language of another, whether it be the speech of the conquerors or the conquered that survives, and there is no reason to doubt that this was equally frequent in prehistoric times. Hence the fallibility of assuming community of race from community of language. Yet the warning against the confusion of language and people is uttered so vigorously, we are so emphatically admonished of the absurdity of speaking, for example, of Indo-European or Aryan *peoples*, that I believe there is nowadays more danger of underestimating than of overestimating the historical bearing of linguistic evidence. It is still a truism that language implies a people speaking it. Even in those cases where a people has changed its language, this has been effected only by mixture with another people. If this other people whose language becomes dominant is numerically stronger than the people whose language is lost, then kinship with peoples of related languages will be true of the larger contingent of the resulting mixed people. And if the people whose language becomes dominant is numerically weaker, this is in itself proof that it is intellectually stronger, superior in civilization and organization, so that kinship with peoples of related languages will still be true of what is the more important contingent in the mixed people. The mere physical domination of a small body of invaders, forming only the ruling class, is not sufficient to impose their language upon the masses. Witness the fate of the Franks or the Normans in France, the Swedish rulers of Russia, the Turkish Bulgarians, the Manchus in China. If the Romans in Gaul, in spite of their numerical inferiority, imposed

their language upon the subject Celts, it was due to the power of the Roman organization, of which they continued to form a part, the country being governed from Rome and receiving from it a constant influx of officials, soldiers, and tradesmen. The statement, often made, that the Greeks, for example, may have received their Indo-European language from a small body of invaders, so that they would be only to a slight degree of Indo-European descent, is unwarranted by historical analogies. This of course is not to doubt the existence of one or more than one pre-Indo-European peoples in Greece and the adjacent islands, and we are anxious for all possible information in regard to them, especially if the so-called *Ægean* civilization, wholly or in part, antedates the appearance of the Indo-European Greeks. (And let it be noted in passing that this question awaits its decision from linguistic evidence. Are not all scholars impatient to learn what is the language of the Cretan pictograph and linear signs?) But the Indo-European Greeks must have come, like the Anglo-Saxon invaders of England, in vast hordes and in successive waves of migration, and the very fact that their language became dominant entitles them to be regarded as the most important element of the historical Greek people, however much may have been contributed to their civilization by earlier conditions.

And if linguistic evidence is subject to some reservation, what of anthropological evidence? One after another of the anthropological criteria has been found inadequate to serve as an absolute basis of ethnological classification. Leading anthropologists like Virchow hold that a mixture of dolichocephalic and brachycephalic, of blond and brunette, etc., is the rule rather than the exception, and furthermore that such racial characteristics are not in themselves unchangeable. And even if the matter of racial classification were in a more satisfactory state than it is at present, it would take us back to such remote periods as to have comparatively little bearing upon the immediate prehistory of even the earliest known peoples. The period of Indo-European speech-unity, for example, which no one need place earlier than 5000 B.C., and is probably later than this, represents a late date from the anthropological point of view, and it is altogether likely that the people speaking this parent speech was already of mixed race. Furthermore, is it not true in general that the physical characteristics of a people, in and of themselves, are subordinate in historical significance to their institutions? Community in myths and customs, but above all in language, is that which goes to make up kinship as a subjective element, that is, that consciousness of kinship which is an important factor in history. Language is the most vital factor in the growth and retention of national feeling. Nothing is so zealously guarded as essential to racial survival. No-

thing has been so systematically attacked in efforts to crush nationality, from the time of the Assyrian kings, one of whom boasts of having carried into captivity the subjects of the four quarters of the world and made them of one speech,¹ down to the present day, when the "language question" is a burning problem in nearly every European state.

Recent years have seen much discussion of the nature and origin of dialects, the result of which only emphasizes how inseparable are the linguistic and historical aspects of the question. In the first place, "dialect" is not a purely linguistic concept. It does not, any more than the term "language," represent a definable degree of speech-variation (or speech-unity, according to the point of view). It rests upon a combination of linguistic and historical elements. It is true that in place of the popular conception of a dialect, a precise and purely linguistic definition has been suggested,² but it is one that yields a concept too limited in scope to be usable, and if adopted would only necessitate the invention of a new term as elastic as the

¹ "The subjects of the four quarters (of the world, speaking) strange languages and varied dialects, inhabitants of mountain and plain, over whom the warrior of the gods, lord of all, rules, whom I had carried into captivity in the name of Ashur, my lord, with my powerful staff, I made of one speech and settled them therein." From the cylinder inscription of Sargon (722-705 B. C.), in *Assyrian and Babylonian Literature. Selected Translations*, R. F. Harper.

² Oertel, *Lectures on the Study of Language*, p. 92 ff. Strictly, there is always some variation between the speech of any two persons and even between two utterances of the same person, so that, objectively considered, the only absolute dialectal unit is the momentary utterance of a single individual. To call this a dialect would obviously be absurd. But such variations may be too minute to be noticed, so that subjectively they do not exist. Accordingly it is proposed to make the test subjective instead of objective. "A dialectal unit is constituted by the speech of all those persons in whose utterances variations are not sensibly perceived or attended to. Subjective uniformity makes the dialect," is Oertel's thesis. Higher groups he would classify as dialect-family, language, and language-family, emphasizing that these represent only ideal types in contrast to the concrete type represented by a dialect as defined. It may be admitted that in this way one can make of dialect a concrete and purely linguistic concept, and one that is somewhat more comprehensive than that obtained objectively. But it is still a too limited concept to which to restrict the term dialect. We could not speak of the dialect of a single town, so long as it included, as often, perceptible variations in the speech of different classes. Its speech-form would rather be a dialect-family. Or, waiving the matter of variation within a single town, we could speak for example, to illustrate from Greek dialectology, of the speech of Tegea in Arcadia as a dialect, but what we commonly call the Arcadian dialect would be a dialect-family, what we commonly call the Arcado-Cyprian dialect-family would be a language, and what we commonly call the Greek language would be a language-family. The fact is, of course, that we cannot have a complete set of terms of absolute value for all degrees of even perceptible variation, and if all but one must necessarily be ideal types, not to be defined precisely, what is the advantage of making an absolute concrete type of this one? Yet we had no right perhaps to illustrate from the Greek, for it is obvious that the term dialect as defined cannot be properly applied to any phase of speech no longer extant. For it is only in the case of living speech that it is possible to take testimony as to what variations are perceptible and so secure the subjective test.

I see no objection to the continued employment of the term dialect, as of dialect-family, language, etc., in its present elastic sense, its special application being shown by the context.

present "dialect." For we need a term to designate the speech of certain territories or communities, without regard to the precise degree of variation (or unity) represented.

But the very existence of dialects as ordinarily understood has been denied, especially by certain eminent Romance scholars, one of whom is honoring this Congress by his presence. Emphasizing what has come to be rightly an accepted belief since J. Schmidt's exposition of his famous wave-theory, namely, that a linguistic change starts at a certain point and gradually spreads over contiguous territory, and that different linguistic phenomena may start from different centres and so cover wholly or partially different territories, they conceive the resulting conditions to be such as would be illustrated graphically by a large series of intersecting circles drawn from different centres and representing the areas of the different linguistic phenomena. They assert that there will be only an infinite series of gradual variations, that we may if we choose give the name dialect to the area of a particular linguistic phenomenon, but that any broader grouping of dialects is purely arbitrary and unscientific. Such a conception is possible only upon the basis of purely linguistic theorizing, defying every historical probability. If we could imagine a given territory occupied all at once by a people of uniform speech, in settlements equally large and equally distant from one another, like the squares on a checker-board, with no natural boundaries by mountains and rivers, and further imagine that these settlements remained of the same relative strength, no one of them gaining predominance over others, then, indeed, speech-variation might proceed with such a result as has been pictured. But such conditions never exist. Even if the incoming people were wholly homogeneous without even the germs of dialectic variation, which is rarely if ever the case, there would inevitably arise certain social and political groupings which would reflect themselves in speech. Some degree of centralization is as certain in speech as in politics. The evolution of a standard language is only the culmination of what on a smaller scale is always operative. There is no time when the centrifugal force of speech-variation starting from innumerable centres is not being more or less counteracted by a centripetal force combining certain phenomena in groups. The extent and the definiteness of these groups vary with the historical conditions. How clearly do the linguistic conditions of ancient Greece reflect that particularism which was so characteristic of the Greeks politically! No single standard of speech until a late period, just as there was no political unity, but numerous dialects, as there were numerous states, showing centralization within certain limits. And will any one deny the existence there of well-defined dialects so clearly marked by certain

combinations of linguistic phenomena that the language of an inscription rarely leaves any doubt as to what part of Greece it comes from, provided, of course, it antedates the κοινή period? Or will it be objected that we know these dialects only in written form and that the relative uniformity within their limits may be artificial? There may be *something* in this, and it is not unlikely that there was more merging of one dialect into another near the boundaries than the few inscriptional examples of this would indicate. But from the varied character of the inscriptions, private as well as official, there is no sufficient reason for doubting that we have in general a faithful representation of what was actually spoken. And if evidence is demanded of dialects which can be studied in their spoken form, it may be pointed out that, as the whole discussion started with an attack on certain groupings of French dialects, it has been shown by minute investigation that well-defined French dialects do exist, if only one recognize that the boundaries need not be mathematical lines, but may be intermediary zones.

There can be no doubt that it is the first necessity of dialect-study to define precisely the area of each linguistic phenomenon, as is done in Wencker's *Sprachatlas des deutschen Reiches*, or on a still more elaborate scale in the *Atlas linguistique de la France* of Gilliéron et Edmont, which is to contain some eighteen hundred maps, each showing the pronunciation of some word or phrase in upwards of six hundred places. But it is the legitimate aim of the dialectologist, with constant reference to available historical data, to classify such material in larger groups and unfold their history.

Since dialect relations reflect historical conditions, their evidence may be used in turn to control and supplement imperfect historical data. Nowadays one scarcely hears even echoes of the once lively discussion of wave-theory *versus* Stammbaum-theory, for it is tacitly recognized that there is truth in each. The difference is only one of chronological emphasis, if I may so express it. There is no doubt that points of agreement between dialects, so far as they are not accidental, that is, due to independent development in each, are significant of geographical continuity, — at some time. But this may be the geographical continuity of the historical period, and this is what was emphasized by J. Schmidt in his famous work; or it may be that of a prehistoric period, and this is what is emphasized by a tree-scheme, which is intended to illustrate how dialects or languages have diverged from a common prehistoric source. One may object to specific tree-schemes as arbitrary, and certainly the attack on existing tree-schemes of the Indo-European languages was entirely justified. One may dispute in each case as to how far it is possible to go in such a scheme. But one cannot doubt the existence of

migratory movements such as are properly represented by a tree-scheme, or that such movements often reflect themselves in dialect relations in an unmistakable fashion. Let me illustrate from the Greek dialects. If we survey the whole body of linguistic phenomena we may divide the points of dialect agreement into three classes. Some we regard as accidental. Others are significant of geographical continuity in their historic positions, as probably the psilosis on the coast of Asia Minor in which the Æolic, Ionic, and Doric dialects of this region share. Others are obviously significant of geographical continuity in a period preceding the great migrations, and there of course are the points upon which are based all attempts to classify the dialects and stems. No one can possibly doubt the historical significance of the agreement in features not found elsewhere between Arcadian and the remote Cyprian, between Asiatic Æolic and Thessalian, or of the mixture of Doric and Æolic characteristics in Thessalian and Bœotian. And I have no hesitation in asserting that those historians, fortunately few, who regard the tradition of the Doric migration as a pure myth, either have no first-hand knowledge of the dialects or are absolutely impervious to linguistic evidence. There is enough that is still obscure in the relations of the Greek dialects, but there is also much that is as clear as day.

It may be said of this or any other like case that it is arbitrary to regard certain points of agreement as accidental and others as significant, and that in combining the latter with vague traditional data and then drawing historical conclusions we are guilty of reasoning in a vicious circle. Perfectly true. But where is there a branch of inquiry in which the so-called vicious circle is not employed, and justified too, if only the circle is completed without undue pressure? When a number of linguistic facts fit together with one another and with traditional data, which in itself may be of little weight, we are entitled to regard them as significant.

I can only allude to the historical significance of borrowed words not due to any racial mixture, such as the Greek words in Latin which bring before us the successive periods of Greek influence: first, the remote period when certain articles of commerce were brought to Italy by Greek mariners, then the influence exerted by the Greek colonists of Magna Græcia, then the time when educated Romans were familiar with Greek literature and sent their sons to Athens for study, and lastly the period when Rome was filled with Greek-speaking slaves. Or, to take an example of a totally different and less usual character, the words which the Gypsies have adopted from the various languages with which they have come in contact since leaving their home in India, some of them, like the Armenian and Modern Greek words, common to all dialects and so significant

of their wanderings as an undivided people, others indicative only of the wanderings of certain groups.

But something must be said of the relation of comparative grammar to the study of prehistoric antiquities. For it is this phase of the subject which is regarded with the greatest suspicion within the ranks of comparative grammarians; and at the same time makes the strongest appeal to popular interest. What Woman's Club has not been privileged to listen to a paper upon "The Cradle of the Aryans"? Linguistic Palæontology, as it is often called, refers to the study of the reconstructed vocabulary of a parent speech with reference to the light it throws upon the civilization of the people using this language. Investigation along this line was initiated and has been most vigorously pursued within the Indo-European field, but similar studies have been made for the Semitic and other families of languages. The common possession, by the various languages of a family, of a given word in the form appropriate to the known phonetic characteristics of each is evidence of the existence of such a word in the parent speech, and consequently of the object designated by this word. Such a series as Sanskrit *çvā*, Avestan *spā* (cf. also *σπάκα*, quoted as Median by Herodotus), Armenian *šun*, Greek *κύων*, Latin *canis*, Old Irish *cú*, Gothic *hunds* (certainly not to be separated, though possibly contaminated with the root seen in English *hunt*), Lithuanian *szú*, Old Prussian *sunis* (Russian *sobaka* must have been borrowed from Iranian), leaves no room for doubt that the primitive Indo-Europeans were acquainted with some species of dog. Similar evidence is sufficient to show their acquaintance with numerous other animals, with certain trees, with at least one metal, with a kind of grain, with some means of conveyance both by land and by water, with three seasons, including winter with snow, with the art of sewing, plaiting, weaving, and making vessels of earthenware, with a complete family organization, etc., etc.

But the earlier essays at a comprehensive view of such conditions, those idyllic pictures of primitive Indo-European life with the milkmaid in the foreground, were marked by so little appreciation of the limitations of linguistic evidence as to bring the whole subject into a disrepute from which it has never fully recovered. Later progress has consisted in a more precise valuation and a more critical application of the evidence from language, and especially in controlling and supplementing it by evidence from other sources, such as prehistoric archæology, historical accounts of early conditions among the various Indo-European peoples, and general ethnology as showing what conditions are likely to be found together. With regard to linguistic evidence, we must recognize that absence of agreement in the designation of an object is no proof that it was

unknown, since the old word may for various reasons have been lost or replaced, just as the old words for brother and sister have been replaced in Greek, those for son and daughter in Latin; further, that agreement in a given word is not always proof of its existence in the parent speech, since, aside from the possibility of independent formation, this agreement may rest on a succession of borrowings, as is the case with the word for wine; lastly, even where the existence of the word in the parent speech is not open to question, its precise meaning may be uncertain. From the series, Sanskrit *ayas*, Avestan *ayah-*, Latin *aes*, Gothic *aiz* (English *ore*), which in different times and places mean copper, bronze, iron, or metal in general, we can, indeed, infer that the Indo-Europeans were acquainted with some metal, but when we conclude that this was probably copper, we do so on other than purely linguistic grounds. Furthermore there are countless points upon which linguistic evidence is altogether silent.

But when the skepticism is carried so far as to assert that no value, or at the most very slight value, is to be attached to linguistic evidence,¹ this can only be stamped as an unwarranted exaggeration. The elimination of borrowed words from apparent cases of agreement has long been recognized as an important corrective. But it is a mere splitting of hairs to urge that *all* cases of agreement may rest upon borrowing, only in the remote period when the later Indo-European languages, though already somewhat differentiated, were still spoken in contiguous territory. No exception need be taken to such a statement if intended only as a warning that the conclusions reached may not be applicable to precisely the same period and that the combination of the various conclusions may not be truly homogeneous. The same is true of the reconstructed forms, and I would emphasize again what was said in reference to the parent speech, that we are concerned with it not so much for any intrinsic interest it possesses for us as for its bearing on later development. If we are able to trace a given institution back to a period before the bonds between the Indo-European peoples were severed and antedating the more individual development of each in the land of its permanent home, what more do we ask? We may deny the application of linguistic evidence in individual cases, but not in principle. It must be used with caution, but the danger of its abuse is not greater than is the case with archæological evidence. Often it fails us entirely, but often it is, in the nature of things, the only available evidence. What archæological evidence can tell us how far the numeral system was developed, or can throw such light on the family organization

¹ I refer especially to the radical position taken by Krestcher, *Einleitung in die Geschichte der griechischen Sprache*, p. 48 ff., in the criticism of which I am in entire accord with the remarks of Schrader, *Reallexikon der indogermanischen Altertümern*, p. 8 ff.

as the restriction of the inherited words for father-in-law and mother-in-law to the parents of the husband? It is idle to discuss whether the study of Indo-European antiquities is a branch of linguistic science to which prehistoric archæology is auxiliary, or *vice versa*. For the relative importance of each kind of evidence will vary according to the individual problem. It is only by the recognition of the claims of each, by the conservative employment of evidence from whatever source, that this branch of investigation can attain its highest development, and even then we must content ourselves with what is only a fragmentary picture at best.

I have now mentioned, not indeed all branches of science which could be adduced as standing in some sort of relation to comparative grammar, but those which seem to me to stand in the closest relationship to it, a relationship which is not merely theoretical but a vital fact, the importance of which to each science concerned has never been so fully recognized as at the present day.

SOME PRESENT PROBLEMS AND TENDENCIES IN COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY

BY HANNS OERTEL

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In an address delivered almost sixty years ago (in 1846; printed in Lassen's *Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, vol. VII, 1850, p. 25 ff.) Schleicher divided the new science of comparative philology, which owes its name to Friedrich Schlegel, into the following three departments: (1) The "philosophical," in so far as the comparative study of languages aims to discover the laws and processes of linguistic development ("die für die Sprache geltenden Entwicklungsgesetze aufzustellen," p. 36). Included in this are also questions touching the relation of speech and thought, and the origin of language. It is immaterial here whether the languages compared are genetically related to one another or not. (2) The "historical," which deals with such ethnological information regarding prehistoric times as may be inferentially derived from a comparison of *cognate* languages; it thus appears as a valuable ally of history. In contradistinction to the preceding division, the interest here does not centre in language itself, but in the historical, mythological, institutional, inferences which may be based upon language. Language plays here the same part in the investigation of *prehistoric* periods which Wolf, in his *Alterthumswissenschaft*, assigned to it for *historic* times. (3) The "grammatical," in which the grammatical system of a given language is illumined and cleared up by the comparison of cognate languages. While the first two departments dealt respectively with language in general and with the historical inferences to be derived from a set of cognate languages, this third department is concerned with some one definite language whose structure it analyzes by means of the comparative method.

Although these three divisions are not mutually exclusive, still less antagonistic to each other, and although the work of most scholars has been, to a certain degree, extended over more than a single one of the three subdivisions, it is easy to name the pioneer and earliest representative for each, namely, Wilhelm von Humboldt for the first (the "philosophical"), August Schleicher himself for the second (the "historical"), and Franz Bopp for the third (the "grammatical").

Now since all investigations along any one of the three main lines indicated by Schleicher — if they are to be inductive — must necessarily rest upon a careful examination of the facts of actual languages and dialects, the large mass of special problems which are connected with each individual language and dialect form, in a sense, problems of comparative philology, nor can they be regarded as minor problems, inasmuch as the whole structure of linguistic science ultimately rests upon their correct solution. And yet a discussion of even a select number of such special problems seemed both impossible and unsuited to the present occasion. For, extending over a great variety of languages, they would require for their adequate presentation the combined labor of many specialists. On the other hand, their very nature would restrict an interest in them to a comparatively small number, as their discussion would, of necessity, have to be of a very technical character. But since these lectures are addressed, I take it, to a wider audience, I have selected a number of problems which are more general, and I shall endeavor to discuss briefly some general problems and tendencies of linguistic thought, which by influencing the methods of investigation, determine, to a considerable extent, the manner in which special problems present themselves for treatment, the point from which their objects are viewed, and the way in which they are grouped and correlated.

In his division of the comparative study of language, Schleicher distinguished between the "historical" and the "grammatical" application of the comparative method to a group of cognate languages. And the contrast between these two as to the ultimate purpose and end for which the comparative method is used is, even now, so important for a proper valuation of the results achieved that I cannot forego dwelling briefly upon it. The difference may perhaps be summed up in these words, that in its last aims Schleicher's "historical" method is *reconstructive*, while his "grammatical" method is *interpretative*. In taking Bopp as representative of the latter, I do not, of course, refer to his attempt at explaining the origin of those forms which express grammatical relations (or, in simple words, the origin of inflection), but rather to what he considered a preliminary step toward the solution of this problem, namely, the comparative description of the organic structure of the Indo-European languages. In fact Bopp's lasting importance does not lie in the attempted solution of the riddle of inflection, but in what his comparative method allowed him to do for each individual and concrete language embodied in his Compendium. By it he was enabled "to extend his gaze beyond the narrow confines of a single language and to group its facts, in the light of all the cognate members of the same family, so as to bring system and organic connection into the linguistic material presented by each individual

language" (p. viii of the preface to the *Vergleichende Grammatik*). Schleicher, on the other hand, used the comparative method for an entirely different ultimate end, namely, to reconstruct inferentially a parent language upon the basis of a comparison of the really existing cognate languages, and in his Compendium "the attempt has been made to place the inferred Indo-European parent language alongside of its really existing descendants" (2d. ed., p. 8, note). The contrast is clear. For Bopp the comparative method is largely a means of bringing order and system into the grammars of the individual historical languages. For Schleicher it is a key to open a prehistoric period by recovering its lost language. Save only where he proceeds to speculate upon the ultimate origin of inflection, the former's face is turned toward the historical periods of a language, the facts of which he interprets from his higher pinnacle; while the latter uses the historical languages as a basis for his inferences, as a spring-board, if one may use the figure, for a leap into the prehistoric.

Any one who has followed the trend of recent discussions cannot have failed to see that there is at present a growing disinclination to believe in the historical reality of reconstructed forms and meanings. The more thoroughly we study the nature and mechanism of linguistic development the clearer it must become that it can properly be compared neither, in Schleicher's biological fashion, to the propagation of an animal, nor, as has been done more recently, to the derivation of a number of manuscript copies from one archetype. The processes of consolidation and disintegration to which dialects owe their constantly changing being are so complicated and of so peculiar a character that such comparisons can be made in the most general and figurative way only, and they cannot justify the application of a method designed for and capable of restoring a lost archetype to the reconstruction of a language. The recent anthropological discussions of Ratzel¹ make one point perfectly clear, namely, that for the development of a secondary ethnic group with such definite and uniform characteristics as the fair, blond, tall, and long-headed Indo-Europeans exhibit we are forced to assume a very large area; for its dispersion over a wide area was its only protection against alien influences and the guarantee of its survival. To think then of this period as one "in which the individual members of the Indo-European family were still united by the consciousness of a common tongue" seems to me to imply a complete reversal of all that we know empirically of political and linguistic history, for in both the course appears to be uniformly from multiplicity toward unity. As all historical nations are the result of a consolidation of tribes, so all historical languages are the result of a consolidation and unification

¹ *Berichte d. sächs. Gesel. d. Wiss.*, 1898, p. 1, and 1900, p. 25.

of dialects.¹ What else does the great diversity of the Italic dialects, with their marked divergence in the most common words as well as in the grammatical material, indicate but that the hordes and tribes which invaded Italy were far from uniform, and that the linguistic unification accompanied the political and economic consolidation of Italy under the leadership of Rome? If we once admit that the Indo-European ethnic group long before the opening of history inhabited, and developed in, a large area embracing Middle and Eastern Europe and reaching far into Western Asia, then the assumption of a well-rounded and evenly developed grammatical structure² becomes as impossible as that of a uniform culture. It is not necessary to assume that all Indo-Europeans once possessed knowledge of, and terms for, agriculture, and that the absence of such terms among the Eastern branch is due to loss. Are we not justified in seeing here primitive differences? Exactly³ so it seems to me unnecessary to assume a fully developed and generally accepted differentiation of optative and subjunctive throughout all Indo-European territory. Is it not possible that the Italic tribes, for instance, did not fuse what was originally distinct, but represent a section and stage which never utilized the *iē*: *ī* etc. forms for the purpose of differentiating between wish (optative) and will (subjunctive)? And may it not be just as incorrect to speak of the meaning of a common Indo-European optative as it would be to speak of a common Indo-European agriculture? In other words, are not many supposed losses and fusions in reality rather primitive and original local absences and primitive and original local failures to differentiate? It seems to me that considerations like these must have been the cause which have led, in recent standard works on comparative syntax, to the substitution of "Gebrauchssphaere" for the older "Grundbedeutung." The latter implied unity, local uniformity; the former puts in its place multiplicity, and thus allows for primitive local differences which we may find continued in the historical languages.

I am not here attacking the starred, constructed forms of our comparative grammars, the value of which no sane scholar under-rates. What I try to combat is the belief that these constructed forms can be utilized for historical inferences. Since the method by which they are produced is purely logical (namely, a summation of correspondences and an elimination of differences), their character is essentially *unhistoric*. But this unhistoric quality in no way impairs their value as aids in the grammatical study of a given lan-

¹ Heyck, *Histor. Zeitsch.*, vol. 85, p. 68; Wrede, *ibid.*, vol. 87, p. 39; Koegel, *Götting. Gel. Anz.*, 1897, p. 648.

² A. Ludwig wrote in 1867: "Auch die Ursprache in der Zeit ihrer (natürlich immer nur relativen) Vollkommenheit bot keine vollkommene Einheit." (*Sitzungsberichte d. phil. hist. Cl. d. Kais. Akad. d. Wiss.* Wien. 1867, vol. 55, p. 134.)

³ The following paragraph has been elaborated more fully by E. P. Morris and the author in the *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* for 1905.

guage. Instead of attaching to these constructed forms the historical value which they possessed in Schleicher's eyes, I should rather regard them as algebraic grammatical notations¹ in which the comparison of parallel forms of two or more languages may be most easily and conveniently summarized and expressed. The construction of a form like *kmtóm* means that Greek *é-κατόν*, Latin *centum*, German *hund*, Sanskrit *çatam*, etc., should be grouped together. It is in other words the common denominator of these forms. The constructed *m* is a convenient symbol to mark the fact that Greek *a*, Latin *en*, German *un*, Sanskrit *a*, etc., are to be paralleled and are alike in so far as they are weak grades, a fact which for some does not lie at all close to the surface and, indeed, is brought to light by the comparison of cognates only. The signs which go to make up the alphabet of the Indo-European are the symbolical expressions of grammatical parallelisms rather than representatives of the historical sources from which the sounds of the concrete languages are descended. But even those who would grant historical reality to the *formal* reconstructions of Indo-European words will hardly go so far as to extend it to the *semantic*² reconstructions dealing with the force and meaning of Indo-European cases, modes, and tenses. So long as it was believed that from the very beginning the mode and tense formatives were charged with a definite modal and temporal meaning inherent in them, a formal reconstruction of the formative carried with it semantic reconstruction also. But all recent investigations (they have just been summarized and extended by Hirt³) uniformly tend to show that there was, generally speaking, no such inherent meaning in these formatives. What we call the modal or the tense-system of a language is the result of a very gradual development in which old *formal* material has been adapted to certain *semantic* uses. Witness, for instance, the use made of thematic (*asa-ti*) and unthematic (*as-ti*) forms for the differentiation of subjunctive and indicative, or the turning of the *s*-formative into a tense-sign. If, as seems incontestable, the tense-system of the Indo-European languages is by no means primitive, but a secondary structure, into which material of a previous period was built by charging old forms with new meaning,⁴ it is not necessary to assume that this new system was uniformly worked out in what is called Indo-European times, and the attempt to construct universally accepted Indo-European meanings from which, by loss or addition, those of the

¹ This statement agrees with Delbrück, *Einleitung in das Sprachstudium* (1880) p. 52. *Einleitung in das Studium der indogermanischen Sprachen* (1904), p. 126.

² For a fuller discussion of this see E. P. Morris's and the author's paper in the *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* for 1905.

³ In the seventeenth vol. of the *Indogermanische Forschungen*.

⁴ Compare also the acquired modal force of the augmentless preterites, Thurneysen, *Bezz. Beitr.* viii, p. 282.

individual languages *must* be derived would seem unwarranted. It is for this reason that I should be slow to assert that the Latin subjunctive forms are *semantically* the product of a fusion of Indo-European subjunctive (ferās) and optative (faxīs) forms. I cannot see what obstacle should prevent our interpreting these forms as reflexes of a section of Indo-European speech in which the adaptation of forms terminating in long ā ē ō and those with the formative iē : ī to subjunctive and optative uses respectively had never taken place; just as the Italic and Celtic *r*-forms of the passive have their *formal* but not their *semantic* counterpart in Sanskrit. Thus, while in dealing with the *formal* side of Indo-European speech the construction of parent forms is a useful and convenient device and cannot under any circumstances do harm, the case is different in syntactical work with its emphasis on the *semantic* side. Here insistence on a uniform parent language with well-defined semantic systems shared in by all sections of Indo-European folk seems fraught with danger and must often tend to cloud the issue by injecting foreign semantic elements, which in reality were, perhaps, never present in the history of a mode or tense. It seems methodologically wrong to assume that because certain formatives in a given number of languages can be *formally* united, their respective semantic contents must also be unified under one denominator, which is to be regarded as starting-point and fountain head from which the meanings in the individual languages are to be historically derived. Early formal identity of formatives may well go hand in hand with primitive semantic differences due to separate and sectional development.

I turn from this general discussion of the value of inferred forms and meanings to a number of problems connected with the different departments of grammar, selecting a few which are of a more general nature.

In phonetics the problem of the causes upon which rests the striking uniformity of sound-changes is not yet finally solved. The investigation of the nature of phonetic changes has been, in the main, confined to the causes which produce primary changes, that is, those which originated in, and were created by, the individual, who therefore plays an active part in their production. While these changes have received detailed treatment, another phase of the subject, namely, the cause which underlies the comparative uniformity of these changes in a large number of individuals scattered over a considerable area, has been touched only lightly and in a more or less general way. There are two possible ways of accounting for such uniformity. One theory (and it is important to note that the foremost authority on the psychology of language holds this view, cf. Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie, Die Sprache*, vol. 1, p. 391) explains it as

due to simultaneous changes which rise independently in the members inhabiting a certain area. Its collective character is, if I understand Wundt aright, due to the fact that the causes for its existence are uniformly present in many members, who, therefore, at about the same time independently hit upon the same change. According to this view, every change starts *and spreads* as a primary change. The other theory makes a sharp distinction between primary and secondary changes and explains the spread of a change as due to the *adoption* of the innovation by the rest of the speech-community. Having been originated elsewhere, the change is afterwards accepted and — mostly unconsciously — imitated. In two ways this latter view (which is shared, among the latest writers, by Delbrück, cf. his *Einleitung in das Studium der indogermanischen Sprachen*, 4th edition, p. 149) seems to me to have an advantage over the other. In the first place, it bridges the gulf which separates phonetic changes from those of a semantic and syntactical kind. For it seems hard to maintain that the change in a syntactical construction or in the meaning of a word owes its universality to a simultaneous and independent primary change in all the members of a speech-community. By adopting the theory of imitative spread, all linguistic changes (*formal* as well as *semantic*) may be viewed as one homogeneous whole. In the second place, the latter view seems to bring linguistic changes into line with the other social changes, such as modifications in institutions, beliefs, and customs. For is it not an essential characteristic of a social group that its members are not coöperative in the sense that each member actively participates in the production of every single element which goes to make up either language, or belief, or customs? Distinguishing thus between *primary* and *secondary* changes and between the *origin* of a change and its *spread*, it behoves us to examine carefully into the causes which make the members of a social unit, either consciously or unconsciously, willing to accept the innovation. What is it that determines acceptance or rejection of a particular change? What limits one change to a small area, while it extends the area of another? Before a final decision can be reached in favor of the second theory of imitative spread it will be necessary to follow out in minute detail the mechanism of this process in a number of concrete instances; in other words to fill out the picture of which Tarde (*Les Lois de l'Imitation*) sketched the bare outlines. If his assumptions prove true, then we should have here a uniformity resting upon other causes than the physical uniformity that appears in the objects with which the natural sciences deal. It would enable us to establish a second group of uniform phenomena which is psycho-physical in its character and rests upon the basis of social suggestion. The uniformities in speech, belief, and institutions would belong to this second group.

In another direction, also, a study of the process of the spread of linguistic changes, combined with a study of the mechanism of dialect formation and early tribal migrations, would be of considerable interest. Hirt, some time ago (*IF*, ix, 292), directed attention to the similarities, both phonetic and morphological, in neighboring but unrelated dialects.¹ "It is a well-known fact that the same phonetic changes are met with in different but adjacent dialectal areas. Most striking are such parallelisms in the languages of the Balkan peninsula. Though much is uncertain, one fact is plain, namely, that Rumanian, Albanian, and Bulgarian, three fundamentally different languages, possess similar features which it is hardly possible to ascribe to mere chance." It seems possible to explain these similarities by assuming at the beginning a large number of many small ethnic units of great mobility and only moderate coherence.² These, moving with considerable ease³ within a comparatively large geographical area, combined, often only temporarily, with other units into larger bodies which may frequently enough have employed a variety of heterogeneous dialects. These, according to the degree of intensity of intercourse and according to the duration of the union, could not help influencing each other. Finally, a certain number of these units permanently consolidated, and, being held together by a common material civilization, they began to form a larger and more coherent unit, became more and more closely knit as time went on, and in the same proportion in which the members of this new body politic coalesced and began to feel their unity, they were further and further separated from their neighbors, and this contrast, which grew up on a political and economic basis, was reflected in the independent development of the language which the new group produced. Such must have been the process which gave rise to definite dialects,⁴ and this manner of forming them explains why — though in historical times we have clearly established dialectal boundary zones — we yet find surprising correspondences between dialects which, in historical times, are completely independent and distinct. They are due to the admixture of small roving bodies of a different linguistic complexion which were themselves absorbed by the larger mass, but which left a trace in the language of those with whom they united.

And, finally, if we maintain the distinction between primary and secondary changes, we shall look for the causes of a change only where that change is primary. It is, of course, true that all sec-

¹ On such similarities and their explanation see Kretschmer, *Einleitung z. Gesch. d. griech. Sprache*, p. 98.

² Edward Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alterthums*, II, p. 44; Kretschmer, *loc. cit.* p. 75.

³ Note, e. g. the ease with which German tribes moved and combined, Lamprecht, *Deut. Gesch.* I (1891), p. 7; *Caes. B. G.* I, 31.

⁴ Bremer in *Paul's Grundriss*, III, pp. 747, 763.

ondary changes must have originated as primary changes, and as *such* they are the direct result of certain forces. But as secondary, that is, adopted changes, they appear where these forces never existed. Not everywhere, therefore, where a certain change is observable may we expect to find the causes also to which it is due; such generative forces can only be discovered where the change is primary. It is wrong to infer that the mere use of a certain syntactical form is *prima facie* evidence of a given mental attitude. As soon as any syntactical phenomenon, such as the order of words in a sentence, has become habitual, it is vain to seek for the causes which lead a given speaker to arrange his words in the accepted order.¹ And Sütterlin (*Das Wesen der sprachlichen Gebilde*, p. 11) very properly points out that for the modern naïve French speaker the analytic *il a aimé* is as much a unit as was the synthetic *amavit* for a Roman. "At the time when the phrase *il a aimé* was first created, the single elements were still comparatively clearly felt; but after it had once become habitual [that is, when uttered by those who simply imitated it] it was fused into one whole. As a matter of fact, the uneducated Frenchman has no idea whether he pronounces one word or three." In a similar way we may speak of the grouping and moulding of a compound concept in the sentence only in those cases where the process is really one of original analysis, but not in those cases where we have a repetition of an analysis already made and cast into linguistic form.² A good portion of the ordinary talk of many persons is undoubtedly of this second, mechanical type.³

I pass over the problem of the origin of Indo-European inflection which has been discussed in its various bearings in two very recent papers by Delbrück (*Einleitung in das Studium der indogermanischen Sprachen*, 4th ed. p. 127) and Hirt (*IF*, xvii, 36). The latter especially, collecting the scattered results of previous investigations (including his own concerning Indo-European gradation and dissyllabic bases), makes four points perfectly clear: namely, that the inflectional system of the Indo-European languages was preceded by an inflectionless period, traces of which are not at all rare in the historical forms. Second, that the distinction of verbal and nominal inflection is not original and that the whole sentence-architecture of the Indo-European, with its characteristic division into subject and verbal predicate, is a secondary growth. Third, all the tense-formatives do not originally refer to time, but to the kind of verbal action. Their tense-force is secondary throughout. And, fourth, that a certain number of what used to be considered suffixes (but not all) are not external accretions, but are the final syllables of a base,

¹ Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie, Die Sprache*, II, p. 365 ff.

² Compare Jerusalem's discussion of the "Erinnerungsurtheil" in his *Urtheilsfunction* (1895).

³ Compare Howells's *Lady of the Aroostook*, pp. 106 and 215.

which in the course of time acquired the force and function of a suffix.

In syntax, the most important feature which has influenced the methods of investigation has been the tendency to carry into practice Humboldt's maxim that language is not so much an *ἔργον* as an *ἐνέργεια*,¹ in other words, to view language not solely as a collection of facts (spoken or written words or sentences) but rather as an activity and a psychical process of which the spoken word itself is only the outward and audible sign. This desire to turn from the finished product to an examination of the producing agency explains the change from the logical to the psychological treatment of grammar.

The arrangement of facts in grammars viewing language as static is largely a classification of linguistic products according to external similarities, similar to the Linnæan classification of plants. Whether this be rougher or finer, whether the subdivisions be few or many, the character of this classification remains essentially the same, inasmuch as it is based upon the present external appearance of things and often cannot take into consideration the genesis of the very qualities according to which it classifies. Now, while such a descriptive classification is necessary, useful, and sufficient for the *practical* mastery of the details of a language, where the sole object is acquaintance with the facts as they are or were, it is *scientifically* insufficient because it fails to indicate how these objects came to be what they are. More than that, it may be positively misleading when it groups together facts which have an external similarity but owe their existence to different causes. These genetic differences a descriptive classification at times veils and obscures. For while it is a truism that a like combination of like forces must produce like effects, it is no less true (though sometimes forgotten) that a different combination of different forces may produce like effects also. It is wholly wrong to work on the principle that like effects must necessarily imply like causes.² Many illustrations might be given of the grouping together of genetically different material under such general descriptive heads as "assimilation," "anaptyxis," etc. And only recently Meumann³ has called attention to the abuse of the term "metaphor" when applied to the variations in the semantic sphere of the child's vocabulary, by showing how entirely different are the psychological processes which underlie the creation of a poetical or rhetorical metaphor from the so-called "generalizing tendency" of the child.

The desire to investigate processes of development rather than classify finished products has affected semantic investigations in

¹ Delbrück, *loc. cit.* p. 45.

² Cf. Foy in *IF*, xii, 33.

³ *Die Sprache des Kindes*, pp. 60-63.

two ways. In the first place it has directed attention to the study of modern dialects and some of the most important contributions (like that of Schiepek, *Der Satzbau der Egerländer Mundart*, 1899) have been along that line. In the second place it has necessarily led to dealing with concrete and individual forms and phrases rather than with general, abstract, and purely conceptual grammatical categories. The advantage of this mode of procedure is that the treatment of a single concrete phrase can take into account all those factors which in the generic treatment by grammatical categories must be disregarded, for all classification implies a more or less judicious slighting. Consequently, "the inevitable result of over-attention to classification is a diversion of attention from details."¹ To illustrate by an example from the author just quoted (p. 210): "It is common . . . to speak of the deliberative subjunctive. But the function [does not abide in the single verb-form, for example, *faciam*, but] belongs to the whole word-group. In the typical form *Quid ego nunc faciam* each word contributes to the total meaning. . . . If both [*ego* and *nunc*] are omitted the question is not necessarily dubitative. The subjunctive form also contributes to the expression of the function of the group, though it is not essential, since the same function is occasionally expressed by sentences with the indicative. But deliberation cannot be expressed by any one of the four words alone, and it is not, therefore, a function of any one of them alone. There is no such thing as the deliberative or dubitative subjunctive; to use the term is to attribute the function of the whole word-group to a single member of the group."

The mention of grammatical categories suggests an important problem which awaits investigation, namely, in how far our so-called grammatical categories exist in the mind of the naïve speaker. Does the untutored speaker who is not sicklied o'er with the pale cast of grammar really possess the categories of number, case, substantive, adjective, etc., apart from the individual forms? The strongest argument in favor of the independent existence of such categories would be the process of so-called functional association. By this is meant the association of words which are neither related in root-meaning (as "father" and "mother"), nor resemble each other in sound (as "co(h)ors" and "curia"), but which play the same part in the construction of the sentence (as two nominatives plural or two first persons of the imperfect). I am not aware that this sort of association appears in any of the experimental investigations which the psychologists have furnished. They are in the habit of distinguishing two main kinds of association only: one by sense, the other by sound. The nature of the material on which they base their classification may account for the absence of this kind of association in

¹ Morris, *On Principles and Methods in Latin Syntax*, p. 217.

the cases which they investigated. But it would seem important to subject the cases of alleged functional association and analogy-formation to a renewed scrutiny with a view of determining whether the psychological process in these cases has not, perhaps, been misinterpreted.

We say, for instance, that in the Oscan dialect the ending of the nominative plural *-ōs* of the masculine *-o-* stems has affected the corresponding case of the relative pronoun (*pōs*) and displaced its regular and distinctive ending (seen in Latin *quī*), much as in vulgar English the sigmatic plural of the noun has affected the personal pronoun of the second person, changing *you* to *yous*. And, since in these cases neither the meaning of the words nor phonetic resemblances can have given rise to associative connection, we are inclined to attribute it to *functional* likeness. It may, however, be submitted that there is another possibility, namely, the transfer of the termination of one word to an adjacent word simply on account of this local contiguity. Words, we must remember, do not in actual speech ordinarily occur isolated, but combined in phrases. Words like the article or pronouns habitually occur in closest proximity to the noun they qualify, and, in general, words with like grammatical function cannot help being placed together in very many instances. Under these conditions it would not be at all surprising if — without any realization by the speaker of their functional similarity — the ending, or the accent ¹ of one member of the group should encroach upon that of the other member, especially if both form a phonetic unit or speech-bar. Such interference may operate in either forward or backward direction, and its character would not be different from that of the so-called regressive and progressive assimilation of sounds within the same word. And this explanation is actually proffered by Wackernagel (*IF*, xiv, p. 367), for some transfers of endings: "Transfer of endings," he says (p. 374), "is not only due to proportional analogy, but also to the fact that the words affected are construed together. . . . Hence the influence of pronominal words on nouns." And he appears to regard in this light the transfer of the ending *-es* which, petrified, appears first in numerals like *τέτορες* with accusative function, and thence spreads over the adjacent nouns. I am inclined to believe that what is now regarded as "functional analogy" owes — if not wholly, at least in good part — its existence to such spread. When we have, for example, in Greek *ὄκτώ* and *ὀπτά* (after *ἑπτά*) I doubt whether the connecting link between the two words was simply their grammatical category and that the change originated in the isolated words, for the experiments which I made concerning the association of numerals (*American Journal*

¹ For the latter see Brugmann, *Berichte d. sächsischen Gesellschaft d. Wissenschaften* for 1900, p. 371 (with references).

of *Philology*, xxii, p. 261) and which were supported by Ebbinghaus's observations (*Zeitschrift f. Psych. und Physiol. d. Sinnesorgane*, xix, 1902, p. 142) showed¹ that cases where one isolated numeral was associated with another were excessively rare. I am, therefore, inclined to believe that the frequent juxtaposition of these two words, without reference to the likeness of their grammatical category, lies at the bottom of the change. And, in general, it would seem as if too little weight is given in our whole treatment of analogy-formation to the associations due to frequent juxtaposition and habitual combinations. We are too apt to take words singly and treat them apart from their ordinary setting. If a word for "day" grammatically influences the word for "night" (as *Nachts* after *Tags*²) is it not because they frequently occur in close proximity in the sentence rather than because the two are associated by sense?³ The coherence of the members of a phrase in the spoken language is much greater than is usually supposed, as is proved by those instances (rare enough in the revised written texts) in which one member of a common word-group may be observed to carry in its train its mate, though the latter be not needed or be even disturbing. Interesting cases of such "agglutinative association" (cf. the author's *Lectures on the Study of Language*, p. 183, sec. 16) are given by Kemmer (*Die Polare Ausdrucksweise in der griech. Litteratur*, Schanz' *Beiträge*, vol. xv, p. 2; 45, 50, 57). They are paralleled in English by such phrases as Colonel Henry Watterson's:⁴ "It (*Life*) is racy of the soil, even as *Punch* in London is racy of English soil, a reflection of the *moods and tenses* of the time, of the thoughts and fancies of the people"; and in these passages from a letter: "As J. was out till morning doth appear, mother and I talked till late"; "This is my regular in the springtime gentle Annie feeling." Such cases⁵ are the morphological counterparts to those phonetic alterations where a word either loses or gains an initial by too intimate union with another word, as *Meisenbühl* (from *im Eisenbühl*, cf. *Zt. f. d. deut. Unterricht*, xvii, 1903, p. 728), and which, for English, are very exhaustively treated by C. P. G. Scott (*Transactions of American Philological Association*, xxiii, 1892, p. 179, xxiv, 1893, p. 89).

¹ Cf. also Ebbinghaus, *Grundzüge der Psychologie*, 2d ed., i, 1905, p. 704. The objections of Marbe and Watts are discussed in *American Journal of Philology*, xxvi, 1905, p. 95, note 1.

² In the same way Latin *noctu* after *diu*, Bartholomae, *IF*, x, p. 13.

³ In this way Gothic *haimos* owes its feminine gender to its frequent connection with *baurgs* (Dieter, *Altgerm. Dial.* p. 571, sec. 330, 2, note 3), late Icelandic *jetr* its feminine gender to frequent connection with *hendr* (Dieter, *ibid.*) etc.

⁴ In an editorial in the Louisville *Courier-Journal*, reprinted in *Life*, vol. xiii (1903), no. 1099, p. 479.

⁵ Cf. also 'high and dry protectionist' in the editorial of the New York *Evening Post* for May 22, 1905, and similar instances collected by H. Willert, *Archiv f. d. Stud. d. neueren Spr. u. Lit.*, vol. cxI (= N. F. xi) p. 420.

SHORT PAPER

MR. ROBERT STEIN, of the United States Geological Survey, read a short paper before this Section on the "Proposed International Phonetic Conference to adopt a Universal Alphabet." The speaker said:

To prepare such an alphabet is a comparatively easy task. Scores of such alphabets exist already, but not one of them possesses sufficient authority to compel its universal use. How shall such authority be secured?

To this question, the circular recently issued by Boston University seeks to obtain an answer. It invites opinions on the plan to hold an international conference for the purpose of adopting a universal alphabet to be used first of all as a key to pronunciation in all dictionaries of the leading languages. I may state at once that the replies received from the editors and publishers of the great American dictionaries are highly encouraging. They state with practical unanimity that, if a universal alphabet were drawn up by a commission composed of the foremost experts, and invested with the requisite authority by scientific bodies of high standing, they would introduce that alphabet as a key to pronunciation in future editions of dictionaries, primers, readers, grammars, and language-manuals as fast as practicable.

It will be noted that the acceptance of the universal alphabet by the dictionaries was made subject to an "if." They are willing to use this alphabet if it is presented to them invested with a sufficient degree of authority. Nothing should be neglected that can add to this authority. Hence the commission which is to prepare the universal alphabet must fulfill four conditions:

- (1) It should be composed of the foremost experts in phonetics.
- (2) They should be invested with representative power by learned bodies of the highest standing.
- (3) They should receive their final commissions from various governments.
- (4) They should conduct their work not merely by correspondence, but should have at least one meeting, preferably several meetings, occupying an adequate length of time.

The scholars able to do this work exist; it only remains to enable them to organize. For this purpose, the circular issued by Boston University is to serve as a preliminary step. Its aim is to obtain the opinion of the learned public. Thus far it has been sent only to the members of the Philological Association, and it may be stated that out of the sixty-seven replies received up to September 16, only four questioned the utility of the conference, the great majority being emphatic and even enthusiastic in its advocacy.

SECTION B — SEMITIC LANGUAGES

SECTION B—SEMITIC LANGUAGES

(Hall 4, September 21, 3 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR G. F. MOORE, Harvard University.

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JAMES A. CRAIG, University of Michigan.
PROFESSOR CRAWFORD H. TOY, Harvard University.

THE RELATION OF SEMITICS TO RELIGION

BY JAMES ALEXANDER CRAIG

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THIS is a subject so intricate in its nature and so extended in its scope that much more time should have been given to its consideration than the few hours which circumstances beyond my control have permitted me to bestow upon it, and furthermore, it demands even under the most favorable circumstances a more varied and profound knowledge for an adequate discussion of it than it is my good fortune to possess. I am reminded at the outset of the famous saying of Euclid, one of the members of the early Ionic school of Greek philosophers, the saying for which he was chiefly remembered by posterity, and which contributed to his recognition by his contemporaries, namely, that it is necessary at the beginning of every discussion to lay down some undeniable principle to start with.

It is self-evident that my subject, The Relation of Semitics to Religion, stands in need of definition. It is, at least, necessary to have some general understanding as regards the sense in which we here use the word "religion." Religion in its largest sense would comprise all its manifestations in all ages and lands, but it is manifest that it cannot be in this sense of the word that I am invited to discuss the relation of Semitics to religion, for the very plain reason that in many instances no relations exist or have existed. At least there have been no historical periods of contact in which a reciprocal influence may have been exerted, or periods of transmission through an

intermediary in which Semitic ideas may have penetrated to remote peoples, as, for example, to the Incas or the Indian tribes of our own continent.

The most that can be said is that in certain particulars there may be found in all religions concepts similar to those held by the Semites at certain stages of their development. Neither, on the other hand, does our subject *necessarily* limit us to a consideration of the relation of Semitics to those great religions which fall either entirely within the field of Semitics, such as the Babylonian, Israelitish, and Jewish, or to the various forms of Christianity which are based upon the religious ideas of the Semites, and more especially upon those of Israel and Judah. The subject calls for a discussion not of Semitics in relation to religions, but in its relations to religion.

The subject tacitly and properly assumes that religion is natural to man, and, if so, that men are universally religious. This fact also bears upon the subject. Go the wide world around, if you have any doubt about that. Pass through its cities, its towns and hamlets and rural regions, and note on every hand what myriad mute, yet convincing, testimonies there are to the religious nature of man. Here are its grand cathedrals; on every street arise its pointing spires, its mosques and minarets, its temples and pagodas; on highway and byway are its chapels, its capellas of saints, its sacred stones. Or, reflect a little along historical lines. How much, for example, of the best artistic creation of the ancient Babylonians and Assyrians drew its inspiration from the religious spirit and religious genius? The fervor of adoration was felt in every chisel-stroke which brought to form their imaginary deities, and their religious sense found finest satisfaction in weaving into their decorative work their conventionalized sacred trees and other emblems of their religious world. With the exception, perhaps, of the animal form, which they studied closely from nature, they are at their best in the religious sphere. Look at the Greeks, the world's preceptors in this region, to whom, more than to any others, it was "the eternal law that first in beauty shall be first in might." Their art was born of their religion. By art they bodied forth their gods, and gave to them most glorious form. By the perfect sculpture of their temples they strove to express the excellency of their religion.

Literature brings unimpeachable witness to the same fact. Even their letters, said the ancients, they learned in the kindergarten of the gods. As their art did, so their literature drew much of its power, permanence, and beauty from religion. Peasant and prince alike have been caught up by its power and taught majestic speech. The Chrysostoms of Judaism were its prophets, and its national library its books on religion. And these, mark you, have preserved its people in their solidarity through all the catastrophes of war,

through all the persecutions of hate. A doubt of man's religious nature in the face of these clamant facts in the history of this one people would be the supremest paradox of thought. But Jewish literature does not stand alone in this respect; the religion of Babylonia has lifted her books of common clay out of the category of things common and unclean. Her myths and epics, her hymns and prayers, furnish us with the finest specimens of her literary art. The stylus was of priestly invention. The "king's ear was enlarged" by Nebo and Tashmit, and the *nishik dupsharuti*, the excellent art of tablet-writing by which the wisdom of Nebo was recorded, was the gift of the gods.

Go to India. There we find a literature that is nothing less than wonderful, immense in quantity and rich in quality. Beginning with the Mantras, almost two thousand years before Christ, with a grand collection of over one thousand selected hymns known as the Rig-Vedas, followed by three other Vedas, it continues down to that comparatively modern body of doctrine known as the Puranas or Traditions. Between this oldest and youngest collection there lie the Brahmanas and Sutras. We have epic and philosophy, ethics and law, brilliant teaching, which, in many an instance, is capable of throwing unsuspected rays of light upon hard problems that lie near to the human heart. What is the great distinguishing note sounding through all this vast body of literature? What was its inspiration and to what end is it primarily addressed? If we must give answer in one word, that word must be Religion.

It would be idle to point to Greek literature or to any other for further confirmation. As the best of Greek art looked toward the gods, so the highest reaches of Greek literature were attained along the ascents of religious thought.

We assume then with our subject that religion is natural to man. It is an essential and necessary part of human life. It gives to itself, moreover, public expression wherever men live together in social organization; but it has its origin in *individuals* who become socially related in religious thought or expression. I do not mean to affirm that every individual has a religious nature, though any other conclusion with respect to the normal man seems difficult. All peoples, and almost all individuals, have a language and the power of speech, have vision and are able to discriminate colors, yet here and there a man is color-blind, or one is dumb. Such a man is said to be defective; the same reasoning must apply in the sphere of religion. Man apparently can no more escape from religion than he can escape from himself. And now, further, these last observations lead to another view which stands in noteworthy contrariety to that which is pre-vaillingly held. Religion is not of the church. This great fact, which is inherent in the nature of man and grows up out of his nature in

connection with the world-order in which he finds himself, exists independently of the churches, and would still exist if there were no churches. Out of it, and for it, the churches have arisen, not *vice versa*, religion out of the church and for the church. In some ecclesiastical organizations this fact of the priority of religion to, and independence of, the church has been utterly forgotten or unrecognized. When, for example, an order of Christians is said to be "a religious order" because of its peculiar connection with the church and its peculiar mode of life, or when a member of such a body is briefly said to be "a religious," the church with its rites and ceremonies is tacitly declared to be the author and guardian of religion, whereas, in fact, it is neither. Religion created the church and is ever re-creating it, because it abides not in temples made of hands, nor, in its last analysis, in courts and ecclesiastics, but in the unspoiled hearts of individual men. It is the individual pure in heart who sees God. Religion belongs to us as individuals, not to the churches. The church is merely an agency for the promotion and cultivation of religion, helpful to the majority of men within its pale, but utterly powerless to affect or make appeal to the higher intellectual and spiritual side of many profoundly religious minds without it, though they may be deeply sympathetic towards many of its aims.

If, then, religion is something that belongs to us all as individuals, possessed by each, and possessing us in turn in absolute and unrestricted thought and service, except in so far as we by moral choice subordinate our individual privilege to altruistic purposes, let us go a step farther and ask whether we are mutually agreed as to what religion is. One thing we have settled and I hope are agreed upon, namely, that religion, being natural to man, belongs to the individual, to me. As regards religion, I am, as an individual, to use a legal phrase, "seized in fee and of right." It is neither a church doctrine, nor a church service, nor both. It is neither of, nor from, nor by the churches. The church did not create it, and it has not the right to demand it of me, nor to command me with respect to it. Its duty is simply to cultivate it among its free worshiping members and promote among men generally, by the functions over which it presides, its highest ideals.

How shall we define religion? It is something that has been variously defined as well as variously conceived. Not long ago I heard a prominent American divine define religion as "An attempt on the part of man to get into right relations to God." The defect of this definition is at once apparent. Religion is not necessarily an attempt of any kind, and if it be nothing more than an attempt, it is not religion at all.

Frequently we find it of advantage in analyzing a concept to

turn for assistance to the etymology of the term by which it is expressed. In this instance, however, we look in vain to the Latin lexicon. The word connotes for us something quite different from that which it suggested to the Romans, who did not agree among themselves as to its meaning. Cicero in his *De Natura Deorum* connected *religio* with *relegere*, and says "those are said to be religious who diligently recur to, and, as it were, repeat all those things which pertain to the worship of the gods." But others, followed by the great church father, Augustine, connect the word with *religare*, to bind back, or firmly; thus rooting it essentially in a sense of obligation. If we come down to more modern times, we find that philosophers and theologians, in discussing religion, are divided into three classes: those who seek its explanation in the intellect alone, who make it purely a matter of thought, as Hegel; or of belief, as Jacobi; or of intuitively perceived truths, as Schelling. Those who would make it a matter of belief only exclude reason or make it antagonistic to belief, thus making of the human mind the proverbial house that is divided against itself. As for intuitive knowledge; that, I think, finds little support from present-day philosophy. A second class declares that religion has its *fons et origo* in the feelings alone. It grows out of a sense of dependence. This is doubtless an important source, but the old maxim *Ex nihilo nihil fit* is an immediate stay to this conclusion. There can be no feeling where nothing but feeling is involved. The case seems to be no better with the third class, who derive it neither from the intellect nor from the feelings, but from the conscience. Conscience is not an independent, separate, faculty, wholly dissociated from intellect and feeling. On the contrary, it presupposes both. The common and fundamental defect of all these views of religion is that they limit it to a single sphere, whereas it operates within and issues out of them all. The mind of man is not made up of a series of bulk-head compartments. Any adequate view of religion must, therefore, take cognizance of all the factors supplied by these different sources. We would, consequently, define religion as man's reasoned thought of the world-order of which he forms a part, the feelings produced in him by this thought, and the deliberate conduct in which it issues. This definition is comprehensive, sufficiently apt, and adequate. I may indicate this by quoting two or three definitions of prominent thinkers, all of which seem to me defective. Herbert Spencer defines religion as "A feeling of wonder in the presence of the unknown." Feeling is everything, and even that is limited to the feeling of wonder. Test that by your thought of Jesus, or of Paul. Were they simply wonderers? Newman, in his *Grammar of Assent*, says, "Religion is the knowledge of God, of his will, and of our duties toward him." Here the definition, taken explicitly, makes knowledge everything. Martineau, in *A Study of*

Religion, describes it as "a belief and worship of the supreme mind and will," and here the main element in Newman's definition is entirely ignored.

I need not pursue this question further, or add to these quotations. I proceed in the next place to ask what relation do Semitics sustain to religion as thus defined? The importance of holding to this definition is obvious. Suppose I were to take Spencer's definition of religion as my starting-point, my subject would then run: The Relation of Semitics to a Feeling of Wonder in the Presence of the Unknown. How could I, how could you, discuss a question like that?

This historical and genetic relation of Semitic thought to religion is unparalleled in degree, if not in kind. Semitic thought has been the matrix whence have been born three of the greatest historical, still extant, and dominant religions, — Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism. And, since the study of Semitics is the study of Semitic thought as it has expressed itself more especially in language and literature, the subject of the hour possesses a practical interest and is of paramount importance. It is not a question of academic interest solely, but one that may well engage the attention of pew and pulpit, of all men who try to discover truth or find their relations and do their duty in the world. But the subject as a whole cannot be discussed in a single lecture.

Let us take the first element of religion as we have defined it, — man's thought of the world-order of which he forms a part, — and ask what relations has Semitics to that. Or let us put the question differently: How and to what extent is that thought affected by the study of Semitics? And, since the study of Semitics, as distinguished from some branch of Semitics, is confined practically to Christian scholars, or scholars in Christian nations, we shall deal with that thought as it exists among Christians. To the preceding question the Semitist must answer, it is affected in many ways and to a much greater extent than is popularly supposed. Let us take the God of Christian thought. Semitics, so far as I can discover, has no positive contribution to make to our present understanding of the nature of God. Polytheistic Semites and monotheistic Semites alike believed in the personality of Deity. On the nature of the ultimate and eternal cause, or principle, we cannot now expect to learn better than we know from a literature that was closed for the most part two thousand years ago. But I think Semitics does aid us in arriving at some reasonable conclusion with respect to the origin of the idea of a God, or gods, and this points clearly in the direction of an animistic doctrine. It is true, of course, that when we meet a race in the possession of a literature it is no longer in a primitive stage, but we are fortunate enough to be able in the Semitic field to catch the people almost, as it were, in passage from the earlier to the more advanced state.

The prevailing idea of a *primitive monotheism* is one that has come down to us through the church. It has found, and finds, its advocates among theologians, and also among archæologists, and philosophers. The theological view of it is derived from supposed explicit and final statements in the Old Testament, especially in the opening chapters of Genesis. In early times, during the Middle Ages, and, indeed, down to a period not far removed from our own times, it was supposed and held that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. This is not to be wondered at in view of the almost universal ignorance of clergymen not only of Hebrew but also of general Semitic literature. In the field in which they are supposed to be masters they are, as a rule, lamentably uninformed. So ran the teaching — the history of his own times Moses wrote from personal knowledge, the period of the patriarchs he learned from tradition, and the history of creation and the earlier experience of man in Paradise he got from the highest authority, the Creator himself. This view so fixed itself in the minds of theologians that even scholars like Dillmann thought it necessary to combat it in his last edition of Genesis. This one God, it was said, revealed himself to mankind at its start, and this primitive monotheism was handed down from the beginning through the line of Adam, Seth, Noah, Abraham, the Prophets, and Jesus. The simplicity of the idea diverted attention from its astonishing naïveté.

The philosophical view approached this doctrine from another side. To cite only one writer, let me take Creuzer, in his work *Symbolik und Mythologie*. To him all old myths are theological. Almost all of the myths of the Greeks were derived from the Orient. From the Oriental point of view these myths stand for comprehensive conceptions, and the myth is but the development of the religious teachings of the priesthood. He holds that between the different mythologies a close relation exists and that there is an original unity of thought toward which the various mythologies point, and that this unity presupposes, as its original type, a pure monotheism. We shall say nothing about the logical, or better, the illogical leaps by which he reaches his conclusion. This original monotheism, although in the process of time it was corrupted into polytheism, yet never wholly disappeared, but was preserved even in the priestly traditions of the anthropomorphic systems of Greece. So long as the race was a unit, this original monotheism, he claims, could and did maintain itself, but the breaking up of the original stock into separate peoples resulted also in the breaking up of the one-God idea — a suggestion which sounds much the same as the one by which the origin of language is explained in the eleventh chapter of Genesis, in which we have a sound religious teaching based upon a popular and worthless etymology of the word Babel. We can understand how one language could give rise to a number of different though cognate lan-

guages, but we should not expect any particular one of them to preserve the original language in its purity, but all alike to change and modify it. Neither should we expect the postulated original one-God idea to be preserved in one out of all the tribes of the earth, and to be sunk so completely beneath the religious consciousness of all the other tribes as to be irrevocably lost to them. That supposition is possible only by the help of another sheer assumption, namely, that of a perpetual miracle which operated to preserve an idea in the minds of the few in order that they might give it back again in the course of the ages to the many, all of whom had it at the beginning.

What does our earliest historical literature in the field of Semitic study teach us on this question of a primitive monotheism? In Babylonia, at least, it teaches us what from other considerations we had reason to anticipate. One of the many important results achieved by the expedition sent out by the University of Pennsylvania to Babylonia was its discovery in Nuffar, the site of the ancient Nippur, of some of the earliest royal inscriptions that have yet come down to us. An inscription of one of these kings, Lugalzaggisi, who, about 4000 B.C., ruled over a territory almost as vast as that of the later Sargon I, was brought to light. It contained over one hundred and thirty-two lines and was written upon scores of large vases which the king's piety had prompted him to present to the old national sanctuary in Nippur. This king calls himself the priest of Ana, that is, the sky-god. He was looked upon by the faithful eye of Lugal-kurkura, that is, Bel. Intelligence was given to him by Ea, the son of Bel, or the Babylonian Hermes. He was invested with power by Utu, the sun-god, and nourished by Ninharsag, the great Abarakku of the gods. It is highly probable that this Bel, whose epithet here is "lord of the mountains" or "lord of lands," was in early times an astral deity, in fact, the sun-god, although an earlier designation of Bel was Enlil, "lord of demons." In any case, the story of Tiamat, which represents the primeval conflict in which the gods of darkness were assailed by the gods of light, the story of the struggle by which cosmic order was wrested from the body of Chaos — this story appears to have passed through different recensions, and, in one or more of them, Bel seems to have been the hero, and, if so, he was in early times a god of light. This would make it all the easier for the priestly schools to transfer to the solar deity Marduk, the god of Babylon, the attributes of Bel when Babylon acquired the political ascendancy among the city kingdoms which had long struggled for supremacy. This same Bel was worshiped in other early Babylonian cities, in Erech, and Kish, for example, and Sin, the moon-god, was the chief deity of the ancient city of Ur, and of the north Mesopotamian sanctuary in Harran. The temple of Bel at Nippur was erected, if the estimate of its excavators be correct, as early as 6000

or 7000 B.C. That means, then, that we have evidence of the worship of the sun and other heavenly bodies as early as this period, a couple of millennia before the time when, but a few years ago, sober-minded men, on the basis of the Bible, declared that the world was created.

When we meet with the old Babylonian on the threshold of history, we find him prostrate before the sun and other heavenly bodies, though not worshipping astral deities exclusively. The Egyptian, likewise, bows before his Osiris and Ra, and the priests of India teach their followers to worship Surya, the same word as the Greek Helios, the sun. The sun is the most awe-impelling and thought-awakening object of the visible universe, majestic in splendor as he marches across the heavens upon his daily round. What a contrast to human experience he forms! Man sees himself and everything that is about him subject to change, his plans are frustrated, his way is blocked, but yonder is a power, a being, for so the early-minded must have thought, that knows unerringly his way and walks it unhindered, unafraid. He is also beneficent and good, so good that when the Hebrew prophet wishes a simile expressive of the goodness of his national redeemer, he calls him "the sun of righteousness" who comes with healing in his wings, as the Babylonian sun-god is represented on the cylinders.

"Unpropped beneath, not fastened firm, how comes it
That downward turned he falls not downward?
The guide of his ascending path, who saw it?"

Thus speaks the sage and worshiper of India.

Every lifeless thing unsupported in space, experience tells him, falls. How does *he* always find his path so unerringly in the heavens when there is none to guide him? He must choose it and adhere to it himself, and it must be that behind all this regularity and persistence of movement there is a purpose, for even the most primitive man is conscious of a purpose within himself.

The Semitic literature of Babylonia, so far as I am able to see, furnishes no evidence for the doctrine of a primitive monotheism, but points rather to a polytheistic astral worship as, at least, one of the earliest forms of religion. I am well aware that some Semitic scholars have endeavored to support the monotheistic theory from a study of other Semitic literature. This has been done especially by one scholar, to whom I may refer, the eminent Assyriologist and Semitist, Professor Hommel, of Munich. In his *Ancient Hebrew Tradition*, published a few years ago, Dr. Hommel makes extended use of the South Arabian Minæan and Sabæan inscriptions, so laboriously collected by Dr. Glazer. In dealing with the proper names of these inscriptions, and while admitting the polytheistic character of the South Arabian religion, he nevertheless endeavors to make it appear

that the prevalence of names compounded with the generic name *Ilu*, god, points back to an earlier monotheism. Characteristic of the reasoning of this book, however, is another statement. In dealing with a certain type of name of the period of Hammurabi, he points out that the most of them are compounded with the names *Sin*, *Shamash*, and *Ramman*, and, as in the case of the *Minæan*, the generic *Ilu*. Hethen continues, "Notwithstanding the countless greater and lesser deities in which Babylonian polytheism abounded, the names in general use seem to prove that it was only the moon, sun, and sky which conveyed an impression of deity to the Babylonian mind" (in this point he supports the idea of an original astral worship); "but then," he adds further, "if we substitute the simple word god, *Ilu*, for the moon, the sun, or the sky, these names express no sentiment which is inconsistent with the highest and purest monotheism." This is much like saying, that, if we were to substitute for Fritz Hommel the title Kaiser, he might pass for the Emperor of Germany. I modestly own my inability to perform the syllogistic feats implied in this mental process.

The more spiritual view which came in with the ethical monotheism of the prophets is a development from the cruder stage of polytheistic belief. "That was not first which was spiritual, but that which was natural, and afterward that which was spiritual."

But granted that this result is achieved, some may say it is a negation and, therefore, nugatory? It is a negation, — a negation of a widespread doctrine pertaining to man's knowledge of God. But every negation establishes an affirmative as its opposite, and a negative conclusion may determine my action as forcibly as an affirmative. If I establish the fact that there is no more gold to be found in yonder mountain ledge, I will cease to dig there for gold. Action, as we have seen, is motivated by feeling, and feeling issues out of knowledge. If we find that there is no evidence of a primitive revelation of one God from the one God, we have cleared the field for the inquiry, how did man arrive at the idea of God? and our answer to this must, in the nature of things, affect our religion.

Another question may now arise: assuming the existence of deity, or first cause, or, perhaps better, constant cause (we are not here concerned about the name), how is knowledge of this deity and his will ascertained? The study of Semitics is, I think, in many quarters at least, leading to different conclusions on this point. The Jewish and the Christian doctrine especially have made this knowledge wholly a matter of direct revelation, received in ecstasy, or otherwise. Philo, the Alexandrian Jewish philosopher, taught that God's word was obtained directly from God while the prophet was in a state of ecstasy. Philo, who was widely read in classical literature, borrowed his theory from Plato. The Egyptian priests taught the same. Abam-

mon, in reply to Porphyry, says, "the divinity comprehends everything in us, but exterminates entirely our own proper consciousness. The divine possession also emits words which are not understood by those that utter them." And Philo says, God plays upon the soul of the prophet just as the musician plays upon the flute. He uses the lips of the prophet without any coöperation on the part of the prophet. As the flute was not conscious of the music it produced, so the prophet was not conscious of his message. This *pagan doctrine* was widely adopted in the early Christian church and has come down to modern times. Hengstenberg advocates it strongly in his *Christology of the Old Testament*, differing from Philo only in making the prophet aware of what he was saying. In one form, or another, this supernaturalistic theory has found and finds many advocates. Among English writers, it has been stated in its extreme form by Lea, who, in his work on Inspiration, declares that the sacred authors were but the "instruments" used by God in the communication of his word; that they occupied the same relation to God as the pen does to the hand of the writer. It is implied also in the teaching of theologians nearer home, who would account for all defects and errors in the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments by the absurd theory of an "infallible original."

The study of the works of Mohammedan philosophers and theologians shows how Mohammedanism, starting out from the same point, by accepting the revelations of Mohammed as divine, developed a doctrine of sacred scripture that equals the extremest views of Christianity. The Shafi'ites with their doctrine of tradition outran the thought of the Princetonites, and that almost one thousand years in advance of them. Over against those who have insisted upon the literal meaning of the word, are others, like the Shi'ists, who look for a higher spiritual meaning in the verbal form, similar to the Schoolmen who taught the *multiplex intelligentia*, which they borrowed in turn from the Talmudists and Kabbalists. Then again we have the Mutazilites, who held that the Quran was the work of Mohammed, but was produced under divine influence, that it had, therefore, a human as well as a divine side. Those things in it which were not conformable to the truth, as they conceived it, could be ignored. In the same way modern theologians refer the irreconcilable views or teaching of the Bible, for example, the unfulfilled and unfulfillable predictions of the prophets, to their human origin. The facts, they say, which point to a human origin of the prophetic teaching, "are no less striking than those which point to a divine origin." (They should say they are much more striking.) This is the admission of the Mutazilite professors in our present orthodox theological seminaries. There were those who held that the Quran was uncreated, and those who held that it was created; those who, like Ahmad ibn

Hanbal, held that religious truth had no other source than the Quran and tradition, and that reason availed nothing. Ahmad, the Mohammedan, was the Jacobi of Christianity, who said, "by my faith I am a Christian, by my reason a heathen." The drift back to the primitive monotheism of Mohammed, and the drift to an agnostic mysticism, marks the thinking of many Mohammedans at the present time, just as similar movements may be found among ourselves. Starting out from practically the same principle of revelation, there is a remarkable parallelism in the development of doctrine among the followers of Mohammed with respect to the Quran to many views held by our fellow Christians in different ages with respect to our Scriptures. Christians will not admit the legitimacy of the Mohammedan's reasoning with respect to his sacred Suras, though it is in all essentials the same as their own.

Just so long as Semitists and theologians were shut up to the use of the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, it was easier to hold to the historic ideas of revelation and inspiration. But the thoughts of men are widening with the emergence into view of the life and thought of other branches of the Semitic family. No one needs now to be told of the immense literature that fills the museums of the world, which, during the last few decades, has been recovered from many mounds in the traditional ancestral home of the Hebrews. In the light of these histories, legends, myths, cosmogonies, these epics, hymns, prayers, religious rituals, and incantations, legal codes, etc., we read anew the life and thought of Israel. The first twelve chapters of Genesis clearly draw from a Babylonian source. The original matter came to the Hebrews by the way of Babylon. The whole is recast in the spirit of the later prophetic and priestly monotheistic schools, but none of us can hereafter look upon these chapters as possessing that *kind* or *degree* of inspiration which, until lately, it has been customary to ascribe to them. The two accounts of creation in the first and second chapters of Genesis, it has long been recognized, are utterly irreconcilable. The story of the building of the tower in the land of Shinar, Gen. 11, and the "confusion of tongues," with its impossible accounting for the name of Babel, are removed at once from the sphere of history to that of legendary fiction, and *Volks-Etymologie*. The laws purporting to have been revealed to Hammurabi by the god Shamash, twenty-three hundred years B.C., are in many instances as wise, humane, and ethical, in others more so, as those commonly supposed to have been given to Moses by Yahwe one thousand years later.

When we come to the history of "Yahwe's Wars," we read such an account as that of the destruction of the Amorites at Gibeon in the light of the victories of other gods "beyond the River." "And Yahwe discomfited them before Israel, and he slew them with a great slaugh-

ter at Gibeon, and chased them by the way of the ascent of Beth-horon, and smote them to Azekah. . . . And it came to pass as they fled from before Israel . . . that Yahwe cast down great stones from heaven upon them . . . and they died. They were more who died with the hailstones than they whom the children of Israel slew with the sword." Such a passage has no longer a unique claim upon our confidence. We must now place side by side with narratives like these others supplied from the Babylonian archives, for example, Ashur's response to Esarhaddon in the presence of his enemy the Gimirrai. "Thou thy mouth hast opened. I thy distress have heard. From the gate of heaven I will curse. Thou shalt stand within their fortress. Before thee I shall arise. To the mountains I shall chase them. Stones of destruction I shall rain down upon them. Thy foes I shall cut off, with their blood I shall fill the river." As Yahwe fought for Joshua and the kings of Israel, so Ashur fought for Esarhaddon and the kings of Assyria. When King Mesha of Moab saw that the Israelites were winning the day, the only strategy he knew was to sacrifice his son upon the walls of the city to his *offended* god, "and lo! the battle was stayed. There was great indignation against Israel and they departed from the king of Moab and returned unto their own land." Israel's god and Moab's god are seen in this story to be twin deities, bone of the same bone, and flesh of the same flesh, as the relationship of Moab and Israel might have led us to expect. It matters not that the sacrifice of children died out in Israel before it did among the people of Moab.

As we read the Hebrew scriptures in the light of the larger literature of the Semitic peoples, we find more and more justification for the significant attempt made years ago by Robertson Smith when he undertook to treat "The Religion of the Semites" as a whole. We see more reason for laying stress upon the human side which was emphasized by the Mutazilites in their theory of the origin of the Quran.

Let us look for a moment at Prophecy in the light of this new view we are learning from Semitics. Prophecy is more and more seen to be the outcome of the conflicts and milling of kingdoms. Political conditions, social conditions, moral sentiments, and patriotic impulses on the one hand, on the other hand the prevailing conception of Yahwe, who has not yet outgrown all the features of his early tribal origin. These were its inspiration and are the most evident facts in its explanation. It presents on its ethical side some of the very best that is in our Bible. Its authors often walk on moral heights far above their fellows, at times appear to soar in the serene sublimities of the spiritual world. But how clearly we see the play of situation and circumstance in the uttered message!

Look at Amos, the prophet of law. He learned a simple science of nature as he trod the plains by day and tented beneath the stars

by night. He saw the seasons come and go with regularity and with their constant phenomena. The thinking shepherd saw and learned. He grasped in some rude fashion the thought of nature's uniformities. Even in the lion's roar there was proclaimed the mighty law of cause and effect. That which he learned from the world of nature he carried up into his thought of Yahwe's moral government. Here, too, there was invariable antecedent and consequent, cause and effect; evil antecedents, evil consequences, evil causes, evil effects. It must be so. He thunders it forth before the calf-worshipping priest Amaziah, before Israel's king, that moral emasculate, Jeroboam, before the vampire nobles and their wine-soaked courtesans, before venal priests and sycophant prophets. "It must be so" runs through his stern denunciations. Doom dogs the heels of crime. Thus Amos became the prophet of law, the stern Puritan, bred, as so often, where the limpid waters run, on the hillside where the horizon is wide, on the open veldt, wherever the air blows free and pure.

Look again, this time at Hosea, who followed Amos, and see him swinging clear to the opposite pole and declaring the transcendent attribute of Yahwe to be Love. Why Love? Why? Because it was the feeling that welled up in his own heart. Won by the natural charms of beauty in woman he had taken to himself Gomer *bath* Diblaim. Alas, that beauty is not always the seamless cloak of nice virtue! Temptation came, and Gomer sinned, but the cry of Hosea's heart went up for her. The steel of anguish entered his soul, but the noble affection of his heart was not outraged. He loved her still, and out of this human experience in which the eternal passion emerged triumphant over the assaults of shame and crucifying pain, there came, eight hundred years before Jesus and John, the message to men that God is Love. God could not be less good than he.

Look again at Isaiah, patrician and priest of the temple. What is his distinctive message? What as priest could it be but holiness, with its antithetic correlates of sin and righteousness? It was most natural that the live coal which purged his unclean lips should be carried by cherub hands from the temple altar. Amos the herdsman found God and his call as he wrenched the leg of the lamb from the mouth of the lion. Note again, that Isaiah, of noble birth, a resident of Jerusalem, a sort of Judæan metropolitan as compared with the other prophets, proclaimed the inviolability of Zion. The spears of the enemy, the arms of Assyria, would break upon her walls. With all Isaiah's sincerity and moral uprightness, he lived too near the centre of evil to see it in all the hideousness lent by perspective. His aristocratic shield protected him from its worst assaults. He was not deaf to its cries, not blind to its miseries, far from it, but they did not touch home to the bone of him or his. How was it with his contemporary in the country village — Micah of Moresheth of Gath?

It was from places such as this that the foul fiends of Jerusalem plutocracy could be seen stripped of all the softening airs of gentility, that the bones of the peasant and husbandman, of the widow and orphan could be seen, ground, as in the fable, to make bread for the plutocrat giants of Jerusalem. What message had Micah for Jerusalem? He had the only message that was possible for one in his situation, a message flatly opposed to the assuring words of Isaiah.

"Zion is built with blood and Jerusalem with iniquity,
Therefore, Zion for your sake shall be plowed as a field,
And Jerusalem shall become heaps,
And the temple hill as the heights of a forest."

What have we here when we look at the very best, that which is instinct with life and moral righteousness? Everywhere we see the man as a mirror of the higher types of his kind; everywhere the play of natural forces, of common, or peculiar, historical and social conditions. If you turn to the less attractive features of prophecy, you will find them, for example, in the later parts of the book of Isaiah — baseless visions of future splendor, mammoth desires for worldly riches, Jerusalem to be the sacred coffer into which all the wealth of the heathen shall be poured, Gentiles crowding day and night with all their treasures to her open gates, the fat rams of Nebaioth smoking upon her altars, high over her towers and temple and lighting up the Holy City Yahwe shedding forth a divine effulgence, the Jews now gathered from the ends of the earth, in lieu of all their suffering and ignominy, shall feast on the fatness of the Gentiles, mumble the beads of the Jewish rosary, and, as for the rest, since there shall be no more need of work or business for them, sit like the anchorites of old in rapt and holy contemplation. How startlingly human all that is! Certainly if in the sublimer lines of Holy Writ we see distinctly the figure of the human impressed in brighter colors upon the page, we here see the darker shadow of the human heart in these ecstatic and baseless visions of impoverished and persecuted Jews. Now I say without fear of successful contradiction that the study of Semitics, even of the book itself, which we all love and revere, is leading gradually but surely to the bringing of it forth from the holy seclusion and isolation to which it has been so long consigned. It is working toward ridding this old literature from the evil of dehumanization, partial or complete, to which a devout but uninformed piety unfortunately subjected it.

I need not here refer to the work which has been accomplished in the last decades in the field of the Old Testament by Historical Criticism. The Pentateuchal books, instead of being the work of one author, Moses, who in the field of legislation was divinely inspired to horoscope the unborn centuries and write *ante factum* a complete code applicable to the minutest details of a future nation's needs,

are finally determined to contain different codes, of gradual growth, and of different ages. They now take their place among legal documents that have appeared in the progress of the world's history and as kindred productions. Formerly they were thought to stand as an exception to all that is definitely known in the history of legal development. In speaking of these codes one might adopt the language of the best legal historians with respect to English law. "The time," says Pollock and Maitland, "has long gone by when English lawyers were tempted to speak as though their scheme of 'forms of actions' had been invented in one piece by some all-wise legislator. It grew up little by little. The age of rapid growth is that which lies between 1154 and 1272. During that age the Chancery was doling out actions one by one, there is no solemn *actionem dabo* proclaimed to the world. . . . It was an empirical process, for the supply came in response to a demand. It was not dictated by an *abstract jurisprudence*. . . . It advanced along the old Roman road which leads from experiment to experiment." And that which was true of adjective law, of which he is here speaking, we are assured, was also true of the substantive law.

The study of Semitics is working in its own degree, and in harmony with other sciences, towards the result of disestablishing the old religious view which confined the revelations of God to a book and his inspiration to the men alone who wrote the book. If God be discoverable, the path of liberty, so long barred by theologic dogma, which has its roots in heathenism, is being cleared of obstructions that men may seek God where they will if, haply, they may find him.

We shall still read reverently that great soliloquy on the divine omnipresence and omniscience contained in Psalm 139:

O Yahwe, thou hast searched me, and known me.
 Thou knowest my downsitting and mine uprising,
 Thou understandest my thought afar off,
 Thou searchest out my path and my lying down,
 And art acquainted with all my ways.
 For there is not a word in my tongue,
 But, lo! O Yahwe, thou knowest it altogether.
 Thou hast beset me behind and before
 And laid thine hand upon me.
 Such knowledge is too wonderful for me;
 It is high, I cannot attain unto it.
 Whither shall I go from thy spirit?
 Or whither shall I flee from thy presence?
 If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there:
 If I make my bed in Sheol
 Behold! thou art there.
 If I take the wings of the morning,
 And dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea;
 Even there shall thy hand lead me,
 And thy right hand shall hold me.
 If I say, surely the darkness shall overwhelm me,
 And the light about me shall be night;
 Even the darkness hideth not from thee,
 But the night shineth as the day:
 The darkness and the light are both alike to thee.

But we shall also turn with similar appreciation and sense of satisfaction to the words of Krishna in the Bhagavad Gita:

I am the ancient sage without beginning;
 I am the ruler and the all-sustainer.
 I am incomprehensible in form,
 More subtle and minute than subtlest atoms.
 I am the cause of the whole universe,
 Through me it is created and dissolved.
 On me all things within it hang suspended
 Like pearls upon a string. I am the light
 In sun and moon, far, far beyond the darkness.
 I am the brilliancy in flame, the radiance
 In all that's radiant, the light of lights,
 The sound in ether, fragrance in the earth,
 The seed eternal of existing things,
 The life in all, the father, mother, husband,
 Forefather and sustainer of the world,
 Its priest and Lord. I am its way and refuge,
 Its habitation and receptacle,
 I am its witness. I am victory
 And energy; I watch the universe
 With eyes and face in all directions turned.
 I dwell as wisdom in the heart of all.
 I am the goodness of the good,
 I am beginning, middle, and eternal time,
 The birth, the death of all. I am the symbol A
 Among the characters. I have created all
 Out of one portion of myself. Even those
 Who are of low and unpretending birth
 May find the path to higher happiness.

Then be not sorrowful, from all thy sins
 I shall deliver thee. Think thou on me,
 Have faith in me, adore and worship me,
 And join thyself in meditation to me.
 Thus shalt thou come to me, O Arjuna!
 Thus shalt thou rise to my supreme abode
 Where neither sun, nor moon, have need to shine,
 For all the lustre they possess is mine.

The bearing of one branch of Semitic study upon the Bible and, therefore, of course, upon biblical religions, have been treated by Dr. Delitzsch in his recent work, *Babel und Bibel*. Others have written along the same lines, such as the Bible, and Monuments, etc. I have purposely refrained in this address from that individual method of treatment. The facts which were set forth in Dr. Delitzsch's address have been familiar to Assyriologists for many years, and it must have come as a surprise to most of them, as I confess it did to me, that such a theological furore should have been aroused by the publication of his lecture.

Before closing I wish to mention two other facts which are of the greatest importance in this connection and which must be borne in mind in considering any form of religion based upon the commonly accepted doctrine of our sacred books or any form of that doctrine. The first of these is that the idea of conscience was of late development even among the foremost peoples of ancient times. There is no word for conscience in any ancient literature until the time of Zeno,

cir. 320 years B.C.; and the ancient Semites had no word for it whatever. When, then, we find the prophets of the Old Testament ringing out in the face of royal murderers, venal judges, false prophets, a worldly priesthood, their stern and uncompromising denunciations, and threatening the nation's doom, and prefacing these prophecies with a "Thus saith Yahwe," we must ask ourselves in the face of this fact what this "thus saith Yahwe" means. Now many a Christian theologian has laid particular emphasis upon passages so prefaced, and claimed for them a special degree of revelation, but many of these phrases and ideas were formed in the days when men were prattling as children, nearer to savagery than civilization, when there was no science, no philosophy, no psychology, no pathology, when a man's brains were supposed to be in his heart and his tenderest emotions in his bowels, when a sterile octogenarian or a barren concubine could bring the generous stork to the home by chewing a mouthful of mandragoras root or bestowing the proper rites upon the *aban aladi*, or birthstone. It was an age when pain was the poison of demons, or the punishment of the gods, when an eclipse was an almighty frown.

The other fact to which I have alluded is that there was no thought of *Secondary Causation*. That is an idea that was introduced by the Greeks. With the Semites all that happened was the *direct result* of the divine interference. Even in Jesus' day he had to combat the idea when he asked the Jews whether they thought that they upon whom the tower of Siloam fell were more wicked than others. This is the theory upon which the pragmatically constructed Book of Judges rests. All the calamities which befell the tribes were the direct result of departure from Yahwe; every deliverance from foes the reward of return to him. This is the theory, too, which called forth that great religious protest from the author of the book of Job. Conscious of his own integrity, Job became the arch-heretic of his day, bade defiance to all the teaching of the schools, and, though he had no explanation for the mystery of pain, he, nevertheless, became a pioneer of truth, cleared the way for better thought of God, and wrote himself immortal. The pure in heart *see* God.

I have already said enough to indicate the way in which the study of Semitics is contributing to *clear the way* for a new and larger idea of deity and his relations to man and the universe. Biblical as well as Semitic study is beginning to see that the deity of the Bible is a Semitic deity and as such insufficient. And, as every religion must be measured by its thought of God, it is clear that the work that Semitics is performing in relation to religion is of fundamental importance. A circumscribed, or limited God, or a God whose nature is conceived of in terms of our own, cannot have a religion large enough for humanity, any more than a bad God can have a good religion.

TWO SEMITIC PROBLEMS

BY CRAWFORD HOWELL TOY

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THE Semitic questions now under discussion traverse the whole field of Semitological science; they comprise phonological, morphological, syntactical, lexicographical, rhetorical, and historical problems. With every generation, it is true, some advance is made — some questions are more or less definitely settled; for example, the signification of the two verb-forms, the Perfect and the Imperfect. But, as investigation becomes more and more minute, new questions come to the front, there is greater demand for exactness, and old conclusions have to be reviewed and old opinions modified. Out of this mass of problems we may select two for our present inquiry: one relating to the primitive seat of the Semites, and the other to the genesis of the Perfect and the Imperfect.

Primitive Seat of the Semites

The state of this question somewhat over twenty years ago I presented in an article read before the American Philological Association in 1881, and printed in vol. XII of the *Transactions* of the Association. I there considered the arguments which had been employed up to that time for the settlement of the question. These arguments were partly geographical, partly linguistic. In favor of Arabia as the primitive Semitic home it was urged that the central position of this country fits it to be a centre of distribution and that it has always been in historical times a point of emigration. To this it was replied that the geographical situation of Arabia by no means settles the question; for though it has been a centre of distribution in historical times before Islam and for a century or two after Islam, still this cannot prove the case for earlier times. The same thing holds of the Aramean region and of the Tigris-Euphrates valley, both of which have poured forth streams of emigrants — there is nothing in the geographical relations that could establish the

superiority of one of these regions as the centre of distribution in prehistoric times.

It has been urged, also, that the people whose language exhibits the earliest forms must have occupied the original seat of the race. This consideration has been adduced in favor of Arabia as the Semitic home, the Arabic language having preserved in general the earliest Semitic forms, but this consideration is by no means conclusive. The preservation or loss of early forms is a matter of wear and tear. A people occupying the original seat may have had such social relations as tended to degrade grammatical forms; and, on the other hand, a community wandering from the original home may have remained so secluded as to preserve to a great degree the earliest forms of its language. To this it may be added that no one of the Semitic languages has in all cases preserved the earliest grammatical forms; but the formal degradation has been produced by conditions which we are not able to fix with certainty. In any case it may be said that the loss of grammatical forms in the Babylonian-Assyrian could by no means of itself demonstrate that this language was not spoken in the original seat of the Semitic race.

The argument from vocabulary has been stoutly pressed. If, it is said, we can recover the vocabulary of the primitive language, its contents, and especially the names of natural objects, will indicate the region in which the language arose. This argument has been urged especially in behalf of Babylonia as the Semitic home. It is found that the Semitic dialects have the same words for certain objects, as the vine, sheep, goat, camel, gold, copper, winter, summer, heaven, river, canal, sea, and bitumen-brick, and this list appears to point to Babylonia. Yet this argument also is not conclusive. The Babylonian term for a movable object, as, for example, a metal, may be an importation, and so to some extent words for plants and domestic animals; animals might easily pass from one region to another, as, for example, the horse was imported into Egypt. Further, when two dialects agree in a word, one may have borrowed it from the other; or one, having borrowed it from a foreign source, may have transmitted it to others. Moreover, one may have changed its home once or oftener, and its vocabulary may have been affected by its various places of abode; all that can be said for any one region to which the vocabulary points is that it has in some regards affected the language, and such influence indicates a residence of the people there at some time. Further, so far as regards the words mentioned above as apparently pointing to Babylonia, some of them are names of objects (as domestic animals, winter, summer, heaven) which cannot be regarded as peculiar to any one place.

None of these arguments, then, can be regarded as conclusive, nor has additional evidence been adduced along these lines. Recently,

however, certain other considerations have been urged in favor of one or another region as the home of the primitive Semitic people.

One argument is based on what is assumed to be the relation between the civilizations of Egypt and Babylonia. It is affirmed that Egyptian civilization was borrowed from Babylonia, and it is thence inferred that this latter country, having developed so vigorous a culture at so early a time, must be the original Semitic centre. This inference is by no means valid: supposing that Babylonia was the first Semitic region to create a great civilization, it would not follow that it was the original seat of the Semites, since it is quite conceivable that the Babylonians might have migrated from their original home to the Tigris-Euphrates valley. It is, in fact, doubtful how far what we know as Babylonian civilization is of Semitic origin; the Babylonians seem certainly to have borrowed much from their non-Semitic predecessors. But, leaving this point aside, there is no proof that Egyptian civilization was borrowed from the Babylonian. The two have certain things in common, as indeed it is possible to find common elements in all the ancient civilizations. The political constitutions of the two countries show a certain similarity; but the similar features arise naturally out of the social conditions, and there is no reason why they should not have arisen independently in two different countries. It is possible to discover some resemblance in the architecture: the pyramids of Egypt have been compared with the Babylonian tower-temples. Both of these structures consist of a series of platforms built one over another. But similar structures are found in other parts of the world, as, for example, in Mexico and Polynesia. And the uses of the two were very different: in the one case we have a tomb, in the other a temple. Perhaps the most striking difference between the two civilizations is found in the religious development, and that in two respects. In the first place the Egyptians developed a system of departmental or specific gods, while the Babylonians never really reached such a point. The Babylonian deities are constructed after one design: any one of them may take the place of any other — that is to say, they represent simply the conception of superhuman power, and every local deity was sufficient for all the needs of his worshippers. Each in turn becomes universal and omnipotent. Now this is to some extent true of Egypt, as it is true of all ancient countries. But the Egyptian pantheon developed far more individualized divine characters, approaching in that respect the Greek. Then there is the curious Egyptian worship of living animals, to which nothing similar is found in Babylonia. In the second place the two peoples diverged widely in their representations of the future life. No two conceptions could be more unlike than the colorless existence in the Babylonian underworld and the vigorous moral element introduced by the Egyptians into the picture

of the future. Supposed resemblances between names of deities in the two countries amount to nothing. At a comparatively late period Egypt borrowed certain Semitic deities, whether from Babylonia or from some other point is not certain. But this has no bearing on the prehistoric situation. If Egypt borrowed its civilization from Babylonia, the traces of the borrowing are no longer visible. One might with equal plausibility say that the borrowing was in the reverse direction; but for this, also, there is no good ground. There is nothing to prevent our supposing that Egypt and Babylonia were two independent centres of culture, their civilizations necessarily showing certain resemblances, but on the other hand presenting evident marks of independent origination.

In still another way the solution of our problem has been sought, namely, in the relations between the Semitic and the Hamitic races. The grammatical resemblances between the Semitic and the Hamitic languages are of such sort as to force us to the conclusion that the two are intimately related to each other. The pronouns and the numerals are almost identical in the two, and the structure of the verb is substantially the same. It is in the highest degree probable that the two families go back to the same ancestor, and that there was a time when the two peoples, the Hamitic and the Semitic, formed one community. This time belongs to a very remote past, since after the separation of the two the Semitic languages developed their peculiar trilateral stems. If the abode of the primitive Hamito-Semitic people could be determined, this might throw light on the starting-point of the Semites. Hypotheses as to this original abode have ranged over the whole of northern Africa and southwestern Asia, and the absence of historical data makes it difficult to reach a definite conclusion.

It has been supposed that a definite point of view might be gained from the hypothesis of a Mediterranean race. In a remote antiquity, it has been surmised, at a time when Europe and Africa were nearer together than now, a race of people dwelt on both sides of the Mediterranean whose descendants are seen in certain communities of southern Europe and over a large part of northern Africa. It is held that certain bodily features point to an original unity of these communities — the color and form of the hair, the shape of the head, and certain facial marks. If such a Mediterranean people existed, including both Semites and Hamites, then there would be a strong presumption that the original seat of the Hamito-Semitic race was in northern Africa, and it would be from this point that we should have to trace the Semites. But the hypothesis of a Mediterranean race has no clearly demonstrable basis. That certain corporal similarities may be discovered between peoples in Spain and Italy on the one hand and peoples in Africa and Arabia on the other hand may be true. But

such resemblances do not afford a trustworthy foundation for a theory of ethnical unity. The period of the supposed Mediterranean race must have been very remote, and in the lapse of thousands of years it is impossible for us to say what original resemblances and differences may have been effaced, and what new resemblances and differences may have arisen. It is well known that climatic and social conditions tend to affect bodily forms. The period in question was doubtless one of migrations and mixtures, of which, however, there is no historical record. The interval between that remote period and the beginnings of history is a blank. It is not possible, therefore, to rest any trustworthy conclusion on a supposition such as is described above.

Putting the Mesopotamian theory aside, we have to ask whether there is anything in the geographical and social conditions pointing to one place or another as the probable home of the Hamito-Semitic people. In historical times we find the Semites mostly in western Asia, and the Hamites extending over a large space in northern and northeastern Africa. The Semitic peoples form a compact mass — their languages are very nearly allied among themselves; and this suggests an original Semitic unity at a comparatively late period. The Hamites, on the other hand, present a greater variety — their languages differ among themselves in grammar and vocabulary to a much greater extent than is true of the Semitic tongues, and they are spread over a very large territory. Hence it might be inferred that Africa was the original seat of the combined people, since it would be more natural that the larger part, remaining in the primitive abode, should spread over a large space, while the seceding part, smaller and compacter, would occupy a smaller territory. If the body which later became the Semitic race withdrew from the parent body, then the tribes that were left, constituting the majority, might scatter over the whole of northern Africa, while the less numerous body, the germ of the Semites, might withdraw to Arabia or elsewhere. This is a not improbable supposition. But on the other hand it is also not improbable that if the original seat of the Hamito-Semites was in Arabia, a portion should have crossed over into Africa, and there, under conditions which are not known, should gradually have spread over a wide territory, this wide dissemination itself giving rise to a greater diversity of dialects. The transit to Africa might have been made by way of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, or by the Isthmus of Suez. In either case a diffusion over the territory later occupied by the Hamites would be, as far as we know, natural and easy. In the absence of all historical data, there is nothing in the climatic conditions to point to a decision of the question.

We may distinguish between the original abode of the Semites and their centre of distribution. It is possible, as is pointed out above,

that they separated from the original mass and settled in some place in Africa before crossing into Asia — there is nothing to make this inconceivable. But because of the pronounced unity of Semitic peoples, it is more probable that they would have come over into Asia before breaking up into different nationalities. The question as to their first resting-place is referred to above. The arguments commonly adduced in favor of one region or another cannot be regarded as conclusive. There is little in favor of Armenia as the cradle of the Semitic race. The argument for it is that it lies in that central Asiatic region whence so many streams of population have poured forth; but, as we have seen, Arabia and Babylonia also have been centres of dispersion. Recent writers are disposed to decide in favor either of Babylonia or Arabia, the majority preferring the latter region. There is much to say for this, especially if Arabia be understood to include the whole desert region up to the Euphrates and westward to the Aramean lands. More than this can hardly be said. In view of the remoteness of the events involved, the absence of historical monuments, and our ignorance of the social conditions of that early time, it cannot be surprising that we should find ourselves forced to leave the question unsolved. Succeeding discoveries may open the way for a more definite opinion, but at present the data are insufficient to permit a positive assertion or denial in the case of any one of the regions under consideration.

The Perfect and the Imperfect

The basis of the Perfect, it is now commonly held, is a noun — whether an abstract or a concrete noun it is not important in our present inquiry to decide. In the third person this noun is inflected in accordance with Semitic rules. The second and first persons are formed by the attachment of pronouns expressing the subject or agent of the action.

In like manner the basis of the Imperfect is a noun, inflected in the third person according to nominal rules. This noun is not the simple stem, but is made by a prefix. The second and first persons, also, are formed by prefixes. The second person has the ordinary dual and plural endings, and in the singular what seems to be a feminine ending. The prefixes of the second and first persons appear to be pronouns, and the same may be the case with the prefix of the third person. Thus the formal difference between the Perfect and the Imperfect is that in the former the grammatical subject is appended to the stem, while in the latter it is prefixed.

The important part played in Semitic morphology by prefixes is generally recognized. While mere relational modifications are expressed by affixes (as in the case of the feminine, the plural, and relative

adjectives), the substantive modifications are expressed by prefixes (as *ma* and *ta* in nouns). Of the precise history of the development of trilateral stems we know very little. It may be said to be probable that these have arisen from bilaterals: bilateral stems exist in Semitic, and certain trilaterals have obviously been formed from bilaterals (as where the second radical is doubled or a *w* or *y* is inserted). If this be the case, the expansion has not stopped at trilaterals. Quadriliteral simple stems have been formed, and a large number of derived stems, which express merely a modification of the meaning of the simple stem. It is by means of prefixes that the Semitic languages have chosen to express the idea of reflex and causative action, the former by *na* and *ta*, the latter by *a* (*ha*) and *sa*. These prefixes are variously combined together and variously attached to the stem. Thus with *na* from *katala* we have *inkatala* (for *nakatala*), and *niktal* (for *naktal*). The mode of combination is merely a matter of euphony. The essential thing is that the signification of the simple stem is modified in a substantive way by means of a prefix. This modification attaches no new content to the signification of the stem, but only indicates a certain direction of the action.

When now we find the Imperfect made from the simple stem by a prefix, the question arises whether it belongs in the same category with the derived stems above referred to. If we compare these derived stems with the Imperfect, we discover an analogy in the two cases, though with a difference. *Niktal* differs from *katal* merely in that it indicates that the act is directed by the subject toward himself; *aktala* in like manner differs from *katala* only in that it states that the action is not performed, but is caused to be performed, by the subject. So *yaktulu* differs from *katala* in affirming not simply that the subject performs the act, but that he moves toward the performance of the act. How such distinctions may inhere in these prefixes it is not necessary to inquire; we do not know their origin or the history of their development. It is sufficient that they have these significations. Thus the Imperfect is naturally based on the Perfect, or rather on the stem which is the base of the Perfect. Both in form and in meaning it comes after the Perfect. It is a peculiar Semitic formation, ignoring the element of time, and choosing only to distinguish between the conception of an act pure and simple (Perfect) and an act toward which the subject moves. This grammatical conception has its advantages and its disadvantages logically and rhetorically. But it falls in with the Semitic system of expressing certain modifications by means of prefixes. The Imperfect may attach itself to any stem, simple or derived, trilateral or quadriliteral. Originally, it would seem, the Imperfect of the simple stem assumed two forms: which, if we leave out the later vowel distinctions, may be written *yakatala* and *yaktala*. Of

these the former was dropped by all Semitic dialects except Assyrian and Ethiopic, and in these two were differentiated in function. Further, there grew up a differentiation by means of vowels: *yaktul* and *yaktal*; and the prefix was written sometimes *yu* instead of *ya* (*yi*). These were originally simple phonetic differences, later functionally differentiated. In the derived stems the Imperfect prefix follows the same phonetic laws as the stem prefix. Thus from *inkatala* (for *nakatala*) we have *yankatilu* (for *yanakatilu*), from *istaktala* (for *satakatala*), we have *yastaktilu* (for *yasatakatilu*).

The Assyrian Permansive presents a curious degraded aspect. It resembles the ordinary Semitic Perfect in form, being made by the addition of a pronoun to the simple stem. On the other hand it has a prevailingly passive signification, and is of rare occurrence. Two explanations of this state of things are possible: it may be supposed that the Permansive is an embryonic Perfect, exhibiting the attempt to create a form by the addition of a pronoun to the stem, an attempt never completely carried out; or we may suppose that the Permansive was a true Perfect which has fallen into relative desuetude. The widespread use of the Perfect in the other Semitic dialects, taken together with the linguistic unity of the Semitic peoples, is a consideration that tells against the supposition that the Permansive is an abortive Perfect; it would be strange if this form, developed everywhere else in the Semitic area, had simply failed to come to completion in Babylonia and Assyria. On the other hand, the infrequency of its use in Assyrian may be accounted for by the fact that the Imperfect was developed in a peculiar way. The function of the Perfect is to express the act pure and simple. This simple act the Assyrian expresses by means of one of the Imperfect forms. How it was led to this we do not know; but supposing that this usage grew up, then it is conceivable that the Perfect should gradually have fallen out, being retained only to express certain peculiar conceptions. There are examples elsewhere of similar depression of grammatical forms.

In this discussion no attempt has been made to discover the origin of the Imperfect preformatives *ya*, *ta*, *a*, *na*; it is only in regard to their function as prefixes that they are examined. The view stated above is not antagonistic to, is rather intended to be explanatory of, the theory that the *yaktulu* of the Imperfect is originally a noun, meaning "he who kills"; what is suggested is that this noun means properly "he who moves toward the act of killing," and that the Imperfect bears to the Perfect a relation similar to that borne by the derived stems to the simple stem.

SHORT PAPER

PROFESSOR DUNCAN B. MACDONALD, of Hartford Theological Seminary, presented a paper to this Section on "The Poetry of Arabia and the Ballad Problem." The speaker said in brief that the bearing of the poetry of Arabia on the ballad problem has never received adequate, or possibly any, recognition. The Arabists are few, indeed, who have passed beyond the philological and historical stages to an æsthetic appreciation of the material of their labors. To most languages a very few months' work will give an entrance, and the entrance once forced, the garden of poetry lies open, but Arabic yields herself with no such lightness. Days and nights must be spent on a grammar of bewildering subtilty, a vocabulary of utter strangeness and overwhelming abundance, and a range of ideas which conceal their common humanity behind veils of novel circumstance.

The speaker dwelt upon the confusion which lay in the name Arabian, and on the probability that the greater part of Arabic literature had been written by men in whose veins was scarcely any drop of Arabian blood. The medieval monk in Ireland who wrote in Latin was hardly less a Roman than some others of Central Asia, North Africa, or Spain, who wrote as Arabs. After the raid of Muhammad and his successors came the Muslim Empire, in which after a century or two the Arabs had little or no part. The official language of the Empire remained a kind of Arabic, thanks to the Koran and the whole system of Islam, with its commonly and erroneously called Arabian literature, philosophy, science, etc., coming from a multitude of nationalities and sects, which made up Islam. Little attention has been paid to Arabia in the true sense, and the literary ideals, forms, and methods of the Arabian peninsula and race. To Arabia itself and to the Arab people in its own home must the folk-lorist and student of literature turn, when he would seek the true Arabian poetry.

Of the beginnings of Arabian poetry we know nothing; they must lie with the beginnings of the Arab race. The curtain rises with the appearance of Muhammad, and from that point we can trace backward some hundred and fifty years. The Arabs show themselves producing a poetry that is singularly popular in origin and idea, highly developed and polished, and wonderfully rich. Grimm's ballad formula, "Das Volk dichtet," holds most exactly of them, but in a different sense. There is no anonymity, but there is a broad generality of authorship. Of great poets the number was undoubtedly small, but the poetic gift was widely spread. Our best commentaries on the old poems are the records of present-day wanderings. Further we have in it the strange phenomenon of a literature as perfectly popular in origin and use as our ballads, which yet obeys rigid norms of meter, rhyme, and form; clothes itself in language of fixed usage, of breadth and richness; and has crystallized into narrow conventions of structure. It is true that it is not *literature* in the precise sense. These verses were chanted and sung, stored in the memory, and passed from lips to ears. Not till after the time of Muhammad, when the need of interpreting the Koran and fixing the structure of classical Arabic had arisen, were they finally reduced to written form.

In the course of the last century the desert was opened again to Europe by stray adventurers. In the fifties, Wallin brought back from his epoch-making journey some poems which were published in the *Zeitschrift* of the German Oriental Society (vols. v, vi). Later, Wetzstein, German Consul at Damascus, made collections and lectured on contemporary Arabian poetry at the University of Berlin in the winter of 1867-68 and thereafter. Count Landberg also made very extensive collections, which, like those of Wetzstein, are still unpublished. But our most

precise and widest information is undoubtedly due to the late Professor Socin in his posthumous *Diwan aus Centralarabien*. Through this precious volume it becomes abundantly clear that the poetry of Arabia of to-day is the same in all essentials as the poetry of Arabia before Muhammad. From the sixth to the twentieth century, the same stream has flowed, unchanging. The meters, the forms, the ideas, the types, are all the same.

But most significant of all in its bearing on the ballad problem is one outstanding characteristic. The Arabian poet, like the Semite in general, knows nothing but a strictly subjective art. He can sing only of his emotions; all has to pass through the alembic of his feeling and be reproduced as it affected him. He can tell no objective story, as one without, seeing and relating what he sees; he must be in the action, and what he tells us of it is what has come to himself. Thus a description of warriors in battle array is wrought for us out of his own pride or fear at the spectacle. The surge and swing of a charge is pictured to us through what he said to his soul when the shouting line rushed on. Nature, too, we know only because the stars shone brightly on his desert path or mocked in their slow march his sleepless eyes, or because the little spots of verdure and flashing pools after rain were a joy to him and gave him thoughts such and such.

A ballad, then, in our sense was impossible to him. He was not a "maker," a ποιητής, but a "feeler," a "knower," — so *sha'ir*, the Arabic word for poet, means. The event was little; the man who saw it, understood it, told what came to him from it, was all. And so these Arabian songs were never anonymous. If the name of the author by chance has been lost to tradition, there stands at the head some formula, "There said a man of Taghlib," or "There said one unnamed." Some one must have said it, for it tells the emotion of some one. Western ballads tell events, who tells them is of no moment. The ballad stands as a record which might have been made equally well by any one who saw the fact. And therefore the identity of the teller bears no stress. After he has sung his song, another may take it and sing it with equal æsthetic right. The name of that first singer, maker of it as he was, is lost, and the song is the inheritance of the people. But for the Arab ode, that was, and is, flatly impossible. And it cannot but raise the final question whether it is not rather in the objectivity of our Western ballads than in their popular use or any hypothetical communal origin that we are to find the clue to their anonymity.

SECTION C — INDO-IRANIAN LANGUAGES

SECTION C — INDO-IRANIAN LANGUAGES

(Hall 8, September 22, 10 a. m.)

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR SYLVAIN LÉVI, Collège de France, Paris.
PROFESSOR ARTHUR A. MACDONELL, University of Oxford.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF SANSKRIT STUDIES IN THE COURSE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

BY SYLVAIN LÉVI

(Translated from the French by Mabel Bode, Ph.D.)

[Sylvain Lévi, Professor of Sanskrit, Collège de France; Director of Studies at the High School, Paris, since 1894. b. Paris, 1863. Litt.F. 1883; Litt.D. 1890. Master of Conferences at the High School, 1885; Assistant Professor in Sanskrit of the Faculty of Letters, Paris, 1889. Member of Asiatic Society, Linguistic Society, Society of Hebrew Studies, etc. **Author and editor of** *The Hindoo Theatre; Traces of the Greeks left on the Monuments of the Ancient Hindoos; The Doctrine of Sacrifice according to the Brahmanas; The Népal.*]

AMONG the languages of the Indo-Iranian group Sanskrit takes indisputably the highest place. I shall not make any attempt here to justify this honor which Sanskrit owes to the length of its existence, the wealth of its vocabulary, the vastness of its literature, and to its rôle in history. It would be an easy task, and one flattering to the heart of an Indianist, to take each of these points in turn and treat each in detail. But I have put before myself another aim, more in keeping with the general spirit of our meeting; I would like to show, in dealing with Sanskrit, that a common impulse animates all the efforts of human thought; the more those studies which I represent seem far-away, indifferent, foreign alike to the passions and the interests of real life, the better they will serve to support the thesis I advance, if it be clearly shown that, in the course of their transformations, they reflect the great ideas which lead humanity toward its unknown goal.

The history of Sanskrit studies goes hardly a century back; they came into being with the Independence of the United States and with the French Revolution. In 1785 Charles Wilkins published in London a translation of the Bhagavad Gîtâ, prepared in India with the assistance of native scholars; four years later William Jones laid before Western readers a translation of Çakuntalâ. Before these

initiators, of glorious renown, Europe had already heard of the Sanskrit language. Europeans settled in India had studied it, mastered it, and even used it, but their knowledge had borne no fruit. They were missionaries dedicated to the triumph of the Church, seeking in Sanskrit an instrument of controversy or the spread of doctrine. Certainly patience, energy, learning, and dignity of life were theirs, but they lacked the active sympathy necessary for success, the sympathy which animates research and makes it fruitful. Moreover, they had not only the Brahmans to contend with; outside India they were closely watched by adversaries who forced them to be prudent and paralyzed them. Voltaire and his school witnessed with triumph and joy the fall of the sacred barriers of ancient history at the end of the seventeenth century. Bossuet analyzed the secret designs of Providence and pointed out their workings without going beyond the world known to the Fathers of the Church; the Church was the central point of humanity. And, behold, other peoples, other civilizations, and other literatures, unknown to the Scriptures, had come to light, and were laying claim to such antiquity as to eclipse the ancient Jewish tradition. The Brahmans were not sparing with millions or myriads of years in their chronology. The Encyclopædia only asked to believe them; the Church only thought how to contradict them; there was no one capable of discussing them.

But the mind of humanity was ripening; exact criticism was to supplant idle controversy; facts were about to take the place of the artifices of disputation. England, mistress of India by the fortune of arms, opened up the Hindu genius to the world and the world to the Hindu genius. France, vanquished on the field of battle, at least competed with honor in the conquest of Asia's past. We know the admirable history of Anquetil Duperron who went out as a volunteer to wring from the distrustful *dasturs*¹ the sacred books of Zoroaster, which he eventually brought back to France. The Bhagavad Gîtâ of Wilkins, the Çakuntalâ of Jones excited the imagination of literary Europe; Goethe's celebrated stanza rings in every one's memory. The moment was auspicious; the classical tradition was worn out, since the masterpieces of the seventeenth century; reason, proud of her victory over imagination, too long a hindrance to her progress, had nothing to offer in exchange but an insipid sentimentalism. Men's minds impatiently desired violent emotions, dazzling pictures, new landscapes, glaring lights; the senses demanded satisfaction in their turn. The Persian and Arabian poets found translators and imitators. The Egyptian campaign made the East popular. Bonaparte at the Pyramids conjured up a past of forty centuries before his wondering soldiers. But Sanskrit, only lately won from the Brah-

¹ The learned among the Parsi priests; literally, the chief priest of a Temple of Fire.

mans, still remained the privilege of the English of India; Europe possessed neither books, grammars, nor dictionaries. However, the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris possessed a collection of Sanskrit manuscripts and some clumsy rudiments of grammar due to the missionaries. Fascinated, like so many others, by reading Çakuntalâ, Chézy determined to go back, at any cost, to the original. A worthy rival of the first humanists of the Renaissance, he set to work alone to acquire a knowledge of Sanskrit. Chézy was the son of a distinguished engineer, and destined originally for his father's profession. It was not long before he deserted the too stern science of mathematics for the kindly companionship of the Eastern muses. In him an extreme sensibility was united with firmness and method; a fortunate facility made the study of languages mere sport to him. He became the pupil of Sacy and Langlès, and was a master of his subject at twenty years of age. He had been appointed to take part in the labors of the Egyptian mission, but was stopped at Toulon by illness. He returned to Paris to seek consolation in the Library among the Oriental manuscripts. The story of his gropings and success has the poignant interest of a drama in which science is at stake; it was not even without a tragic catastrophe by which he lost the sweet and precious peace of home life. He was forced to sacrifice his conjugal happiness to the jealous demands of research, but his obstinate enthusiasm did not falter; twenty-five years later, arrived at the goal of his efforts, but overwhelmed with sorrows and filled with bitterness, he crowned the six hundred and fifty pages of the quarto volume, in which he had at last published the text of Çakuntalâ, with this verse of Walter Scott, where he breathes out his very soul:

"That I o'erlive such woes, Enchantress, is thine own!"

I have not been able to resist giving in detail the first steps of this heroic pioneer, to whom I may be allowed to offer homage here, as a Frenchman, as a forerunner, and my own predecessor. It is Chézy's chair which I now occupy at the Collège de France. "On the 29th of November in the year of grace 1814 and the twentieth of the reign," an ordinance of Louis XVIII, signed "at his royal château of the Tuileries," created at the same time two new chairs in the Collège de France; one, to which Antoine Léonard de Chézy was appointed, was for the teaching of the Sanskrit language and literature; the other, for the Chinese language and literature, was first occupied by Abel Rémusat. Silvestre de Sacy, the recognized head of French Orientalism, pompously thanked "Louis-le-Désiré," "through whom letters flourished under the ægis of peace, in the shade of Minerva's olive-tree." A less fervent royalist might have enjoyed recording that the *ancien régime* was no sooner restored but it found itself compelled to give its countenance, at the outset, to the conquests

of the modern spirit in that very asylum which Francis I had thrown open to independent research, opposite the University devoted to tradition. In 1530 Greek and Hebrew were sanctioned by the royal will; it was the overthrow of the principle of authority represented by the Latin of scholasticism. In 1814 Sanskrit and Chinese, admitted on equal terms with classical studies, foretold a wider humanity.

Chézy had not foreseen the far-reaching results of his work, any more than Sacy or Louis XVIII. He was an Orientalist steeped in classic rhetoric, and he sacrificed to elderly Muses and superannuated Graces. His opening lecture seems addressed to the retired magistrates who translated Horace into French verse. "Do not believe, gentlemen, that this literature has treasures only for science and stern reason. No; lively imagination also has a large part, and among no people in the world has brilliant poesy displayed itself in more magnificent outward garb, or been accompanied by a retinue more lovely and more captivating. From the haughty Epic to the timid Idyll the most varied productions of taste will present themselves in crowds to your enchanted gaze and arouse in you by turns every kind of emotion of which the soul is susceptible." And to prove "the fecundity of the Indian Muses" he enumerated all these kinds "treated with equal success by the Bards of the Ganges."

But more vigorous minds were already preparing to resume the work and render it fruitful. It was the period in which the author of *Indian Wisdom*, Schlegel, summed up the programme of Sanskritists in three stages, Paris, London, India. Since 1812 Bopp had settled in Paris, and, without allowing the din of near battles to distract him, patiently collected the materials which his genius was to bring into order. Others before him, since the sixteenth century, had observed the evident relationship of the Sanskrit vocabulary with the classical languages. No European could hear the Sanskrit names of relationship, *pitar*, *mâtar*, *bhrâtar*, the names of numbers, *dvi*, *tri*, etc., the verb "to be" (French *être*, Sanskrit, *asti*), but there awoke in him a far-off echo of his mother tongue or of ancient languages.

Comparison, discussion, and speculation had gone on without rule or measure; Bopp created the science of comparative grammar, classed facts, and recognized laws. Under the varieties of language prevailing in Europe, Iran, and India he pointed out a common stock and succeeded in explaining most of the deviations from it, going back by way of induction to the primitive type. Then appeared a word which soon became current, a compound no less unexpected than expressive, a symbol which summed up the revolution that had been accomplished. India and Europe, which everything seemed to separate till that time, came together and were henceforth fused into one in the accepted expression "Indo-European." The Brah-

mans, so long mysterious, the obscure peasants of Bengal, the Punjab, Gujerat, had received their heritage from the same linguistic fund as a Homer or a Virgil; the groups which had been unknown, despised, hated, — the German, Slav, and Neo-Latin, — grouped themselves into a new family of languages. Soon new discoveries filled the gaps and attached to the chain those links which were missing. The deciphering of cuneiform inscriptions brought to light the Persian of the Achæmenidæ; Zoroaster spoke in the Avesta, which was even explained in the original, and these ancient documents of Iran connected the shores of the Indus with the valleys of the Caucasus. Never had a Plato, a Descartes, a Leibnitz, in their vastest dreams conceived so large a family within the human species. The learned were dazzled; even their heads were turned, this time. Then arose a strange and at first puerile sentiment, which proved disastrous later, when it spread to the common people; comparative grammar gave birth to Indo-European chauvinism. The Revolution, borne to the far ends of Europe by Napoleon's wars, had awakened the national conscience in one people after another. Allies or adversaries of France, those who had been subjects the day before, awoke suddenly to find themselves citizens; divine right was forgotten; the state ceased to be incarnated in the monarch, and was incorporated in the entire nation. Neither certain of their doctrines, nor of their own inmost essence, but upheld nevertheless by the will to live, the nations grouped themselves with restless fervor around their languages, their institutions, their traditions, which constituted their collective titles of nobility. The national spirit was formed, as in the cities of ancient times, in the struggle with barbarians. When scholars afterwards proceeded to call attention to the linguistic relationships which antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance had neglected or disdained, national pride was willing to lay claim to the kindred groups. Led away by the bewildering charm of a grand discovery, savants, and after them the public, took kinship of language to be a sure indication of common origin. The peoples scattered over the immense area of Indo-European languages saw themselves, in spite of the natural sciences, and on the evidence of their language, grouped into one single race which received the name of Indo-European or Aryan race. The civilized world which was still within the limits drawn by the prejudices current in Europe and the nearer half of Asia, appeared thenceforward as the patrimony and the battle-field of two races eternally hostile, the Aryan and the Semitic races, both pushing forward to conquer the earth.

The fierce struggle between the Encyclopedia and the Church was bearing fruit. In his eagerness to bring contempt on the Bible Voltaire had already been imprudent enough to accept as genuine testimony from ancient India a pretended Veda, the *Ezour Vedam*,

which a nobleman had brought from India and presented to him as a book "translated from the Sanscretan by the high-priest or arch-brahman of the pagoda of Chiringham, an aged man respected for his incorruptible virtue." In reality the original "Sanscretan" had never existed, and the arch-brahman was a Jesuit missionary. The author of the clever imitation had hoped to lead the Hindus to the Christian religion by this pious fraud; if he did not succeed in that, he at least succeeded in duping Voltaire, and might rest satisfied. But now the Sanskrit language, studied and taught in Europe, gave access to the real Veda. The Brahmans persisted as long as they could in defending this coveted treasure from the enterprise of profane men of science; their delays and refusals only served to pique curiosity and inflame imagination all the more. According to them the Veda had no date, it went back beyond all time, back to a past impossible to calculate. They easily imposed their conviction on the earliest interpreters. At last the Aryan race had its Bible; an Aryan Bible. But the Veda was not accommodating; written in an archaic tongue which differed from classical Sanskrit even more than Homer from Plato, bestrewn with puzzling forms and disused words, it seemed to defy the sagacity of philologists. The only help afforded by India was a commentary too late to be authoritative. On these ancient texts was expended a wealth of science, of shrewdness, of patience, and almost of genius. But a foregone conclusion, an unconscious *parti pris*, directed and influenced these efforts. There was a desire to give the Aryans of Europe worthy ancestors. The German scholars who occupied the first rank in philology had naturally substituted for the title Aryan or Indo-European a word which flattered national *amour propre*; they spoke of the Indo-Germanic language, of the Indo-Germanic race. Thenceforward the Vedas were the complement of the Niebelungen. The origins of religion took their place beside the origins of the epic. It was pleasant to picture the singers of the ancient hymns as grave and noble patriarchs, thoughtful, devout, austere, patriarchs formed on the romantic model; their candid soul, filled with enthusiasm for the grand spectacles of nature, poured itself forth in lyric effusions. Lost in the radiance of the Veda, Indianism forfeited its independence and placed itself like a faithful Achates at the side of comparative grammar. The infatuation of the first days had died out some time before. The public, satiated with the East by the Romantic School, found no further charm in it; the successors of Wilkins and Jones pursued their laborious task without exciting attention. But Sanskrit still remained, by well-established right, the corner-stone of linguistic studies; perpetuated without alteration for tens of centuries, it surpassed in purity all the languages of the family. Moreover, the Hindu grammarians had been the real creators of comparative grammar; it was in their school

that Bopp and his successors had learned the art of rigorous analysis of words, the art of classing their elements, explaining their formation, and tracing their derivation through the vocabulary. The Hindus, who have but little taste for observation of external phenomena, who are but mediocre pupils of their neighbors in the domain of the natural sciences, have given the closest study to the data of the inner life; their psychology has penetrated to the unconscious and prepared the way for modern investigation; their grammar, several centuries before the Christian era, established the study of sounds with almost faultless precision. The glorious name of Panini, even to the present day, hovers over Indo-European linguistic science.

Although sheltered under the ægis of comparative grammar, the study of the Veda was nevertheless tending toward a revolution. Linked together from this time forth, the Semitic Bible and the Aryan Bible were doomed to the same fate. Criticism, gradually emancipated from the tradition of ages, had first tried its hand on Homer, and, in spite of the anxious protests of defenders of the past, it had dared to direct a front attack against accumulated prejudices. Emboldened by success, it seized on the Scriptures, braved the scandal, and subjected them to severe examination.

There was no choice but to submit and recognize in the sacred books a late compilation, sacerdotal in its origin and inspiration. The shock of the attack reached the Veda. May a disciple of Abel Bergaigne be allowed, upon this high occasion, to recall the name of the master loved with a filial affection and everlastingly regretted, who was the author of this revolution? The liturgy, when more thoroughly studied and better known, threw a pitiless light on the ancient hymns; those songs in which, as was at first believed, we could almost hear the whimper of humanity in its cradle, betrayed a soulless religion reduced to mere forms, a subtilized religion which confounded the priest with the magician, a priestly poetry which subsisted on old patches and worked to order. The trench which had been ingeniously dug between the Veda and Sanskrit literature narrowed and tended gradually to be filled up. The Veda once Aryan became Hindu. Indianism lost its connection with Indo-Germanic studies; it retired within itself, forming a mighty, organic unity. The Veda lost nothing by this; it continued, by reason of its age and influence, to dominate the development of India. Thus transformed, the study of the Veda renewed its youth and entered on a new era. Among the four great collections (*Samhitā*) which are the foundation of Vedic literature, the Rig-Veda collection had long kept possession of the favor and attention of scholars; it was the Veda *par excellence*. This collection, methodically arranged, presented to the view of those prepossessed in its favor an *ensemble* as noble and correct as could be wished; it was possible to extract passages

of lofty reach, picturesque or pathetic or grandiose pieces such as the Aryan Bible demanded. Two other collections, the Sâma and the Yajur-Veda, betrayed their liturgic origin too crudely to take rank with the Rig-Veda. The fourth collection, the Atharva-Veda, had nothing edifying about it; the Brahmans themselves had recognized this more than once. It was a strange combination of charms, spells, speculations, and domestic ritual, in which medicine, sorcery, debauchery, political intrigue, and daily life, with its trifling incidents, jostled each other. It was embarrassing for the ideal of Aryan nobility; it was kept at a distance, or at least in the background, like a suspected personage, like a bastard. However, the world was changing; literary nobility and nobility of birth were sinking together; *la grande populace et la sainte canaille* were claiming their turn. History no longer confined herself to a list of exploits connected with illustrious names. Watching the stir in the street, she had guessed at the obscure supernumeraries taking their part in the human drama; she strove to catch a glimpse of them in the shadows of the past. Folk-lore came into existence, and the Atharva supplanted the Rig-Veda, fallen into discredit. Triumphant democracy made its victory apparent in Vedic studies.

If limited to the study of the Vedas and the orthodox classics, Sanskrit philology was in no danger of exhausting its material too quickly; the enormous mass of works accumulated in the course of twenty centuries by unwearying generations of writers gave promise of a long time to be spent in exploiting them. A great number of these works found favor with literary men by the beauty of their form, with thinkers by the loftiness of their ideas or the boldness of their speculations. But history, for which so much had been expected from the discovery and study of these works, was destined to be disappointed. Blinded by puerile vanity, the Brahmans had detached India from the world; they had been wonderfully seconded by nature, which seemed to have isolated the peninsula amid the walls of the Himalayas, the formidable deserts of the Indus, and the yet more formidable expanse of the sea. They delighted in representing "Hindu wisdom" as a fruit sprung spontaneously from the soil, a miraculous production due to their power alone. Their fascinating spell, which still sways so many candid minds, had already had its effect upon the ancients. Did not Pythagoras, among others, pass for a disciple of the Brahmans? With a consistency so strict that it seems to imply a conscious determination, they had put away inconvenient memories, and if, by chance, tradition forced a real name upon them, they shrouded it in the mists of a false antiquity. If we had to trust to their fantastic chronology, a glorious contemporary of Alexander, Candragupta the Maurya (the Sandrakoptos of the Greeks), would be placed seventeen centuries before the Christian

Era! Of Alexander himself and his expedition they naturally remembered nothing. Up to the time of the Mussulman invasion, too positive and too near to be by any possibility denied, they pictured India happy and blissful, enjoying the willing or compelled respect of all the barbarians of the earth. The positive and exact testimony of the Greeks and Latins exposed the fraud of the Brahmans; Hellenism, it was well known, had penetrated victoriously into the "Holy Land." But it was not enough to bring to light the interested falsehoods of the priestly caste; science undertook the colossal task of restoring to India her lost history. Scattered over the vast expanse of the country, steles, pillars, and rocks could still be met with, on which were traced inscriptions in enigmatic characters, mute witnesses of vanished epochs. The patience of investigators — a patience of genius — succeeded in breaking through their long silence. After a century of work the political history of the Hindu world begins to appear to us; still broken up by enormous gaps, confused, uncertain, calling for cautious judgment. It is still easy to mention dynasties which waver, according to the differing hypotheses, within a space of three centuries, the length of time which separates Alexander from Augustus, the discovery of America from the Independence of the United States. But, taken as a whole, the picture is already clear. Political India shows a resemblance to religious India in a continual production of small groups which combine together, now and again, to form a system, and fall apart almost immediately. And this history, which was believed to be as old as the world, does not begin before the morrow of the Macedonian invasion! We have not a single line of an inscription which we have the right to date earlier than this. The epigraphy of India begins with the admirable sermons which a Buddhist emperor, Açoka, caused to be engraved in every corner of his vast dominions toward the year 250 before the Christian Era. A happy chance, perhaps some deep excavations, may open out to epigraphy a more distant horizon; but at the present time our positive documents do not go beyond the date mentioned. Sanskrit epigraphy begins still later. It appears in tentative fashion at about the beginning of the Christian Era, but does not begin to flourish till the middle of the second century. Before this period the authors of the inscriptions used only dialects, related, no doubt, to Sanskrit, but greatly disfigured and altered. I am far from concluding that the Sanskrit language was not formed till this late epoch; but it must be admitted on this testimony that Sanskrit was not one of the vulgar tongues of India three centuries before the birth of Christ. The grammarians who had lovingly fashioned it had detached it from real life when they gave it fixed forms. Doubtless the divorce only became apparent by degrees; the difference between the spoken language and the written Sanskrit at first only

seemed to lie in slight shades of correctness or purity; when the distance widened, the priestly caste remained faithfully attached to the privileged language that separated it from the illiterate masses; it consecrated its own language to religion and imposed it on the orthodox literature. Imagine the Latin of Cicero rescued by the Christian Church, and, under her patronage, accepted as the language of literature by all the peoples of Europe, irrespective of spoken tongues, and you will understand the rôle of the Sanskrit language and literature in India.

The Brahmans had intended to keep the monopoly of Sanskrit; they flattered themselves that they shared it with the gods alone. But two rebellious churches rose up against Brahman pretensions and marked the hour of their triumph by the conquest of Sanskrit. Cultivated by the Buddhists and Jains, the mass, already huge, of Sanskrit literature spread and multiplied in spite of the Brahmans. But Jainism, after a short time of prosperity, sank into a long torpor and was forgotten. Buddhism, receiving a mortal blow by the invasion of Islam, which burnt the convents and massacred or dispersed the communities, disappeared from Hindu soil. The Brahman had his revenge; he wreaked his jealous hatred on the remains of the rival who had disputed empire with him; he thought to efface the last traces of Buddhism, and preserved the mere name only to execrate it. But again Western science baffled his calculations.

In 1816, by the force of British arms, a British resident, assisted by two subordinates, was established at Nepal among the refractory Gurkhas. Ten years later Hodgson with toilsome perseverance extracted the still immense ruins of Buddhist Sanskrit literature from the libraries of Nepal. At about the same time Ceylon, Burma, and Siam, which had remained faithful to the Law of the Buddha, yielded up to investigators a still more considerable collection of works both religious and profane, written in Pali, an ancient dialect, near to Sanskrit and sprung from the same soil, but independent.

Sanskrit texts and Pali texts, coming from opposite points of the Indian horizon, brought with them, each one, a body of tradition and legend on the life of the Buddha and the destinies of the church. By means of strictly critical comparison it was possible to extract their part of history from these stories. Burnouf, the successor of Chézy at the Collège de France, undertook this heavy task, undaunted by the multitude of manuscripts and the variety of languages; by dint of sagacity, penetration, justice, and reason he accomplished at the outset a definitive work. His *Introduction to the History of Indian Buddhism* remains at the end of half a century of new discoveries and researches an authority still safe and still consulted.

With Buddhism Sanskrit finally overstepped the frontiers of India. The bold enterprise of Csoma de Kőrös, who had shut himself

up for several years in a convent of Ladakh, had brought to light an immense Tibetan library, translated, to a great extent, from Sanskrit originals, some of which were preserved in Nepal, others lost. China and Japan, thrown open by degrees to Western research, yielded up in their turn similar collections translated from Sanskrit originals. The history and literature of China added their testimony to the power of the movement which, from the beginning of the Christian Era onwards, carried Indian Buddhism in triumphant marches as far as the palace of the Son of Heaven and even to the islands of the sea, fructifying thought, elevating the souls of men, awakening or transforming art. The memoirs of a Fa-hien, a Hiuen-tsang, and I-tsing described the pilgrims fascinated by the "Holy Land," impatient to adore the footprints of the Buddha, braving the sterile sands and treacherous whirlwinds, the brigands, the mountains, and the storms of the ocean in order to study the sacred Sanskrit language and bring back to their own country a reliable translation, with the authentic words of the master or his disciples. So strong a movement of expansion must necessarily leave positive traces; the expansion of Europe at the present day, following the self-same routes, is bringing about by degrees the discovery of the monuments of this long-perished past. No sooner was France mistress of Indo-China than she began her work by an admirable campaign of archæological discovery; an immense harvest of inscriptions collected from Cambodia up to Tonkin has revived a history which was believed to be utterly wiped out. Sanskrit had served for twelve centuries to immortalize the praises of the sovereigns of Cambodia and Champa. The *Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient*, founded in 1898, is methodically carrying on the work of the early pioneers; science profits by the fruitful union of Sanskrit and Chinese, brilliantly accomplished by this school. The rivalry of England and Russia in Central Asia has not been less fruitful. Since 1890 the attention of Indianists has been kept awake by a continuous series of discoveries. Under the sands of the Takla Makan sleep Pompeiis, half Hindu in character. Treasure-hunters, according to the chances of their adventurous expeditions, have unearthed fragments of ancient manuscripts written in Sanskrit, mingled with fragments in an unknown language; arithmetic, medicine, sorcery, astrology, jostle one another in these incongruous leaves. A French mission has brought from Khotan a manuscript of the *Dhammapada* written in a dialect closely resembling Sanskrit and dating, without doubt, at least fifteen hundred years back. Dr. Stein's mission in 1900 was the beginning of a methodical and first-hand exploration of the buried ruins; the religious, administrative and artistic history of Central Asia in the first centuries of the Christian Era shines forth with unexpected clearness. The patience of scholars is still busied

with these documents, and, behold, new discoveries are already announced, due to the Grünwedel and Huth mission. This time we have to do not with fragments of manuscript, but a text printed on wood in the Tibetan manner. The work is in Sanskrit, with a marginal title in Chinese, and belongs to the Buddhist Scriptures. What splendid discoveries are we not justified in hoping for, now, if the convents of Central Asia have multiplied copies of the sacred canon, of the Sanskrit Tripitaka, in print!

Thus, a century after its birth, Sanskrit philology sees its field extend to the limits of man's horizon. By its origin, by its grammar, by its vocabulary, by its earliest monuments, Sanskrit belongs to the Aryan group, extending from the mouths of the Ganges to the shores of the Atlantic. By Alexander's expedition and the creation of new kingdoms to the northwest of India, Indian and Hellenic destinies were linked together for three or four hundred years. By the expansion of Buddhism India dominated the politics, the thought, and the art of the Far East. The childish pride of the Brahmans had thought to exalt the dignity of the sacred language by presuming to confine it, like a secret treasure, within the impassable boundaries of India. Science has once more broken down superstition and revealed a truth grander than falsehood. No more than any other nation of the world has India created or developed her civilization alone. Our civilizations, by whatever particular name we choose to call them, are the collective work of humanity. Far from developing in shy isolation, they are only of worth when they borrow largely. The market of thought, like the business market, is a continual movement of exchange. On whatever point of the globe we may live, we are all legitimate heirs of all the past of humanity; the richest are those who claim most of that past. Whether applied to India or other regions, historical studies have grandeur and beauty in so far as they increase the patrimony of man; they awake in the individual the conscience of the species; they reveal to us our double debt towards the past which has formed us, towards the future which we are forming. Thus they raise the labors of scholarship above a vain dilettantism; by them her rôle is carried even into practical life, unjustly disdained, and they show her toiling patiently and consciously for harmony and progress.

THE MAIN PROBLEMS IN THE FIELD OF INDIAN LANGUAGES

BY ARTHUR ANTHONY MACDONELL

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WHEN about to present a survey of the main problems which await solution in my subject, the sacred and classical language of India in connection with its descendants, the first thought which occurs to me is that few realize how large a section of the science of man it covers and how important a part it has played in the history of civilization. Most people know little further than that Sanskrit is now studied not only in India but in all the more advanced countries of Europe and in America. Thus there are now at least four professors of Sanskrit in the United States and about twenty-five in German universities. There is already at least one in Japan, where the subject is beginning to be pretty widely studied. Beyond the small circle of the initiated, few are, however, really aware that Sanskrit is the key to the languages and civilization of nearly three hundred million people in India, that it is, directly or indirectly, through ancient daughter dialects, the vehicle of the religions of nearly the whole of that vast population; and that, chiefly through Buddhism, it has influenced not only the religion, but even to some extent the laws and customs, of some four hundred millions of the human race beyond the limits of India. It has thus been instrumental in raising to a higher level the civilization of nearly one half of the human race. In fact, what Greece and Rome did for the West, ancient India may be said to have done for the farther East. The civilization which it diffused was, though less advanced, distinguished by much originality, profound thought, and deep morality, and that diffusion — what has been so rare in the history of the world — was a conquest of peace and not of the sword, a conquest made solely by the influence of literature, religion, and art. Sanskrit literature and science have had a considerable influence even on the West, — in the Middle Ages, for example, through the migration of Indian fables and fairy tales, but especially through the introduction of

the numerical figures and the decimal system with which the whole world reckons. The effects of the latter debt on civilization in general can hardly be overestimated. Again, the discovery of Sanskrit and its literature led in the nineteenth century to the foundation of the sciences of Comparative Philology, Comparative Mythology, and Comparative Religion; and through the first of these sciences it has appreciably influenced the teaching of Latin and Greek in the schools of the West. The results obtained from the study of Sanskrit are also indispensable in the historical investigation of institutions and customs. Indian studies are here peculiarly important because, with the single exception of China, India is the only country which has had a recorded historical development of some 3500 years. Let me give a few examples to illustrate this remarkable continuity of civilization. Sanskrit is still spoken by thousands of Brahmans as it was centuries before our era. Nor has it ceased to be used for literary purposes; for many books and journals written in this ancient language are still produced. The copying of Sanskrit manuscripts still goes on in hundreds of libraries in India, unchecked even by the introduction of printing during the nineteenth century. The Vedas are still learnt by heart as they were long before the invasion of Alexander, and could even now be restored from the lips of religious teachers if every manuscript or printed copy of them were destroyed. A Vedic stanza, of immemorial antiquity, addressed to the sun-god Savitri, is still recited in the daily worship of the Hindus. The god Viṣṇu, worshiped more than 3000 years ago, has countless votaries in India at the present day. The wedding ceremony of the modern Hindu, to single out but one social custom, is essentially the same as it was hundreds of years before the Christian Era. The only true basis of teaching and learning is still considered to be oral instruction, just as it was in the very earliest times. Owing to such survivals of language, thought, and custom from the days of hoary antiquity, a visit to India is of peculiar value to the Sanskrit scholar. For it is only thus that he can thoroughly realize the actual facts of Indian civilization, and that the full force of much that he has read is brought home to him. Let me illustrate this by the experience of a friend of mine. There is a well-known hymn of the Rig-Veda, in which the sound produced by pupils repeating their lessons is compared with that made by frogs during the rains:

“ When one repeats the utterance of the other
Like those who learn the lessons of their teacher.”

My friend, a Sanskrit scholar, was a few years ago asked to visit a school for native boys in the district of Behar. As he entered the building, the croaking of the frogs in a neighboring watercourse sounded loud in his ears. Making his way through various passages, he at last came to a long corridor, where he was greatly surprised

to hear the same sound with extraordinary distinctness. The door opened, and he stood face to face with a class of Hindu boys repeating their lesson in unison.

In the domain of linguistic study India occupies a unique position. For practically all the languages of this continent, shut off from the rest of the world by its huge mountain barrier, and equal in extent to the whole of Europe excepting Russia, can be traced to a single ancient tongue through a recorded development of some 3500 years. India may, in fact, be regarded as the linguistic delta formed by the stream of Sanskrit speech which, a thousand years before the foundation of Rome, broke, like the mighty river which gives the whole country its name, through the stupendous mountains of the north-west. For this vast period we have linguistic records registering every step of development with a completeness which, especially in its earliest stages, is unparalleled in the history of any other branch of the Indo-European family of speech. At the present day there are in India about a dozen languages descended from the oldest form of Sanskrit and subdivided into nearly 300 dialects, which are spoken by about 220,000,000 of people. Beside them are the four main Dravidian languages which represent the aboriginal speech of India, and are spoken by some 60,000,000. These have, however, been Sanskritized at various periods, while their literature is based on Sanskrit models. These forms of aboriginal speech, existing either below or cropping up through the Sanskritic alluvium, furnish, as we shall see, some highly interesting and important problems to the linguistic investigator which have hardly yet been touched by scientifically trained scholars. In this connection I may mention that modern India furnishes many striking examples disproving the old theory which classified races according to the languages spoken by them. Thus the tribes called Bhil at present speak only three debased Sanskritic languages, though it is ethnologically certain that they belong to the aboriginal race. Other aboriginal tribes partly still retain their primitive tongue, but have partly adopted Sanskritic dialects. There is indeed every reason to believe that a very large proportion of the Hindu population which now speaks Sanskritic vernaculars represents the descendants of the aboriginal race with hardly any admixture of Aryan blood.

As the history of the Indian languages admits of being traced continuously in their successive stages from the earliest period, it will, I think, conduce to clearness if, in considering the problems which they offer at the present day, we follow the chronological order of their development.

Owing to the extraordinary interest created in Europe by the discovery of Sanskrit a century and a quarter ago and the undoubted importance which it possesses, the attention of trained scholars

has been almost exclusively directed to the study of the earliest linguistic phase of India. In consequence of this, coupled with the fact that the study of Sanskrit in Europe began in a scientific age, we have not only long possessed a Sanskrit Dictionary which in comprehensiveness and accuracy surpasses that of any other dead language; but also a grammar dealing on historical principles with the Sanskrit language by that great American scholar, W. D. Whitney, which stands unequalled in a similar way. As having led to the foundation of comparative philology, Sanskrit long maintained an exaggerated preëminence in that science. This was followed about thirty years ago by a reaction which, starting from the discovery that the vowel-system of Sanskrit is less primitive than that of the European languages, tended to assign quite a subordinate position to Sanskrit. Though I have from my student days at the University of Göttingen given a good deal of attention to comparative philology, I do not consider myself entitled to express an authoritative opinion on the details of this science. I nevertheless venture to make the general assertion that Sanskrit still occupies and will continue to occupy a dominant position in comparative grammar. By this I mean that, if all the linguistic material supplied by Sanskrit were eliminated, the lacunæ in comparative philology would be immeasurably greater than if the linguistic material of any other Indo-European language were lacking. This seems to me to be evident in the great authoritative work of Professor Brugmann, the leader of comparative philology at the present day. It will, I have little doubt, be still more clearly established on the completion of the comparative Sanskrit grammar of Professor Wackernagel, of Göttingen, the second volume of which was passing through the press before I left England and has since (1905) appeared. This work will, I think, surpass all other comparative grammars of individual Indo-European languages hitherto published, both in fullness of detail and scientific trustworthiness.

Since in the early days of Sanskrit studies, European scholars became acquainted only with that later phase of the ancient language of India which is familiar to the Pandits, and is commonly known as Classical Sanskrit, research remained almost entirely limited to that dialect till about the middle of the nineteenth century. Since then the earlier language of the Vedas has been assiduously investigated in Europe and America. All the four Vedas have long been accessible in thoroughly scientific editions, and much progress has been made in the study of their language, their matter, and their mutual relations. The Vedas have been proved by internal evidence to be considerably anterior to the rise of Buddhism, that is, to have been composed long before 600 B.C. The language of the three lesser Vedas has further been shown to be posterior to that of the most

important, the Rig-Veda, through the application of the statistical method by Professor Whitney, to whom the historical investigation of Sanskrit owes more than to any other scholar, as well as by Professor Lanman and others. Moreover, in the hymns of the Rig-Veda itself, the existence of chronological strata has been discovered, and some important general results have been arrived at, chiefly by the labors of Professor Lanman, Professor Oldenberg, and the late Abel Bergaigne. The most prominent problem which here confronts Vedic scholarship is, by means of the minute investigation of all the available evidence, phonetic, grammatical, lexicographical, metrical, to ascertain the lines of demarcation dividing these literary strata. The solution of this problem is of the highest importance for the history of the Sanskrit language and literature. The work on *Vedic Meter* recently (1905) published by Professor E. V. Arnold, of Bangor, Wales, contributes valuable material to its solution as far as the metrical evidence of the Rig-Veda is concerned.

Another unsolved problem, which partly depends on the one just mentioned, is the approximate age of the Vedic language and literature, and the approximate date of the Aryan migration into the northwest of India. Its solution appears to me to have made no advance during the last forty-five years. Indeed, the question seems to be invested with more doubt now than it was then. For there is, at the present time, a difference of more than 3000 years between the lowest and the highest estimate of the beginning of the Vedic age. I cannot help thinking that this enormous divergence will, by patient investigation, be reduced to one of a very few centuries. Professor Jacobi's astronomical theory based on the doubtful interpretation of a Vedic word, which would indicate that the rainy season in the early Vedic period began under astronomical conditions different from those of later times, is ingenious, but has in my opinion been refuted by Professor Oldenberg. According to this theory, the Vedic period would begin about 4500 B.C. It seems to me quite incredible that the comparatively small divergence between the language of the earliest Vedic period and that of Pāṇini (who dates from about 300 B.C.), a divergence hardly greater than that between Homeric and Attic Greek, should have required more than 4000 years to accomplish. Considering how very closely the language of the oldest part of the Avesta, the Gāthas, estimated to date from about 600 B.C., approximates to that of the oldest Veda, I find it hard to believe that very many centuries could have elapsed from the time when the Indians and Persians were still one people. In fact, 1500 B.C. seems to me to be rather a high estimate for the approximate date at which the Indo-Iranians separated and the Indians invaded the northwest of India. More definite knowledge of the chronology of the Rig-Veda, coupled with all the evidence which Iranian philology

can bring to bear, and the careful comparison of analogous phases of ascertainable duration in other dead languages, can hardly fail to lead to much greater certainty than is at present attainable.

A further problem presented by the Vedic language is the true principle to be followed in interpreting the meanings of words which are either exclusively Vedic or seem to have a different sense from that which they bear in Classical Sanskrit. All scholars are agreed that interpretation based exclusively on comparative philology on the one hand, or native commentators on the other, cannot lead to satisfactory results. At the same time there is a school of Sanskritists who tend to bring down the Vedas, as being exclusively Indian literary products, linguistically too close to the Classical Sanskrit period, and to color their interpretation too strongly with the thought of that period. To speak of a work as purely Indian does not necessarily take us much beyond fixing the geographical limits of its origin. *Beowulf* is a purely English poem, but I doubt whether more light is not shed on its language and thought by the Old Saxon literature of the Continent than by the English literature of the age of Tennyson. The principle advocated by Professor Oldenberg of admitting every form of evidence, even extra-Indian, which is capable of throwing light on the interpretation of the Vedas, appears to me to be the correct one. What is at present wanted is definiteness in laying down the limitations which should be imposed on the two divergent methods I have indicated.

A branch of this problem is the true relation of Vedic myths to the forms which they present in post-Vedic literature. Some scholars hold that the latter shed much light on the interpretation of the former; others that they add nothing to our knowledge of the former, and are sometimes even based on a misunderstanding of them. I cannot help thinking that the efforts which have hitherto been made to illuminate obscure Vedic legends from the material of the later period have not proved at all fruitful. Judgment should, however, be suspended on the question as a whole, till all the available material has been examined in its historical connection.

We already know pretty clearly, in a general way, the various phases through which the ancient language of India, by the gradual loss of grammatical forms, — a process of decay rather than of growth, — finally arrived at the stage stereotyped by the grammar of Pāṇini about 300 B. C. These phases have, however, yet to be treated in greater detail and to be separated with greater definiteness than has hitherto been done. It is intended that this task should be accomplished in forthcoming contributions to Bühler and Kielhorn's *Encyclopædia of Indo-Aryan Research*, dealing with the language of the Vedas (by myself), and with that of the later period beginning with the Brāhmaṇas (by Professor Lüders).

It is well known that Sanskrit has continued to be written and spoken by the Brahmins from Pāṇini's time down to the present day. The grammar has, of course, remained unchanged; but the construction and style have been to some extent modified, while many words have been borrowed from the Sanskritic vernaculars, some even from the aboriginal dialects. The problem as to the extent of such influences on the Sanskrit both of the earlier and later period has yet to be treated as a whole.

This brings us to the daughters of Sanskrit, the Prakrits, or vernaculars, which have been spoken in India from Vedic times down to the present day. Three main stages can be distinguished in their history. The ancient Prakrits may be regarded as coming down to about the beginning of our era, the medieval Prakrits to about 1000 A.D., and the modern Prakrits down to the present day. There is evidence to show that, even as early as the time of the Vedas, vernaculars derived from the earliest form of Vedic language existed, since borrowed words of the Prakrit type are to be found in the Vedas, though not to the same extent as in later Sanskrit. The exact extent to which vernacular words have been introduced into the Vedic vocabulary has yet to be examined. We know that in the sixth century B.C. Buddha preached his doctrine in a vernacular dialect because the masses were no longer able to understand Sanskrit. We also know that the form of ancient Prakrit called Pali was introduced into Ceylon along with Buddhism in the third century B.C., and has ever since remained the sacred language of the southern or purest form of Buddhism. It is a striking testimony to the antiquity of Sanskrit that a daughter language should have been thus stereotyped long before the beginning of our era.

The literature of Pali is both extensive and important; more important in some respects even than that of Sanskrit. For it embraces in their purest tradition the doctrines of Buddhism, a religion which has been so potent an engine of civilization in countries beyond the limits of India. It contains, moreover, a large amount of material capable of shedding light on the social history of India during the early centuries of our era, in a way which Sanskrit literature cannot do. As the earliest recorded literary daughter of Sanskrit, it occupies a position second only to the parent tongue in the linguistic history of India. By the devoted labors of a very few scholars, a surprising amount of work has already been done in the editing and translating of Pali texts, in utilizing the matter contained in them — as appears from such works as Professor Oldenberg's *Buddha* and Rhys Davids' *Buddhist India*, as well as in pioneering linguistic studies. But vastly more still remains to be done. Many texts have yet to be edited, others must be re-edited in a form better adapted to the advancement of scholarship. Many important Pali works have yet

to be translated. All the material which is contained in the whole range of this literature and bears on the history of Buddhist India will have to be extracted and worked up. And after all this has been done a critical history of Pali literature will have to be written. Among the most urgent needs in the field of Pali scholarship at the present day, however, is the compilation both of a comprehensive and thoroughly scientific grammar and of a dictionary resembling the Sanskrit work of Böhtlingk and Roth, which will include all the lexicographical material that has become available during the last thirty years since the publication of Childers' lexicon. A Pali grammar of the kind I have indicated will no doubt be supplied by the work which Professor Otto Franke, of Königsberg, is about to contribute to Bühler and Kielhorn's *Encyclopaedia of Indo-Aryan Research*. As to the Pali Dictionary, Professor Rhys Davids is at present planning one on a large scale in coöperation with some other scholars. It is sincerely to be hoped that this undertaking, which would do more than anything else to promote Pali studies, will not be retarded or frustrated by want of funds.

If research in the field of Pali is to be advanced in the manner which the extent and importance of the subject demand, the establishment of a few chairs of Pali is essential. At present there is, I believe, not a single salaried professorship of Pali in Europe or America. Pali studies are meanwhile being carried on either by a few professors of Sanskrit, chiefly in Germany, or by scholars who, being obliged to make their livelihood in some other way, are able to devote only a scanty leisure to their favorite pursuit. I have, for some time past, been urging the advisability of founding a chair of Pali in the University of Oxford, where Oriental subjects are otherwise very fully represented. I do not, however, feel confident of success unless some generous benefactor should step in. Perhaps the King of Siam, the only Buddhist monarch in the world, who is well known to be a munificent patron of Pali learning, having himself published on a magnificent scale a complete set of the Pali canon in Siam, may come forward as the founder of the first chair of Pali in the West.

As to the old Prakrits, they are known to have had a continuous recorded existence in the form of inscriptions for several centuries, beginning with the rock and pillar edicts of Aśoka, the Buddhist Emperor of the third century B.C., which are scattered all over India. These early Prakrit inscriptions, as well as the Sanskrit ones which begin to appear in the second century A.D., have been to a large extent published; but many of them, owing to defective reproduction, will have to be re-edited. Epigraphical research would be greatly advanced by collecting all these inscriptions within the compass of a single work in a critical edition. The reconstruction of the political history of the period from this material, together

with the evidence of contemporary coins, remains an important problem to be solved by Indian scholarship. Medieval Prakrit has, further, a recorded literary use from about 400 A.D., mainly as the vehicle, in a particular dialect, of the extensive religious writings of the Jains. It was, however, also employed in the composition of secular works, for instance epic poems, and as the language spoken, in various dialects, by the less educated classes in the Sanskrit dramas. Only one play composed entirely in Prakrit, and dating from about 900 A.D., is extant. This work has been edited in model fashion, by Dr. Konow, as well as translated by Professor Lanman, in the Harvard Oriental Series. I may observe, in passing, that that series promises to mark a new stage in the method of editing Indian texts. It will, I think, for the first time set an example of how texts should really be edited so as to bring out their full value as instruments of further research. I myself completed, just before leaving England, a contribution to the series in two volumes, in which this object has been kept steadily in view.

A vast advance in the study of medieval Prakrit has been made by the publication of Professor Pischel's epoch-making Prakrit grammar in Bühler and Kielhorn's *Encyclopaedia*. Now for the first time the phonology and inflection of the various Prakrit dialects have been stated and distinguished. The main thing that has to be done is to bring out thoroughly scholar-like editions of the large number of Prakrit texts which exist. It is only on such a foundation that the various dialects of Prakrit can be satisfactorily kept apart and their exact historical relationships to the Aryan vernaculars of modern India clearly defined. Unfortunately the workers are here even fewer than in the field of Pali studies, though a small band of primarily Sanskrit scholars, such as Weber, Bühler, Pischel, Jacobi, Leumann, have already done much valuable pioneering work. Hence the time is probably far distant when the whole of Prakrit literature will be accessible in a thoroughly trustworthy form, when its linguistic facts will have been sifted throughout, when its history will have been written, and when all the material extracted from it will have been utilized to fill in many of the details wanting to complete the still very imperfect picture we at present have of the social, political, and religious aspects of India down to the period of the Muhammadan conquest about 1000 A.D.

About the beginning of our era the Buddhists, and to a less extent the Jains, commenced to learn Sanskrit, so that by the tenth century Sanskrit was practically the only literary language of India. In this way Sanskrit became almost the exclusive vehicle of the literature of northern Buddhism, which spread to Nepal, Tibet, and China. With it a vast number of Sanskrit Buddhistic works were introduced into those countries and translated into Tibetan and Chinese. Thus

there is still in existence the large encyclopedia called *Tanjur*, comprising a collection of 200 translations of Sanskrit works, so faithfully rendered into Tibetan, that where the corresponding Sanskrit text has been preserved and it happens to contain a lacuna, the missing Sanskrit words can be restored with certainty. Among the Sanskrit originals discovered in the countries where these translations have been preserved is the grammar of the Buddhist Candragomin, found in Nepal only a few years ago. The Tibetan translation enabled Professor Liebig, in his edition of the text, to emend successfully some passages which were defective in the original. Diligent search will, it is to be hoped, result in the recovery of many Sanskrit works (at least as far as Buddhist literature is concerned) of which at present only the Tibetan or Chinese translations are known. Much might have been expected in this direction from the British occupation of Lhasa, where the monasteries must contain many manuscript treasures, but the absence of any Sanskrit scholar in the expeditionary force will, I fear, preclude the discovery of valuable Sanskrit manuscripts such as would probably have resulted, had an energetic scholar of the type of my friend Doctor Stein, accompanied the British troops.

Patient search may also lead to the recovery of some of the originals of the numerous Sanskrit Buddhist works which were translated into Chinese from the first century of our era onwards. Much may be hoped in this direction from the labors of the Society of Oriental Research recently founded in Japan, one of the objects of which is to examine systematically the monasteries and temples of China and Corea with a view to the discovery of Sanskrit manuscripts. What is possible in this way will be apparent from the following example. By the year 1879 all knowledge of Sanskrit had died out in Japan. In that year two young Japanese Buddhists, named Nanjio and Kasawara, were attracted by the influence of Max Müller to learn Sanskrit at Oxford, in order to study Buddhist texts in the original Sanskrit as well as in Chinese translations. Through these young scholars (whom I taught Sanskrit during the first year of their studies), Max Müller caused investigations to be made in Japan, which soon led to the discovery, in an ancient monastery, of a Sanskrit work dating from the sixth century A.D. and at that time (1880) the oldest Sanskrit manuscript known.

The works of the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims who visited India in the fifth and seventh centuries A.D. mention a large number of geographical and personal Indian names, the identification of which is of great importance to Indian history. The transformations which these words undergo, owing to the widely divergent character of Chinese phonetics, often render their identification purely conjectural in the present state of our knowledge. An important problem here

awaits solution on the part of those who are thorough Chinese as well as Sanskrit scholars. It will consist in ascertaining on scientific principles the phonetic laws according to which, in different centuries and in different dialects, the Chinese language has reproduced the corresponding Sanskrit sounds. Mr. Nanjio, the Buddhist scholar I have already mentioned, and another Japanese who studied Sanskrit for three years at Oxford, and is now Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Tokyo, are at present engaged on investigations of this character. I hope that in the course of two or three years the results of their labors will be published and materially advance our knowledge of the history of India down to about 700 A.D.

We now come to the third period of the languages descended from the earliest form of Sanskrit, the beginning of which about synchronizes with the Muhammadan invasion of India and with the conquest of England by the Normans in the eleventh century. Down to the end of the second period the Prakrits, though phonetically and inflectionally much worn down, were still synthetic languages. But from the eleventh century onwards we find that the tertiary Prakrits, the literatures of which date from the thirteenth and later centuries, have assumed an analytic character, or in other words, replace inflection by the use of prepositions and periphrastic forms, much as modern English has done in comparison with Anglo-Saxon.

At the present day these Indo-Aryan tongues, spoken, as I have already said, by 220,000,000 of people, consist of nine main languages. The most numerously spoken is Hindi, with 63,000,000; then comes Bengali with 45,000,000; Bihari with 35,000,000; Oriya, Rajasthani, Gujarati, with about 10,000,000 each; Marathi with 18,000,000; Panjabi with 17,000,000; and the group of which Sindhi is the principal tongue, with 8,000,000.

A comparative grammar of the chief languages was written as much as thirty years ago, and has proved a useful pioneering work; but it is no longer up to the knowledge or scientific standard of the present day. One of the main problems in the study of modern Aryan languages of India is the production of a thoroughly scientific comparative grammar based on a more scholarly investigation of the individual languages than has hitherto been made. Grammars and dictionaries of all the principal languages have been compiled, but most of them, though often of much practical value, are the work of untrained scholars and therefore leave a good deal to be desired as a basis of research. They deal, moreover, for the most part, only with the literary form of the language. The non-literary dialects of the uneducated, which are linguistically of great importance, have been hitherto almost entirely neglected, and thus offer practically a virgin field to the philologist. They are all the more important owing to the extreme lengths to which the introduction of Sanskrit

words has been carried in some of the literary vernaculars, notably Bengali. Among these vernaculars, Hindustani, which came into literary use in the sixteenth century and is also the *lingua franca* of India, is perhaps of least importance from a linguistic point of view, since it is a form of the Sanskritic Western Hindi which has been artificially filled with Persian words. The unadulterated natural vernaculars often present features of great interest to the philologist. Thus in the speech of Kashmir we see a language which is caught in the act of transforming itself from the analytic into the synthetic stage, and thus reëntering the linguistic cycle through which it has already passed. The chief problems which these vernaculars present to the philologist are the accurate demarcation of the main languages, as well as of their numerous dialects, and the influence which has been exercised by foreign languages on their phonetics, vocabulary, grammar, and syntax. Thus not only have many Persian words been adopted by Hindustani, but several have found their way even into the non-literary vernaculars. Again, we already know that the Dravidian languages have affected the phonology not only of Sanskrit and the old Prakrits, but also of the modern vernaculars. It has also, for instance, been shown with probability that contact with the Tibeto-Burmese languages has introduced a certain form of passive construction into the Aryan vernaculars.

By the side of the Sanskritic tongues, the language spoken by the aborigines of India who were conquered by the invading Aryans still survives in various forms. Spoken by about sixty millions of the inhabitants of India, it is represented by two main branches, the Dravidian and the Munda, which have the common characteristics of being agglutinative in formation and of possessing only two genders, the one designating animate and the other inanimate objects. The four main Dravidian languages are Telugu, with a population of about 21,000,000, Tamil with 16,500,000, Canarese with over 10,000,000, and Malayālam with 6,000,000. These four languages have already been the subject of considerable study, almost entirely on the part of missionaries, who have often acquired a thorough practical and literary knowledge of them. But the linguistic value of the work, in other respects often important, published by these scholars is considerably diminished by the absence of philological training. The dangers arising from the lack of such a qualification may be illustrated by the following example. An acquaintance of mine, who possesses a very extensive linguistic and literary knowledge of one of the non-Aryan tongues of India, one day remarked to me: "What a strange thing it is that the Sanskrit word for horse and the English for donkey should be the same" [meaning *aśva* and *ass*]. A remark like that throws a flood of light on a man's

philological equipment. These Dravidian languages are full of Sanskrit or Prakrit words borrowed at different periods; those adopted at late date are easily recognizable; but others, which go back to the time of early contact with Aryan civilization, have been so worn down and assimilated as to be indistinguishable, except to the trained scholar, from ordinary Dravidian words. A leading problem in connection with these languages will be the ascertainment of the phonetic laws by which the Sanskritic elements may be detected, as well as the mutual influences of Sanskrit and Dravidian determined. Singhalese, the very interesting vernacular of Ceylon, presents a cognate problem. Here we have a language which has been shown to have an Aryan basis due to the introduction of Pali, as the sacred language of Buddhism, in the third century B.C. The Tamil elements are, however, so considerable, that Singhalese was long regarded as a Dravidian tongue. The scientific disentanglement of the various strands of this language will furnish much material of historical interest. How much historical information a single word may convey, the following instance will show. The word *was* is used in Ceylon to designate the holiday-time in the summer months when the weather is settled, and, during the bright moonlight nights, the people listen for hours to the recitation of edifying works like the Jātakas, or tales of the incarnations of Buddha. This word is ultimately derived from the Sanskrit *varṣa*, meaning the rainy season, the time when the mendicants in the plains of northern India returned to their monasteries and devoted themselves to the study of religious books. The term thus preserves an historical connection with the original practice by indicating the cause which led to it, though in the modern survival of that practice in Ceylon the cause is altogether non-existent.

On the northeast and the east of India the Tibeto-Burman family of speech forms a non-Aryan linguistic fringe. Here we have a peculiarly interesting field for research in Nepal, a country in which some thirty different dialects are spoken and which has been Hinduized by an admixture of Rajputs, but at the same time is one of the richest repositories of Buddhist antiquities. It was within the borders of this state that only a few years ago the site of Buddha's birthplace, Kapilavastu, was discovered, a site which when excavated is likely to yield material of almost unrivaled interest to the Indian archæologist. Then there is Burma, which, like Siam, has experienced both a Sanskrit influence through Hinduism and a Pali influence through Buddhism. Hence the scientific investigation of Burmese, as well as Siamese, which is still a task of the future, should, with the aid of archæology, furnish results throwing much light on the linguistic, religious, and social history of those countries.

The labors of the Linguistic Survey of India, which have been carried on during recent years under the auspices of the Indian Government and under the able direction of Dr. G. A. Grierson, will vastly advance our knowledge of the classification, the relationships, and the general linguistic character of all the languages of India and of their almost innumerable dialects. Six of the sixteen parts which will embody the work of the Survey have already appeared. The results of the Survey as a whole have also been summarized and form a part of the Indian Census Report for 1901, which has been published in three volumes (1903). This report, which contains a vast amount of valuable information regarding the present condition of the population of India in its various aspects, well deserves to be studied by all who are interested in Indian affairs.

In conclusion, I should like to make some observations regarding Indian languages from an educational point of view. The main problem here seems to me to be, how Sanskrit, which, together with its literature, is the key to the languages and civilization of modern India, is to be made the instrument of mental training in the schools and universities of India, as Latin and Greek are in Europe and America. At present it is by no means such an instrument, either under the native traditional system or the European method of teaching Sanskrit in India. The native system consists in learning certain books by an abnormal exercise of memory, to the great detriment of the reasoning powers. It is bound to die out with the spread of Western educational methods, which must take its place. Western methods, however, as at present applied in the Government colleges, to the teaching of Sanskrit, are even more unsatisfactory. For memory is still the main faculty relied on, and that in a much less disinterested way. A certain number of books, prescribed in a somewhat haphazard way, are got up, generally with the aid of inadequate editions, not with a view to knowing them, but solely to passing the examinations necessary for the attainment of a degree. The evil is aggravated by the fact that the Indian Government has of late years adopted the policy of appointing only native scholars to chairs of Sanskrit. The consequence is that there is no longer any means of teaching native students Sanskrit scientifically or of training them in methods of research. Under these conditions there will before long not be a Sanskrit scholar in the true sense of the word left in India. The sort of scholarship to be expected in future will be of the type indicated by the following anecdote. According to a rule of the *Bibliotheca Indica*, no text was allowed to be edited in that series except from three independent manuscripts. A certain native scholar wished to edit here a text of which he possessed one manuscript only. The difficulty would have appeared insurmountable to the Occidental. But the Indian mind is nothing if not ingenious.

Our Sanskrit friend handed his manuscript to his Pandit copyists, and then there were three! I have little doubt that there was now a plentiful crop of various readings for collation which in footnotes would give an edition quite a critical appearance.

The remedy for this deplorable state of things appears to me to be in the first place the nomination of a few trained European scholars to Sanskrit chairs in each presidency to insure the spread and continuity of scientific methods of teaching and research in India. In the second place, a committee of experts might be appointed to examine the whole question of the teaching of Sanskrit in Indian schools and colleges, and to make recommendations with a view to securing an adequate curriculum and the publication of suitable text-books in connection with it. I believe that by such means Sanskrit, the classical language of the Hindus, could be made a potent agency not only in stimulating and training the intellectual faculties, but also, by enabling the Hindus to understand their own civilization historically, in spreading that enlightenment which will be the surest means of delivering the Indian people from the bondage of caste which has held them enthralled for more than 2000 years. Before the advance of such knowledge the mass of irrational prejudice which so cruelly divides class from class must gradually disappear, as the mists of night melt away before the rising sun. Sanskrit learning might thus be made to contribute to that elevation of the human race which is the ultimate aim of all the arts and sciences represented and coördinated at this great and unique Congress.

SECTION D — GREEK LANGUAGE

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(Hall 3, September 22, 3 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR MARTIN L. D'OOGHE, University of Michigan.

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR HERBERT WEIR SMYTH, Harvard University.

PROFESSOR MILTON W. HUMPHREYS, University of Virginia.

SECRETARY: PROFESSOR J. E. HARRY, University of Cincinnati.

THE Chairman of the Section of Greek Language was Professor Martin L. D'Ooghe, of the University of Michigan, who congratulated the members of the Section upon the abundant evidence that is at hand to show that Greek is a vital study and an educational force of no small power. The speaker said in part:

"As one reviews the work done by the scholars of Europe and America in this field of learning for the last thirty years, the conviction is borne in upon him that never before in the history of scholarship has so much fruitful activity been shown in this department of learning. Greek has certainly shared to the full in the intellectual quickening so characteristic of the modern age.

"With the increase of material for study, due to the explorations of archæologists and to the discovery of new inscriptions and manuscripts, many old theories have been exploded, many new views have been gained, and fresh light has been thrown upon problems that vexed our forefathers.

"There is another matter that calls for congratulation. I refer to the changed spirit in which Greek is learned and taught nowadays. The ancient Greek is no longer a dead mummy, but simply an older contemporary, whose thought and life are part of our own. Thanks in part to the influence of our American School of Classical Studies at Athens, the old Greek life has been made a reality, and the meaning of Greek literature has become understood and appreciated as never before. To read Homer in the light of the discoveries at Hissarlik and Mycenæ; to feel the thrill of the magnificent odes of the Theban poet on the plain of Olympia in sight of the stadium; to catch the music of the beautiful chorals of Sophocles in the theatre of Dionysos at Athens, — how the old Greek life with all its fascinations throbs anew within the scholar's veins; and how infectious it becomes to those who sit at the feet of a teacher thus inspired.

"It is not my task to review in connection with the event commemorated by this Exposition, under whose auspices this Congress is held, the contributions made by the scholars of Europe to Hellenic learning during the century that has elapsed since the Louisiana Purchase.

It is, however, my duty and privilege, on behalf of my compatriots and associates to express to our brethren across the sea our profound gratitude for the great service they have rendered us of this newer world in quickening our torch of learning in order that here on this western continent may be kindled many an altar of Athena and that this western civilization may be saved from crass commercialism and vulgarity by the spirit of Hellenic Culture."

THE GREEK LANGUAGE IN ITS RELATION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS

BY HERBERT WEIR SMYTH

[Herbert Weir Smyth, Eliot Professor of Greek Literature, Harvard University. b. 1857, Wilmington, Delaware. A.B. Swarthmore College, 1876; A.B. Harvard University, 1878; A.M. and Ph.D. University of Göttingen, 1884. Instructor in Latin and Sanskrit, Williams College, 1883-85; Reader in Greek Literature, Johns Hopkins University, 1885-88; Professor of Greek, Bryn Mawr College, 1888-1901; Professor of Greek, Harvard University, 1901-02; since 1902 Eliot Professor of Greek Literature; Professor of the Greek Language and Literature, American School of Classical Studies, Athens, 1899-1900. Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; President of the American Philological Association, 1904-05.]

BEFORE the battle of Plataea, when the Spartan ambassadors urged Athens to reject the proposals made by the envoys of the Medes, the Athenians responded that they could never betray the cause of Greece, allied as it was by blood and language, the common sanctuaries and sacrifices to the gods, and the community of Hellenic customs (Herodotus 8, 144).

This is the earliest conscious formulation of the conception of nationality extant in the history of Europe; though the impulses making for a national Hellenic unity must have been dimly felt long before the fifth century B.C., perhaps when the separate immigrant tribes from the north first came into contact with "Carian" civilization. If we add to the definition (what is latent in the utterance of the Athenians), the will of the different members of a people to regard descent, language, religion, and customs as common ties, we have the mint-marks of ancient nationality, in effect the consciousness of the same past that carries with it the prospect of the same future. Nationality is not identical with patriotism, nor yet with racial affinity. Nor is it as objective elements, but as the conscious expression of Hellenic feeling, that language and descent derive their significance as factors of national sentiment. Despite the variations in speech of almost every state or canton, the Greeks recognized that a common language marked their individuality as a people; though it was not till the third century A.D. that, with but one notable exception, the last of the local dialects had given way before the Koinè, which, after Alexander, first attained the position of a "high" Greek, and finally, together with Aramaic and Latin, became one of the so-called world-languages of ancient times.

Doubtless Wilhelm von Humboldt and Schelling went too far in maintaining that the individuality of a people is *created* by its language. The speech of the Hellenes, we should rather say, is one of the products of their national mind, a product in which their national

mind most readily, and perhaps first, gave expression to its individuality. Though national differences are marked by language rather than created by it, language more than any other expression of national life displays the native endowments of a people and discloses the innermost physiognomy of its nationality.¹

It is to certain aspects of this general theme, the language of the Greeks as the most complete expression of their national psychology, that I especially invite your attention. An adequate treatment of this theme carries with it an attempt to characterize the language from certain psychological points of view and to discuss certain qualities of national character. By singling out some departments of the investigation of Greek that deserve ampler attention than they receive at present, I shall endeavor to open up here and there certain avenues of approach to that ideal which we all have in mind, — a history of the Greek tongue in its relations to the other factors of Greek life. We have, indeed, many Greek grammars, but no history of Greek speech as an index of Greek nationality.

A thesis that has as its basis the determination of the national mind of any people is of course open to the objection that the conception of national mind is elusive. Nor need one have any hesitation in admitting that the science of national psychology, as set forth by its adherents, is liable to error on every hand, and nowhere more fatally than when it descends to arguments drawn from the rigid insistence on the details of national character and soul. Terms denoting the characteristics of nationality may be easily extended in their application beyond their legitimate scope. Phenomena of language may be interpreted in different ways. The necessities of one language may be the luxuries of another; thus the relations of time may be much more strictly expressed in one language than in another, which is therefore not obscure in this regard; error is possible in ascribing to one people a conservative character, to another a progressive spirit, because of the retention or abandonment of inherited sounds (as the vowels and especially the diphthongs, the aspirates, the spirants, final consonants), cases (the locative, instrumental, ablative), or the tenses and moods (the aorist, the optative), and in many other particulars, such as the dual number. Then there is the danger of seeking to discover marks of capacity for emotion or of individuality in the attribution of gender to senseless things. But more than all, as the individual in his totality resists final psychological analysis, so, *a fortiori*, the nation. Especially in the case of ancient peoples we lack the means to arrive at even a partial conception of the national soul; the total outcome of our investiga-

¹ F. A. Wolf maintained the unique hypothesis that Greek mirrored the life of the nation without distortion because it was not till late that the language fell under the control of the grammarians.

tion is the mere moraine cast upon the surface by the movement of the glacier forces of national existence.

The national type furthermore seems to vanish in the presence of the individual. The student of national types, like the traveler, constantly meets with individuals whose anomalies apparently resist his classification under the hypothetical type; as was long ago recognized by Apuleius of Madaura in his *Apology* (24): "quando non in omnibus gentibus varia ingenia provenere? quanquam videantur quaedam stultitia vel sollertia insigniores, apud socordissimos Scythas Anacharsis sapiens natus est, apud Athenienses catos Meletides fatuus." In Greece the mass and the individual stand in a certain opposition. The mass-type may be predominant, as among the Romans; whereas the forces making for individuality among the Greeks are far more marked than among the Latin peoples, who have few men of the distinct individuality of a Cato. So striking is the centrifugal tendency in Greece that in certain respects not a few of the greatest writers present characteristics that seem unhellenic; for example, Thucydides and Aristotle; Polybius is largely Romanized. National character is the result of the clashing of the mass-type and the individual-type: the insubordination of the individual is compelled to moderation (as the national phonetic laws restrict the tendency of the dialects to deflect from the norm); the mass receives in exchange an indeterminate impress from the individual. The national mind of the Greeks, then, while it differs from the mind of each of the individuals composing the nation, nevertheless exercises a controlling influence over all. Notwithstanding the tendencies of Greek particularism, so pervasive are the dominant qualities of the mass-type that the sum of the differences between any two poets or prose writers is less than the sum of their points of resemblance to two writers not Hellenes. Or possibly (despite the opposition of Ionian and Dorian), we may even go so far as to make this statement of any two individuals.

The national mind of the Greeks is a product of ethnological, sociological, and historical factors. Scientific proof of relative degrees of national capacity is not afforded by arguments based on ethnological considerations of the descent and racial characteristics of the members of the Indo-European group, all of which we may assume inherited a certain common endowment of potential capacity; yet that native endowment has manifested itself in the most diverse creations of literature, art, religion, language, architecture (the language of form), and other products of civilization. Nations alike in one respect, as intellectual character, often differ in other respects and find points of resemblance with nations of a different type. We may conjecture that by some subtle alchemy the fusion of the

Hellenic element with another stock yielded, as so often in the case of the union of alien races, the peculiar quality of genius that gives the Hellenes their separateness; yet after all comes the inevitable admission that the processes of nature which create diversity among nations, as among children of the same parents, defy all ultimate analysis. Certainly all theories of the comparative æsthetics of the structure of language fail to penetrate into the secrets of national ability. Whatever the embryonic mind of the Greeks was, their physical environment merely modified it or gave it opportunity to express itself in different terms. The Greeks brought with them from their inland home no memories of the sea; ¹ nor did they inherit from their Aryan progenitors names for the marine divinities; it was their contact with the Ægean that made them a seafaring folk, as it was their inherent qualities as a people that made Poseidon the god of the "on-swelling" waters and populated the deep with the creations of their poetic fancy. We cannot penetrate beyond this fact: that it was the unique prerogative of the Greeks that their language possessed in its earliest known stages the power of expressing delicate relations of thought and feeling; while from the dawn of Hellenic history the sovereignty of their greatest poet was imposed on intellect and heart alike.

It is in form rather than in content that the individuality of the Greek mind is expressed most inwardly. The religion, the customs of the Greeks mark rather the expression of individuality as regards content: their language sets forth not merely the content of thought; it sets forth the form, the movement of thought; it best voices the Hellenic conception of the world. But it is not merely that the Hellenic language expresses the mode of Hellenic thought: the language reacts on the mode of thought. "Human reason," as Eduard Meyer says, "grows *with* and *in* language." From the first day that Greek speech consciously obeyed the will of the Greeks, it continually adjusted itself to the enrichment of their mind; until reflection, reacting on thought and aiming to idealize feeling, created the language of the subtlest dramatic poetry and of philosophy.

Assuming by a broad generalization a division among different peoples on the lines of a predominance of the intellect or of the emotions, the Romans are a people whose language in its literary and "popular" expression is marked by the intellectual quality. In most uncivilized peoples feeling predominates, as is apparent in part from their abundant use of simile and metaphor. Among all languages that unite the qualities of intellect and emotion, Greek stands supreme.

Will, too, enters into the question as an element of language. Though the part it plays in the structure of national character is

¹ Pictet thought the Indo-European peoples were familiar with the Caspian.

strongly marked (witness the difference between Greece and Rome), its function in the differentiation of languages is less well known; nor can I have the hardihood to attempt to set apart the activity of the will from that of the intellect and feelings in this brief study of the relation of the physiognomy of the Greek mind to Greek speech.

To this study there are two methods of approach, each of which has its proper advantages. We may contrast the Greeks with themselves at different periods of their history, — *tempora mutantur nos et mutamur in illis*. Or we may seek to discover the characteristics of Greek speech by comparison with Latin or with the modern languages. For my present purpose it is this method to which I shall give special prominence.

For the study of the qualities of the Hellenic mind we have the direct evidence of the peoples with which the ancient Greeks came into contact. To this secondary source of information the moderns must have recourse, but a surer guide is afforded by their own examination of the expression of mind and character that is contained in the records of the Greeks themselves.

The Roman characterization of the Greeks presents no exception to the rule that the estimation of one people by another is colored by the national traits of the observer. Roman analysis is in the main deduced from contemporary observation.¹ The Roman writers were not impelled to search for the psychological causes that produced Hellenic superiority when Hellenic intellect or Hellenic arms achieved their highest preëminence.

On the social side the Romans did not fail of appreciation of the Greek comitas (Tacitus, *Agr.* 4), liberalitas, facilitas and elegantia. Capitolinus, *Maximinus* (29, 3), says: soror mea (*i. e.* of Alexander Aurelius) Graecis munditiis erudita.

To the keenness of the Greek, particularly the Attic, intellect, the Roman pays tribute. Graeca facundia is echoed from Sallust to Ausonius. Quintilian (12, 10, 36) opposes the strength of his countrymen to the mental agility of the Greek: non possumus esse tam graciles, simus fortiores; subtilitate vincimur, valeamus pondere. Greek sales, lepor, subtilitas, salsi eloquii venustas, the nasus Atticus, are commonplaces of Roman criticism, but not infrequently the sensitiveness of the Greek intellect appears as ingenium molle to the rugged and less delicate Roman. But it is the levitas propria Graecorum (Cicero, *pro Flacco*, 57) that is the dominant note. Lactantius says: quorum levitas . . . incredibile est quantas mendaciorum nebulas excitaverit (*Div. Inst.* 1, 15). Akin to this levitas is the negligentia of the Greek (Cicero, *Epist.* 16, 4, 2); the Greek is otiosus et loquax (*de Orat.* 1, 102). Cicero says: hoc vitio (ineptum esse) cumula-

¹ The evidence is collected by Wölflin in *Archiv für Latein. Lexicographie und Grammatik*, 7 (1890-92), 140f.

est eruditissima Graecorum natio (*de Orat.* 2, 18). Augustine (*Civ. Dei*, 2, 14) speaks of the lascivia Graecorum in the same breath with which he brands their levitas. The accusation of luxury is brought against them by Trebellius Pollio (*xxx tyr.* 16, 1), and by Paulus (*Festus*, p. 215). Greek arts of flattery are reprehended in the Graeca adulatio of Tacitus (*Ann.* 6, 18) and the Graecia blanda of Ennodius (344, 18); their vainglory prompts the remark of Pliny (*N. H.* 3, 42), Grai, genus in gloriam suam effusissimum; and that of the scholiast on Juvenal 3, 121, Graeci enim soli volunt maioribus amici esse. The "dregs of Achaea" disgust Juvenal because of the effrontery of Greek versatility. But it is above all the mala fides that stamps the Hellene. Graecia mendax is echoed again and again. Greek calliditas is emphasized by Livy and Silius Italicus. St. Jerome, *Epist.* 38, 5, says outright: impostor et Graecus est. In the famous passage in the oration *pro Flacco*, 9, Cicero has given, together with his verdict on Greek superiority, his condemnation of the vital defect in Greek character: hoc dico de toto genere Graecorum: tribuo illis litteras, do multarum artium disciplinam, non adimo sermonis leporem, ingeniorum acumen, dicendi copiam . . . testimoniorum religionem et fidem nunquam ista natio coluit. Even where it was not a question of a superiority of the national sense of public honor, the Greek failed to satisfy the Roman censor: the exquisite aroma of his mythology, which the Latins assimilated only in its crude externalities, was the basis for the criticism of Claudius Marius Victor, *Aleth.* 3, 194, mendax Graecia . . . veris falsa insinuare laborat, and of a writer in the *Mythogr. Vat.* 3, 9, 12: pulchre mendax Graecia.

To the Roman, then, the Greek was keen-witted, eloquent, refined in speech and generally in manners, but marked by levity, bad faith, untruthfulness, vainglory, and the arts of insinuation. The national ideal of the Romans — their gravitas, continentia, and animi magnitudo (*Cic. Tusc.* 1, 1, 2) — was the antithesis of the Hellenic ideal. Deeds rather than words marked the vir fortis atque strenuus; and Sallust voices an essential part of Roman character in saying (*Cat.* 8, 5): optimus quisque facere quam dicere malebat; whereas the greatest of the statesmen of Greece was λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατότατος (Thuc. 1, 139). The modern estimate of the essential qualities of the Greek mind and character does not deny the justice of the Roman verdict. Indeed the Roman arraignment of the defects of the Greeks is not so severe as that which Polybius, no mere courtier of success, levels against his own countrymen (cf. 6, 56, 13; 37, 9; 38, 5). But in their analysis the moderns penetrate deeper into the springs of intellect, feeling, and will; and they select as the best field for the evaluation of Hellenic genius that period when the vital qualities of the race had met with no impairment through

the surrender of that individual liberty in and through which Hellenic nationality found its completest expression.

To us the Hellene is a unique combination of psychic forces; gifted with the rare endowment of a high spirit united with an intellect agile yet profound; gifted with the power to see things as they are and in the light of their essential characteristics, with a sense of proportion and of hostility to extravagance; inimical to all formulas;¹ animated by joyous self-confidence, a proud reliance upon his own powers, and a consciousness of his own superiority that divided the world into Greek and barbarian; possessed of an unerring taste and sensitiveness to form (which plays in the refinements of expression a larger rôle than does the intellect); progressive and a creator wherever he worked, yet conservative and bound to the past not only through the sanctities of his faith (which found fixed form in the earliest and the best of his books), but also by a realization of the continuity of the development of the arts; a lover of knowledge, not a lover of wealth; shaping his large curiosity to the purposes of the scientific spirit, and thus impelled to discover the causes of things and to fathom the mysteries of the world in which he lived; an apostle of intellectual freedom, not of mere utilitarianism; endowed with a genius for clear thinking in forms of beauty; a lover of truth in the veil of beauty; his ideal of human nature the harmonious development of man's faculties, a combination of the beautiful in outward form with inner worth.

Equally mobile with his intellect was his emotion. His emotional qualities were not repressed by insistence on the virtues of impassiveness. To lament was not unworthy of a manly nature, and sympathy was not unattended by tears. Susceptibility to feeling vitiated the course of justice, as it damned Phrynichus' play. When art depicted the agony of the body, it did not fail to hold the mirror up to nature: Philoctetes' screams filled the theatre. But at his highest, in literature as in life, the Greek submits his emotion to the control of his intellect; he argues while he feels; his dialectic is discerned through the veil of his emotion. As no other people, the Hellenes enjoy that rare possession — the union of keenness of feeling with the sacred passion for science. By temperament (which is constituted by emotion and will in their mutual relations) the Greeks were excitable and impulsive, and thus stand nearer to those peoples which live in and for the world about them than to those which withdraw into themselves; yet in a higher degree than other nations they combined the qualities resulting from the surrender to the world and the abnegation of the world.

The intellect of the Hellene is stronger than his moral energy.

¹ But in the later development of philosophy disloyalty to the letter of Epicurean tenets was the equivalent of impiousness in the opinion of the faithful.

The diabolical ingenuity of Iago would have awakened less repulsion in him than the *ἀνοία* of Othello. The conception of virtue as a mean shows that at bottom the Greek is hostile to, or incredulous of, absolute moral truth. Metaphysics rather than ethics is the Greek sphere. It was a half-Oriental who made moral good everything, the rest nothing.

Greek character is marked by lack of stability, of sustained endeavor, of indomitable will, of seriousness, of gravity, of patience under discipline.¹ Romanus (not Graecus) *sedendo vincit*. Gusts of passion sweep the Athenian from the moorings of reason; and he returns to his better self only when he sees the shipwreck he has wrought. The possession of the empire of the intellect did not confer upon the Hellene that power to withstand the blows of fortune which in the Roman moved the admiration of Polybius. In the crises of character he often reverts to the elemental creature whose veneer was his delight in the art of Sophocles. The complacent Ionian was the victim of the palsied will; indeed defective will-power lies at the root of much of the defect of Greek character. If the senses of the Greek gave buoyancy to the movement of his intellect and rarely descended to the baser uses of appetite, his mobility often degenerated into loquacity, his acumen to quibbling and disputatiousness, his love of rhetoric to pretentious frivolity. Markedly individual in his personality, his self-love made him belittle the success of others and made him a stranger to the finer forms of sympathy.

Such is the normal type of the Greek. But the race is not homogeneous. The Dorian is almost an alien intrusion, and between him and the other Greeks there is a discrepancy of kind (not merely of culture) that I would explain on the ground of ethnological difference. In the northwest originally dwelt only half-Hellenic tribes that were to become factors in the later life of the nation. The Dorian is the Roman on Greek soil, and, like the language of the Romans, Doric is marked by parsimony and inability to form compounds.

Diversity and individuality, a wide range of capacity, a just balance of faculties, characterize the Hellene. Such as he was he remained the same in his intellectual physiognomy from first to last. If resistance to centralization stimulated his energies, it worked his political ruin. A world-empire was indeed secured at the price of national independence and of national ideals, the loss of which destroyed the national consciousness of the possession by the Hellenic stock of a common language, religion, and customs. Yet the essential

¹ Contrast the relatively few words in Greek with the many words in Latin that indicate the quality of persistence in effort: *sedulus, assiduus, industrius, diligens, laboriosus, strenuus*. There are comparatively few words in Greek for earnest, grave, dignified; many for insolent (to the Latin the "unusual" man), shameless; e. g. *θρασύς, ἀσελγής, βδελυρός, ἰταμός, αὐθάδης, ὑβριστής*. The difference between the two peoples is seen in the frequent use of *virtus, consilium, ratio*.

Hellenic qualities remain essentially unimpaired even in later periods of Greek life, when Hellenism, in its excessive individualism, displayed an increasing detachment between the mass and the few who still preserved the old ideals.

But the lineaments of a national type, be they never so well defined, must of necessity lose the precision of their outlines when the phenomena of language are to serve as the material of illustration. The minuter differentiae of racial psychology resist transference to vocabulary, syntax, and style. It is only the larger lines of Greek speech that mark the general psychological qualities of the Greeks. Like the people that used it, the language is characterized by elegance and delicacy. It is marked by an indescribable air of distinction; by facility of resource and suppleness; by transparency and lucidity of structure; by a reconciliation of intellectual vigor and emotion. Inexhaustible in its native power, it reproduces Greek naturalness, vividness, mobility of temperament, plasticity of mind. Its exuberance is tempered by continence; form and matter are welded to harmony by a sense of proportion. The genius of logic is native to it; as the mirror of the reflective processes of the mind it is both subtle and precise; as an artistic product it combines freedom with strength and grace. Direct and concrete, it lends itself to the happy inventions of fancy and follows the shifting mood with dramatic liveliness. Like the national hero, it is marked by ποικιλία. It wears the folds of a royal mantle (as Lamartine said of another language); and with all its alterations it retained a certain youthful vigor and creative energy; it did not become senile by crystallizing into rigidity. The language of Homer remained a national possession to the last.

An analysis of the distinctive qualities of the language in relation to the national psychology demands a detailed study of phonetics, word-form, vocabulary, word-meaning, syntax, and the general aspects of style. Such a study can at best only note the preponderance of this or that psychological factor, and in the survey of the few points that I can attempt here it is impossible to disengage the operation of the intellectual from the emotional faculties: thought and feeling are closely woven in forming the web of the inner life of language.

Sounds

The study of sounds as an index of the difference between Greek and other peoples is a province of investigation much neglected, not merely by reason of the elusiveness in the doctrine of phonetic symbolism as first enunciated by Humboldt, but also because of absolute and inevitable gaps in our knowledge; furthermore research

in the modern languages has not been carried far with the help of scientific instruments, such as Rousselot's.

The euphonic quality of language is not to be measured solely by the proportion of vowels and consonants. It is the character of the initial and final sounds, or rather the character and the position of the sounds in *all* the parts of a word (as studied by Pott), that marks the phonetic differentiation of one language from another.

In comparison with Latin, Greek is richer, more harmonious, but less majestic. It has ν , and ζ , and the aspirates, but is unfriendly to the spirants.¹ It is rich in vocalic color, the wealth of which is due in large measure to the retention of the original sounds and, in the case of the diphthongs, in part to the disappearance of intervocalic spirants. The relative frequency of vowels and consonants in Greek, as contrasted with other tongues, has not been studied with any completeness. An examination of six consecutive hexameters from the Iliad shows 94 vowels, 106 consonants; from the Odyssey, 96 vowels and 105 consonants; from Virgil the figures are 99 and 107; from Horace 98 and 114; from Platen 92 and 174.²

It will be observed that while Greek has a greater variety of vowel sounds, the absolute number necessary to carry the consonants is not materially different in Greek and in Latin. The dialects differ, and Ionic shows greater variety in vowel sounds than Aeolic or Doric.

Consonantal alliteration is a mark of strength rather than of beauty, and Latin affects such alliteration much more than does Greek; Greek has, too, few stereotyped alliterative phrases such as $\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu \mu\omega\mu\acute{\epsilon}\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ ἢ $\mu\iota\mu\acute{\epsilon}\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, ἥτοι κρίνον ἢ κολοκύντην, κακοῦ κόρακος κακὸν ψόν, whereas these are common in Latin (*salvus sanus, si sis sanus aut sapias satis, purus putus*), though the speech of the Romans is much inferior to that of the moderns in the abundance of alliterative expressions.

Studious as Greek is of euphony, it is noticeable the language manages with ease such initial sounds as $\pi\nu$, $\gamma\nu$, $\tau\mu$, $\delta\mu$, $\beta\delta$, $\gamma\delta$, $\sigma\tau\lambda$, $\sigma\kappa\nu$ and some others forbidden to Classical Latin. Initial $\gamma\mu$, $\chi\mu$, $\sigma\chi\lambda$, $\sigma\chi\rho$, $\sigma\chi\nu$, $\sigma\phi$ it does not allow. On the other hand the *os rotundum* of the Greeks is most exclusive as regards final consonants; yet it does not shrink from $\sigma\phi\acute{\iota}\gamma\acute{\epsilon}$, $\phi\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\gamma\acute{\epsilon}$, $\iota\gamma\acute{\epsilon}$. ($\acute{\alpha}\lambda\varsigma$ and $\mu\acute{\alpha}\kappa\alpha\rho\varsigma$ have no parallels.)

The modern languages, particularly those of Germanic stock, largely through the breakdown of the suffixal elements, are incomparably richer and incomparably more cacophonous as regards final sounds. One effect of the limited range of Greek in this respect is

¹ The loss of the spirants, says Bergk, gives to Greek an impression of stammering in comparison to other languages.

² The consonants normally exceed the vowels in frequency. But in archaic inscriptions (as those of Elis), a single consonant is often written for two consonants.

the almost utter absence of pregnant rhyming phrases such as sing-song, pell-mell, last not least, haste and waste, *songe mensonge*, lug und trug, träume schäume. We find *παθήματα μαθήματα* and a few other phrases. At best Greek could rhyme with two consonants only in combinations of sigma; for example with ψ in $\delta\psi$, $\mu\acute{\alpha}\psi$, or with ξ .

Clashing of consonants, which marked the austere style, was gradually avoided in literature; while the dialect inscriptions showing phonetic spelling record an attention to euphony which is surprising to the student of the literature. Apart from Elean and Late Spartan with their rhotacism the dialects display no fondness for the *littera canina* that is so common in Latin. Nu is a favorite consonant, yet the Greek equivalents of septem and densus avoid the dental nasal. Sonant *r* is avoided as is also sonant *l*. The sound of *s* had its detractors, such as Lasus; but his asigmatic ode was a mere *tour de force*. The Marathonian oath in the Oration on the Crown shows 50 sigmas in 67 words, and sigma is the commonest consonant. The sound of iota ($\xi\sigma\chi\alpha\tau\omicron\nu\ \delta\epsilon\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu\ \tau\omicron\ \iota$ says Dionysius of Halicarnassus) was much more frequent in Latin than in Greek; and Hermogenes, who remarks that the diphthongs lend solemnity,¹ adds that this is not the case with $\epsilon\iota$ (that is $\bar{\iota}$) and ι .

To get an approximate idea of the relative frequency of the sounds of the language I have taken about 1000 consecutive sounds from 38 verses of the *Prometheus* (631-667), and from a part of Thuc. 2, 4. These sounds are distributed as follows (η is placed under η , φ under ω ; α includes $\tilde{\alpha}$ and $\bar{\alpha}$).

	Aesch.	Thuc.		Aesch.	Thuc.		Aesch.	Thuc.
1	σ 129	ν 99	11	λ 37	ω 38	21	γ 19	$\epsilon\iota$ 14
2	α 77	ϵ 89	12	ω 33	ι 33	22	$\epsilon\iota$ 19	θ 13
3	ν 73	τ 87	13	δ 31	μ 32	23	χ 17	χ 11
4	ϵ 70	σ 82	14	ι 31	$\alpha\iota$ 30	24	ϕ 10	$\alpha\upsilon$ 8
5	o 66	o 72	15	θ 28	ρ 30	25	$\epsilon\upsilon$ 6	
6	τ 62	α 71	16	ν 26	$\omicron\upsilon$ 24	26	ξ 6	8
7	ρ 52	λ 65	17	$\alpha\iota$ 25	δ 22	27	β 5	ξ 5
8	π 48	π 40	18	κ 24	$\omicron\iota$ 22	28	$\alpha\upsilon$ 3	$\epsilon\upsilon$ 2
9	η 42	η 39	19	$\omicron\upsilon$ 24	υ 19	29	ζ 3	ψ 2
10	μ 39	κ 38	20	$\omicron\iota$ 21	γ 16	30	ψ 1	ζ 0

Aeschylus: vowel sounds, 443, consonants, 584. Thucydides: vowel sounds, 461, consonants, 558. The order of frequency of the vowels is e (ϵ and η), o (o and ω), α , ι , υ ; of the consonants, the dentals greatly exceed either the palatals or the labials; the mutes are thrice as numerous as the mediae or the aspiratae. Further investigation is of course necessary to arrive at greater certainty. A rough tabulation of the frequency of initial letters by the pages

¹ The sound of ω had a certain solemnity (Plato, *Phædrus*, 244 D).

of Liddell and Scott's Lexicon shows the following approximate results:

1	α	269	9	τ	71	17	ν	26
2	π	249	10	υ	58	18	γ	22
3	ε	231	11	φ	54	19	η	19
4	σ	152	12	χ	45	20	ρ	16
5	κ	150	13	λ	43	21	ω	12
6	ο	83	14	θ	31	22	ψ	11
7	δ	79	15	ι	28	23	ζ	6
8	μ	77	16	β	27	24	ξ	5

Summing up we may say that the phonetical apparatus of the Greeks seems to stand midway between the consonantal languages of Europe, such as Germanic and Slavic (especially Polish and Russian), and the essentially vocalic tongues, such as Italian, the musical character of which, due largely to its vocalic endings, has been gained at the cost, as Pott has remarked, of the intellectual character of the language. The point to which I desire to call attention in connection with the question I have in hand is that in general the vocalic languages are spoken by peoples which attach more importance to form than to matter, and are sanguine and nervous, whereas the consonantal languages are the property of those peoples that emphasize matter over form and are melancholic or phlegmatic.

Accent

Accent, too, has its psychological value. Between the free play of the accent of the Veda and the rigidity of Latin, Greek here again has a middle range. The range of Indo-European accent has, indeed, been restricted, but the restriction has been to the advantage of euphony and symmetry. Thus, for bhāramāṇas, bhāramāṇasya and ādikṣamahi, ādikṣadhvam, Greek has *φερόμενος*, **φερομένου* and *ἑδείξαμεθα*, *ἑδείξασθε*. The freedom of Greek accentuation goes hand in hand with its rich vowel system and its power of semasiological differentiation through difference of form. Cf. *φόρος*, *φορός*; *τέρπεισθαι*, *ταρπῆναι*; *φερεσакής*, *σακεσφόρος*; *τιμή*, *ἄτιμος*; *ἦθος*, *εὐῆθες*. It may not be an unjustified deduction to infer that peoples whose language is chromatic in its accent are often those which attach greater importance to form; while matter is more emphasized by those which, like Latin, stress the penult or antepenult; or the radical syllable, as the Germanic tongues, which thereby obliterate the suffixal elements.

The act of speaking is both physical and psychological. Only the professional psychologist can answer the inquiry of the philologist whether energy of emphasis is due to predominance of emotion or of will. Certainly temperament must largely determine emphasis and

speed of utterance. The rate of pronunciation must be an unknown quantity: certainly it cannot necessarily be inferred from speed of thought; even if it is true, as Steinthal maintained, that the moderns think quicker than the ancients, this is not a sure guide to the rate of speed of Greek speech.¹ Certain inferences point, however, to the probability of a quick tempo: the abundance of short vowels, the large number of short monosyllables and dissyllables, especially particles (contrast γέ with *quidem*, δέ with *autem*, *vero*),² the avoidance of hiatus, of which Latin, unlike its descendant French, is careless. We may not err in thinking Attic as spoken with ease and rapidity. Nonnus, 37, 319, says ταχύμυθος Ἀθῆναι φωνή. Latin may have been uttered more slowly but with greater energy than Attic, though the law of iambic shortening points to some rapidity. The Dorians spoke with deliberation.

Form

The varied gifts of the Greeks are reflected by the varied formal means of expression at their command. The abundance of formative suffixes, the extent of the verbal system,³ the limitless possibilities of composition, mark the exceeding richness of Greek on the purely formal side. The elasticity of the language gives play to the subtler affinities of personality. Sanskrit is equally rich, if not richer, in form; but it stiffened into rigidity: both language and literature are deficient in dramatic quality, in personality. A unity to which everything is sacrificed is a dead uniformity. In Greek ossification was prevented in part by the vigorous life of the dialects, many of which, not one merely, were irradiated by the genius of poetry. The formal resources of Greek are applied with a distinctness that is widely at variance with the indiscriminateness of uninflected languages, such as English, which may use the same word as noun, verb, and interjection, as in the case of *hollo*. Regularity in Greek coexists with wealth of form, with freedom of differentiation and of analogy. The larger use of writing, the development of literature, restricted to

¹ Rapidity of Greek thought is indicated by syntactical attraction and assimilation which compress the separate members of a sentence; by the swift transition from direct to indirect discourse and the reverse; by the frequency of ellipsis, as of the substantive verb, or when a sentence begins with the impetuous ἀλλά; by the frequent omission of either the protasis or the apodosis; by the use of brachylogy; by the construction πρὸς τὸ σημαίνόμενον; by the innumerable forms of anacoluthon; by the use of various figures of speech such as aposiopesis; by diverse locutions, such as οἷός τ' ὁ δρᾶσθαι.

² Cf. Demosth. 18, 179, οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔγραψα δέ, οὐδ' ἔγραψα μὲν οὐκ ἐπέσθην δέ, οὐδ' ἐπέσθην μὲν οὐκ ἐπεισα δέ Θηβαίους, with Quint. 9, 3, 55, non enim dixi quidem sed non scripsi, nec scripsi quidem sed non obii legationem, nec obii quidem sed non persuasi Thebanis.

³ In Greek 507 verbal forms are possible, in Latin 143, in Sanskrit 891; though as regards the number of forms actually in constant use Sanskrit is not superior to Greek.

some extent the manifold variety of the earlier language; but that restriction too gave regularity and normality, which are apt to be absent in languages which, like Latin, live for centuries without the restraining and corrective influence of literary art, and thus degenerate into anomaly and irregularity. Some part, too, of the formal riches of Greek were abandoned by the action of the law of least effort and by the conscious operation of the intellect.

Allusion can be made to only a few points of interest. The multiplicity of the so-called irregular verbs proceeds from a nice sense of distinction between various kinds of action ('point'-action, continuative, terminative, perfective, etc.), which is due to the difference of the formative elements and to the meaning of the several roots which combine into a system. Lucidity marks the formation of derivative words, especially the compound abstracts, which, as a rule, show at once their connection with the primitives; whereas in English and the "dead Romance languages," as Fichte called them in contrast to German, abstract words are frequently borrowed and thus stand in no living relation with common speech.

Greek, as German, shows more color in making neuters of its diminutives, whereas in Latin difference in size is not marked by difference in gender. So, too, in other forms: Latin contents itself with *amans* for *φιλῶν*, *φιλοῦσα*, *φιλοῦν*. Many words form plurals that are impossible in the modern languages: in Greek such plurals often manifest the operation of an intellectual activity, in Latin they usually display strength of feeling.

But the originality of the language is nowhere more patent externally than in its ability to form compounds. Here appears the flexibility of the Greek mind, its fertility of resource, its innate artistic capacity, its power of welding with pregnant force the various characteristics of an object; here the distinctive virtues of individuality have free room to make themselves felt. Take, for example, such compounds as *ἐξελευθεροστομέω*, *καταστερισμός*, *τελεόμηνος*, and the elastic *αὐτόχειρ*. In lucidity and precision Greek may vie with Sanskrit, but its sense of proportion rejects the *sesquipedalia verba* of that tongue.¹ In plasticity Greek has a possible rival in German alone.²

¹ Examples of long words are *ἀπογνωσιμαχῆσαντες*, *στωμυλιοσυλλεκτῶδης*.

² Aristophanes may for the moment rear towering compounds, but normal Greek rarely can vie with German herein. German, too, excels in the construction of such words as "Anundfürschsein"; and outdoes even itself in "Auchnichtseindauchandersseinkönnen." English reaches its maximum in "transubstantiationableness" and "proantitransubstantiationist." Grimm's *Wörterbuch* gives 617 words compounded with "kunst" and almost as many with "krieg" and "hand." It should be observed that, though German is like Greek as regards the freedom with which it forms compounds, the quality of German compounds is in many respects different from that of Greek, and especially as regards sensuous epithets. The influence of Greek in the eighteenth century is seen in the increased frequency of such compounds as "neidgetroffen" (Goethe), "donnergesplittert" (Klopstock). Compounds with the past participle are rare in O. H. G. and M. H. G. German admits also the present participle, as in "liebeglühendes Herz" (Körner) and "völkerwimmelnde Stadt" (Schiller).

Latin¹ and the Romance² languages are immeasurably inferior in every respect. Doric alone of the dialects lacks the power to form compounds readily.

Like German, Greek has the power of giving a peculiar shading of expression by its substantival compounds, which have a different value than the analytical disposition of the members of the thought.

The relative brevity of the compounds of Greek enables the poet to view concretely an object or a quality from more points of vision than is possible to most other Indo-European languages: extension of the thought is not purchased by undue extension of mere word-form. The images are, so to speak, phonetically condensed. Cf. *ἀστυνόμοι ὄργαι*, "disposition for ordered life in cities."

No term-stone can be set to the possibility of shaping new compounds in Greek, or, indeed, to the character of their formation. Innovations, such as *φιλαπεχθήμων*, are continually coming to view. The poets display the same delight in the delicately chiseled workmanship of their *τορευτὰ ἔπη* as Cellini took in each new creation of his art. The lately discovered lyrics of Bacchylides showed nearly one hundred compounds either used for the first time or unattested in any other writer.

The study of Greek compounds has been unduly neglected from at least one point of view. Since sense-epithets are preëminently a mark of personality, we have need of an investigation, especially of the compounds of a sensuous character. Such a study should include an examination of the range of each poet from Homer on, together with the determination of the sensuous sphere from which

¹ Confessions by the Romans of the poverty of their speech in the formation of compounds is frequent. Cf. Lucr. 1, 830, Livy 27, 11, 5, Cic. *De Fin.* 3, 4, 15, Gellius, *N. A.* 11, 16, 1, Latin has very few compounds with two prepositions (cf. *ἐναπολαμβάνω*, *ἐπικαταβάλλω*), and the constitution of such compounds is evident only after scrutiny (*abscondo*, *consurgo*).

² The inability of the Romance languages to grapple with the compounds of Greek may be illustrated by the following translations, by Desrousseaux and Da Festa respectively, of Bacchylides, 11, 37-46:

νῦν δ' Ἀρτεμις ἄγροτέρα | χρυσάδακτος λιπαρὰν | ἡμέρα τοξόκλυτος νίκαν ἔδωκε, | τᾷ ποτ' Ἀβαντιάδας | βωμὸν κατένασσε πολὺλ- | λιστον εὐπεπλοῖ τε κοῦραι, | τὰς δ' ἔξ ἑρατῶν ἐφόβησε | παγκρατῆς Ἥρα μελάρων | Πρωῖτον, παραπλήγι φρένας | καρτερὰ ζεύξας ἀνάγκη.

Mais Artémis aujourd'hui, chasseresse au sceptre d'or, calme déesse, illustre par son arc, lui donne une victoire éclatante. A Artémis jadis un autel où s'empres- sent les prières fut bâti par le fils d'Abas et ses filles au beau péplos, que la toute-puissante Héra chassa de l'aimable palais de Proitos, l'esprit subjugué par la dure nécessité de l'égarément.

Ma ecco che ora gli ha dato una splendida vittoria la cacciatrice Artemis dall' aurea concocchia, la mite inclita arciera. A cui un giorno eresse un molto sup- plicato altare l'Abantiade e le sue vergini figlie vestite di bei pepi; poichè fuori dalle amabili case di Proitos le aveva tratte spaventate la possente Hera, con le menti avvinte da una fiera, fatale insania.

The translation of the passage by Jurenka does less violence to the native quality of German: Doch jetzt hat die Jägerin Artemis, die goldspindlige, kundige Schützen, die Sänftigerin, den glänzenden Sieg dir verliehen. Ihr siedelte einst der Abantiade an einen vielumflehnten Altar mit seinen schöngewandigen Töchtern, die aus den anmuthigen Hallen die hochmächtige Hera gescheucht des Proitos, da den Geist in des Wahnsinns schreckliche Noth sie geschirret.

each epithet is drawn, and a separation of the imitations from the fresh and living picture. Research work of this sort would prove a valuable contribution to the study of the psychology of the Greek people.

Word-Meaning

Words are the shorthand of thoughts. We pack into them the total impression of the thing or the quality they denote. The etymological signification is merely the seed from which is developed the full-grown plant. The Greeks, like other Indo-European peoples, put their national subjective impressions into words derived from roots equally the possession of other members of the same linguistic family; and with results that display their individual attitude towards the world of things and of ideas.

For the elucidation of the mind of a people semasiology is far more significant than the study of external form. For the psychologist the investigation of Greek word-meaning offers, with all the limitations incidental to an ancient language, the advantage of materials of a literature enormous in extent ¹ and admitting of a more definite limitation than any modern literature.

Yet it is surprising how little has been done in this field of research. Buttmann we have, and his unequal successor, Goebel. Here and there we find work of a special character, like Bechtel's *Ueber die Bezeichnungen der sinnlichen Wahrnehmungen in den indogermanischen Sprachen*, Schrader's *Die Psychologie des älteren griechischen Epos*; or discussions of the subject from the general point of view, such as Hecht's *Die griechische Bedeutungslehre*. Pezzi's *Espressione metaforica di concetti psicologici* stands alone in its kind, and it does not profess to be more than a register. Synonyms deal with only a single aspect of semasiology, and of modern books there is but one. There has been no gleaner in Greek fields like the incomparable Grimm.

Comparative semasiology is the surest guide to national distinctions of thought. φίλος is rendered by friend, ami, Freund; ἀρετή by virtue, vertu, virtue, Tugend: and yet on closer inspection that which seems nearest akin is separated by wide gulfs of difference. φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν differ from "diligere," a word that well indicates the cautious and prudent Roman (cf. Catullus, 72, 1), to whom "loving" was a process of wise selection. Each tongue has its own voice, and here Danish outdoes all other languages with its distinction between "kjaerlighed," man's love for woman, and "elskov," the ideal inspiration for all that is lovely which is awakened in man by his love for woman. (See Abel, "Ueber den Begriff der Liebe in

¹ If we take the period ending with the birth of Christ, there are extant about 125,000 verses and over 22, 000 (Teubner) pages of prose.

einigen alten und neuen Sprachen," in his *Sprachwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen*, p. 47.)

Degrees of national social development are likewise indicated by the contrast between "guest," ξένος, and "hostis," in Old Latin "stranger," in Classical Latin "foreigner."

The shifting of signification within the limits of the same language reflects many aspects of national life, and especially national morals; as when foul thoughts are glossed by fair words and fair words lose thereby their innocence.

The unequalled resources at his command enabled the Greek at will to employ synonyms at every hand; and this is nowhere more noticeable than in the expressions for "good" and "bad."

The astonishing wealth of synonyms in Homer, one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of any language, denotes the concentration of the linguistic sense upon the things of prime interest to the Homeric man.¹ With the destruction of national sentiment synonyms are used without distinction, abstract and vague expressions grow apace, the finer shading of thought is blurred in its outline through the adoption of general terms, or words properly expressive of delicate relations of ideas dissipate their vitality as they enlarge the range of their signification, adjectives are "applied to everything because they are applicable to nothing in particular" (ὁλοσχερής in Polybius); inanimate things and animate persons are persecuted by the poets, who worry them with epithets.

Greek semasiology has a twofold task: to set forth, on a psychological basis, the history of words according to their content, from Homer to the end of Greek literature; to discover the processes of thought by which words pass from one signification to another. The determination of the etymology and the chronology is the duty of the philologist; the determination of the laws that operate in the movement of signification from age to age is the task of the empirical psychologist.

To illustrate the psychological and the chronological determination, I select a few examples, first of the development of words from a primitive sensuous sphere to an intellectual or non-sensuous sphere, and, secondly, of the transference of words from one kind of sensuous meaning to another. Thus, πρέπειν, originally applied to the sense of sight (though it is also used of smell and sound), passes through the delimitation which restricts it to that which appeals favorably to the sense of sight, and yields the common Attic meaning. πράττειν, originally "to voyage through," "to pass over a space," acquires the force of "complete" in Homer (who retains also the primitive

¹ For "battle" Homer has 6 words; for "helmet" 5; for "hunter" 4; for "sea" 7; for "beggar" 7. He has seven words to mark different kinds of herdsmen, besides four words of a general character.

meaning), and finally that of "act," "do" without regard to the attainment of the goal (first in Xenophanes). *συμβάλλειν* in Homer still means "to bring together," in Heraclitus it means "to compare," in Pindar "to recognize." *τέρπειν* shows a tendency to differentiate the forms with *α* (*ταρπήναι*) with the meaning "satisfy," "satisfy" (a meaning which disappears with the *α*-forms) from the forms with *ε*, which have the force of "rejoice."

The range of a many-sided language like Greek is enlarged by those ideas that appeal to the wider commonalty of the consciousness of the entire race. So it is with the sense of sight and the appearance of light which awakens a train of associative images. Image reacts upon image. *ὄμμα* is not only the eye but that which is seen by the eye, the capacity of insight, the effluence of the thing seen (cf. Plato, *Meno*, 76 D). Various aspects of thought are presented by many words of like character, such as *αἰγή*, *αἰγάειν*, *λάμπειν*, *λαμπρός*, *φῶς*, *φέγγος*, and their opposites. So with *δεδορκέναι* = *ζῆν*. In the language of Greek poetry concrete sensuous images, as *φοιτὰς νόσος*, "intermittent pain," may be subtilized by the reflective process.

An inviting field of investigation is a study of certain forms of comparison as the expression of the mental habits of the Greeks. How far does Greek apply a quantitative standard where the modern languages employ other expressions of degree? *πολύς* and *μέγας* have a wide range, like *multus* and *magnus*. The Greek used *πολύς* of *γέλως*, *ὑπνος*, *αἰδώς*, *ἀνάγκη*, *νύξ*; *μέγας*, of *φίλος*, *φωνή*, *λόγος*, *καιροί*. The animal world offers the standard of comparison in *ἵπποσέλιον*, *ἱππόκρημνος*, *βούγλωστος*. Diminutives are common where emotion is readily or strongly expressed. Italian has many, English few, diminutives; South German has more than North German. Very common in Latin, they evince the tendency of the Romans to express their feelings strongly when they express them at all. In Greek they play an important rôle in popular speech and in those forms of literary art which are nearest akin to the language of the people. Thus Aristophanes has *βαλλάντιον*, *γαστρίδιον*, *ιματίδιον*, *μελίττιον*, *ὀφθαλμίδιον*. Epic poetry, choral lyric, and tragedy avoid the diminutive, though in some words occurring in these classes of literature the diminutive force has been lost, as in *μηρίον*, *τειχίον*; whereas *ἡνία* seems to be a primitive. The elective affinities of literature show that there was a difference between the speech of the cultivated classes and that of the common people, though that difference was probably less than that which distinguishes German and French dialects from the coyer literature.

But the investigation we desiderate has much more to do than to open up the polarities of comparison. Above all is needed a study of expressions for love, admiration, tenderness, hate, anger, sternness,

coldness, astonishment, etc., and of the utilization or rejection of opportunities to set forth these emotions. How far is the Greek naïve, how far does he restrain himself from baring his soul, how far does he express gradations of his psychic state?

The emotional faculties of the Greeks were keenly sensitive. Excitability, intensity, passion, mark their personality. The driving impulses of pleasure and pain express themselves in a surprising wealth of interjections. The Roman, whose boast is "et facere et pati fortia" (Mucius Scaevola in Livy 2, 12, 10), borrows most of his exclamations of joy from the Greek (io, evoe, eu, euge, eia), while his exclamations of sorrow are his own. Greek abounds in words for joy; witness only χαίρειν (with the incomparable salutation χαίρε), τέρπεσθαι, εὐφραίνεσθαι, ἡδεσθαι.

In common with the Roman, the Greek refuses in general to delineate his mental state with the nicety of discrimination and accuracy of psychological detail characterizing all languages that bear the impress of romanticism; and in restricting the delineation of emotion to the larger outlines of human feelings, the classical languages seem pallid in contrast to the many-colored richness of modern literature. It can be shown, I believe, that the Greeks affect a certain undifferentiated intensity of expression: thus στéνειν is less than "groan," δακρύειν is "to be moved to tears"; αἱματόεν ῥέθος is Deianeira's "flushed cheek." But this stress of emotional effect is much less pervasive among the Greeks than the Latins, who employ expressions indicative of great strength of feeling, expressions which do not admit (without qualification) of alternatives of lesser pathos. The Roman constantly says "flentes," "lacrimantes," "multis cum lacrimis." When once moved, he had no hesitation in using the strongest words at his command. Hence the vogue of the superlative in Latin is more marked than in Greek. Pliny (*Epist.* 2, 9, 3) uses four superlatives in immediate succession.

I have singled out a study of the expression of the emotions as an approach to the characteristics of the national mind of the Hellenes. But there are innumerable others of the same sort. Take, for example, the expressions of the idea of duty: duty to God, to one's self, to our neighbors, to our friends and foes. Only by these and similar studies can we gain an approach to the psychology of that people whose combination of intellect, imagination, fancy, and artistic sense we rank so high; and this, methinks, is infinite riches, in comparison to which much of the output of our dissertation-factories is poverty indeed.

The student of Hellenic thought has here stretched out before him fresh fields that are well-nigh untrodden: the olives of Athens have not yet all been gleaned.

Vocabulary

It is possible to exaggerate the significance of national vocabulary. Some, indeed, have said that were every external manifestation of national achievement in the mechanical and other arts to be destroyed, it would yet be possible to restore the entire state of a nation's civilization by the aid of its vocabulary alone. But vocabulary, though it may be called the mirror of national mind, the pulse of national life, cannot alone reproduce the inner coloring of thought, the subtle play of light and shadow, that resides in the combination of words; and it is in the combination of words that the national soul most subtly expresses itself. Vocabulary is then, after all, a sketch, not an exact reproduction of nationality. Its wealth is regulated by the intensity of interests that a people brings to bear upon the outer world of things and the inner world of thought. The national capacity of the Greeks for expression is not to be measured along the periphery by mere wealth of words marking sensuous or even intellectual ideas; abundance of concrete words is not a gauge of intellectual vitality (the fourteen words for the parts of the Homeric ship do not in themselves differentiate the Hellene from the Phœnician); it must be measured at the centre too, by the definiteness with which intellectual and sensuous ideas are expressed, by the inner significance attributed to these ideas.

The Greeks were impelled by a propension to create, and their language responded to this impulse without hesitation. New words were born at inventive crises. Each new thought found for itself adequate expression in a speech of marvelous copiousness and plasticity. Every advance of civilization enriched the language with new conceptions and infused new life into words already in use. *οὐσία* acquires the meaning of "substance" from that of "property," "possession"; *ρίζωμα*, "root," in Empedocles becomes "element"; *κατηγορία*, "accusation," becomes "category"; *φύσις*, "natural constitution," is used for "nature"; *γύαλα* the "convex swelling of the cuirass," for the "vault of heaven." On the formal side the vitality of the language is seen in the construction of new compounds rather than in the formation of derivatives from single stems. It is but seldom that two words have the same form but different meanings.

I cannot attempt to set forth the achievements of the Greeks in the construction of technical terminology. From the chaos of mere words Aristotle and the Stoics brought forth order and laid the foundations of the language of grammar. The Hindus, indeed, possessed a like degree of acumen in this field, but it was the fortune of Dionysius the Thracian and not of Pāṇini, to compose the book which, next to the Bible, has had (as Delbrück says) a larger influence on the thought of Europe than any other single volume.

Every language is defective from the angle of vision of those of its users whose range extends over other languages, and who, therefore, borrow to supply their own deficiencies. Vocabulary has to follow trade and an increasing acquaintance with nature. The national debt of Greek presents a most instructive commentary on the character of Greek thought and national consciousness, especially when compared with other languages. Latin was an enormous borrower; when the language was saturated with Hellenisms it was a mere affectation of purism on the part of Tiberius to apologize for his use of "monopolium." A Chinese emperor in 1771 displaced over 5000 Chinese words in favor of a like number of Manchu origin. Of all the tongues of Europe, which have the past as well as their contemporaries to draw from, French is the coyest to adopt new words. English is said to show 13,230 Teutonic, 29,853 "classical" words; but as English is a composite language, the preponderance of non-Teutonic words is not altogether due to mere borrowing. Russian is said to form new words readily from its own resources.

The pronounced hostility of Greek to borrowed words is one of the most remarkable features of that language, and the more remarkable because it was spoken from the Black Sea to the Pillars of Hercules, and because Greece itself was the home of thousands of barbarian slaves. Chauvinism in a language may seem venial when a language like Greek is possessed of a practically inexhaustible mine from which to quarry the materials of thought. "Lingua mater," we may say, "nova miracula suis ex visceribus numquam emittere cessabit." But the ability of a language to meet all demands upon it for the expression of its ideas is not an index of national resistance to acquisitions from abroad. German, with all its splendid capacity for compounding new words, would not repudiate many of the loan-words (said to be at least 14,000) that were acquired during the peculiar phases of its history.

Apart from proper names, the number of borrowed words in Greek for appellatives (for these only are borrowed) is much disputed, but is, on any theory, small. The trend of opinion at present is that A. Müller, Muss-Arnolt, and Lewy have exaggerated the amount of the debt to the Semitic languages. I hold no brief for Leo Meyer's *Wörterbuch*, which in many respects is a most unsatisfactory work; but at all events it is not inclined to dogmatism about the words in doubt. Down to the time of Aristotle, if my reading of the book is accurate, Meyer accepts as certainly foreign only about 100 words, while the origin of perhaps as many more which wear a foreign look he cautiously classes as obscure. As the domain of natural science was enlarged there was a constant increase in the vocabulary, chiefly through the activity of the Peripatetics; and Aristotle and Theophrastus (and later Dioscorides) show a considerable number of

foreign words for animals, minerals, and plants. Most of the loan-words of Greek are taken from the animal, the mineral, and (chiefly) the vegetable kingdom; besides these, there are, especially, names for materials of wearing apparel, woven goods, arms, measures, and musical instruments. Scientific terms and words for the arts the Greeks created for themselves.

But I do not so much wish to call attention to the refusal of the Greeks to adopt words of other languages as to emphasize their attitude towards certain objects seen by them for the first time. When an unknown object with a strange name becomes known to most peoples the name is usually transferred mechanically (sometimes with a certain amount of resistance) into their own speech. Sometimes the foreign word is retained for a time and later a designation of native manufacture is substituted for it. Of this latter process there is no sure example in Greek.

It is hard to discover the source of importations because more than any other people the Greeks regarded a new object from the point of view of its essential characteristic and found a name for it by recourse to their own tongue.¹ Thus in many instances they expanded or modified the current conception of a word already existing; as in the case of *δορκάς*, gazelle, *τροχός*, potter's wheel, *Διὸς βάλλανος*, the sweet chestnut, *μέγας στρουθός*, ostrich, *Περσικόν (μῆλον)*, peach, *Κυδώνιον (μῆλον)*, quince, *φασιανός (ὄρνις)* pheasant. Sometimes derivatives were formed, as *ἵαινα*, hyena (for which *γλάνος* was another name), *ἰχνεύμων*, ichneumon (because it seeks out the eggs of the crocodile), *κράνεια*, cornel-tree, *κεράτια*, St. John's bread. Finally it was common to construct compounds, such as *ρίνóκερως*, *στρεψίκερως*, *πίγαργος*, *κατωβλέπων*, *κερκοπίθηκος*, and *ῥοδόδενδρον*.² Even the Phœnician names of the letters of the alphabet have been transformed and often made to end in alpha. This capacity of the Greeks to create names would seem to hold true in the case of objects which they themselves saw in foreign countries; and the process thus described may well have coexisted with the adoption of foreign names for things actually imported, or the knowledge of which (notably of animals, plants, and minerals) was imported by the Phœnicians before the Greeks displaced that people as the traders of the Mediterranean. Examples are *πάνθηρ* from Sanskrit *pundīkaras*, *πάρδος* from *prḍākus*; *μύρρον*, *νάρδος*, *πέπερι*, *ἀλόη*; *σάπφειρος*, *ἰασπις*, *σμάραγδος*.

The cases of folk-etymology are perhaps less common than in other languages; as *Μεῖλιχος*, "the mild (Zeus)" is Phœnician Melech or

¹ This occurs of course in other languages; cf. French *sanglier* from *singularis* instead of a name derived from *verres* or *aper*.

² See Weise, *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie*, 13 (1881-82), 233 ff. To this article (and the same author's *Charakteristik der lateinischen Sprache*) I am much indebted.

Moloch; the date, δάκτυλος, is Aramaic dikela, palm; in συκόμορος, sycamore, we seem to hear σῦκον and μόρος, though the word is derived from Hebrew schikmim.

A marked feature of the language, even its later history, is its proud refusal to adopt Latinisms. Strabo finds Greek equivalents for procurator, legatus, aquaeductus, sinus. Literature seems only then to have adopted Latin words when they had been enfranchised in the language of the people, which was not often the case. Plutarch was weak in Latin; Libanius was ignorant of it. Not till the fourth century was Latin better known because of the Latin rhetors in the Eastern Empire. Cestius and Argentarius seem to have been the first to make addresses in Latin. The influence of Latin syntax is indeed seen in Philodemus to a considerable extent, but Philodemus was himself Latinized.

Various other aspects of Greek vocabulary open up interesting points of approach. The play of fancy, the poetical envisagement of an object are seen in many of the names for animals, fishes, plants, etc. Thus, κερδῶ, fox, φερέοικος, snail, ψυχή, butterfly, ἡχέτης, cicada, βασιλίσκος, golden-crested wren; βάκχος, κύβιον, are names of fishes; νυμφαία is the water-lily. It is noteworthy that the same word often designates a plant and a fish, a bird and a fish. Sometimes the same animal has many names, which are due to popular recognition of diverse qualities.

Greek names for persons are one of the finest achievements of the genius of the Indo-European languages; and the principle of name-giving inherited by all the Indo-European peoples nowhere attained such splendid results as in Greece. The common names of the Greeks have an element of distinction, an idealistic and poetic tone that echoes the national spirit as the names of no other land. κλέος is the most prolific single element, and its frequency recalls the remark of Pliny (N. H. 3, 42): Grai, genus in gloriam suam effusissimum. The stateliness and dignity of the names in εὖ-, ἀριστο-, καλλι-, καλο-, ἀγορα-, δημο-, -μαχο-, ἵππο-, θεο-, κρατο-, etc., evince at once the national ideals and the contrast to the lowliness and poverty of the Roman names, which often express intellectual or physical defects (Cato, Verres, Cicero, Catilina; Brutus; Flaccus, Plancus, Sulla, Naso). In Latin there are at most only thirty prænomena. Success in war was not to the Greeks a proper source of name-giving, and not till the Macedonian age do we meet with such names as Demetrius Poliorcetes, Seleucus Nicator; whereas the addition of designations like Africanus and Numidicus is proper to the genius of the Roman people. The Greek found in names for persons the *nomen et omen*, a religious significance rather than an opportunity for mere word-play or jest such as marks the attitude of Cicero in his correspondence and even in his speeches. But the well-nigh universal refusal of the

Romans to name their children after their gods evinces a deeper religious feeling than the Greek custom, which, with few exceptions, draws on the entire pantheon (for example, Ἀπολλώνιος, Ποσειδώνιος). In fact, while the names of the Greeks mirror the high spirit of the cavalier, the Roman names utterly fail to reflect the dignity of Roman national life.

Another difference between Greek and Latin is the individualization by the Greek of his mountains, springs, and other features of natural scenery. All of these bear definite names, and some are relics of the primitive "Carian" civilization, such as Ἐρύμανθος, Ἀράκυνθος.¹ So rich is the vocabulary of Greek places that we may almost use the words of Lucan in speaking of the district about Troy: "nullum sine nomine saxum."

Conscious of the wealth of the vocabulary at his command, the Greek does not scruple to repeat a word already used; while the anxiety of the Roman to vary his words is an effort to hide by artifice the poverty of his resources. Poetry has its own vocabulary, but the proprieties of prose demand a limitation of the material used by the poet; yet no such strict bounds were set by the Greeks as by the Latins. Under the impulse of a controlling emotion the writer of prose in Greece feels free to rise to the region of poetry and to borrow from the loftier language of his fellow craftsmen the means to awaken emotion in others.

The deficiencies of Greek vocabulary are also instructive. Words for color are more numerous than in Latin, the poverty of which in contrast to the abundance of Greek is lamented by Favorinus (Gellius, *N. A.* 2, 26, 5). Their infrequency in Greek, however, in comparison to modern languages is an indication of indifference, not to the charm of color, but to the minutiae of shading. French is said to have five times as many color-words as English, but we are not therefore insensible to the play of color effects; and English differentiates *auburn*, *hazel* and *bay*, *rose* and *pink* where German has only *braun* and *rosa*. Greek words for color often suggest more than they mean, as in the case of χλωράχην used of a woman.

Both Greek and Latin have a highly developed system of names for family relationship, but a point of difference between the two languages may be noticed in the "conjuges liberique" of the Roman in contrast to the παῖδες καὶ γυναῖκες of the Greek. The relation of the slave to his master in Greece (παῖς, οἰκέτης, ἀνδράποδον, and the colorless δοῦλος) is much less individualized than in Rome, where an ampler system of names indicates a wider aspect of the position occupied by the slave in regard to the family and the state (puer, famulus, verna, minister, ancilla, servus, mancipium).

¹ Probably "Carian" are also ἀσάμινθος, τερέβινθος.

Syntax

7

To syntax so much attention is devoted to-day that we almost lose sight of other aspects of the study of language. Greek syntax, too, displays the obvious and the subtler operations of the national mind. The Roman loves concinnity, subordination; the Greek loves variation, independence, the largest amount of freedom under the sovereignty of law. To fixed forms of thought, to rigidity and uniformity of expression, the Greek mind is hostile. The acuteness of his logical faculty loves to unbend; — an entasis disturbs the level line of thought only to yield a higher beauty than that of mere evenness. Greek speech is acutely sensitive to the psychological processes of assimilation, attraction, and the varied forms of analogy; all of which give evidence of liveliness and rapidity of comprehension. A passion for precision of outline is voiced in the delight in antithesis. Antithesis is sometimes developed within antithesis; and readily finds expression even when it does not point a contrast in the thought. Greek is the language of “buts”: we might almost say of it what Goethe said in another connection: “jedes gesprochene Wort erregt den Widerspruch.” Independence of the members of a sentence is gained by *μέν* and *δέ*, even when syntactical subordination is effected by conjunctions. A further testimony to the antithetical form of thought are the many polar expressions, as when one member of a pair is logically insignificant (Ξ 315–316, *Alcman*, 4, 43–44); or where a doublet takes the place of a general expression (Sophocles, *Antig.* 1108–09; cf. *ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε*); or when opposites are associated the latter of the two is added solely to explain a general idea already expressed (δ 719–20). I cannot pause to remark on the many shades of finesse, on the blending of the intellectual and artistic qualities, on the power to chase the fleeting shadows of the associative analogies of thought, that are apparent to every observer of the syntactical usages of the language. We think of the mental agility demanded by the Greek of his hearers and readers; the sudden shifts of construction, as when an independent clause takes up a relative clause; the striking ellipses, especially in proverbs; the power of minute distinction noticeable in the use of the subjunctive and optative moods with or without *ἄν* or *κέν*, or of the future and subjunctive with or without *ἄν* or *κέν*; the blending of the active and the middle with the subtle distinctions of the latter voice; the distinction between the active, reflexive, and middle; the articular infinitive, a late addition to the resources of the language, but rich in possibilities; the wide range of the adverb as an attributive (*οἱ δὲ ἄρχοντες*), a usage forbidden even to German and approached only by English, as in “an out-of-the-way corner.” Greek affects active, personal constructions, is poor in impersonals in comparison with Latin;

Greek prefers the direct reproduction of the words of another, whereas Latin allows greater range to *oratio obliqua*. The *Symposium* of Plato is herein a *tour de force*.

The power of the participle gives variety to the sentence and reduces to a brief compass a thought that otherwise might be expressed in dragging subordinate clauses. (The addition of *ἰών, φέρων, ἄγων*, etc., that appears to us superfluous, gives vividness by sketching a situation.) Greek, Latin, and English are here nearer akin, though Greek has a far wider range than either Latin or English; while German lacks the use of the transitive participle, as it does that of the Greek verbal adjective. In Greek the participle is readily substantivised, and is sometimes petrified, as in *γέρον, θεράπων*. In German this is rarely the case, as in *Wind*, that is, *der wehende*.

Greek emphasizes the character of an action within the free range of the tense-system, but in comparison to some languages, and especially Latin, it is often careless of some of the exact distinctions of time-relation; nor, it may be added, though not as a corollary, did the Greeks, until the time of Timæus and Polybius, that is, long after the period of their most marked individualism, develop the essential virtue of the historian, — the passion for exact chronology.

The double tense-forms are not linguistic luxuries, though an original differentiation may be relaxed, either momentarily, or absolutely, as in a later stage of the language. Ordinary cases, such as *ἔξω* and *σχήσω*, will occur to every one; let me call attention to the differences of the dialects; *e. g.* *ἀνέγνωσα* alongside of *ἀνέγνων*, the former having in Ionic the meaning "persuaded." From the point of view of other languages Greek does seem to possess several linguistic luxuries, as the future, *βουλήσομαι*, with the infinitive, where *βούλομαι* would suffice. Many such delicacies of expression fell out of use in course of time. But outworn distinctions may well survive in a language that is subtle, as the evanescent distinction between the present and future infinitive in the periphrastic construction with *μέλλω* as a verb of thinking.

One delicate syntactical usage that has heretofore been regarded as the distinct property of Latin has latterly been shown to exist in Greek. The epistolary imperfect indicating the time of the reading of a letter by its recipient is now known to occur in a Greek letter of the fourth century B.C., so that this use in Latin, like the word *epistula*, is in all probability borrowed from Greek. See Wilhelm, *Der älteste griechische Brief*, in the *Jahreshefte d. oester. arch. Inst.*, 1904, pp. 94 ff.

Order of Words

A good arrangement of words marks the organic expression of thought, and pleases the ear. The order of words in Greek illustrates

the spontaneity and mobility of the genius of the Hellenic race. This is not due solely to the fact that, in proportion as the inflections of a language are well developed, the arrangement of the words is freer and the need of emphasis on logical relations is therefore less pronounced. There is, too, the national quality of mind.

Thus it may not be overbold to discover in the rigid arrangement of subject, object, and predicate in French an aspect of the Gallic mind, which here, as elsewhere, is controlled by the centralizing tendency of society, by convention, by linguistic etiquette, and above all by its insistence on absolute perspicuity. "La clarté est la base éternelle de notre langue," says Rivarol; and Condillac remarks that French is perhaps the only language which has no synonyms, signifying thereby words absolutely identical in meaning. Above all other tongues the Gallo-Roman demands elegance, propriety, and mathematical exactness. This absolute precision is indeed foreign to the Greek, who gives freer play to his fancy, to his personality, and thus reproduces the shifting charm of nature. Greek does not recognize such rigid distinctions in meaning as appear in Latin *carmen malum* and *malum carmen*, *partus secundae* and *secundae partus*, *homo urbanus* and *urbanus homo*. Nor does the imperiousness of logic dominate Greek as it dominates Latin.

When Greek prose had attained perfection it fell into a strange captivity that marks the peril of supersensitiveness to form. The moderns can have no adequate understanding of the passion to avoid hiatus in prose and to modify the freer movement of prose by the rhythms of poetry. Held in check, as in Demosthenes, the opposition to hiatus evinces the delicacy of Greek perception; autocratic in its demands, as in Polybius, it reduced art to the bondage of the letter. So long as both tendencies remained under control they indeed limited the free disposition of the members of clauses and sentences; but that limitation the Greek was willing to accept in order to gain a more finished utterance.

Metaphors

Metaphors are the sparks of the mind; metaphors illuminate the recesses of feeling. The attitude of a man to life, his external activity, his innermost thought, the attractions and repulsions of his personality, are embodied in the figurative language he naturally employs. Many metaphors are purely personal; and yet it is possible to discover affinities which pass beyond the sphere of the individual and indicate unconsciously the national mind and character. Change in metaphor is a capital index to change in social conditions and in morals. Every language marks its progress by the creation of new modes of figurative thought. Every age brings its contribution to metaphorical expression: those of the distant past we often find

difficult to understand; those of recent times, drawn mostly from trade, science, art, we comprehend, as a rule, with ease. So rapid, however, is the change in social conditions that a metaphor less than a century old now may need its interpreter. Who grasps at first the meaning of "to burke a parliamentary question"? So the ancients must have been sore distressed to comprehend *τελενικίσαι* "to make empty," from the Seriphian beggar Telenicus.

Greek figurative language is not so ample a record of civilization as are the metaphors of modern times. Invention and discovery are infrequently a source of the metaphorical language of the Greeks, possibly because of a difference of attitude in comparison with any modern people, but more certainly because invention and discovery constituted a mark of civilization less effectively in ancient times than they do at present. Some expressions of the sort do exist, however, as *καινοτομεῖν*, "to make innovations in the state," from opening up a new vein in mining.

It is well-nigh impossible to discover mint-marks of nationality in the "petrified metaphor," which permeates every language and is seen especially in the expression of intellectual conceptions. If we confine our observation to the pure metaphor and the simile, we shall find that they record to no slight degree national activities and especially occupations. Latin shows at every hand the Roman soldier, the agriculturist, the spectator at the gladiatorial games. With the Greeks the sea is the most prolific source of metaphors that bespeak the national thought. The figurative uses of *ἐρέσσω*, *ἀντλέω*, *γαλννίζω*, *ὀκέλλω*, *ἀνακροῖω*, *σαλεύω*, *κατουρίζω*, *ἔρμα* ballast, *ἔρμος* haven, etc., are constant. The Greek says *λιμὴν ἀτυχίας* "a harbor of misery"; *εἰς πέλαγος αὐτὸν ἐμβαλεῖς γὰρπραγμάτων* is the warning of Menander (65, 6) to a man about to marry. Aristophanes says of the bride *πλευστέον ἐπὶ τὸν νυμφίον*. The sea is the type of animation (*πέλαγος ἡ πόλις ἐστίν*), of peevishness, inconstancy; whereas we speak of the uncertainty of the weather. The audience in the theatre is the *θάλαττα κοίλη*. The *palæstra* yields an abundance of figurative usages: *αἶρω*, *ἀποστλεγγίζω*, *κλιμακίζω*, *ὑποσκελίζω*, *σκιαμαχία*, *περὶ στάσεως ἀγωνίζομαι*, may serve as common examples. The contests in court recall those in the gymnasium. *ἀγών*, *αἰρέω*, *διώκω*, *φύγω*, *παρέρχομαι*, *προκαλέομαι*, etc., in their figurative senses are all drawn from the same source. Most metaphors from riding deal with racing.

Music yields *παπαταίω*, *παραχορδίζω*, *πλημμελέω*, etc., and *αὐτὸς αὐτὸν αἰλεῖ*. Roman gravity reprehended dicing: *impudicus et vorax et aleo*, says Catullus, 29, 2. The Greeks had easier consciences on this score. Witness the use of *κυβεύω* for *κινδυνεύω*. *ἀναρρίπτω κίνδυνον* is borrowed from *ἀναρρίπτω κύβον*. From the occupation of weaving are drawn the figurative uses of *διοκορραφέω*, *ἐπικλώθω*, *σπαθᾶω*, the phrases *ἀμύρντοι λόγοι*, *ράπτω ἐπιβουλὰς*; fishing yields *δελεάζω*, *ἐκκαλαμάομαι*; the statu-

ary's art, *πλάττω κακόν, ἀπὸ καναβευμάτων*. The life of the farmer supplied the figurative use of *ἀροῦν*, to "procreate," and *πόντος ἡρόθη δορί*, and of *ἄλοάω* "thresh" and "thrash." Metaphors from war are not so common in Greek as in Latin; hence the range of the figurative uses of *πολεμέω* and *μάχομαι* is more restricted than is that of the corresponding Latin words. Comedy is far less free than tragedy in its recourse to metaphors from arming. There are of course many differences between Greek and modern metaphors. The ass is not always the stupid beast, and the goose is not foolish to the Greek. The dog is not always the faithful companion of man. If there be virtue in heredity, the character of the modern Greek dog has not changed from that of his classical ancestor which justified the phrase *παλλακὴ κυνῶπις* of *Aspasia*.

Blümner calls attention to one advantage possessed by the form of metaphor in Greek and Latin. We might say, "Each one of you, like the fox, gets his bribe," or "The fox gets his bribe," but we cannot say, "Each one of you, a fox, gets his bribe"; as the Greek does in proverbial sayings with pregnant force, *ὑμῶν εἰς μὲν ἕκαστος ἄλλῳ πῶς δωροδοκεῖται* (*Cratinus*, 128).

Proverbs

Metaphors often find a place in proverbs, and a word may be said of the character of the Greek proverb. The Greeks did not sharply distinguish between *παροιμία* and *γνώμη*. They often included under proverbs expressions that are merely metaphorical, as *συκίνη ἐπικουρία*; famous words of the poets or other writers, as *ἄμμες ποκ' ἡμες*, an abbreviation of *ἄμμες ποκ' ἡμες ἄλκιμοι νεανίαί*; word-plays; comparisons, as *ὀργιλώτερος τῶν κυνιδίων*. Many, perhaps most proverbs, disclose no truth that is the specific property of any people. Form, shading of expression, manner of pointing the moral, may vary with different peoples, but the content is usually common property. Proverbs set forth the wisdom of an age rather than of a nation as distinct from any other nation. In Greek, in comparison to the mass of "literary" proverbs in the collections there are relatively few handed down orally and drawn from the mouth of the common people ("ex vulgi faece," as *Erasmus* has it). Greek literature, even Greek philosophy, stood nearer to the life of the common people than is the case in modern times. The Greek poets and philosophers drew on popular wisdom for their axioms of sound sense and good morals with a frequency that would be indecorous in their fellow craftsmen of to-day. Still much proverbial wit smacks of the soil whence it springs. *Goethe* has well expressed it:

Sprichwort bezeichnet Nationen

Muss aber erst unter ihnen wohnen.

"Operam et oleum perdidi," says the Roman; "Da ist Hopfen und Malz verloren," says the German. Many Greek proverbs, especially those in Aristophanes, take their point from Attic life or history; others, as those drawn from the sea, epitomize national sentiment. Such are ἐπὶ δυοῖν ἀγκύραιν ὀρμεῖν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς (ἀγκύρας) ὀρμεῖν, δεύτερος πλοῦς, and the less common ἀπὸ κόπης ἐπὶ βῆμα, ἄλας ἄγων καθεύδεις, πρὸς κώρυκον γυμνάζεσθαι, ἄλιεύς πληγείς νοῦν οἶσει, Ἀττικὸς εἰς λιμένα, κέρδους ἕκατι κὰν ἐπὶ ῥίπῃς πλέοι. The pithy *sententiae* of the Spartan mark his sturdy and homely character; the wit of the keen Sicilian is barbed (ἐκ παντὸς ξύλου κλῶς γένοιτ' ἂν καὶ θεός).

So the principles that are a guide to life are set down in the homely language of peasant and merchant. Nor are there indications lacking that in Greece too there were those "whose whole wisdom lies in a collection of proverbs." Innumerable are the proverbs taken from the close intimacy of men with animals and their observation of the life of birds.

Versification

The rhythms in which the poet's thought gains an utterance embody the national genius. Nowhere is this the case with greater certainty than in Greece. The versatility of the Greek mind is expressed in the countless rhythms of their manifold lyric; their subtle sense of the connection between form and content finds opportunity for expression in a wealth of rhythms incomparably superior to that possessed by any other civilized people. If we regard only the dactylic hexameter as the national meter, the spontaneity, grace, and mobility of the Hellenes is mirrored in the movement of the verse; while the Saturnian, as has often been pointed out, reflects the stately and dignified Roman.

National Style

If style is regulated by the movement of thought itself it may not be hazardous to speak of a national style voicing national endowment in poetry or prose or in both. Thus the national style of the Romans is prose, which is suited to the gravity of the national manners and character, to the logical character of the national mind. With all the majesty of Virgil and the vehemence of Juvenal, the Roman character is not essentially poetic. As the Latins came under the influence of the Greeks they lost something of their stiffness, sharpness, and homely hard sense. But in that department of the poet's art which is most individual, in lyric, the Roman failed, with all his dependence on his Greek models, to acquire the power of the wing. The Romans had a distinct genius for prose, as have the French, the creators of modern prose style. (Boccaccio and Cervantes,

I am told, still latinized.) French lyric that is not due to the influence of Provençal or English lacks in power when measured in comparison with German, English, or Greek. The intellectual and emotional qualities of the Hellenic race endowed it equally with a genius for poetry and for prose; though poetry rather than prose is perhaps truly national in its scope. The sovereignty of Greek style exacted submission in the form of imitation among all nations and at every time. The creative quality of the Greek spirit transfused its imitators so that they gained the power of originality, of passing through imitation to creation. Bossuet read Homer whenever he had to compose a funeral oration.

One salient difference between the classic tongues (and especially Greek) in comparison with modern languages is their greater precision and lucidity. We pack such an infinite deal into our words that exactness and clearness of thinking often disappear. The Greeks developed their thought in order to be clear. Their connectives focus attention on the logical evolution of their thought.

Aristotle says that a foreigner could be recognized by his avoidance of certain particles. The particles are logical; but they are also lyric and emotional. They indicate personality, opinion, hope, doubt; though they reproduce the Greek dialectical keenness, they have less of that reflective character that marks our ponderous and meticulous "I believe," "I assume," "I daresay." The intellectual quality of Greek speech does no violence to its poetic quality. Feeling holds its own when the reason is most at work. The language of the Greeks is a diaphanous robe of finely spun texture which allows each delicate contour of the thought to display its just proportions.

THE PROBLEMS OF GREEK

BY MILTON WYLIE HUMPHREYS

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AN adequate treatment of the problems of Greek would require the prolonged labor of many specialists, and the result would be, not a short essay, but volumes. It is reasonable, therefore, for one man, whose specialty is not suited for elaboration here, to hope for lenience on the part of specialists in other branches of the subject.

Under the perplexing conditions it seems best to give a rough, general survey of the territory, and while doing so to make as it were a few raids through some special parts. These parts will be confined to the language proper, and definite references to modern works will be avoided.

This paper does not deal with the objects and tasks of Greek philology; but a few remarks on the obstacles to the solution of problems seem appropriate. Since many of the problems can be solved only by means of accumulated results, it is obvious that all errors or defects of research are obstacles. Two or three of these will be noted by way of illustration. One is the failure to make discriminations. I do not refer to hair-splitting distinctions, of which we have too many, but to the confusion of wholly different things. We find *δεῖνὰ ποιεῖν* with its two meanings confounded with *δεῖνόν* (or *δευνά*) *ποιεῖσθαι*, *ἀρχεῖν* with *ἀρχεσθαι*, *ἕξεσσι* and the dative with *ἕξεσσι* and the accusative with the infinitive, *δαῖ* and the accusative with *δαῖ* and the dative with the infinitive, and so on; and sometimes we are told that one of the usages is "rare," when it is rare only in the sense in which "broadaxe" is rare in comparison with "hatchet." Sometimes we are told that the perfects of certain verbs are used as presents, and find *τέθνηκα*, "I am dead," cited as an example instead of *τεθνάτω*, "let him die"; and we actually find the supposed confusion of the infinitive with *μή* and the subjunctive or optative after verbs of fearing ridiculed as if the infinitive after such verbs were never used as the equivalent of *μή* with the finite verb. Then there is the

widespread disposition of critics to eliminate the scattering early examples of phenomena which abound in later periods. We are told, for example, that the second aorist passive “ἡγγέλην is frequent in later Greek, and was introduced by copyists into correct writers”; and so it has been “emended” even from Euripides; and yet it occurs in a good Attic inscription. It should be borne in mind that many of the seeming peculiarities of late Greek had their origin at an early period, and sporadic examples should be expected.

One sample of defective method will now be mentioned; the use made of statistics, or rather the making of statistics that are of no use. What is gained, for instance, by knowing the ratio of the aorists to the imperfects in any given work unless we know in how many of the examples either tense might have been used? In Xenophon's *Hellenica* the ratio of the aorists to the imperfects is much greater for the compounds of πλέω than for the simple verb. Does this show that Xenophon had a predilection for the aorists of the compounds as compared with the simple verb? Of course not. The circumstances under which ἐκπλεῖν, καταπλεῖν, διαπλεῖν, etc., are used more frequently call for the aorist, and the same phenomenon appears in Thucydides. Again, even if statistics have been intelligently made, they should be used with great care. By one of the metrical tests it can be demonstrated that the ninth and the tenth books of the *Æneid* are by different authors.

The problems of Greek relate to every part of the subject: the letters, the history of their forms in inscriptions and manuscripts in different places; the sounds represented by the letters; the accents; words, their forms, meanings, and origins or etymologies; the combination of words into sentences; the modes of speaking or reciting from the ψιλλὴ λέξις of conversation up to the singing of lyric poetry; the restoration of texts; the authorship, chronology, sources, and possible revision of works; the origin and mutual relation of dialects; the subject-matter, and so on. These subjects bring us into contact with comparative linguistic, meters and music, textual and higher criticism, and most branches of the so-called sciences. The Hellenist must also deal with the results of research in the fields of archæology, mythology, history, and general antiquities. We can never know when a new fact may throw light on our subject. The antepirrhema of the knights, however much admired by some for its exquisite humor, was sheer nonsense, until we learned from an archæological source that the horses on which the knights entered the theatre, those horses that preferred crabs to clover, were two-legged horses. How far the Hellenist must deal with the subject-matter is a perplexing question. If he must explain mythological and historical allusions, why not also scientific facts or theories? Wherever the line be drawn, Greek scholars must at least aid in the

restoration and interpretation of Greek works of all sorts. The Optics ascribed to Euclid, the treatise of Apollonius on Conic Sections with the use of coördinate axes, the invention of differentiation and integration by Archimedes, and similar works, can be interpreted only by Greek scholars competent to understand the subject-matter, or, less satisfactorily, in collaboration with mathematicians. So the Hellenist must support the investigator on the slippery field of comparative linguistic, and must avail himself of all the light shed from that source and be able to distinguish the light from the darkness.

To begin, then, at the beginning. The letters of the alphabet, including tachygraphy, present too many problems to be so much as named. The digamma alone presents a legion of problems. How was Z pronounced? How the aspirated mutes, especially when two stand together? And the diphthongs: when did the two syllables of *λείπειν* assume the same vowel sound, and what was that sound? Was the future of *πάσχω* identical with that of *πείθομαι* for Pericles? If not, how was it for Demosthenes? When did (Andoc. *Myst.* 147) *οὐδ' ἡμάρτηται οὐδὲν οὔτε ἡμῖν εἰς ἡμᾶς οὔτε ὑμῖν εἰς ἡμᾶς* become *οὐδ' ἡμάρτιτε οὐδὲν οὔτε ἡμῖν εἰς ἡμᾶς οὔτε ὑμῖν εἰς ἡμᾶς*? Such are some of the questions. Then, it being assumed that the sounds represented by the letters are known, numerous questions arise. There is still a question as to the nature of accent, and there is actually a question whether the accent was observed in reading poetry, and on the other hand the much more reasonable question whether there was any metrical stress. The questions relating to *ψιλλὴ λέξις*, *καταλογή*, *παρακαταλογή*, *τὰ ἔπη*, *μέλος*, etc., bring us into contact with metric, music, and dance, and the analysis and performance of plays. All these must be passed over here. The analysis of a tragedy, thanks to Aristotle, is fairly well settled, and that of a comedy has entered upon a new epoch, but still has its problems, I might say, its warfare.

Words present countless problems. The etymology and meaning are in some instances unknown even when these seem as if they ought to be obvious, such, for example, as the much-discussed *ἄμαιμάκετος* and *ἡλίβατος*. And even *γλαυκῶπις*: is it "gray-eyed," or "of the gray water"? Or is it "owl-faced"? (**Ἀπολλων ἀποτροπᾶει!*) The Homeric poems alone furnish a considerable vocabulary of unexplained words. Some whole classes of words have their problems. When does *τρεῖς ἡμέραι* mean three actual days and nights, and when does it mean one day and two nights, or can it mean this at all? If *διὰ πεντηρίδος* means "every five years," how is it that a festival celebrated every *four* years is called a *πεντητηρίς*? (Our lexicon has a serious error on this word.) In short, when do numerals and their compounds, applied to units of time, denote our cardinal numerals and when our ordinal? Also the history of numeral notation is still

to be written. One "specialist" says that for some unknown reason the early Athenians used H instead of E for *ἐκατόν*! The history of the transition to the later system is needed for purposes of textual criticism. The date of the well-known couplet on the *ἐξ ὥραι* of labor would aid in the solution of several problems, fixing the *terminus ante quem* for the new system, the use of *ὥρα* for "hour," and the imperative *ζῆθι*.

The names of animals and plants are troublesome. The *αἰλουρος* and the *γαλή*, with the later *κάττα* and *κάττος*, have a literature of their own, and yet the cat problem remains unsolved. Despite volumes on Greek birds, the make-up of the chorus in the *Aves* is not altogether settled. And now, to pass on to plants, we are told that the *δάκινθος* could not have been the hyacinth, that *φηγός* was probably not the oak, that the *κώνειον* with its painless death could not have been the *conium maculatum* nor the *cicuta virosa*. But there is scarcely any end to such questions.

The inflection of words still has its problems. It is sufficient to refer to the controversy over the dative plural in Homer, and the question to what extent *ῆν* was plural and *ἐντί* singular. Our grammars change from year to year. Now we have the long delayed *τέθηκα*; shall we ever have *-όσθων* as an alternative for *-έσθων*? There are still questions enough as to forms, and even as to accents, as in the case of the so-called proclitics; but I must hasten on.

Syntax and style are closely bound together. Of style proper I shall say as little as possible. Style relates to different ways of saying the same thing. If a change in a sentence adds to or takes from its sense, it is not a purely stylistic change. Publishers once, to suppress my egotism, changed "I do not know" into "It is not known." We can say either *ἐπλήγην πρότερον ἢ ἐπάταξα* or *πρότερος ἐπλήγην ἢ ἐπάταξα*, but the latter says more than the former, and the difference does not pertain to style. The delicate tints of stylistic coloring are very elusive, and the distinctions drawn, I fear, are sometimes illusory. Much depends on the mental characteristics, natural and acquired, of the individual. Association particularly plays an important part. If the Greek scholars should each write down three brief passages that are respectively most impressive, most touching, and most beautiful to him, the list would be very interesting. Probably only one person here would select as the most impressive *ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ἡγείτο δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμων, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεὺς*. Usually, as in the example cited, the subject-matter is the main factor of impressiveness; but the very sound of words may have a powerful influence, that of some words on some people, that of others on others.

Do not, then, judge me too severely when I confess that on me the *ῆθος* of the Greek cases is to a great extent lost. To my mind the

effect of placing the accusative at the head of a sentence is not due to any vigor of the case itself, but to the fact that its position announces a departure from the every-day arrangement of the parts of the sentence. As "omne ignotum pro mirifico," so "omne inusitatum pro grandiloquo." The subject accusative with the infinitive in oratio obliqua is to me nothing more than a nominative. Analogously, to my mind the difference between the genitive and the dative is purely grammatical. In ὁ πατήρ μοι τέθηκεν, μοι is not possessive: it means "I have lost my father," just as in Cicero's single mention of his father, "Pater nobis decessit a. d. III. Kal. Decembres," "nobis" instead of "noster" is the one note of feeling. The Pindaric θυγάτηρ οἱ (if οἱ is dative) is due to the predication involved in apposition, a latent predication which may become active. The possessive dative used attributively is a solecism, or rather a Colophonism. When the case is a predicate, the distinction between ownership and possession is purely grammatical. Ἐνταῦθα Κύρῳ βασιλεία ἦν . . . ἔστι δὲ καὶ μεγάλῳ βασιλέως βασιλεία ἐν Κελαιναῖς: here the predicate dative and attributive genitive do not imply different kinds of possession. So τὰ ἐν Κελαιναῖς βασιλείᾳ ἔστι Κύρου would not allow Κύρῳ. The rule, however, that if the subject has the article the genitive is used, if not, the dative, is inadequate and does not get at the root of the matter. A noun with the article may have the predicate dative (Dem. 43, 52), and the genitive may be used when there is no article with the subject. As this paper does not offer solutions of problems, no attempt is made to state what seems to be the correct rule. The ordinary distinction between "possession" and "ownership" is probably due to the fact that ἔστι Κύρῳ may be rendered "Cyrus has."

The problems of the cases have not all been solved. As yet the cases have usually been treated separately, and for individual authors or works, whereas they need to be treated conjointly and comprehensively. To one point attention is directed. The prevailing distinction between the accusative and the dative with the infinitive after ἔξεστι and προσήκει, though sadly muddled in some of our standards, is theoretically plain enough; but what are we to make of examples like Isocr. *Paneg.* 28, where it is said of a λόγος that has become μυθώδης: ὁμῶς αὐτῷ καὶ νῦν ῥηθῆναι προσήκει? Is this semi-personification: "it *deserves* to be told"? A complete collection of examples would be useful.

With the cases the prepositions are intimately associated. Not to mention the more general problems, the simple question of different cases with the same preposition is often misunderstood, and we find efforts to force the idea of motion into all examples of παρά with the accusative, or the view that παρά *of rest* must take the dative at least of a person. Here, by the way, style has its effect to the extent that poetry has the greater privilege of being quaint.

The question of the choice of prepositions has its problems. Why, for instance, *ὁμολογείται παρά* (or *πρός*) *τινος* rather than *ὑπό τινος*? Even *σύν* still seems to need elucidation. We talk of its use in Attic prose as being restricted to commercial language, and, in another sense, to a few phrases; but when Stratoniceus (who had in his school-room two pupils and ten statues representing Apollo and the Muses) was asked how many pupils he had, and answered, *σὺν τοῖς θεοῖς δώδεκα*, he was punning on what I believe to have been two good Attic uses of the preposition, except that one of them is confined to a few phrases ("with the help of," "thanks to"). I do not recall an instance of *μετά* in the sense "inclusive of."

The question of the simple verb with a preposition, *ἐλθεῖν εἰς*, the compound without the preposition, *εἰσελθεῖν*, and the compound with a preposition *εἰσελθεῖν εἰς*, needs elucidation. Here style and meaning are both concerned, and even the latter seems to be misconceived in some instances. In certain translations we read "Epidamnus is a city situated on the right as you sail into the Ionian gulf." Of course it should be, accent it as you will, "There is a city Epidamnus"; but that by the way. The point is this: we are told that this is the only prose example of *ἐσπλεῖν* with the simple accusative. If so, it is the only prose example of *ἐσπλεῖν* with an accusative not depending on *ἐσ-* directly. As you sail by Epidamnus on your right, you are far within the Ionian gulf of Thucydides. There is a similar confusion of *συστρατεύειν τινί* with *συστρατεύειν μετά τινος* (or *σύν τινι*).

The article, with its development, its prose use and its poetical omission, its uses with proper names, and so on, must be reluctantly dismissed with a brief remark on one point: the use of the article with a noun in address. *Μῆτερ Δαρείου ἡ γεραία, Πάτερ ἡμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς* and similar examples are familiar to all, and no one would defend *πάτερ Δαρείου ὁ γεραίε* or *ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς πάτερ*; but some appear not to know that where there is no vocative form there is no vocative case and the article is not excluded; but to what extent the address affects the use of the article I have not seen discussed. The article with a nominative following and qualifying a true vocative, as just cited, is treated by some as an irregularity, as is the predicate vocative as in *ὦ φίλτατε μεταπίπτων*; but on what grounds?

The pronouns still have their problems. When, for instance, "I" is used for "any one," must *ἐγώ* be expressed? Certainly not in late Greek. A study of this subject which I have published does not pretend to be exhaustive or conclusive. Again, what is there specially "Attic" about *τί λέγεις σύ*? Has the pronoun anything to do with it? Why was *σύ* in *ἐλθὲ σύ, τοῦτο ποίησον σύ*, in the *Κοινή* equivalent to *ῥακά* or *μῶρε*, and did it have the same effect in the classic Greek? But I cannot take time even to ask the many remaining questions.

In the syntax of the verb only a few isolated points will be touched upon. First, as to tense: the dispute over the fundamental difference between certain tenses is chiefly a battle of words, and I pass it by. All will agree that a question between the imperfect and the aorist is usually a question of the encroachment of the former upon the theoretical domain of the latter. ἔλεγε, "he was saying," "used to say," or "he said"; but εἶπε only "he said." So from the durative are developed some special tense-relations not derived from the aorist. The ingressive aorist of a verb denoting a *state* is not the same as the imperfect that leaves an *act* in progress. When a purpose is implied we hear of a conative imperfect if the voice is active: ἀπώλλυσάν με; but it is equally conative in the passive: ἀπαλλύμην ὑπ' αὐτῶν, only the grammatical subject does not make the attempt. In ἐσφζόμεν ὑπ' αὐτῶν it would be doubtful who made the attempt. But this so-called conative is the same as we find in Andoc. *Myst.* 114, αὐτὸς μὲν αὐτὸν ἀπώλλυον τιθεῖς τὴν ἱκετηρίαν, ἐσφζόμεν δὲ τῇ τύχῃ, where there is no attempt. Like this is the imperfect as the future of the past, as Antiph. *Tetr. A. β.* 3, φανερὸς γενόμενος ἀπαλλύμην. Andoc. *Myst.* 58, φονεὺς οὖν αὐτῶν ἐγίγνομην ἐγὼ μὴ εἰπὼν ὑμῖν ἃ ἤκουσα. ἔτι δὲ τριακοσίους Ἀθηναίων ἀπώλλυον, καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐν κακοῖς τοῖς μεγίστοις ἐγίγνετο. All these uses, the "conative," the "ingressive," the "future from the past," were probably to the Greeks one and the same: at least some convincing proof of the contrary would be welcome. The problematical "conative aorist," the "conatus sine effectu," must be passed by.

Omitting also the problems relating to the present and aorist of the subjunctive, optative, imperative, and infinitive, let us consider the supplementary participle not in oratio obliqua. Two cases only will be mentioned. Verbs of physical perception, practically ὁρᾶν and ἀκούειν, we are told, normally take the present participle, especially so ὁρᾶν. It is true that we can see an act only in progress; but then we can see it through, and in that case we should expect the aorist. In other words, did the Greeks *never* distinguish between "I saw a tree falling" and "I saw a tree fall"? I am reluctant to admit this. When the boy Cyrus saw a deer break cover, he gave chase: ὡς εἶδεν ἄλαφον ἐκπηδήσασαν . . . ἐδίωκεν. The imperfect ἐδίωκεν, as it leaves him in pursuit, we should expect; and I must confess that I should with Xenophon have written ἐκπηδήσασαν rather than ἐκπηδῶσαν. An exhaustive list of examples is desirable.

Analogous to ὁρᾶν is ἀνέχεσθαι. To endure an act properly belongs to the time during which the act is in progress; but as περιορᾶν and ἐφορᾶν may take the aorist as summing up the act, there seems to be no *a priori* reason why ἀνέχεσθαι should not take the aorist, especially since the act may be one which, for some reason, cannot be resisted at the moment. We may refuse to submit to something already done. The examples of the aorist participle with ἀνέχεσθαι are

scarce. Homer's vexatious ἀνιηθέντα νέεσθαι, emended, however plausibly, into ἀνιηθέντ' ἀνέχεσθαι, cannot be counted. Xenophon (*Cyrop.* VI, 2, 18) makes the characteristic remark that a hundred horses would not be able to stand the sight of one camel: οὐκ ἂν ἀνάσχοιντο ἰδόντες. Lysias (13, 8) says οὐκ ἠνέσχεσθε ἀκούσαντες, though Xenophon (*Hell.* VI, 5, 19) says of a similar situation, οὐκ ἠνείχοντο ἀκούοντες. Demosthenes (41, 1) has an example of the aorist participle with the present ἀνέχεσθαι as in the problematical Homeric example: εἰ μᾶλλον ἡρούμην δίκας καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν ἢ μικρὰ ἐλαττωθεὶς ἀνέχεσθαι. (The hexameter is only apparent.) I do not recall an example of the aorist with the object of ἀνέχεσθαι, as in ἀνέχεσθαι τὴν γῆν τεμνομένην, though situations can be conceived in which I believe the aorist would be required. An exhaustive list of examples of all sorts is needed.

The mutual relations of aorist and perfect furnish some problems. The fact that with πολλάκις the aorist was as natural to the Greeks as the perfect, and that with πολλάκις ἤδη it was almost the rule, is often ignored, and πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα is cited as an aorist used instead of a wanting perfect. So the aorist subjunctive is spoken of as a less accurate substitute for the more unwieldy perfect, whereas the perfect has a different function, so far as I have observed; but a thorough examination I have never made nor seen. That the aorist indicative in like manner takes the place of the more unwieldy pluperfect in the unreal condition seems equally erroneous. The favorite illustration is οὐδὲν ἂν ὦν νυνὶ πεποίηκεν ἔπραξεν, where the aorist is the proper tense. We might say οὐδὲν ὦν πεποίηκεν δικαίως ἔπραξεν, and so we find (Dem. 23, 178) πάντ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω πεποίηκεν καὶ οὐδὲν . . . δικαίως ἔπραξεν. It is not necessary to state why the aorist in such cases seems to be the proper tense. Among the examples are some in which the circumstances cause the aorist and pluperfect to exchange places as compared with the example just cited. A collection of all the examples would be instructive.

The difference between the aorist and the perfect participles presents some difficulties. "Being justified by faith, let us have peace": δικαιωθέντες . . . ἔχωμεν. Must this mean (as of course it does) "let us be justified and have," or might it mean "seeing that we are justified"; or would this latter require the perfect? Not necessarily; for Xenophon (*Hell.* II, 2, 6) has οὗτοι σφαγὰς τῶν γνωρίμων ποιήσαντες, κατεῖχον τὴν πόλιν, and yet the σφαγαί had occurred long before, and ποιήσαντες is causal.

The moods, the main field of problems, can only be touched upon. Some of these problems, such, for instance, as relate to the ideal general condition and the prohibition, I pass by reluctantly, as some of my published views concerning them have been misunderstood. Attention is directed to only two or three practical cases. It has sometimes

been denied that the pure optative can be used interrogatively; but *ἀπολοίμην* may have the force of "I wish I may perish" as well as of "may I perish." So the old servant (*Med.* 83) says *ὄλοιτο μὲν μή, δεσπότης γάρ ἐστ' ἐμός*, where the particle *μὲν* shows plainly that *μή* is *not* an afterthought, and the meaning is "Perish, indeed, may he not," that is, "I do not, indeed, invoke a curse upon him." There are other similar examples. This use clearly allows the interrogative form, and so we find (*Med.* 754) *τί δ' ὄρκῳ τῷδε μή 'μμένων πάθους*. The extent of this usage needs investigation.

The question of *ἄν* with the future (even in Homer) is still a battleground, as is the question about the difference between the subjunctive and the optative in the future condition. Some discussions of this latter question ignore a far-reaching phenomenon of speech, not peculiar to Greek. When a state of affairs is, even theoretically, assumed, it may, in the continuation, be treated as actually existent, "If the laws were to appear before us and say" is theoretical or ideal; but now the laws are here and we can say *ἐὰν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι*. Analogously, "if a man shall steal (*ἐὰν κλέψῃ*), he shall return what he stole (*ἂ ἐκλεψεν*)," not necessarily *ἂ ἄν κλέψῃ*. Again, in the condition, a very practical case may, from modesty, courtesy, or other cause, be placed in the theoretical form, as in the case of Virtue in the Choice of Hercules, where Vice uses the practical subjunctive.

The circumstances under which the future in protasis is absolutely required in classical Greek I have never seen defined. It helps little to say that it is really a present condition, the future being equivalent to *μέλλω* with the infinitive (which sometimes is not true). The future is used when the apodosis states something which precedes in time the act of the protasis. But in later Greek the subjunctive is sometimes so used; and I have never seen a history of the origin and development of this usage. The extent of the totally different use of the future in threats and warnings has been investigated for some authors, but much remains to be done. I would here note that the future is employed even with the first person when the apodosis would be a threat or warning if it were in the second person.

In treating final clauses, the distinction between *ἵνα* as a *pure* final particle and the rest as relatives overlooks the fact that to the Greeks this *ἵνα*, even if, as some have attempted to prove, it had a different origin, was the same as the relative *ἵνα*, though *ἵνα* as a relative was not very familiar. The rule that it never takes the future is certainly wrong, but I have never observed *ἵνα ἄν* with the subjunctive. How did *ἵνα* with the future sound to the Greeks, and did they *never* use *ἄν* with the subjunctive after it?

The historical indicative in final clauses is confined to cases where the unreality extends to and includes the purpose. If it is a wish, for instance, the final clause is part — in fact the main part — of

the wish. But is the construction restricted to the wish impossible of realization, the unreal condition, and the (kindred) unfulfilled duty? Though some statements of the principle imply that this is not the fact, the examples cited can all be reduced to these heads, and, so far as I can recall examples, they are all of this sort from the grammatical point of view, but sometimes their character is veiled, and the wish or duty is expressed *only* by the form of the final clause. To illustrate: Ischomachus (Xen. *Oec.* 8, 2) tells his wife that *he* is to blame for her inability to find some article, "because," says he, "I did not designate a place for each thing in order that you might know where to put it." Should we read *ἵνα εἰδῆς* with the manuscripts, or *ἵνα ᾗδεις* (= *ᾗδειςθα*), as has been proposed? To my mind the historical indicative is necessary. The neglected duty here is like that of (Dem. 36, 47) *ἀντὶ τοῦ κοσμεῖν . . . ἵνα ἐφαίνετο*. The duty is not necessarily a moral obligation; it may be imposed by consistency or appropriateness, as (Plat. *Theaet.* 161 c) where Socrates says, "I am surprised that he did not say the hog was the measure of all things," *ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνν καταφρονητικῶς ἤρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν*. Here *χρῆν* might have been used in the leading clause. Iphigenia (*I. T.* 357) says that no wind has ever driven Helen and Menelaus to her, *ἵν' ἀντετιμωρησάμην*, where the wish is *expressed* only by the final clause. A full examination of the question whether the historical indicative and the subjunctive or optative are ever interchangeable without change of sense seems desirable.

The problems of the infinitive can receive here only a few illustrations. The seeming prepositional use of *πρίν* with the infinitive, originating and enjoying its most flourishing period long before prepositions could be construed with the infinitive, is to me a mystery. The use of mood after *πρίν* in the classical period still seems to be a little clouded, and we find *πρίν δῆ* or *πρίν γε δῆ* spoken of as exceptional, with the finite verb after an affirmative clause, though, like our "until at last," it is regularly used to introduce something that puts an end to a situation, whether a negative, expressed or implied, precedes or not. It is practically one word, like *νῦν δῆ*, "just now," and *μὲν δῆ* in *καὶ μὲν δῆ, ἀλλὰ μὲν δῆ, οὐ μὲν δῆ*.

The use of *πλὴν* with the simple infinitive is taught in some of our best works, and yet I have never observed a clear example. Those cited in the books are no examples at all. One is *τί ἄλλο πλὴν ψευδῆ λέγειν*; but the whole sentence is *τί οὖν μ' ἄνωγας ἄλλο πλὴν ψευδῆ λέγειν*, where *πλὴν* is simply *ἤ*. When *πλὴν* is construed with the infinitive, as far as I have observed, it requires *τοῦ*; but a thorough search is needed.

The simple infinitive of so-called purpose, whatever it was with Homer, as in *δὸς ἄγειν*, is in classic prose not a purpose in the great majority of cases, but a permission, or commission, or something analogous. There is no more purpose in *οὓς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου*

than in (Xen. *Hell.* II, 3, 35) *προέμενοι αὐτοὺς ἀπολίσσθαι*. The limitations of this use of the infinitive I have never seen satisfactorily stated.

The construction of *δοκεῖν*, "to seem," cannot be called a problem. I mention it only because of the surprising misstatements in some of the best grammars. "It seems to me that they came" can never be *δοκεῖ μοι αὐτοὺς ἐλθεῖν*, but must be *δοκοῦσί μοι ἐλθεῖν*. The seeming examples and their true nature are too familiar to mention. If there are any real examples of the accusative with the infinitive after *δοκεῖ*, "it seems," they should be collected.

The negative presents a mass of problems. I have already published something on the defects of our knowledge here, and have not space to add anything now. I will only say that recent authors of text-books still go on using *οὐπω* and *οὐποτε* for "yet" and "ever" in negative sentences.

There remain several departments of Greek grammar which I must entirely omit. Indirect discourse, sometimes strangely treated as a special department of syntax, involves all the departments, and any treatment of the subject is defective that fails to provide for every construction of direct discourse, even if such provision is to say that it cannot be expressed in indirect discourse. Such a treatment I have never seen, nor anything remotely approximating it. The special problems here are many and cannot even be enumerated.

Problems of textual criticism I must also omit. Once I had occasion to read a lengthy paper on the subject, pointing out what seemed to me radical defects. Further study of the subject has strengthened my views and I am convinced that great improvement of method is still possible. The individual problems are of course well-nigh endless.

Higher criticism needs only to be mentioned, and Greek scholars see before them a wilderness to be cleared and made ready for cultivation, and it would be absurd to offer any remarks here.

[NOTE.—The above paper was prepared under the impression that the author had no choice, but was expected to treat in forty-five minutes the subject prescribed,—"The Problems of Greek." He would have much preferred to discuss some special topic, such, for instance, as meters, which he supposed was even excluded as belonging to some other Section of the Congress. The paper is printed exactly as it was read.—M. W. H.]

SHORT PAPERS

PROFESSOR WILLIAM ARTHUR HEIDEL, of Iowa College, presented a paper on "The Significance of the *δραιοι* in the Eleatic Philosophy." The speaker's arguments and conclusions were based upon the statement that that which distinguishes the Eleatics alike from their predecessors and their successors is the fact that they identified unity and homogeneity, the *ἐν* and the *δραιοι*, and deduced from their identity, interpreted with all strictness, the ultimate logical conclusions to which the assumption must lead.

PROFESSOR MAURICE HUTTON, of the University of Toronto, presented a short paper to the Section on "Hellenism," in which he said in part:

"It has been a familiar experience in my own life that my virtues — or what I have been pleased to call my virtues — have been due to ignorance.

"All the more interest I find in the Socratic paradox that virtue is knowledge. Paradox though it be, that maxim I think expresses the inner idea of Hellenism, the inner idea of the Greek mind; and to it I add the kindred paradox that virtue is an art, the paradox of the first book of the *Republic*. These paradoxes I find in the life, the literature, and the language of the Greeks.

"In their life they are expressed in the worship of intellect, to whatever ends addressed. The unscrupulous Antiphon is 'second to no one in virtue,' that is, in intellectual force and astuteness. The typical heroes of Hellas are Odysseus and Themistocles; conspicuous each for his adroitness, 'slimness,' and finesse. Another political hero — selected by Aristotle as one of three great statesmen of Athens — is Theramenes; the academic statesman or 'mugwump'; the fastidious 'independent' who tried all parties and was satisfied with none, for none realized his ideal of a 'scientific republic.' He also was generally considered merely an adroit schemer; but his quest of perfection in politics was probably disinterested enough; he was the doctrinaire in politics. These 'intellectuals,' as the French call them, appear at their best in the great days of Athens; at their worst in the days of Roman domination when the Greek became the facile, astute, domestic chaplain of his brutal, strong-willed Roman employer; when he presented that most melancholy of spectacles, the spectacle of a man of genius without character and self-respect; evil days are not good for men merely intellectual; such men are birds of paradise, or butterflies needing the sunshine of prosperity, if they are to discharge well their ornamental functions in the economy of nature.

"'Hellenism' in literature conveys the same suggestion of the cult of knowledge. Their literature is over-intellectual; there is the attempt to base everything, even the deepest and therefore least known instincts of human nature, upon knowledge. Patriotism is laboriously justified alike by poets and historians as enlightened self-interest; the citizen must be a patriot, since his life and his success depend upon the life and success of his state; so too he must be pious, since by piety he will earn the support of his god, who can be trusted, if fairly treated, to support him, since he has no other natural votaries; there is a solidarity of interest between god and worshiper; honesty again is recommended as the best policy; a man does not serve either god or fellow men for naught; whence we find without surprise, since no one was ever honest on these grounds (and if he was he was not), that Greek honesty was less robust than Roman, in proportion as it was more intellectual and less instinctive.

"The second paradox of Greece, that virtue is an art, cannot obviously be disen-

tangled from the first; but it may to some extent be treated separately. Many people in all ages treat life as an art; and make the end of life a dexterous opportunism; but this is especially Athenian; 'connoisseurs of life, ever hankering after novelties and contemptuous of the trite,' as Cleon calls them (Thucydides, 3, 30); impressionists, in a word. In many dialogues of Plato — in the *Ion*, e.g., or in the last book of the *Republic* — this assumption is so radical that it is an axiom that the poet, if he is to be any good, must be able to throw some light on some art or science; on medicine or government or war; and it is triumphantly shown that he cannot do this, and therefore is an impostor; unless indeed he be an inspired idiot; for sometimes the poet can throw light even on these things, but he does not understand the light he throws; he is a mouthpiece only for the truth which utters itself by him; he is inspired, but he does not understand the truths with which he is inspired; but the highest knowledge is conscious knowledge, not unconscious instinct, or inspiration, or whatever we call that sort of knowledge. The secret of virtue and life lies in knowledge and conscious art; the poet is therefore on this, as on other grounds, inferior even to the carpenter.

"This comparison of life to an art is surely striking and characteristic, and involves consequences already noticed. The artist works, at least largely, for his own hand and for some definite and brilliant result associated with his own name; the soldier, on the contrary, so far as he is a good soldier, does not fight for his own hand; he is only a small part of a large machine, and though the result depends partly on his fidelity, it is not conducive necessarily to his glory or promotion; he may easily die, as he has fought, unknown and unrewarded.

"It follows from the proposition that virtue is knowledge and is art, that Hellenism represents broadly reflection and thought versus action; the life of the student versus the man of affairs; the theorist against the practical man. And this can be illustrated by the language of Hellas and Hellenism; the third head of my subject; *πρᾶγμα* is action, it is also a weariness of the flesh, a bore and a nuisance; *πόνος* is labor and sorrow; conversely, *ποιητής*, the creator, maker, and man of action, is the poet; *σκαίος* is left-handed figuratively, that is, in the sphere of the intellect and of art; the stupid man or the awkward man, the "gauche" man, as the modern Greeks of France say; with races less artistic and less intellectual, "sinister" means morally rather than intellectually left-handed.

"Hellenism in language shows a deficiency in the Hellenic mind on the side of personal character, of the emotional and moral nature, and of will: *θυμός* is used for spirit, courage, the whole element of will and character; apparently it really means 'anger' rather; and the inference is legitimate that Greek courage is apt to be of this illegitimate kind; this inference is supported by Aristotle's analysis of courage in the *Ethics*; the ordinary courage of high spirits and love of adventure seems absent; in the same way this *θυμοειδές*, or element of anger, or moral element of the soul, though it appears to cover for Plato all that we mean by personal character, is at bottom, it seems, provisional and temporary; it may survive this life and may animate a god even, such as Ares, but it is not the true soul, and it is not immortal."

SECTION E — LATIN LANGUAGE

SECTION E—LATIN LANGUAGE

(Hall 9, September 23, 10 a. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR MAURICE HUTTON, University of Toronto.
SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR E. A. SONNENSCHNEIN, University of Birmingham.
PROFESSOR WILLIAM G. HALE, University of Chicago.
SECRETARY: PROFESSOR F. W. SHIPLEY, Washington University.

THE RELATIONS OF LATIN

BY EDWARD ADOLF SONNENSCHNEIN

[Edward Adolf Sonnenschein, Professor of Latin and Greek, University of Birmingham, England. b. London, 1851. M.A. Oxford, 1878; D.Litt. 1901; M.A. Birmingham, 1901. Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Birmingham, 1901; Assistant Professor of Humanity, University of Glasgow, 1877-81; Professor of Greek and Latin, Mason College, Birmingham, 1883-90. Examiner Classics, University of Wales, University of Edinburgh, 1899-1902; Examiner in Greek to the Central Welsh Board, 1905; Hon. Sec. of the Classical Association of England and Wales, 1904. Editor of Plautus's *Captivi*, *Mostellaria*, *Rudens*. Author of *Latin and Greek Grammars in the Parallel Grammar Series* (of which he is editor in chief); *Ideals of Culture*; *Ora Maritima*; *Pro Patria*, etc.]

I HAVE decided to treat the subject entrusted to me to-day not from the purely linguistic point of view,—though this would have supplied me with a fruitful theme,—but rather from a point of view which would, I suppose, in Germany be called “kulturhistorisch.” What I propose to discuss is not the relation of Latin to other languages as languages, but rather the place of Latin in the history of civilization, and the work that it has done in the world as a vehicle of culture. The subject thus opened up is of course far too great to be embraced in a brief paper; nor do I pretend to be able to deal competently with all its aspects: but it is, perhaps, not inappropriate in scope and magnitude to the present occasion.

The history of the Latin language, regarded as an organ of culture, may be divided into three great periods: (1) the period in which it is the organ of a culture moulded mainly by Greece; this period extends from long before the third century B.C. to the latter part of the second century A.D.: (2) the period in which Latin becomes the organ of the Christian Church, from the end of the second century to the end of the fifth century A.D.: (3) the period vaguely spoken of as the “Middle Ages,” from the sixth to the end of the thirteenth century of our era.

It was a favorite idea of ancient writers to represent the course of history as a succession of cycles, each of which was more or less coincident with its predecessor. That history repeats itself,—even

that the atoms of which the universe is composed return after the completion of some *magnus annus* into the precise position which they occupied at its commencement, — this is the common assumption of ancient philosophers and poets:

Magnus ab integro saeculorum nascitur ordo.

If we compare this theory with modern philosophies of history, the broad distinction is that, whereas we proceed on the postulate or working hypothesis that the world is progressive, the belief in progress was in ancient times conspicuous by its absence. Development, indeed, they knew; but only development in the downward direction, — degeneration, — and that only within the limits of one cycle. Thus at bottom their philosophy of history was static. The Eleatic conception of "Being" as against "Becoming" expresses the deeply rooted conviction of antiquity. If Plato had been sketching the history of modern Europe he would probably have seen in the period which followed the decline and fall of the Roman Empire the commencement of a new cycle; he would have compared the inroads of the barbarians to the migrations which changed the face of Eastern Europe at the commencement of the Hellenic period; and he would have ended by predicting a decline and fall of the civilization of the West, including, perhaps, that of the great Atlantis, whose existence he seems to have divined some nineteen centuries before the time of Columbus. Yet such a conception would have ignored a cardinal fact in the case. It was not in utter nakedness that modern Europe entered on her career. Much, no doubt, of the spiritual wealth of ancient Hellas had been lost, many a "cloud of glory" had been dispelled, at any rate for a time, but much of it lived on in other forms, reborn in the institutions, the art, and the philosophy of Rome. Thus it comes about that so large a part of our spiritual inheritance is Greek. The Renaissance of Greek studies in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries would not have been able to galvanize into life a culture that was utterly dead; it was because part of that culture was alive, albeit in Roman forms, that its second rebirth was possible. And even for this second rebirth we are indebted principally to the genius of Rome working in Italians like Petrarch, Politian, and Poggio. When we think of these things, how to the same Rome which one of her poets of imperialism apostrophized in the words, —

Fecisti patriam diversis gentibus unam, —

we owe also our connection at two points with the intellectual conquests of Greece, we may well pause before we accept as final the verdict which one of the greatest of living scholars has summed up in the ungrateful phrase "*das seelenmordende Rom.*"

Standing some years ago in Norwich Cathedral, I had the greatness of Rome brought forcibly home to my mind. In the aisles there stretched out a series of groined vaults which carried one straight back to the Colosseum; and at the extreme east end, behind the altar, rose two stately Early English arches, once the entrance to a Lady Chapel of the thirteenth century, but now standing isolated; for the Lady Chapel itself was destroyed in the sixteenth century. The groined vaults are Romanesque, but the Early English arches are also Roman, only one degree further removed. Let two Roman barrel vaults or two Romanesque arches intersect, and you get the arch misnamed Gothic. A clear line of structural descent connects the one with the other, and the genius of Rome may claim them both as her own.

The relations of Rome to the Greek and to the modern world may be also illustrated by the history of verse. From Greece Rome borrowed the system of strictly quantitative meter, and discarded in favor of it the native Saturnian. But gradually she adapted it to the conditions of the Latin language by grafting upon it the Italian principle of accent,¹ the beginning of certain feet being marked by the use of an accented syllable, just as in architecture she introduced the feature of the arch. The effect is prominent in the verse of the *poetae novelli* of the second century A.D.; but it is also visible to some extent in much earlier forms of Latin verse. To quote only one example, the second half of the dactylic pentameter of Ovid is subject to the law that it must be as accentual as possible, provided always that it does not end with a monosyllable. This sounds like a paradox; but I believe I could, if not give it proof, at any rate make it plausible. The dissyllabic ending is simply a necessary sacrifice to secure coincidence of "ictus," as it is called, with accent in the other places. Well, in the course of time this accentual feature transformed the whole character of Latin verse, yet without involving a return to the Saturnian. And just as the pointed Gothic arch developed out of the Romanesque, so the accentual principle received such further development in the modern Teutonic verse based upon Latin models — accent being of course also a Teutonic principle — as to throw the quantitative principle completely in the shade; so that we now employ a kind of verse which seems at first sight comparable to Greek verse only by way of contrast. But only at first sight. This, too, I have no time to discuss fully to-day; but I will merely say that in my opinion the main difference between English and Latinized Greek verse is that English is not based upon any system of *prosody*, — that is, that the quantities of

¹ The *differentia* of Latin verse as compared with Greek is that it is *both* quantitative or semi-quantitative in some cases, *and* at certain points accentual; nor do I accept any purely accentual theory of the Saturnian.

syllables in English verse are not predetermined, as they are in Latin, by rules representing more or less accurately the prose pronunciation. The English poet in building his rime employs expansible and contractible bricks.

Our debt to Greece was finely acknowledged by Shelley, in his preface to *Hellas*, — a poem inspired by sympathy with the cause of Greek independence. "We are all Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts have all their root in Greece." The truth which lies in this statement, accompanied by some exaggeration, is becoming clearer to us every day, in proportion as the achievements of ancient Hellas in the fields of letters, of art, of science — aye, even of religious thought and political organization — become better known to us and more justly appreciated. Yet it would probably be truer to say that we are all Romans. For in the first place the Greek influence upon the modern world is mainly indirect, coming to us through Rome; and secondly, there are elements in our culture which are not Greek at all: other influences have been at work — these, too, mediated by Rome and the Latin language. As to the former point, no truer word can be spoken than the oft-repeated statement that just as conquered Greece led her conqueror captive, so conquered Rome imposed on the Teutonic barbarians not only her laws but also her culture and her civilization as a whole.

This second mission of Rome, which began with and before the fall of the Western Empire, was continued down to the Renaissance; and that Italy and the Eternal City might continue to hold the position of instructors of the nations was the prayer of Marco Vida in the sixteenth century:

Artibus emineat semper studiisque Minervae
Italia, et gentes doceat pulcherrima Roma
Quandoquidem armorum penitus fortuna recessit.¹

As to my second point, the existence of non-Greek elements in our civilization, that is a matter for which neither Vida nor Shelley could be expected to have an open eye. But the fact that not only Greece, but also Judæa, and at later date Arabia, stood at the back of Rome, and that the triumph of Latin civilization was a triumph for these also, is written large in history.

Rome was, in fact, the heir of at least two civilizations; her culture was the common stream into which had flowed the two rills of a universalized Hellenism and a Hellenized Judaism. But Latin was the medium of communication; so that we may fairly describe the complex unity of modern civilization as mainly a Latin unity. There have also been *direct* influences of Greece upon the modern world, notably at the time of the Humanistic Renaissance of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and during the last hundred years;

¹ Marco Vida (1489–1566), *Poetica*, II, 11, 63–65.

but these have never overthrown, though they have modified, the structure which was erected on a Latin foundation. Just as the political institutions and the law of Rome form a large part of the structure of every modern state, Roman roads playing the part of modern railways in opening up new avenues for civilization, so Roman thought is the predominating partner in the intellectual life of to-day.

The first period in the history of the Latin language, so regarded, is the period of Greek influence; and its most important subdivision falls in the middle of the second century B. C., the time when Greeks like Polybius and Panætius introduced to the "Scipionic circle" at Rome an intenser form of Greek culture than had been known there before. From this time onwards for over three hundred years a new influence dominates Latin literature, — the influence of Greek philosophy and especially of Stoicism. Of all the gifts of Greece to Rome, none was fraught with such far-reaching consequences as the philosophy of the Stoa. The fact that it caught the ear of Rome as no other system of philosophy ever did, that it exercised a profound influence on life and thought from the middle of the second century B. C. till the end of the second century A. D., that it transformed the whole system of Roman jurisprudence through the idea of the Rights of Man (the *Jus Naturae*), that it became nothing less than the religion of the educated classes under the early Empire, — all this is unmistakable testimony to two facts: (1) that there was no absolute breach of continuity between the Greek and the modern world; and (2) that Stoicism was really congenial to the Roman temperament.

But what was Stoicism? Not purely Greek, it would seem: every one of its men of note — such as Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Aratus, and at a later date Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater, Panætius, Poseidonius, Athenodorus (Canaanites) — hailed from the East, and some of them were of Semitic blood: the period at which it sprang into existence was that of the decay of the Greek city-states; the atmosphere it breathed was that of the Greater Greece opened up by the conquests of Alexander; the ideals it expressed were those of an epoch of expansion, — ideals of cosmopolitanism (the very word has a Stoic ring),¹ of the brotherhood of man, of philosophic liberalism and imperialism. Its monism and monotheism stood in marked contrast to the dualistic tendencies of Greek philosophy since Anaxagoras. Altogether, though much be explained as development on purely Greek lines, yet the probability, both external and internal, of an Oriental and indeed a Semitic strain in Stoicism seems too strong to be resisted. Greece, in fact, had *grown into* Stoicism — but

¹ It seems to have come to the Stoics from the Cynic Diogenes; his answer (*κοσμοπολίτης*) to the question *ποδαπὸς εἶ*, is quoted by Diogenes Laërtius, vi, 63.

not without contact with Oriental thought. How deep the world's debt to the East is will probably never be fully known.

Stoicism appealed strongly to the Roman character — to its dignity, its piety, its commercial integrity, its *δεισιδαιμονία*.¹ I am speaking, of course, of the Roman character at its best. It is worth remark that the only department of Latin literature, except the literature of Law, which was distinctly a Roman creation was a special kind of *didactic* literature, precisely the sphere in which these Stoical qualities had a field for their exercise, though it goes by the name of Satire. If we had adhered to the name chosen by Lucilius and Horace, it might, perhaps, have suggested to us as an English equivalent the word "Sermons." What are the *Sermones* of Horace but lay sermons, not without a spice of humor? And though he is fond of drawing caricatures of the Stoics, caricatures which we are too ready to take *au grand sérieux*, he was himself a bit of a Stoic at heart, at any rate when in a moral mood. So were most of the great Roman writers. Virgil seems to have given up his early Epicureanism in favor of a religious view of things in which Stoicism and Platonism were blended, if not indeed one: the doctrine of the world-soul as expressed in the fourth Georgic (219–227) is, I think, Stoic rather than Platonic; the famous passage in the sixth *Æneid* (724–751), with its doctrine of rewards and punishments in the future state, is perhaps Platonic rather than Stoic; for the Stoics believed in absorption in the *πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου* (*spiritus*, or *anima mundi*), rather than any form of personal immortality.² The coryphæi of the Scipionic circle were, as I have said, all Stoics — Lucilius,³ Lælius Furius Philus, Scævola, and the rest; so too, perhaps, even Cato the Censor, in his old age. Terence talks Stoicism in the line:

Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto (*Heaut.* 77).

Varro was half a Stoic; Cicero a good deal more than half. Even Sallust preaches Stoicism when he wishes to be impressive. Under the Empire we find Stoicism professed in Seneca and in Persius, as well as in the Emperor Marcus Aurelius and the Phrygian slave Epictetus. It commanded the respect of Lucan and Juvenal, whose later Satires are practically Stoic tracts,⁴ and it would have made a

¹ Polybius, vi, 56, 10.

² The virtues that Virgil admired most were fortitude (*patientia*) and piety. See the passage in Donatus's *Life*, ch. 18, quoted by Sellar, p. 123, and by Wickham, *Introduction to Horace*, Ode i, 24 (p. 73).

³ In my opinion Lucilius was a Stoic; cf. especially the fragment about *virtus* (=wisdom), preserved by Lactantius. The word *virtus* acquired a technical philosophical sense in Latin, equivalent to the Stoic *ὁρθὸς λόγος*; cf. Cic. *Tusc.* iv, 15, 34 (=recta ratio), *De Leg.* i, 8, 25, *De Fin.* iii, 4, 12; Hor. *Ode* ii, 2, 18, iii, 2, 17; *Sat.* ii, 1, 70, 72; *Epist.* i, 1, 17.

⁴ I have not forgotten the passage (13, 121) in which the Stoic is spoken of as differing from the Cynic only in his *tunic*. The Stoics and the Cynics were really akin.

convert of Tacitus, had he not had other axes to grind. The younger Pliny too shows Stoic leanings. Nor was its influence confined to letters: it showed itself under the Republic in the humanistic and socialistic radicalism of the Gracchi — pupils of C. Blossius — and in the assassination of Julius Cæsar; and under the early Empire in the political martyrdoms of men like Musonius Rufus, Rubellius Plautus, Thræsea Pætus, and many others, who formed the "Stoic opposition."

This vogue of Stoicism goes, indeed, so far as to suggest a doubt as to whether the Stoicism of Rome was not merely an expression of the Roman character itself. And no doubt the Romans were Stoics by nature as well as by nurture. Yet Stoicism must have helped to *develop* those elements in the Roman character to which it appealed so strongly. The old Roman *virtus* (manliness) came to have a wider sense (wisdom). Nor is it easy to say how much of the later form which Stoicism assumed in the hands of men of affairs like Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius is due to contact with the Roman genius for simplification and adaptation and practical life, and how much to later developments of Stoicism itself, as taught by men like Panætius and Poseidonius. One thing is certain, — that neo-Stoicism, if I may so call it, put off something of its arrogance, its dogmatism, its pedantry, and its paradoxes, and became a more human thing than early Stoicism had been. And this gain more than compensated for the losses which it suffered on the purely speculative side. Neo-Stoicism as developed at Rome became a power in the world.

There is probably no school of philosophy which has been so hardly judged as Stoicism. Its influence upon the world has been incalculable. The main *differentiæ* of modern society, as compared with ancient, are, I suppose, broadly speaking, three: the passage from the city-state to the empire-state, the abolition of slavery, and the creation of the church as distinct from the state. All these were voiced, or at least anticipated in principle, by Stoicism. As to the third point, Stoicism, like some other Greek schools of philosophy, linked men together in a unity which was independent of the state and in which therefore lay the germs of a church.

Again the Stoic theology led to an attitude towards nature which was a new thing in literature, a sense of the *mystery* of nature, as the dwelling-place and vesture of deity, the *templum deorum immortalium* (Seneca, *De Benef.* vii, 7, 3). It was something like the old Greek nature-worship minus its polytheism. To the formation of our modern attitude towards nature no doubt other elements have contributed, notably the Celtic, as Matthew Arnold held. But Stoicism was the beginning of it.

The world at large is little conscious of the debt which it owes

to Stoicism as a religious philosophy. The high seriousness and lofty morality taught by this school the world has passed by with a shrug of indifference; its charities, extended to slaves and even to the lower animals, —

ὅσα ζῶει τε καὶ ἔρπει θνήτ' ἐπὶ γαίαν,¹ —

have been put down to "rhetoric" or inconsistency; and men have been contented merely to "shiver at its apathy." But its apathy was, after all, only meant as a protest against emotion in the wrong place. The Stoics objected to basing mercy (*clementia*) upon mere emotion (*misericordia*). May not the reason for this indifference of the world at large towards a noble school of thought be found partly in the fact that Stoicism stands too near to ourselves to be seen clearly? It is said that if you show a man his own likeness in a mirror he will sometimes turn from it in disgust. Stoicism is essentially a philosophy not of despair, but of confidence and almost defiant optimism. Many of the fundamental ethical principles which are generally regarded as specifically Christian had been developed independently by the Porch. The idea of the fatherhood of God and its corollaries, the brotherhood of man and the law of love, in a word, the whole idea of basing morality directly upon a religious theory of the universe, is Stoic.

The striking phrase, τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἑσμέν, quoted by St. Paul, and the use of the word πατήρ in addressing the Deity are common to the Hymn of Cleanthes and the prologue to the Φαινόμενα of Aratus.

And this is a new note in literature; there is nothing quite like it in Plato or Aristotle, though Greek literature of the classical age has some analogies.²

In view of these facts it is no matter of surprise that Stoicism has contributed to Christianity some of its cardinal terms: πνεῦμα (*spiritus*), συνείδησις (*conscientia*), αὐτάρκεια (*sufficientia*), in their special religious senses, have come to us through the Stoics. Even λόγος is ultimately due to them.

The phrase πολιτεία τοῦ κόσμου, *civitas communis hominum et deorum*, "city of God," is only one of many links that connect the early Greek Stoics with Cicero and Marcus Aurelius, and Marcus Aurelius with St. Augustine. Nor did some of the chief of the early fathers of the church, notably St. Augustine, fail to recognize the affinities of Christianity to earlier religious systems. *Seneca saepe noster*, says Tertullian, *Seneca noster*, says Jerome: and the recognition went so far as to lead some zealot to manufacture a correspondence between Seneca and St. Paul, which was intended to

¹ Hymn of Cleanthes, third century B. C.

² Plato speaks of God as πατήρ in the *Timaeus*, but rather in the sense of the creator — the δημιουργός — than as standing in an intimate relation to the soul of man.

account for their resemblance. Some passages in Seneca are indeed startling enough to awaken a suspicion of some contact. He several times speaks of God as *parens noster*, and as "within us" (*prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus est*); he calls him *sacer spiritus* (*Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet* — the same idea as I Corinthians III, 16, and VI, 19, "your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost in you"). Whether Seneca may not have come into contact with some refined form of Judaism at Rome, it is indeed hard to say. Yet these terms are Stoical property: the "God within" of Seneca is the same as the *dominans ille in nobis deus* of Cicero, and the *divinae particula auræ* of Horace. And if Seneca has some striking parallels to the ethical teaching of the Sermon on the Mount, these are only deductions from that fundamental ethical principle of Stoicism by which it is linked not less with Aristotle than with Christianity: *hominem sociale animal, communi bono genitum*.¹ "Nur allein der Mensch vermag das Unmögliche." The Stoics had seized the grand conception that Reason, man's prerogative, is an emanation from, or part of, the Deity. I know of no better general exposition of this doctrine of the "Indwelling Supreme Spirit" than Emerson's Divinity School Address of 1838.

Let us now turn to the second period in the history of the Latin language, the period in which Latin becomes the organ of the Christian Church. In this period, which extends from the latter part of the second century to the latter part of the fifth century A.D., from Marcus Aurelius to the fall of the Western Empire, Christianity was taking shape: and it brings us to the second great element out of which the composite unity of Latin civilization was developed. The official conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity in the fourth century has been called "the miracle of history";² but there is no need to appeal to miracles in this case. The Græco-Roman world was prepared for the reception of Christianity through that shifting of the ancient landmarks which finds expression in Stoicism. And there is also another order of facts to which I have now to allude, avoiding as far as possible controversial matter. For if Stoicism was a composite thing, Christianity, as it entered the stream of Roman history, was not a simple one.

Iam pridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes,

says Juvenal (3, 62) in his indiscriminate manner. But before the Orontes flowed into the Tiber it had admitted a Greek tributary. Of the social and intellectual life of Syria proper during the centuries that followed Alexander's conquest, we know, alas, too little. What would we not give to be present in one of those old lecture-rooms of

¹ Seneca, *De Clem.* I, 3, 2.

² Freeman.

Tarsus or Soli or some other centre of Stoic teaching! But of the Hellenization of Palestine we know more: how from Alexandria, as a centre of influence, the process went on quietly during the third century B.C. until the violent attempt of Antiochus — Ἐπιφανής or Ἐπιμανής — to force the gods of Greece upon Judæa, and his insults to the Temple and the Torah, led to a violent reaction, and Judaism asserted itself again under the Maccabees. But not till Hellenism had left a deep mark upon Jewish thought and Jewish literature. All this is fully recognized by Jewish as well as by Christian historians. The Greek cities to the east of the Jordan, alluded to by Josephus, cannot have been without their influence. But even if Hellenism was at a low ebb in Palestine between Antiochus and the birth of Christ, the labors of the learned in the flourishing Jewish colony at Alexandria, though directed primarily to spreading a knowledge of the Jewish scriptures among the heathen and reconciling the teachings of the Law with Greek philosophy, were not without their reaction on Judaism itself. A knowledge of this Hellenized and humanized Judaism must have been spread over the world by the dispersions and settlements of the Jews which followed the overthrow of Jewish independence by Pompey in B.C. 63. At Rome the Jews formed a regular colony on the west of the Tiber, and we hear of them in Cicero and Horace.

The converging streams of thought from Greece and from Judæa were bound to meet; and the phraseology of St. Paul can hardly be explained except on the supposition that Christianity and Hellenism had already met in him. But at Rome the effective union came later. The old religion maintained its ground for centuries, side by side with the new; and when Christianity triumphed, it triumphed rather by taking its rival up into itself than by destroying it. Thus if Stoicism prepared the way for Christianity, Christianity made Stoicism for the first time a force capable of appealing to all sorts and conditions of men. The earliest extant product in the Latin language of this fusion of elements is the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix, in which Christianity and Stoicism are so blended that it is sometimes difficult to say whether the argument adduced is Christian or Stoic. Its date is not certain; but its latest editor, Waltzing, places it at the end of the second century. The latter part of that century had witnessed the production of the first Latin translation of the Bible, — the *Itala*, — and the beginning of the fifth century saw the completion of Jerome's Vulgate. Boethius, "the last of the Romans whom Cato or Tully would have recognized for their countryman," as Gibbon calls him, closes our second period, — a period, no doubt, of decadence in literature, as literature; but a period of full vitality and efficiency in the history of the Latin language. By the close of the fifth century Latin Christianity had taken definite shape, a body of

doctrine formulated on the principles of Roman law and a church organized on the lines of Roman administration.

Is it not the history of architecture and of verse over again, even though we are not able to point to any feature quite so definitely Roman as the arch in architecture or the accentual principle in verse? The products of Greater Greece and of Judæa were not merely adopted and transmitted by Rome; she made them her own; and sent them forth, stamped by her own genius, to shape the religious sentiment of the modern world. It was not the intention of this paper to vindicate the originality of the Romans, but it seems to vindicate itself.

Historians of Latin literature generally put up a notice-board at the end of the fifth century to the effect that the "Dark Ages" have commenced, or warning us that to the age of gold, silver, **Third** and the baser metals has succeeded an age for which **Period** no metal is base enough. But the reign of the Latin language was far from coming to an end with Boethius. Nor can the attempt to set up an entity called Modern History, as distinct from Ancient History, be congratulated on its success. Historians are so little agreed as to where it begins that their dates range from the first inroad of the barbarians to the seventeenth or even the eighteenth century.

There was no real breach of continuity; and the Latin language of the eight centuries that lie between Boethius and Roger Bacon, whether it be called "Dog Latin" or "Lion Latin," remained a language which was both living and national, the organ of that greater Roman nation or Christian commonwealth which included the Teutons and which about the middle of this period assumed a new form in the Holy Roman Empire. The idea that nationality depends on unity of race does not appeal to a Briton, and must seem still more eccentric to an American. The proper name for the Latin language from the sixth to the end of the thirteenth century is not *lingua Latina*, but *lingua Romana*. In this capacity it achieves an even greater universality than it enjoyed before. And it is fully alive, though there spring up side by side with it a number of daughter languages which are completely developed before the close of this period. Moreover, this Latin, if grammatically decadent, is capable of serving its age well as an instrument of thought. The rule of Augustine, "*Melius est reprehendunt nos grammatici quam non intellegant populi*," expresses the very sensible point of view adopted by his successors in their handling of the *lingua Romana*.

During the first three centuries of this long period the work done by Latin is necessarily limited; for all intellectual life had perished except in favored places like Ireland, and among exceptional men

like Priscian, Bede, and Alcuin. The relations of Latin were mainly with the monasteries; and to these centuries, if to any, may be fitly applied the term "The Dark Age." The three centuries that follow (A.D. 800–1100) are a period of transition to a brighter period, and are marked by a reform of schools. But Latin is still mainly confined to the clergy, though the works of men like Scotus Erigena and Eginhard must not be forgotten. It is not till the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that Latin once more becomes a great force in the world. During this last stage of its existence as a living language it puts off its ecclesiastical character and enters on new paths as an organ of secular life, in philosophy, in law, and in science, especially the science of medicine. It becomes the language of the universities which were then springing into existence, and finds a wide field of activity open to it in the service of that movement which has been rightly called the Early or Scholastic Renaissance, as distinct from that greater Humanistic Renaissance of which Petrarch was the "morning star." The stimulus to all this new life came partly from the Saracens. Arabic works on philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, and other branches of science and pseudo-science were translated into Latin, and Europe was thus brought for a third time into contact with Semitic thought. But it must be remembered that the light of Arabia was in large measure a light borrowed from Greece and the remoter East; conspicuously so in the case of the Arabic Aristotle, which made its way in a Latin dress from Spain into Northern Europe at the beginning of the thirteenth century.

After the fourteenth century Latin is no longer the universal language of Europe, no longer a national language in the sense in which the term has been used above, though it continued to live in works like the *Imitatio Christi* of Thomas à Kempis. The reason is that it was no longer alone in the field. And the Renaissance, from the very fact that it was a revival of purer standards of taste and diction, necessarily turned its back upon that well of living speech which had supplied the needs of the preceding centuries. But what killed Latin as a living tongue was not only purism but also the growth of its rivals in literary capacity. English had blossomed into literature as early as the seventh century (Cædmon, to say nothing of *Beowulf*). German had produced a truly national literature in the twelfth and thirteenth. The reign of Latin thus overlaps that of the modern tongues as an organ of literature and science; and as their influence waxed, hers waned.

But I have yet to ask your attention to one more phase in the life of Latin. For if Latin died as a universal language when the new literatures were born, yet it died only to rise again, together with Greek, in a new form.

For the revival of classical literature in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries turned its face in reality, not so much to the past as to the future. And perhaps the most important fact in the history of modern literatures is this, that all the names of first importance are post-Renaissance.¹ Chaucer had caught its spirit; and among its most prominent representatives are to be numbered a Rabelais, a Cervantes, a Shakespeare, and later on a Goethe and a Schiller. Herein, I take it, lies the ultimate reason why we study the Greek and Latin classics at all; their study is in reality a study of our own past, — our very own, — divorced from which all that is most characteristic in the present is only half-intelligible. Were it not for this, — were it true that the world would be exactly what it is if the Greeks and Romans had never existed, as the late Mr. Herbert Spencer thought and said,² — then, I confess, I should feel that the classical studies could be justified only as a disciplinary study — and for the light that Latin throws upon the vocabulary and syntax of the mother tongue. It is because the precise opposite is true, because modern life is soaked with Greek and still more with Latin influences, that it will always depend for its complete interpretation on a study of the classics — that is, so long as the landmarks of our present culture remain unshifted. And even at the present day the Latin language is to the Latinized classes what it was to our Teutonic ancestors, a second tongue, to which we can apply in a more real sense than to Greek the old saying of Cassiodorus: “Dulcius suscipitur quod patrio sermone narratur.”³ Hence it is that we like to speak of Plato rather than of Platon, and that the Germans, going one step further, convert Bacon into Baco. It is, indeed, a noteworthy phenomenon that the tongue of old Latium should have conquered for itself the New as well as the Old World, and should find now in America a land which not only maintains Latin as an integral part of the school curriculum, but has also given to the Old World some of its most scientific grammars and dictionaries.

Let me illustrate the influence of Latin upon English literature by one fact which I discovered only the other day. One of the most famous speeches of Shakespeare is, I think, based upon what would seem *a priori* a very unlikely source — the treatise of Seneca “On Mercy,” an appeal to the reigning Emperor Nero.⁴ The leading

¹ Dante is one of the witnesses to the dawn which preceded the day.

² See his *Autobiography*, vol. II, p. 237.

³ Preface to his *De Orthographia*, quoted by Sandys, *History of Classical Scholarship*, p. 254.

⁴ Parallels between Seneca's tragedies and Shakespeare have been quoted by J. Churton Collins in his recent *Studies in Shakspeare*; but I am not aware that any one has hitherto adduced evidence that any *prose* work of Seneca was known to Shakespeare. In the light of the *De Clementia* I am inclined to think that the passage of Titus Andronicus which Mr. Collins regards as based on Cicero *Pro Ligario*, XII, 32, may also come from Seneca.

ideas of Portia's speech are all there; it is only the inimitable form of expression that is Shakespeare's.

Nullum clementia ex omnibus magis quam regem aut principem decet (1, 3, 3; again 1, 19, 1).

"It becomes
The throned monarch better than his crown."

Eo scilicet formosius id esse magnificentiusque fatebimur quo in maiore prae-stabitur potestate (1, 19, 1).

"T is mightiest in the mightiest."

Quod si di placabiles et aequi delicta potentium non statim fulminibus persequuntur, quanto aequius est hominem hominibus praepositum miti animo exercere imperium? (1, 7, 2.)

"But mercy is above this sceptred sway.
It is enthroned in the heart of kings;
It is an attribute of God himself."

Quid autem? Non proximum eis (dis) locum tenet is qui se ex deorum natura gerit beneficus et largus et in melius potens? (1, 19, 9.)

"And earthly power doth then show likest God's
When mercy seasons justice."

Cogitato quanta solitudo et vastitas futura sit si nihil relinquitur nisi quod iudex severus absolverit (1, 6, 1).

"Consider this
That in the course of justice none of us
Should see salvation."

Compare *Hamlet*, 11, 2: "Use every man after his desert, and who shall 'scape whipping?"

And the story of Augustus pardoning Cinna (1, 9) probably suggested:

"It is twice blessed;
It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes."

Lodge's translation was not published till some twenty years after the *Merchant of Venice*. But that is no difficulty to those who believe that Shakespeare had not forgotten the Latin which he had learnt at Stratford Grammar School. And Seneca was more read in those days than he is now: witness the enormous influence which his tragedies exercised on the predecessors of Shakespeare. I venture to commend the study of Seneca's prose works to Shakespearian scholars.

A CENTURY OF METAPHYSICAL SYNTAX

BY WILLIAM GARDNER HALE

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WHEN the invitation to take part in this Congress came to me, the difficulty of surveying, in the allotted forty-five minutes, all the problems presented by the Latin language — problems in fields so varied as those of the critical treatment of the contents of the various authors, paleography in its more general aspects, epigraphy, grammar on the side of forms, grammar on the side of syntax, grammar on the side of meter, and the rest — seemed insuperable. I was thereupon assured that I might deal with all the problems, or with any of them. But my doubts were not at an end. I felt that the situation demanded that your speakers should discuss some phase of the subjects in which they were most practiced, and in which they had, accordingly, the largest measure of faith in their own judgment. This meant that, if I were to speak at all, it must be upon conceptions and methods in the study of Latin syntax. But it was one of the essential articles of my creed that no man can deal successfully with problems of Latin syntax, if, as the plan of the committee seemed to contemplate, he sedulously confined his eyes to the ground covered by the Latin reservation. Again I was assured that I was at liberty to say what I chose. I plan, therefore, without regard to barriers of language, to discuss the way in which most writers to-day look at questions of the origins of mood-uses.

We are not aware, in general, where our conceptions of mood-forces came from. We do not even know whether they properly belong together. What we have is an eclectic system. But the choices made have for a long time not been made by a conscious process. Each writer has in general accepted whatever seemed to him to commend itself. I shall later show you a single sentence of three lines, in which four radically different and mutually contradictory schemes are combined.

A satisfactory treatment of the subject would demand a discussion of every phase of opinion from the beginnings of syntactical studies

to the present day. It is obvious that I cannot present even a hundredth part of this. I must, however, necessarily run briefly over the centuries that preceded the one covered by the title of my paper.

The first recorded thinking about the syntax of any language of our family took place among the Greeks. The moods received names. In the best Greek writing on the subject, that of Apollonius the Cross (an unhappy epithet for one engaged in so charming a work), Greek mood-syntax reached its culmination. Apollonius defined the moods as expressing a *διάθεσις ψυχική*, which I like to translate by the phrase, "an attitude of mind." We have not got beyond this yet, nor ever shall. We have strayed far from it in the last century, and to it we must return.

Apollonius uses for the moods the names inherited from his predecessors. They are: *ὁριστική*, the Mood of Indicating or Defining, the Latin *Indicativus*; *προστακτική*, the Mood of Commanding, the Latin *Imperativus*; *εὐκτική*, the Mood of Wishing, the Latin *Optativus*; and *ὑποτακτική*, the Subjoined Mood, the Latin *Subiunctivus*. In giving the first three names, the Greeks were unconsciously thinking of the moods as Apollonius did in his definition. They were recognizing the *attitudes of mind* conveyed by them, the representation respectively of a fact, of a command, of a wish. The list of forces is imperfect, but it is sound so far as it goes. Examples in which the three moods convey precisely the attitudes of mind described by the names occur in abundance.

In hitting upon the last name, the Subjoined Mood, the Greeks committed a great error. They had named the other moods from their forces; this mood, on the other hand, they named simply from its relation, *in subordinate clauses*, to other parts of the sentence. It was to them simply the mood of attachment. The mischief accomplished by this purely superficial treatment is not yet undone.

We have already seen, then, two entirely different ways of looking at uses of the moods. For the second I know no apposite name, unless it be "mechanical." For the first, the conception which looks upon moods as expressing attitudes of mind, the proper name is "psychological." We mean more to-day by the word psychological than Apollonius meant by his definition. But, so far as Apollonius went, we mean the same thing.

The Roman grammarians accepted the Greek conceptions of the moods, and translated the names, as above. Naturally, then, they applied the names Subjunctive and Optative to the same set of forms used under different circumstances. The mood in *utinam amarer* they called the Optative. The mood in the second verb of *prodest ut eas* they called the Subjunctive.

The scholastic grammarians did not interest themselves in the

moods. Interest was revived when the Renaissance grammarians took up the task. I hope some time to tell the story in detail. It is an exceedingly interesting and instructive one; and it has not yet been told in a way that seems to me wholly satisfactory, — admirable as is Golling's sketch in his recently published Introduction in vol. III of the great German Historical Latin Grammar.

We pass at once to the eighteenth century, and to the first influences of modern philosophy. Delbrück, in his *Comparative Syntax*, has called attention to the influence of Wolff on certain parts of grammar, but no one, so far as I know, has called attention to what seems to be his influence on the doctrine of the moods. Wolff finds three notions to be fundamental in his scheme of ontology, namely those of Possibility, of Necessity, of Contingency. Here and there in the eighteenth century one finds a grammatical treatment corresponding to this. Thus in Meiner's *Philosophische und Allgemeine Sprachlehre*, Leipzig, 1781, the Indicative is made to fill the category of Necessity, the Subjunctive the two categories of Possibility and Contingency. A less thorough-going use of the same scheme is to be found in Harris's *Hermes*, London, 1751. Harris identifies the Potential Mood, the Subjoined Mood, and the Mood of Contingency, and explains the Latin Subjunctive of Purpose on the ground that an act purposed is in human life "always a contingent, and may never, perhaps, happen, despite all our forethought."

The philosophical system of Wolff was destined to be succeeded by the system of Kant; and the system of Kant was destined to be applied to the syntax of the verb. The fact that Kant influenced mood-syntax has been pointed out frequently enough. But it has been done by no one in detail except Koppin, in his two *Beiträge*, 1877 and 1880; and Koppin seems to me not clearly to have unraveled the tangled threads, nor to have recognized sufficiently the modifying influence of Matthiä, Dissen, and Thiersch. Further, by quoting Matthiä in an edition published in 1825-27 instead of the original edition of 1807 and 1808 (distinct books), and Thiersch in an edition of 1824 instead of the original one of 1812, Koppin makes these men to be followers, rather than shapers, of the opinion of others. Again, no one has pointed out clearly the extraordinary manner in which ideas laid down first for Greek were taken up for other languages of our family, or the extraordinary fact that under this or that disguise they or their descendants rule the greater part of the grammatical world to-day. It is these things which I shall myself try to do, in altogether too brief fashion, within the short time allowed me.

In 1781, Kant published the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the first working-out of his complete system. In this he places all judgments under one or another of four categories: Quantity, Quality, Relation,

¹ I wish to thank Professor John Dewey for assistance in placing this influence.

and Modality. Each of these categories is again divided into three. We are concerned to-day only with the use made of the categories of Modality. The sub-categories of this are: Existence, Possibility, and Necessity. Every recognition or conception of an act or state possible to the human mind must fall under one of these three categories. These three conceptions, native to the mind, are the frames, so to speak, through which the mind looks at whatever occurs in the external world.

Eleven years after the publication of the *Critique*, namely in 1792, J. G. Hasse, a schoolmaster in Kant's own town of Königsberg, published a *Grammatology of Greek and Latin, for academic instruction and the upper classes Gymnasien*. In his general treatment, he adapted Kant's scheme to grammar, the moods being made to express *Existence, Possibility, and Necessity*. In the details of his treatment, however, strangely enough, Hasse did not apply these conceptions.

Nine years later, in 1801, Professor Gottfried Hermann of Leipzig published a book on the reform of the theory of Greek grammar, *De emendanda ratione grammaticae Graecae*. He upbraids Hasse, in the most general terms, for having misunderstood Kant. As for himself, he says that he shall hold himself free from taking sides in metaphysics, but that he shall avail himself of the categories of Kant. This is precisely what Hasse had done; and, so far as the verb is concerned, the adaptation made by Hermann is the same as the adaptation made by Hasse. On the whole, Hasse seems to have been the saner and better grammarian. He is to-day, however, almost forgotten,¹ while Hermann, dogmatic, severe, strenuous, and triumphant, fills a great place in the history of classical studies.

The moods, says Hermann, indicate whether the act referred to *actually* takes place, or *can* take place, or *must* take place (the three categories of Existence, Possibility, and Necessity). The first idea is expressed by the Indicative. For the second, the subtle observation of the Greeks recognized two conceptions of Possibility, namely, Objective Possibility (*possibilitas obiectiva*), and Subjective Possibility (*possibilitas subiectiva*). The introduction of the terms "Subjective" and "Objective," which played so large a part in philosophy, will be noticed. These two conceptions are expressed by two distinct moods, the Subjunctive and the Optative. The Subjunctive mood, or the mood of Objectivity, expresses that which in the nature of the case in the given instance is capable of taking place. The Optative mood, or the mood of Subjectivity, expresses that which is capable of being thought. The third modal force, that of Necessity, is expressed by the Imperative if the Necessity is Subjective, by the verbal adjective *-τέος* if Objective.

¹ Hasse's name is not even mentioned in either of the two well-known lexicons by Pökel and Eckstein.

The Subjunctive is necessarily a dependent mood. For since it expresses that which in the nature of things in the given instance is capable of taking place, there must always be something to give the reason *why* the act can take place. But this can be furnished only in a main sentence. Hence the Subjunctive must always be dependent. Where it seems independent, this appearance is due to ellipsis. Thus ἴωμεν, "let us go," was originally ἄγε ἵνα ἴωμεν, "come, in order that we may go." Τί ποιῶ stands for σήμαινον τί ποιῶ, "tell me what I shall do," or οὐκ οἶδα τί ποιῶ, "I don't know what to do," etc.

Here we find a mixture of two influences. The one was the old Greek error by which the Subjunctive had been made the mood of dependency. The other was the error with regard to ellipsis, developed especially in the period of Renaissance grammar. The actual interpretation would be recognized by everybody to-day as impossible. Yet a great deal of our prevailing syntax of the present time historically goes back to precisely this reasoning of Hermann's.

The uses of the Optative are, in Hermann's treatment, all to be deduced from the idea of the Subjectively Possible, that is, of that which may be *thought* as *possible*. Thus the mood used in expressing wish is the Optative, because a wish is the thought of something as possible.

Hermann's book marked the firm establishment of a new method in syntax, which we may call the *metaphysical*; and it made syntax of the Kantian type.

We have now to trace the modifications of this first scheme. Matthiä, in two Greek grammars, 1807 and 1808, appears to have desired to deal with his problems without a metaphysical leaning. Nevertheless he did not escape the influence of Hermann. For the Imperative, he followed the older treatment, and made it the Mood of Command, not of Necessity. For the Optative he accepted Hermann's theory, with a modification. Hermann had made this the mood of Subjective Possibility, of an act *thought* as *possible*. Matthiä threw the emphasis on the side of thought rather than on the side of possibility, and accordingly defined the Optative as the *Mood of Thought*.

For the Subjunctive also he departed somewhat from Hermann's interpretation. Hermann had made the Subjunctive express Objective Possibility, in contrast with the Optative, the mood of Subjective Possibility. Matthiä held that both moods expressed the thought of an act as against reality, the difference being that the Subjunctive expressed the act more definitely, as depending on external circumstances, while the Optative expressed it less definitely.

Matthiä also remarks in the book of 1807 that, the terminations of the Subjunctive being primary, and those of the Optative second-

ary, the former are regularly used with tenses of the present or future, the latter with tenses of the past. The next step naturally would be to make the difference between the two merely one of tense, the mood being the same in both. This step was actually and fully taken by Kühner, in his Greek grammar, in 1833.

The effect of Matthiä's hint that the Optative was only a secondary Subjunctive has passed away in the last quarter of a century. The effect of his shifting of the supposed ground of the Optative to make it that of Thought, and putting the Subjunctive likewise under this category, has not passed away. It is, as we shall presently see, the system under which we are mostly living.

In the year 1808, Dissen, in a *Habilitationsschrift*, *De temporibus et modis verbi Graeci*, gave another twist to the doctrine of the moods. He made the Imperative the mood of Will, — the old conception, with a new name. The Optative he made to express a *conscious* thought, that is, the *recognition* of something as the thought of some one else, or of one's self at an earlier time. This was a modification of Matthiä's view. For the Subjunctive, he constructed a modification of Hermann's view. Hermann had made the Subjunctive the mood of Objective Possibility, of that which in the very nature and condition of things (*per ipsarum rerum condicionem*) is capable of taking place. In order that this should be shown, there had to be a main sentence, on which the other depended. Dissen, throwing emphasis on the side of "the very nature and condition of things," made the Subjunctive the mood of that which *hung upon* something else, in other words, the Mood of Conditionality. Naturally, then, the Indicative became, in his system, the Mood of Unconditionality.

The particle *ἄν*, according to Dissen, in itself expresses Conditionality. This is the reason why all connectives compounded with *ἄν* (as *ἐπὶ ἄν*,¹ *ἐπειδὴ ἄν*, *ἐὰν*, *ὅταν*, *ὁπόταν*, *εἰτ' ἄν*) take the Subjunctive. The same holds for the conjunctions meaning "before," "so long as," or "until" (as *πρὶν ἄν*, *ἕως ἄν*, *ὄφρα ἄν*, *ἕσ' ἄν*). The same holds, further, for all relative words with *ἄν* (as *ὅς*, *ὅστις*, *ὅλος*, *ὅπου*, *ὅθεν*); for the sense is the same as if, instead of the relative, one were to use an *ἐὰν* or *ὁπόταν* ("if" or "when") with a demonstrative.

This combination, made by Dissen in his working-out of his metaphysical material, remains in full force to-day, having been taken up later by Thiersch, by Reisig, and by Hermann himself, and then passed down from one German worker to another. In the English-speaking world, it is to be found in the grammars of Goodwin, Allen-Hadley, Goodell, Babbitt, Bevier's *Brief Greek Syntax*, Monro's *Homeric Grammar*, and even Thompson's *Greek Grammar*. We are learning and teaching the doctrine, nearly a century after it was

¹ I give these forms as Dissen writes them.

spun as a thread of a metaphysical web. It is wholly indefensible. It is, of course, true that there are relative and temporal clauses which are in effect conditions; but the great mass of these clauses, as of the others referred to, are not conditions. They are mere, and wholly simple, *determinative* clauses (to employ a term from my *Cum-Constructions* and my *Anticipatory Subjunctive in Greek and Latin*). They simply answer the question, "What man, what time, what thing, etc., do you mean?" Thus in the sentence "happy he at heart above all others who shall lead you home in marriage," *κείνος δ' αὖ περὶ κῆρι μακάρτατος ἔσῃον ἄλλων ὃς κέ σ' οἰκόνδ' ἀγάγηται*, *Od.* 6, 159, the relative clause simply makes known to Nausicaa *who it is* that the speaker pronounces happy. It is no more conditional than the preterite Indicative in the corresponding "thrice and four times happy the Danaans who perished then in broad Troyland," *τρισμάκαρες Δαναοὶ καὶ τετράκις, οἳ τότε δλοντο Τροίῃ ἐν εὐρείῃ*, said by the same speaker in *Od.* 5, 306. Again in *Il.* 2, 33, "but keep this in thy mind, nor let forgetfulness lay hold of thee when sweet sleep shall leave thee," *εἴτ' ἂν σε μελίφρων ὕπνος ἀνήῃ*, it is nothing short of grotesque to explain the last clause as conditional. It is merely a time-fixing clause, — an *anticipatory determinative clause*, the thing determined being here *a time*.

Four years after the appearance of Dissen's dissertation, in 1812, Thiersch published two Greek grammars. His mood-system is a composite of those of his immediate predecessors. For the Optative, he accepted Matthiä's view. This mood expresses an act as merely *thought* ("als bloß gedacht"), as an *idea* ("Vorstellung"). A wish is expressed by the Optative because it conveys a mere thought. A clause of repeated action in the past takes the Optative, because the putting together of many acts into one group is not an affair of the things in themselves (which, as such, would be expressed by the Indicative), but an act of the mind, and so a "Vorstellung," etc., etc.

For the Subjunctive, Thiersch adopts the view of Dissen, combining all the phrases used about it in Dissen's dissertation. The Subjunctive is the mood of the *dependent*, the *conditioned*, the *uncertain*. Whatever involves Dependency, Conditionality, or Uncertainty must accordingly go into the Subjunctive. Thus in *ἵωμεν* "let us go," the Subjunctive is used because there is no real going. The going *depends upon* the will of the person addressed, is conditioned by that will. Hence it must be expressed by the Subjunctive. Similarly, the Subjunctive has to be used in clauses of purpose, because a purpose presupposes a main act, and is dependent upon it.

In spite of the wildness of these fancies, Thiersch reached several helpful conceptions. Thus he recognized the rise of the relative pronoun out of the demonstrative in Greek, and so established,

though still in a very incomplete way, the existence of an earlier stage of parataxis, out of which the later stage of hypotaxis grew. Thiersch also saw the *facts* of mood-usage more justly than his metaphysical schematizing suggests. He recognizes Will as the force of the Subjunctive in what he calls its earliest seat, namely exhortation and prohibition, and derives the Future force of the mood, as seen in many Homeric examples, from this earlier force, on the ground that acts lying in the future depend either upon the Will of some one or upon the later course of things ("dem weitem Erfolg"). In the same connection, he uses the phrase "wo dieser noch zu erwarten," "where this is still to be expected." Out of this has grown the use of the technical name Erwartung, now generally used in Germany for one of the families of meanings of the Subjunctive. We have thus already seen, as early as 1812, the suggestion that the uses of the Greek Subjunctive may be divided into two classes, Will and Expectation, and the suggestion of the descent of the second from the first. This is psychological syntax, beclouded though it is by the veil of metaphysical syntax thrown over it.

The opposite method, that which makes Expectation (Futurity) the oldest force of the Greek Subjunctive, was adopted by Aken, in 1861.

Both these conceptions, it may be said in passing, have been adopted for Latin. Thus in 1827, Wüllner, *Bedeutung der Sprachlichen Casus und Modi*, endeavored to explain all the forces of the Latin Subjunctive as containing the idea of Will, and in 1870, Greenough, *The Latin Subjunctive*, endeavored to explain all the forces of the same mood as expressing Futurity. Both these men had broken away from the tenets of the metaphysical school; yet both continued to hold the doctrine, which had arisen through the thinking of that school, that every use of a given mood contained in it the original force of that mood.

The general view of the Optative suffered no further development in the teachings of the metaphysical school, though a variety of names came into use. The mood was that of "Vorstellung," "des rein Vorgestellten," "des bloss Gedachten," "der reinen Subjectivität." It expressed a *thought*, an *idea*, something *abstracted from reality*. Yet various attempts, quite in the modern method, were made to trace the evolution of one use out of another. Thus Baümlin, *Untersuchungen über die griechischen Modi*, 1846, says that the Optative is the mood of the Subjective, and that, as such, it has two functions, one to express what is merely thought, the other to express what is wished; but he adds, "If this seems too vague, then it is better to start with the idea of Wish as the older, since it is easier to think that the idea of Vorstellung arose out of the idea of Wish than vice versa." The connecting link, he adds, may be formed by the Opta-

tive of Concession. He does not illustrate, but probably has in mind such a series as "may it be so," "grant that it be so," "it may be so." Here is already the conception of the growth of one force out of another, and of a third force out of the second. This is *evolution*, a conception very different from that of the presence of some one force in all the uses of a given mood.

So much for Greek. But the story does not end here. These same ideas were accepted as valid for the syntax of all languages. Often the same man wrote on both Greek and Latin, treating both in the same way. Thus Reisig, adopting Hermann's views in substance, wrote a monograph on *av* in 1820, and then, in lectures on Latin syntax, given finally in 1826-27, and published by Hasse in 1839, reproduced the same scheme for Latin, — three forms of being, Reality, Possibility, and Necessity, and three corresponding moods, Indicative, Subjunctive, and Imperative. Possibility is thought of either objectively, as resting on the relation of things, or subjectively, as in the mind of the speaker.

This is the Hermannian scheme, pure and simple. The majority of Latin grammarians, on the other hand, following the modified scheme devised by Matthiä, made the Subjunctive the mood of thought ("Vorstellung"), and the Imperative the mood of command. Thus Zumpt, second edition, 1820 (probably also in the first, which I have not been able to see¹), explains the Subjunctive in a clause of Purpose as expressing a thought ("Vorstellung"), the Subjunctive with *cum* causal as expressing the idea of inner dependence, which is a matter of thought ("Vorstellung"), and the Subjunctive with *cum* temporal as *involving* the same conception of inner dependence. Here we recognize the greater part of our ordinary syntactical armory of to-day. The story is henceforth largely the same. Schulz's Latin grammar, 1825, says that the Indicative is the mood of reality, while the Subjunctive expresses the contents of a sentence not as a fact, but merely as an *idea*, a *conception*. Thus in indirect questions, expressions of purpose or result, wishes, concessions, conclusions, one is dealing, not with facts, but with conceptions, as in "I told him that I had gone to church" ("dass ich in der Kirche gewesen sei"), in which for the moment I regard my being in church not as a fact ("Thatsache"), but as the object of a mental activity, and so as a conception. The treatment is the same, again, in Etzler's *Erörterungen*, 1826, Kühner's Latin grammar, 1840, Madvig's Latin grammar, 1844, etc. Madvig says, for example, that in *Titius currit ut sudet*, "Titius runs to get into a sweat," the Subjunctive is used because the sweating is a mere conception. Holtze, in 1861-62, says the Indicative, Subjunctive, and Imperative, as everybody knows (*notum est*), express things respectively as Actuality, as dependent

¹ Golling states that he has not been able to see either of the first two editions.

on Thought alone, or as Command. The same doctrine is the prevailing one to-day in Germany. Thus Waldeck, in his *Practical Guide to Instruction in Latin Grammar*, 1892, says, pp. 146, 147: "Hierin nun liegt ein sehr wichtiger Unterschied des Lateinischen; diese Sprache fasst alles, was als von irgend jemandem, also auch dem Redenden selbst gesagt, gefragt, geglaubt, empfunden, wahrgenommen, also gleichsam aus seiner Seele gesprochen wird, nicht als Thatsache auf, auch wenn es an sich eine solche ist, sondern nur als die Behauptung, Frage, Meinung, Empfindung, Wahrnehmung desselben, also als Vorstellung." And Methner's *Investigation in the Theory of the Latin Moods and Tenses, with especial regard to use in Instruction*, makes that which the Subjunctive expresses to be everywhere "eine gedachte, vorgestellte Handlung" (p. 152), "ein Gedanke" (p. 149), "ein vorgestelltes Geschehen" (p. 146). Hoffmann, in his doctrine of absolute and relative time as determining the mood of the *cum*-clause, carried the doctrine to its natural conclusion by making the Subjunctive the mood of the non-existent, and did not even see the humor of this *reductio ad absurdum*.

American Latin grammar followed German Latin grammar. The Andrews and Stoddard's grammar, upon which most people of my generation were brought up, taught that "the Subjunctive mood is used to express an action or state simply as conceived by the mind"; and again, that "relatives require the Subjunctive, when the clauses connected by them express merely a conception; as, for example, a consequence, an innate quality, a cause, motive, or purpose." Two of our well-known grammars of the present day base the treatment of the moods upon the same thing, — grammars made by two men who have rendered distinguished service to classical studies. One of them, that of Professor Gildersleeve, says: "The Subjunctive mood represents the predicate as an idea, as something merely conceived in the mind (abstractions from reality)." The other, that of Professor West, says, "Mood is the manner of stating the action of the verb. The action may be stated: (1) As really happening. The Mood of Fact (Indicative). (2) As Thought of. The Mood of Will, Desire, Possibility (Subjunctive). (3) As Demanded. The Mood of Command (Imperative)." Here is the same scheme, — Fact, Thought, Command. Thus the metaphysical Matthiä-Hermann-Kantian scheme of 1801–1807 is being taught in America in 1904. Even the extremest product of the methods of the metaphysical school, of which I have just spoken, namely Hoffmann's doctrine of absolute and relative time as determining the mood in the *cum*-clause, was imported into America in the Allen and Greenough grammar, and, passing over into the Harkness grammar, stood in both until I attacked it.

French Latin grammar has largely followed the same course.

Thus a very important French syntacticist, Ferdinand Antoine, whose recent death all workers in classics must deplore, wrote in his *Syntaxe de la Langue Latine*, Paris, 1885, p. 163, "Le subjonctif exprime une simple conception de l'esprit."¹

Thus far I have been following out, for Latin, the Matthiä-Hermann-Kant theory. Another form, the Thiersch-Dissen-Hermann-Kant theory, is to be found in Ramshorn's Latin grammar, 1824. Ramshorn makes the Indicative the mood of Reality, the Subjunctive the mood of the Conditioned, and the Imperative the mood of Necessity. It will be seen that I do not agree with Golling's statement that the grammars of Zumpt and Ramshorn rest upon no philosophical theorems, but upon grammatically scientific foundations.

Many combinations and interadjustments of these systems have of course appeared. Thus Schmalz, in his Latin syntax of 1885, started with Subjectivity, and from this got Dependency, Inner Connection, etc. In the third edition, 1900, he starts with a *fictive* power (which is simply, of course, our too familiar "Vorstellung"), and from this gets Subjectivity, which he then makes to account for the various dependent uses of the Subjunctive. The oldest theory of the Subjunctive, namely, that it is essentially a subjoined mood, has also been revived by Kruczewicz, in the *Zeitschrift für österreichischen Gymnasien*, 1894, and in a printed lecture by Professor West in the *Latin Leaflet* for January 18, 1904.

This must suffice for Greek and Latin grammar. It would seem now as if my story might be at an end. But the most extraordinary part of it still remains to tell. Metaphysical and wholly unpsychological ways of looking at mood-syntax did not stop with the grammars of two languages, but spread to grammars of all languages of the family.

The Indicative, says Becker in his *Organismus*, 1827, expresses an act as "ein wirkliches," while the Subjunctive represents it as "ein vorgestelltes," whether it be in itself real or conceived ("sei es an sich wirklich oder vorgestellt"). Grimm adopted the system in his German grammar, Mätzner in his English grammar, etc. It is to-day the dominant creed. Every teacher of English, German, or French will recognize it as the system in almost universal vogue. I need give but a couple of illustrations, one for English, and one for French.

One of the latest and best American grammars of English, that of Professor Carpenter, says "Verbs are said to be in the Indicative, Subjunctive, or Imperative moods, according as they represent statements as actual facts, as thoughts, or as commands"; and again, "the Subjunctive mood represents statements as thoughts or con-

¹ Antoine did not remain satisfied with this view, as is shown both by private letters to me, and by the fact that he has in print accepted and expounded my views upon the constructions with *antequam*, *priusquam*, *dum*, *donec*, and the like.

ceptions, which may or may not have a basis in reality, or which are obviously not conceivable as facts."

In Macmillan's French Course, Third Year, by G. Eugène Fasnacht, we read on p. 62 the statement, "The Subjunctive Mood (is used) if the Principal Sentence implies that the action expressed in the dependent clause is merely conceived in the mind of the speaker." And in a single sentence of three lines, referred to earlier in this address, we have a mixture of four systems. It reads as follows: "In the sentence 'son père veut qu'il vienne,' 'his father wishes that he should come,' the contingency (eventual fact) of his coming is in the speaker's mind, subjoined to the will of another (his father)." The word "contingency" belongs to the Wolffian school, the phrase "in the speaker's mind" to the Hermannian-Kantian school, the phrase "subjoined to" to the old Greek error about the Subjunctive, and the word "Will" to true psychological syntax, in its simplest form.

But, it may be said, "the English Subjunctive and the German Subjunctive, at any rate, *do* express ideas, and not facts. Why not so explain them, then, in class-room work?" The most conclusive single answer is as follows: "If you do this for the English Subjunctive, *e. g.*, you should also explain in the same way the more common *equivalents*, namely, the forms with the modal auxiliaries *will* (1st person), *shall*, *should*, *may*, *might*, *can*, *could*, *would*." When you ask, "Why does the writer here say *shall*, why does he here say *can*, why does he here say *would*?" the student should be taught to answer, in every case, "Mood of idea." But there could not be a class so blind that some one in it would not ask the question, "Do all these words express the *same* idea, and may any one of them be substituted in any sentence for any other?"

The truth is, that our first task to-day is to get rid of all this metaphysical inheritance, which belongs to an unscientific age, and to study language directly by and for itself.

SHORT PAPERS

PROFESSOR H. C. ELMER, of Cornell University, presented a paper to this Section on "Some Questionable Tendencies of Modern Textual Criticism."

PROFESSOR SIDNEY G. ASHMORE, of Union College, presented a short paper on the subject of "The Classics in Our Schools."

SECTION F — ENGLISH LANGUAGE

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(Hall 3, September 23, 3 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR CHARLES M. GAYLEY, University of California.

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR OTTO JESPERSEN, University of Copenhagen.

PROFESSOR GEORGE L. KITTEDGE, Harvard University.

THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE CONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO OTHER SUBJECTS

BY OTTO JESPERSEN

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No single human individual ever lived completely isolated from his fellow beings; no nation was ever entirely cut off from other nations; and no contact between individuals and nations ever took place without leaving traces in their coming lives. Language is inconceivable without such contact, and nothing is more contagious than modes of speech. From the manner in which a man talks, one can always tell what sort of people he has had most intercourse with and what sort of influences, intellectual and moral, he has been chiefly subject to in the whole of his life. This is true of nations too; a complete survey of the English language would, therefore, show to the initiated the whole of the life of the English nation from the oldest times till the present day.

Let us for a moment imagine that all human records, all books, documents, inscriptions, letters, etc., were lost, with the single exception of a number of texts written in English at various dates, and let us imagine a body of men buckling down to the task of writing the history of the English language with that material only. They would be able, of course, to find out a great many things, but however highly gifted we imagine them to be, there would always remain to them an immense number of riddles which no amount of sagacity would enable them to solve, and which now, to us, are no riddles at all. In the old texts they would encounter a great many words whose meanings could be gathered with more or less certainty from the context; but a vast number of other words would remain unintellig-

ible to them, which are now made perfectly clear to us by their similarity with words in cognate languages. How much should we understand now of *Beowulf*, if we had not Gothic, German, Norse, etc., to compare the words with? And then the forms of the words, their inflections and modifications: our supposed philologists would be at a loss to explain such phenomena as vowel-mutation (umlaut) or to understand the use and formation of the different cases, etc. Similarly, when they saw a great many of the old words disappear and give way to others that were hitherto totally unknown, they would not be in possession of the key we now have in Scandinavian, in French, in Latin and Greek: much of what is now self-evident would under these circumstances strike everybody with amazement, as falling down from heaven without any apparent reason.

A scientific treatment of the English language must, then, presuppose the scientific treatment of a great many other languages as well, and the linguistic historian cannot possibly fulfill his task without a wide outlook to other fields. Not only must he have some acquaintance with the cognate languages, the Arian (or Indo-European) family and more especially the Germanic (or Teutonic) branch of it, but the English have in course of time come into contact with so many other nations and have been so willing to learn foreign words from people of every clime, that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that whoever would really and thoroughly fathom the English language would have to study half the languages spoken on the earth.

More than to any other branch of science the investigators of English are indebted to Arian and Germanic philology. They have continually to consult such works as Brugmann's and Delbrück's *Vergleichende Grammatik und Syntax*, Streitberg's *Urgermanische Grammatik*, Kluge's, Uhlenbeck's, and Franck's etymological dictionaries, not to mention the other dictionaries of German, Dutch, etc., in which etymology plays only a subordinate part; further periodicals like *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur*, *Journal of Germanic Philology*, *Indogermanische Forschungen*, Kuhn's *Zeitschrift*, — it would be an easy thing to lengthen the list. In classes of Old English recourse must continually be had to Verner's law in order to explain the relation between *wæs* (Mod. E. *was*) and *wæron* (Mod. *were*), or between *risan* (Mod. *rise*) and *ræran* (Mod. *rear*). To understand the rudimentary passive in *hatte* ("is called," cf. Spenser's *hight*), we must go to Gothic, Sanskrit, and Greek, as indeed we must to comprehend the whole of the inflectional system. The force of the prefix *ge-* in *gehieran*, *gewinnan*, *gedon*, and innumerable other verbs is made intelligible by a reference to Latin *con-* in *conficio*, etc., and to the different tense aspects (*aktionsarten*) of Slavonic and other cognate languages. All this is too obvious to call for further comment or illustration.

I must, however, mention here especially one language of paramount importance for the study of Oldest English, namely Frisian. The Frisians were the neighbors on the Continent of the tribes that invaded Britannia; so much the more must we regret that no very old monuments exist to show us the state of the Frisian language at the time of the invasion or shortly afterwards. But even those monuments we have, from the thirteenth century on, have not been studied by philologists with the care we might expect, considering their importance for the history of English. In fact, Frisian has been the stepchild among Germanic tongues. Now, however, this seems to be in a fair way of becoming otherwise, and Anglists — to borrow that very convenient name for “students of English” — should heartily welcome the endeavors of Dr. Wilhelm Heuser, who has in a very handy little volume made the Old Frisian language readily accessible to everybody, and who has there and elsewhere called attention to some very important conclusions that can be drawn from Frisian phonology with regard to Old English dialects.¹ It is to be hoped that this line of research will in future receive all the attention it deserves.

As already hinted above, English philology has to deal very largely with loan-words from various sources. Celtic philology, however, is not so important to the Anglist as might appear likely at first, because there are really very few Celtic words in English, a fact which is easily accounted for by the theory of speech-mixtures put forward lately by the eminent Celtologist Windisch.² This question is largely mixed up with another question which has been much discussed of late years, namely, what language did the Angles and Saxons find generally spoken on their arrival in England? Had Latin supplanted Celtic, totally or partially? This, however, need not occupy us long here, as it really falls outside of the history of English proper.³

In whatever direction it may be finally settled, the fact remains that Latin loan-words are extremely numerous and important in the English language. All educated people are well acquainted with those innumerable scientific, technical, and other Latin words which have been adopted during the last five centuries and which have stamped the English vocabulary in so peculiar a way. But this class of words, together with the Greek words, which are inseparable from them, offer no serious difficulties to the philologist. They are book-words, taken over through the medium of writing in the form corresponding with that of the golden age of classical literature, and

¹ Wilhelm Heuser, *Altfriesisches Lesebuch*. Heidelberg, 1903. — *Indo-germanische Forschungen*, Anzeiger xiv, p. 29.

² E. Windisch, *Zur theorie der mischsprachen und lehnwörter*. *Berichte über die verhandlungen der sächs. gesellschaft der wissenschaften*, XLIX (1897), p. 101 ff.

³ A. Pogatscher, *Zur lautlehre der griechischen, lateinischen und romanischen lehnwörter im Altenglischen*. Strassburg, 1888. — J. Loth, *Les mots latins dans les langues brittoniques*. Paris, 1892. — Pogatscher, *Angelsachsen und Romanen*, *Englische Studien*, XIX (1894), p. 329 ff.

only a minority of them have in English cast off the literary imprint.

Much more philological interest is attached to the older strata of Latin loan-words, the oldest of which were adopted before the Angles and Saxons left the Continent. Here we have to do with an oral influence, and the forms of these words therefore reflect the pronunciation of the Latin-speaking communities with which the various Germanic tribes came into contact. The deviations from the classical forms found in the English shapes of these early loans must therefore be due partly to changes in the language from which they were borrowed, partly to the subsequent alterations they have undergone in the borrowing language. Rightly interpreted, they consequently shed light on the development of Latin into Romance as well as on that of Germanic into English, and inversely, in order to be rightly interpreted, they require familiarity with both languages on the part of the investigator. As contemporary monuments are totally wanting, at any rate for the borrowing language, the subject is extremely difficult of treatment; but most of the phonological difficulties have been surmounted in an important work by A. Pogatscher.¹ The cultural side of these early loans as well as of the somewhat younger loans due chiefly to the conversion to Christianity has been treated of by Kluge and others, especially MacGillivray.²

The Danish and Norwegian vikings and especially those Scandinavians who settled in England for good, left a deeper mark on the English language than is very often supposed. It is evident, therefore, that the student of English should not neglect the Scandinavian languages, the less so as their close relationship with English and the early development in them of a literary style enable the scholar to clear up a great many points in English, even apart from those points where the protracted contact between the two nations has left its marks on either nation's language and civilization generally. Hitherto it has chiefly been Scandinavian scholars who have grappled with the numerous problems connected with this contact. The Dane Johannes Steenstrup has traced much of juridical importance back to Scandinavian institutions, his chief criterion being the loan-word test.³ The Swede Erik Brate gave us the first account of the fates of Scandinavian sounds in Early Middle English,⁴ and lately his countryman Erik Björkman has given us a very full and extremely

¹ Pogatscher, *Zur lautlehre der griechischen, etc., lehnworte im Altenglischen*. Strassburg, 1888.

² F. Kluge, in Paul's *Grundriss der germanischen philologie*, I, 2d ed. Strassburg, 1899. — MacGillivray, *The Influence of Christianity on the Vocabulary of Old English*. Halle, 1902.

³ Joh. Steenstrup, *Danelag. Normannerne*, vol. IV. Copenhagen, 1882.

⁴ Erik Brate, *Nordische lehnwörter im Ormmulm*. Paul und Braune's *Beiträge zur geschichte der deutschen sprache*, x (1884).

able treatment of the whole of the subject, in which both lexical and phonological points of view are done full justice to.¹

The Scandinavians had scarcely had time to establish themselves, still less to complete their social and linguistic fusion with the native race, when the Norman Conquest brought in another element, which was to play a still greater part in the development of English life and English language—at any rate as far as outward appearance is concerned, for if we were able to look beneath the surface and to take everything into consideration, it is not improbable that the Scandinavian influence would turn out to be the more important one of the two. As it is, French loan-words are more conspicuous than Scandinavian ones, just as the political revolution brought about by the Conquest is more in view than the subtler modifications of the social structure that may be due to the Danes and Norwegians. Among the historians who have written of the Conquest and its consequences and who have incidentally paid attention to linguistic facts and unearthed documents illustrative of the conflict of languages, Freeman deserves of course the foremost place, although he is perhaps a little apt to underrate the rôle played by French. Some of his assertions have been put right in Johan Vising's excellent survey of the history of the French language in England.²

As for the French loan-words themselves, more attention has been paid by English scholars to their place in the economy of the language, their intellectual power or emotional value as compared with the native synonyms, than to the relation to their French originals, although that side too offers no small interest. Their phonology is rather complicated on account of their coming from various dialects and being taken over at various dates, so that sometimes the same French word appears in English in two widely different forms, for instance *catch* and *chase*. The first scholar who treated French loans in English from this point of view with perfect knowledge of French as well as of English sound-history was Henry Nichol, whose article on the French language in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* gives much attention to English and is still well worth reading. Since then, the question has been treated in various places by that indefatigable veteran worker in all branches of English etymology, Walter William Skeat,³ and in Germany by Dietrich Behrens.⁴

With regard to the other languages, from which English has borrowed freely at various times, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, etc., it is

¹ Erik Björkman, *Scandinavian Loan-Words in Middle English*, I-II. Halle, 1900-1902.

² Johan Vising, *Franska språket i England*, I-III. Göteborg, 1900-1902.

³ W. W. Skeat, *Principles of English Etymology*. Second series. Oxford, 1891. — *Notes on English Etymology*. Oxford, 1901.

⁴ Dietrich Behrens, *Beiträge zur geschichte der französischen sprache in England*. (*Französische Studien*, v, Band 2. heft.) Heilbronn, 1886. — *Französische elemente im Englischen*, in Paul's *Grundriss*, as above.

to be regretted that no specialists have made these several influences subjects of monographs, as the very able chapters devoted to them in Skeat's *Principles of English Etymology* cannot be said to have exhausted the subject.

I have spoken hitherto of the direct use obtainable from the study of other languages for the history of English. But it is clear that indirectly, too, the scientific study of any subject, and more especially the scientific study of any language, may be of value for the student of English. The wider his outlook and the greater the number of languages he is able to compare with English, the more light will he be able to throw on his special study. His ideas ought not to be narrowed down to one particular type of linguistic structure. A broad horizon is the more necessary because the development of the English idiom has in a great many respects diverged very widely from the structural type characteristic of the older languages of the same family. The grammarian should be on his guard against applying indiscriminately the same categories and the same points of view to all languages, for no language can be rightly measured by the yard of any other language. This, however, is just what has been done to a very great extent, not only with regard to English, but more or less in describing and in judging all languages. Latin grammar was studied earlier than, and more extensively than, any other grammar; Latin was considered *the* language, and any deviation in other languages from its rules was considered a deterioration. Even if this manner of looking at things grammatical has now been largely superseded, because an ever-increasing number of different languages have been scientifically investigated, there still remain not a few survivals of the Latin superstition, which it will be the work of future grammarians to root out completely. Grammatical terminology is still in the main based on Latin grammar. The student of English will find in his grammatical vocabulary expressions for whatever English has in common with Latin, but those grammatical categories and phenomena which are not found in Latin have either no names at all or else each author has his own names. The combination found in "he is reading" is by some called simply the periphrastic conjugation, by others the progressive form, or the present continuous, or the descriptive present, or the definite present. Now, of course, names are not everything, and we may have very definite notions without definite names, or, at any rate, without definite names accepted by everybody. Still, the want of a fixed technical nomenclature is decidedly a drawback.

But there is another, and much more serious, drawback derived from the preponderance of Latin grammar. It is, in fact, a very difficult thing for anybody that has been from his earliest youth thoroughly drilled in that particular set of grammatical ideas, to

liberate his mind from their vitiating influence when dealing with another language. His grammatical vision is too apt to be colored by the Latin spectacles he has worn so long. He will look in English for the same cases, the same tenses and moods as he is familiar with in Latin, and it is surprising how often he finds them in places where a man coming fresh to a grammatical investigation of English without a previous training in Latin would probably have described the actual phenomena in a totally different manner. I open one of the best-known English grammars and find the following statement, namely, "The name of Cases is given to different forms which a noun (or pronoun) assumes to denote its relations to other words in a sentence. Five Cases may be distinguished in English, the Nominative, Objective, Dative, Possessive, Vocative." The author does not appear to have seen his own want of logic in making *form* the distinguishing feature of cases and yet establishing five cases in English, for in a note he goes on to add, quite unconcernedly, that "with the exception of the Possessive all these have long since lost their characteristic endings, but the use of the Case-names serves to mark the relations formerly indicated by them." In the grammar I quote, as well as in some other modern ones, such distinctions are referred not to Latin, but to Old English, but I think I am right when maintaining that they are really made in deference to Latin syntax rather than to Old English, as shown by the inclusion of the vocative on the one hand and by the exclusion of the instrumental on the other. Such grammars also classify as accusatives of description or of time, space, measure, or manner, a great many instances where Old English and other cognate languages have the dative or some other case. We should accustom ourselves in dealing with such questions to take each language, and each stage of each language — Modern English for instance — entirely on its own merits and look the real facts in the face, without any regard to how other languages express the same meanings. In a very able book on the absolute participle in English, the author says that it is right to parse the so-called nominative absolute as "a dative absolute in disguise." Now this amounts to very much the same thing as saying that a locomotive is a horse in disguise or — to remain within the sphere of language — to say that in "he likes pears" *he* is a dative in disguise, *likes* a plural in disguise, and *pears* the subject in disguise, because in Old English the sentence would run "him liciaþ peran." It is unhistorical to treat Modern English as Latin or Old English or any other language in disguise.

It is often urged that we should in English distinguish a dative from an accusative on the strength of meaning only, but then we might with equal right say that the adjective is in three different cases in the sentences "my father is old; my father has grown old;

my father is sick," for there is really a logical foundation for the distinction made here by Finnish: *isäni on vanha* (nominative); *isäni on jo tullut vanhaksi* (translative, indicating the state into which any one or anything passes); *isäni on sairaana* (essive, indicating the state in which anybody or anything is). The distinction is a real one in Finnish, because it is shown externally; but it is not a real one in English. In the same manner we should be justified in speaking of a dative case in English, if it had either a distinct form or manifested itself outwardly in some other manner, for example, by a fixed position. If the dative preceded invariably the accusative, we might recognize a positional dative, but it does not. In "I gave it him" there is nothing grammatical to show us which of the two words is the indirect object. It is true that when the direct object is a noun (not a pronoun) the indirect object is always placed before the direct object; but that is not enough to establish a separate case, unless, indeed, we should be willing to apply the same designation of "dative case" to all the nouns placed first in each one of the following sentences:

I told the boy some stories.

I asked the boy a few questions.

I heard the boy his lessons.

I took the boy long walks.

I kissed the boy good-night.

[I painted the wall a different color.]

I called the boy bad names.

I called the boy a scoundrel.¹

If we are to speak of separate datives and accusatives in English, I for one do not know where in this list the dative goes out and the accusative comes in. (Note that in the second sentence Old English would have had two accusatives.) In the same manner I think it perfectly idle to inquire what case is employed in "he was tied *hand and foot*," "they were now *face to face*," "we shall go down *Harrow way this day week*," "I saw a man the *age* of my grandmother," etc. We have here various employments of the "kernel" or "crude form" of a noun, and nothing else. It is even more wrong to speak of phrases with *to* and *of* as datives and genitives, as is done, for instance, in articles on "Die Trennung eines Genitivs von seinem regierenden Worte durch andere Satztheile." What is meant is the order of two prepositional (or adverbial) adjuncts, as in "the arrival at Cowes of the German Emperor." *Of the Emperor* is no more a genitive than *at Cowes* is an accusative or *from Cowes* an ablative. Whoever takes an interest in the purification of English grammar from such sham classifications as I have here instanced, will find great help in an

¹ Some of these combinations may not be very frequent, but they all occur and all have to be analyzed.

excellent book by H. G. Wiwel,¹ in which the same kind of work has been done with regard to Danish and in which the growth of the traditional grammatical system is, moreover, elucidated in a masterly manner. As Danish resembles English more than any other language in grammatical structure we have here another instance of a research in one language being useful to students of a cognate tongue. But it should not be forgotten that in England one of the foremost scholars of our day has done excellent work in this respect, for Henry Sweet's ingenious essay *Words, Logic, and Grammar* of 1873² really not only anticipates such works as Wiwel's, but on some points even goes further in doing away radically with traditional notions and grammatical prejudices.

The exaggerated importance attached to Latin is also injurious to the study of English if it causes forms and constructions to be *valued* according to a Latin standard. Some authors, Milton and Dryden among them, have impaired their English prose by thinking too much of Latin syntax instead of trusting to their natural linguistic instinct, and similarly some grammarians are apt to despise such English idioms as are contrary to Latin rules. The omission of relative pronouns, a preposition placed at the end of a question or of a relative clause, the passive construction with a so-called dative turned into the subject, all these eminently English idioms have not been valued according to their merits. That the ordinary schoolmaster should persecute these things is perhaps only what might be expected so long as a rational course of modern linguistic science as applied to English does not enter into the ordinary school curriculum, but what concerns us more here is that the same underrating of a great number of pithy and expressive constructions is found even in works dealing with historical English grammar. In the same manner, instead of examining impartially the rise and spreading of the past indicative in conditional clauses ("if he was caught, he would be punished") and after such a verb as *wish* ("I wish he was dead"), many grammarians dispose of the use by simply branding it as careless or slipshod English, precluding themselves from the correct point of view by considering *came* in "if he came" as necessarily subjunctive. If people would not blink the fact that in modern English "if he came" and "if we were" and "if I do" and a thousand other sentences are no longer either in the indicative or in the subjunctive, they would see how natural it is that the indicative should come to be used in the comparatively very rare instances in which the indicative and subjunctive forms are still distinct, and then we should, probably, soon see an investigation, which is now nowhere found, of the ques-

¹ H. G. Wiwel, *Synspunkter for dansk sproglære*. Copenhagen, 1901.

² Henry Sweet, *Words, Logic, and Grammar*, in *Transactions of the Philological Society*. London, 1873.

tion, where does unsophisticated usage retain the subjunctive and where is the indicative employed naturally by everybody in England and America?

This leads up to another consideration. Up to quite recent times, the history of any language was chiefly studied through the means of written literature. But now it is more and more recognized that, indispensable as are written documents for the study of the older periods, they can never give everything, and that they will remain dead until vivified by the help of the study of the language as actually spoken nowadays by living men, women, and children. The study of language should always begin, like charity, at home; everybody should be trained in the investigation of his own, his family's, and his friend's every-day speech, before going on to deal with dead languages — and I take here the word "dead" in its strictest sense, including the language of Carlyle and of Emerson just as well as that of Chaucer or of Cynewulf, for they are all accessible to us through written and printed books only. The tendency towards a living language-study is strong everywhere, and the student of English should keep thoroughly abreast of the best work done in that direction with regard to other languages, German, French, Scandinavian, and so on. This is true of all branches of philology, not only of phonetics, where it has been recognized by everybody in theory if not always in practice, but also of such branches as syntax and semantics, where there is now in many countries a growing tendency to take as a basis the observation of the actually spoken language.

The study of other languages will assist the Anglist in more ways than those enumerated hitherto. Let me finish this lecture by drawing attention to one of the most fundamental problems in the evolution of language. English is characterized by its large admixture of foreign words, and the history of the English-speaking race is in a large measure the history of its mixture with alien races. Now, English has gone farther than most cognate languages in simplifying its hereditary flexional system and wearing off most of the old endings. The problem naturally arises: what is the relation, or is there any relation, between these two things, race- or speech-mixture and simplification of structure?

The general assumption seems to be that foreign influence is the cause of that simplification, and this assumption is always stated in a purely dogmatic manner, no attempt being ever made to prove the assertion. Nor is it possible, so far as I see, either to prove or to disprove it on the strength of English alone, as the direct evidence afforded by contemporary documents is so scarce. The foreign influence to which the breaking down of the old grammatical system is ascribed is nearly always taken to be that due to the Norman

Conquest. But as I have shown elsewhere ¹ it is probable that the Scandinavian immigration exercised a much stronger influence on English grammar than the French. Both the mutual relations of the two languages, Scandinavian and English, and the greater rapidity of the structural change in the North, where Scandinavians settled in the greatest number, point decidedly in that direction, if we are to think of foreign influence at all. On the other hand, the chronology of some changes, for instance the early confusion of the old system of genders in some Northern monuments, as well as the gradual manner in which the leveling took place on many points, where we seem able to account phonologically and morphologically for each little step in a development which it took centuries to accomplish — all this makes it not unwarrantable to speak of the whole process as one which would have taken place in the same, or nearly the same manner, even had no foreign mixture entered into play.

As we are thus left unable to answer the question decidedly one way or the other from what we know about English itself, the idea naturally presents itself that an examination of parallel processes in other languages might perhaps assist us materially. For if we find everywhere else in other languages the two things, mixture of speech or of race and simplification of grammatical structure, going together, and if, on the other hand, pure languages are always conservative in their structure, the conclusion apparently is a safe one that the two phenomena are interdependent. The limited time at my disposal, and still more my limited knowledge, prevent me from doing here more than throwing out a few hints.

Among the Germanic languages, Danish is one of the simplest, as far as flectional structure is concerned, — and Danish has undergone a very strong foreign influence, a considerable part of its vocabulary being made up of Low German words. If we compare the different Danish dialects with one another, we see some differences in regard to the degree in which the simplification has been carried out, the dialect of West Jutland going farthest in that respect. There, for instance, the three grammatical genders have been merged together, final *-e* has disappeared, the definite article is one invariable prefixed *æ*, while in other dialects it is postfixed and varies according to number and according to the two or, in other places, three genders still distinguished. Now, there does not seem to be a scrap of evidence to show that this part of the country has witnessed any stronger race-mixture than the others. It is worth noting that in the district nearest to German-speaking communities two genders are preserved. It is my impression that the most simplified dialect has no greater admixture of loan-words than the more conservative ones, and this impression has been endorsed by the greatest authority on Jutland

¹ Otto Jespersen, *Progress in Language*, p. 173. London, 1894.

dialects, the Rev. Dr. H. F. Feilberg. The structural contrast to West Jutlandish among the Scandinavian languages is Icelandic, which has preserved the old endings and inflections with wonderful fidelity; this conservatism is combined with an extremely small number of loan-words, and no race-mixture has ever taken place.

We proceed to South Africa, where we find a language which has perhaps thrown off more of the old flectional complexity than any other Germanic language, English not even excepted, namely Cape Dutch or "Afrikaansch," "de Taal." The total absence of distinction of gender, the dropping of a great many endings, an extremely simple declension and conjugation, which has given up, for instance, any marks of different persons and numbers in the verbs, and other similar traits, distinguish this extremely interesting language from European Dutch. As for loan-words, the number of English words, which is now very considerable, can have nothing to do with the simplification, for the English did not come to the Cape till after the grammatical structure had undergone most of its changes. French loan-words are not so plentiful as might be expected from the number of Huguenots among the original stock of immigrants, but Malayo-Portuguese has contributed quite a considerable number of words. In the latest book on Cape Dutch the simplification is attributed, not to any particular foreign tongue, but to the fact that the language has been largely spoken by people having originally had a different mother tongue, no matter what that tongue was in each individual case.¹

Among the Romance languages, Roumanian evidently is the one which has undergone the strongest foreign influence; it has a great many loan-words from various sources, and the people also is largely mixed with alien populations. But here, the structure of the language is rather less simple than that of the sister tongues; Roumanian has, for instance, preserved more of the old declension than other Romance languages. Its neighbor, Bulgarian, has in some respects the same position among Slavonic languages as Roumanian among Romance. The same causes have been at work among both populations and have produced race-mixture as well as a large proportion of loan-words from Turkish and other languages. But with regard to simplification, Bulgarian stands on a different footing from Roumanian, as it has given up very much of the old Slavonic complexity; the case-system has nearly disappeared, and prepositions are used very extensively instead of the old endings.

In the Balkans we meet with still another language which has to be considered here, namely, Modern Greek. The extremely artificial form in which this language is written does not concern us here,

¹ H. Meyer, *Die sprache der Buren*. Göttingen, 1901. — Compare also D. C. Hesseling, *Het Afrikaansch*. Leiden, 1899.

as it is an outcome of an entirely unnatural tendency to conceal the history and development of some two thousand years. Spoken Modern Greek presents a combination of the two phenomena, simplification of grammar and a great influx of foreign words.¹ So does Modern Persian too; its accidence is extremely simple and in so many respects resembles English that Misteli consecrates the last sections of his great work to a comparison of the two languages in their present shapes.² Persian also in that respect resembles English, that it is full of loan-words, nearly all expressions for philosophical, abstract, and technical ideas being Arabic words. But just as most of the philosophical, abstract, and technical Latin and Greek words were adopted into English after the process of grammatical simplification had been carried very far, in the same manner Arabic influence in Persian follows, instead of preceding, the doing away with most of the old complexity of grammar. Pehlevi, or the language of the Sassanid period, before the Arabic conquest, is far simpler than Old Persian. If, then, the Persian simplicity is a consequence of speech-mixture, it must be one of earlier date, and perhaps the Aramaic influence on Pehlevi is strong enough to account for everything; that, however, must be left for specialists to decide.

In India, the old system of inflections has broken down in the modern languages, which are all more or less analytic in their structure. Hindi seems to have gained much in simplicity as early as the thirteenth century, although the modern system of auxiliary verbs and of postpositions was not then fully established, but the strong influx of Persian (with Arabic and Turkish) words did not begin till some centuries later. Hindustani is practically the same language as Hindi with still more foreignisms in it. Gujarati has preserved more of the old inflections than Hindi, but the Persian elements are rather more numerous here than in Hindi.

We should not leave the Arian (Indo-European) languages without mentioning the numerous varieties of Creole languages that have sprung up in all those parts of the globe where Europeans have been in constant communication with native populations of different races. Grammatical simplicity has in all these languages been carried extremely far, and though the actual admixture of exotic words is very unequal and inconstant, varying as it does, according to circumstances and individuals, still it is always pretty considerable.³

Outside the Indo-European languages, the nearest in kin are probably the Finno-Ugrian group. The absence of old documents

¹ See on the relation between the two things especially K. Krumbacher, *Das problem der neugriechischen schriftsprache*. Festrede in der kgl. bayr. akademie der wissenschaften in München. 1902.

² F. Misteli, *Charakteristik der hauptsächlichsten typen des sprachbaues*. Berlin, 1893.

³ See H. Schuchardt, *Kreolische studien*, Wiener akademie, 1883 ff.

makes it a difficult matter to speak of the history of these languages; still, we may say that Esthonian, which has undergone a strong German influence, shows a more worn-down state of the old grammar than Finnish, and that the same is the case with Livonian, which has been so strongly influenced by Lettic that nearly half of the vocabulary is borrowed from that language. As for Magyar, or Hungarian, its vocabulary presents a highly variegated appearance: Persian, Turkish, Slavonic, Latin, and German elements are freely mixed with the original stock. Phonetic development has worn down the forms of the words to a considerable extent, and many of the old grammatical forms have disappeared. The case-endings now used are quite modern developments and are joined to the words in a much looser way and also much more regularly than those of Finnish, for example; in fact, they can hardly be termed anything but postpositions. On the whole its grammatical structure seems to be really simpler than that of the other languages of the same group.¹

In the Semitic group, Hebrew even in the oldest period known to us is much simpler in its grammatical structure than Arabic. Whether this is due to speech-mixture or not is a question which I must leave to others to decide; but I am told that scholars are now beginning to recognize more and more Assyrian loan-words in Hebrew. Aramaic is still simpler, and here foreign influences seem to be much easier to trace.

Outside the three great families of languages which I have here spoken about, very little is known to me that might serve to clear up our question. Malayan has a very simple grammatical structure and a very great number of foreign words. Chinese is still less complicated in its structure, but is its vocabulary to any great extent made up of loan-words? On the other hand, are the American Indian languages, with their intricacies of grammar, completely free from foreign mixtures? It is surely permissible to entertain some doubt on both of these heads.

I am painfully conscious that what I have been able to do here is only a very imperfect sketch. I dare draw no definite conclusion from the somewhat conflicting evidence I have been able to adduce, but I have thought it might be well to throw out a few suggestions for a future work, which ought certainly to be done by some one possessed of a deeper knowledge of the languages I have mentioned, and, if possible, of all the other languages that might throw light on the subject. This scholar of a, let us hope, not too remote future, I should venture to recommend to pay especial attention to chronology, — for it is not enough to state mixture and simplicity, but it

¹ With regard to the Finno-Ugrian languages, I am largely indebted to the lectures and writings of Vilhelm Thomsen.

must be shown also for each individual case that the latter is subsequent in time to the former, if we are to believe in a cause and effect relation between them. And then he must, wherever possible, distinguish between speech-mixture and race-mixture and determine in each case whether one or the other or both have taken place. He will find some very useful generalizations on the relation between the two kinds of mixture in a paper by the American scholar George Hempl,¹ whom I am happy to quote here at the close of my paper, for it would scarcely be possible to find a more apposite place than America in which to investigate the question I have alluded to. Here in America you have race-mixtures and speech-mixtures of every kind going on and readily accessible to observation every day. Here you see the greatest amalgamation that the world has ever witnessed of human beings into one great nation. The future of the English language is to a great extent in the hands of the Americans. It is gratifying, therefore, to see that the study of its past and of its present is taken up with such zeal and such energy by a great number of extremely able American scholars that we cannot fail to entertain the very best hopes for the future of English philology.

¹ G. Hempl, *Language-Rivalry and Speech-Differentiation in the case of Race-Mixture*. *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, xxix (1898), p. 35.

PRESENT PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

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My theme is Present Problems with regard to the English Language. I did not choose this theme myself, nor was it, I suppose, assigned me by a committee of philologists or linguistic students. Indeed, it is manifestly not altogether appropriate to the nature of the general subject, to the character of the material with which one deals in linguistic investigations, or to the present state of science in the department of learning which we are met to discuss. In natural science, in philosophy, in social questions, the specialist may no doubt survey the field at any given moment and pronounce categorically that this or that question (or group of questions) presses with peculiar insistence for solution, and that when the solution is arrived at, it will point the way to large discoveries, or to momentous advances in knowledge or enlightenment. In the investigation of a particular language, however, the case is different. There are problems enough, no doubt, and difficult problems; but who shall venture to say that we are now grappling with principles or theories on which depends either the whole future of our science or the amelioration of the human race?

Pray do not misunderstand me. It is by no means my purpose to criticise adversely the managers of this intellectual enterprise. Nor do I intend to belittle the subject which calls us together, and to the study of which we are, each in his own way, so ardently devoted. Least of all would I be taken to mean that there is nothing to talk about. As I have already suggested, we have problems in abundance, — an abundance, indeed, which is fairly embarrassing. All I desire is to account for the omissions which you will severally detect in my discussion this afternoon. It is not to be expected that any brief treatment of so complicated a business should not overlook or ignore the pet puzzle of many an individual among this audience. For we are very multifarious in our interests. Look into your hearts, gentlemen, and judge. Some of us are worrying over “*u-umlaut*”; others pass sleepless nights in meditating on the Kenticisms in Chaucer; to not a few the dog’s letter, the snarling *littera canina* of the old grammarians, is a perpetual stimulus or an ever-puncturing thorn in the flesh. A select number find their refreshment (or dissipation) in unriddling runic puzzles. Others the Middle English dative charms

elusively, — fleeing to the woods, but desirous first to be seen. For myself, I must confess that I give much thought to certain idioms containing (as I think) *for* and an adjective, but reducible, in the opinion of many, to compounds with the “intensive prefix,” — and that I should die happier if I felt sure of ever knowing the whole truth about the *kankedort* in which Troilus found himself when he heard Pandarus and Cressida whispering at the door.

These, then, and thousands like them, are all *present problems with regard to the English language*, and I might easily fill my allotted five and forty minutes by cataloguing them, and still leave the most immediate interests of some of you untouched. Because these are little things, the scoffer talks of pedantry, and the mousing philologist is ridiculed as an operose trifler — a cavalier of empty thoughts. But we may leave the scoffer out of account. Our revenge on him is lordly and complete. As a learned friend of mine once said to some of his fellow students who were inclined to think that literary criticism was the whole of life, — it is exhilarating to observe the hungry eagerness with which the supercilious outsider picks up the crumbs that fall from the philologist’s table. A correct analysis of *if you please*, or *you are welcome*, or *willy nilly*, or a demonstration of the common trick of substituting a glottal catch for a guttural, will hold an audience of literary enthusiasts as surely as the finest analysis of the æsthetician or the boldest flight of the critical aeronaut.

The minuter questions of English philology, such as those to which I have already adverted, are of course being settled one by one, and their solutions are gradually, though very slowly, finding their place in collective treatises. One of the larger problems that confronts us is the difficulty of getting collective treatises written in a competent way. To be sure, there is no reason for discouragement. As we compare the array of trustworthy manuals that the tyro now has at his disposal with the scanty and incorrect apparatus of the greatest scholars fifty years ago, we have much to be thankful for; but no one can deny that there is still an enormous amount of sifting and codification to be done, even in those departments of our subject which have received the most earnest and fruitful attention from philologists.

The earliest period of our language (call it Anglo-Saxon or Old English as you please; for this petty question of mere nomenclature I refuse to regard as a problem, though much ink has been shed in debating it) has been more minutely and successfully studied than any other. The reasons are obvious, and need not be recapitulated. One of the most potent has been, of course, the fact that Anglo-Saxon is of vital importance to every Germanic philologist, to a degree that is not true of any later period of English. Hence we have enjoyed, in this field, the active coöperation of scholars of different nationalities

well trained in philological method, some of whom have only a slight interest in the English language in its later, and much more significant, developments.

Yet our shelf of Anglo-Saxon works of reference is far from full, and some of the gaps occur in places to which we should oftenest have recourse if we did not know they were empty. The state of Anglo-Saxon lexicography, for example, is a disgrace to English-speaking scholars. Who will give us a halfway satisfactory Anglo-Saxon dictionary and free us from the thralldom of Bosworth-Toller? Grein's *Poetical Lexicon* is so marvelous a piece of work that, old as it is, one hesitates to suggest its revision. Yet everybody knows that a new Grein is a need that is sorely felt. A distinguished American scholar has long been giving his leisure hours to making collectanea for an exhaustive Anglo-Saxon dictionary; but I doubt if he has much expectation of finding a publisher. There are understood to be large materials at Oxford; but one despairs of ever seeing them put forth. Is there any hope except in international coöperation among a large number of scholars, financed by some institution of inexhaustible resources that feels no regard for profits, and directed by a specialist characterized by equal breadth and fineness of knowledge and by exceptional skill in the organization of materials and the management of collaborators? Instances of similar lexicographical enterprises now proceeding to a successful issue will at once occur to you. I need not mention them by name. Should we not all keep in mind as one of our first duties the furtherance of this great undertaking in every way in our power?

I will not dwell on the other deficiencies in our Anglo-Saxon equipment. On the whole, the material is so compact and manageable, the various desiderata are so well defined, and the number of trained workers is so great, that, without being unduly sanguine, we may hope to see most of our needs supplied as time goes on, — the great task of the dictionary excepted. There is still much to do in Anglo-Saxon dialectology; but the main lines of distinction are well recognized, and there are a number of distinguished monographs. Syntax, to be sure, is an almost untilled field; but to that subject we must recur in a moment. As to meter, there are still wide differences of opinion, and of late there has been manifested a tendency to question the soundness of some of the best-accredited results, or, at all events, to deny their utility for purposes of textual criticism. One thing, however, is clear: There are a large number of facts about the structure and movement of Anglo-Saxon verse that have been ascertained beyond the possibility of a doubt and that have been shown to admit of orderly classification. In all our discussions on points of theory, it is well to remember that these facts are *facts*, not *opinions*. *The verses do actually contain such and such syllables, arranged thus*

and so, and with certain quantities and accents in reasonably fixed positions. All of these facts *may* be significant with regard to the meter; many of them must be significant. How far all or any part of them suffice to pluck out the heart of the mystery is a debatable question. The objection that an ancient *scop* cannot have had all these types and sub-types in his head when he took harp in hand is merely ludicrous. It is much as if one were to contend that the musician's crotchets and semiquavers are perverse nonentities because a boy can whistle a tune without ever having heard of them. It is about on a level with the child's inquiry as to how Adam found out the animals' names. There may be — there probably is — a good deal about Anglo-Saxon meter that is not yet discovered; but that is no reason for rejecting the information which we have already acquired.

While this particular subject is under our eyes, and before you have had time to describe me in your own minds as either a philistine, or a partisan, or a shuffler, it may be well to say a word on the history of English meter in general, — of what we may call Modern English meter in distinction from that of pre-Conquest times. Here there are certainly problems enough. The whole matter is one enormous puzzle. We do not really know how far English meter is Germanic, how far it is Latin, and how far it is French. Individuals know: there are theorists in plenty who feel certain about the influence exerted on the native versification by the hymns of the church and the secular poetry of the foreign invader. But I am not speaking of the views of those who know because they have made up their minds, but of what can actually be proved to the satisfaction of an unbiased scholar. Again, the whole subject of quantity in modern English meter is as good as *terra incognita*. Of course quantity plays its part as well as accent. Our ears tell us that, and our common sense. Besides, we have the testimony of the poets themselves. But how great is the quantitative function, and what are its relations to accentual rhythm? Further, we are in no sort of agreement as to pauses in metrical writing. Most metricians tell us, for instance, that in Shakespeare's blank verse a pause may take the place of an unaccented syllable, — some even assert that it may stand for one that is accented. To me, however, such statements appear to have no meaning. They seem to belong to mathematics, not to poetry.

Again, we are at sword's points about ictus and rhetorical accent. Everybody knows that the same verse may often be *singsonged* with five accents and *read* with three or four, and that it satisfies the ear when uttered in either way, though it appeals to the intellect in only one of its two renditions. What are we to make of this phenomenon? And what of pitch-accent and stress-accent? What of feet or measures? How far are they real divisions and how far mere fetches of scansion?

These are elementary questions. But no scholar in the world has yet answered them to anything like general assent. Heaven knows there are answers enough before the public! About once a year somebody puts forth a brand-new system of English meter, with novel symbols and a fresh nomenclature; and it is impossible even to conjecture the number of eager young spirits in our universities who are at this moment beginning to glow with the hope that they have at last put their fingers on the strings in the long-sought way. For my own part, I am not sanguine. We know the rough facts, and we can feel the finer ones as we read or chant the verses of the great poets. But whether we shall ever do much more is a question. The phoneticians are active, and if help comes from any quarter it must come from them. But — if one dare say it — some of the most advanced phoneticians have become so subtle and hair-splitting, and seem to have so little notion of what is worth doing and what is not, that they appear to an outsider (as well as to not a few of their more conservative brethren) to be doing little more than piling up rubbish. Some day there may be born a great psychologist with an innate feeling for verse as verse. When he has exhausted the subject of psychology, he may apply himself to literature, and when he is sufficiently at home in that field, he may perhaps find time to become an expert phonetician. He may then solace his declining years by explaining for good and all the intricacies of English meter. I hardly expect to live to see the man. Let me add, by the way, two more qualifications: he should be modest, and a person of unusual common sense.

There are problems in plenty with regard to the history of English as a literary language, this side of the Anglo-Saxon period, — and many of them are of great moment to students of literature as well as to the special devotees of linguistic science. To some of the questions there is a generally accepted answer, — generally accepted, but not quite amply demonstrated. As to others, scholars take sides (and hold them) with commendable stiffness. Nearly all of the questions are pretty generally misconceived, in this or that way, by the educated public, including most writers of literary histories.

First among the problems that I have now in mind is the general question of French influence upon English. In its main outlines this matter is pretty well settled. We know (though it seems impossible for historians of literature to find out the facts) that the Norman dialect was familiar at the English court before the Conquest, so that it is conceivable that, even without the Battle of Hastings, it might have come to occupy a position similar to that of French at the Prussian court in the reign of Frederick the Great, or German at the Danish court in the eighteenth century. We know also that the prevalence of Norman French as a court dialect after the Conquest

had very little direct influence on English; that the dialect from which most of the Old French words came that made their way into the language of the island was Central French; that most of these words came in after 1300 (say between 1300 and 1400), and that many of them were in the first instance literary or society borrowings, like *prestige* or *fiancée* in modern times. But nobody has yet grappled victoriously with the details. The complicated linguistic situation in England in the early fourteenth century — the critical moment in this concern — is, in fact, appreciated by very few persons, if one may judge from what one hears or reads. One of the best of Middle English scholars — one of the small number to whom the English of that period is a living language — has gone so far as to declare that the French of Stratford-atte-Bowe was the language of the English court in Chaucer's time, and that that great poet and accomplished courtier thought as highly of it as of the French of Paris. Another good scholar appears to believe that the French of Gower came straight down from Anglo-Norman times. It is seldom recognized that there were in the fourteenth century, as there are now, great differences among the gentry and nobility of England in the purity with which they spoke the language of the polite nation, and that a Parisian accent was then, as now, a highly valued accomplishment. We shall never get these tangles straightened out until some Romance scholar whose native language is English and who has a philological as well as a practical command of it, gives us an authoritative book in which all the needed distinctions are made and the evidence that establishes them is marshaled. At present it cannot be denied that everything that has been written on the subject is superficial, or fragmentary, or honeycombed with error. I know — you all know — a philologist of the first rank, equally versed in Romance and in Germanic philology, who has such a book as we want in his head at this moment, and who merely needs to overcome his modesty, to lay aside the self-sacrificing work which he is constantly doing for others, and to abandon for the moment a modicum of his commendable caution, to perform an inestimable service to the history of the English language.

Another point of great importance is the rôle which is to be ascribed to Chaucer in the development of our standard idiom. Here one would think there might be agreement; but there is none. The old view that Chaucer made literary English by mixing French with corrupt Anglo-Saxon, throwing in final *e*'s at will, and polishing the conglomerate, was so absurd (though it is far from being exploded in outside circles) that it has, by a revulsion of feeling, prompted some to reduce his services to an infinitesimal quantity. These revolutionists seem to believe that Chaucer found the literary language ready made in the dialect of educated Londoners, and that

the history of that literary language would have been the same if he had never lived. Between these extremes it is not hard to find the truth; but it is hard to prove it, hard even to get it accepted as a working hypothesis. What we should be careful to remember is that there is a vast amount of work still to be done before we can know exactly what happened in England, linguistically speaking, between 1350 and 1450. That work, too, does not consist merely in writing dissertations of the statutory length on the basis of a conventionally orthodox scheme of Middle English dialectology. For (may one dare to whisper it?) Middle English dialectology is not by any means reducible, in the present state of our knowledge, to any such hard and fast scheme as one might think from the confident little treatises that appear from time to time from aspirants for academic honors. There has been too much cocksureness in assigning this, that, or the other document to the southwest corner of the northeast Midland district, or in declaring that a writer must have been born five or six miles from Lichfield and passed some of his maturer years in the outskirts of Warwick, occasionally passing through Coleshill as he returned to his native town on a visit to his kinsfolk. Here again I would not be misunderstood. Far be it from me to refuse recognition to the painstaking labors of those (great scholars and small) who have toiled in this field, whether in gathering materials or in ordering them and drawing inferences. What is meant is merely that there is a fictitious air of completeness and scientific certainty about the dialectology of Middle English as at present understood which will not stand the test of scrutiny on the part of one who asks for evidence and requires sometimes more than a medieval subservience to authority. What is purely an inductive inquiry has come to be too much a matter of deduction. It is incumbent on the younger generation of English scholars to reopen the case, — not in a hostile spirit, but with a determination to prove all things and hold fast only that which is good.

Hitherto, study of the Middle English dialects has been too much confined to their phonology, — partly, no doubt, because of its importance as a criterion, but partly also because of the somewhat disproportionate attention which this branch of linguistic science has received for so many years, and partly (alas!) from inertia. Here were certain schemes already drawn to fill up; here was a diagram; here was the line of least resistance. Many an American, in recent years, has become intensely interested in his own ancestors because he had come into possession of a genealogical chart and took a fancy for filling the blanks. Now, though admittedly there can be no investigation of dialects that is not based on sound phonology, it ought to be equally evident (though it seems not to have been found so) that, when the sound-chart of a dialect has been properly drawn up,

our study is not at an end. We know very little about any dialect when all we know is its vocalic and consonantal behavior, and, indeed, when we add to that an acquaintance with some of its inflectional habits. With reference to the great Middle English dialects, — each of which has an abundant literature and may lay claim to have been at some time a literary language of some pretensions, — we need to know its characteristic vocabulary, the special idiomatic phrases which distinguish it, its metrical system, and its syntax. If we are asked how far our present codified knowledge of the dialects in question meets these requirements, we shall have to hang our heads. This is a matter of some concern to the literary historian as well as to the linguist. It has been much the fashion to talk about “schools” or “groups” of Middle English poetry. The terms may be misleading, but we will not pause to quarrel with them. In the present state of our ignorance about some of the things just mentioned, there is constant danger of our confusing what belongs to a dialect with what belongs to a school. Nor is that all. Different works are not infrequently ascribed to the same writer on the ground of resemblances in style and language which, if they prove anything, prove only that the documents are written in the same dialect and employ a common stock of catchwords and catchphrases. The abuse of the argument from so-called parallel passages is largely due to our ignorance or neglect of all dialectic phenomena except those of sounds and forms. It is safe to say that arguments for identity of authorship in the Middle English field are every day based on collections of parallel passages of a kind that would call down Homeric laughter on the heads of their accumulators if they were dealing with documents and writers of our own day. Now much of this abuse comes from pure neglect of logic; but by far the larger part of it must be charged to ignorance, excusable and even unavoidable ignorance, perhaps, but still ignorance, pure and simple. The investigator simply does not know that the phrase or sentence or verse that he copies down on his card is not the property of A or B or C, but of everybody who spoke or wrote that dialect, and that, accordingly, it was the inevitable form of words when that idea (itself a commonplace of experience or reflection) had to be expressed.

The “vocabulary test” is pretty nearly discredited by this time, so fantastic are the pranks which it has been forced to play in the face of an astonished world. But the “parallel passage test” is still in high favor. Yet we all know, it is to be presumed, that, for some purposes, the unit of expression is not the word, but the set group of words, — the phrase or sentence; and that consequently the test from parallel passages is often in no way distinguishable from that from community of vocabulary.

All this suggests one of the most serious desiderata of our science.

We need to pass from the study and collection of *words* to the study and collection of *phrases*. Lexicographers deserve all honor. In the Middle English field, to be sure, we are still pretty badly off, but we ought to be thankful for what we have. Yet how little has been done towards the history of idioms and phrases in comparison with the labor that has been devoted to tracing the history of individual words! What I say applies as well to Modern as to Middle English. We need investigations of phraseology. There is no more fascinating pursuit for the linguist, none that will repay him more immediately or more abundantly for his time and trouble. The bearings of the subject are multifarious. Take the purely historical point of view. We know that a certain poem contains twenty per cent. of French and Latin words. Are we to infer that this measures the Romance element in its language? By no means. How far are the phrases French or Latin in their relations, even when the words are Germanic? Our habit of translating foreign phrases literally and making them a part of our speech is well known and of very long standing. Many of our commonest idioms are naturalized citizens that have adopted the speech of their new country. It is notorious that the genealogist has much trouble when he gets into a region where immigrants have been in the way of translating their family names. We must remember, too, that there are what may be called literary idioms as well as popular idioms, and in these Middle English writers reveled with all the unrestraint of authors who wished to produce largely and rapidly and who had never conceived that it is a virtue to be original.

For some time we have been trembling on the verge of another huge group of problems, which I have mentioned two or three times, but without dwelling upon them. I refer, of course, to syntax.

The study of English syntax is in its infancy. The neglect of this department of philology has, indeed, been often commented on with reference to all the modern languages. It stands in the most startling contrast to the minute and almost passionate attention which has been devoted to the history of sounds and forms. Yet English syntax has the bad eminence of being perhaps more neglected than that of any other great language. A few brilliant scholars have coquetted with the subject. Several heavy and unilluminated persons have made unwieldy collections of material, usually overlooking the vital matters or stopping short as soon as they had reached a point at which they were in sight of something either difficult or significant. There are two or three manuals of substantial worth, and a number of distinguished monographs. But in general it must be admitted that English syntax has hardly been studied at all, except for practical purposes. I have learned, since these sessions began, that a thoroughly equipped and uncommonly keen-sighted scholar has in hand a large

work on this subject, from which we are justified in expecting the happiest results.

Perhaps it is worth while to survey the field for a moment, — to specify what one would like to have if wishes were horses, — to sketch, however tentatively, a kind of programme.

In the first place we desire to know thoroughly the Germanic foundations. For this, of course, a complete Anglo-Saxon syntax is necessary: not a mere list of verbs with the cases they govern, or an array of the different ways in which the numerals may be arranged, or a set of statistics comprehending the relative frequency of the weak adjective and the strong. These things are well enough, and we cannot get along without them. But what we must look forward to is something far less mechanical, a system of Anglo-Saxon constructions such as we already have for the classical tongues, discriminated as finely as the nature of the idiom will admit, arranged both logically and historically, complete both for the poetry and the prose, and supported at every point by exhaustive material. This, of course, is not the task of one man, or perhaps of one generation; but we are not talking about what can be accomplished to-morrow or next day. We are trying to face the problem of English syntax as it stands, probably the most stupendous problem of all those with which it is our business to grapple.

This ideal system of Anglo-Saxon syntax is needed, as we have seen, as a foundation for our whole structure. We must know how the syntax of our language stood when English was a purely Germanic speech, before we can reason with certainty as to what took place when our idiom was subjected to those extraordinarily complex forces which have made it unique among the languages of articulate-speaking men.

Here, at the very threshold, we are confronted by a difficulty of no small proportions. Since most of our Anglo-Saxon prose is translated from the Latin, we cannot trust its syntactic evidence without careful scrutiny. At every step, therefore, the possibility of foreign literary influence must be borne in mind. We must compare the constructions of poetry, and we must appeal constantly to the testimony of the other Germanic languages. Nor must we forget, in examining the poetical texts, the archaizing tendency of all expression in verse. Finally, we must bear in mind the probability of syntactic differences coincident with differences of dialect, and we must remember the special complications that have resulted from the partial transference of a large body of Anglo-Saxon poetry from one dialect, more or less completely, into another.

If we can do all this, — and we shall be forced to do it somehow and sometime, — we shall be in a position to study with intelligence the bewildering syntax of the Middle English period.

The most obvious question about Middle English syntax is: What did French do to it? This is not the only question; but it is so insistent that to many persons it plays the part of Aaron's rod with the other serpents: it swallows up all the rest. Very little has been accomplished in the investigation of Middle English syntax, and in part for this very reason. Some scholars appear to think that all one has to do is to discover a French construction (or a French phrase) that is identical with one in the English of this period, and then to infer that we have an example of the gradual Gallicizing of our language. The inference is far too easy. Take for example, the matter of prepositions and cases. One often hears that the substitution of prepositional phrases for the inflected cases of nouns comes from unconscious imitation of the French. But we must be cautious. As inflections decay, what is to replace them but prepositions? Imagine for the moment that there had been no Norman Conquest, but that inflectional decay had taken place in English as it has in Dutch and Danish, for example. Would not the spread of prepositional phrases have taken place then? There were already constructions enough of this kind in Anglo-Saxon to give the impulse to any number of analogies, — to any amount of growth. I am not taking sides. I am merely asking for a suspension of judgment until we have more facts in order; and this suggests a second article in our programme: We need to study carefully and exhaustively the syntax of the Transition Period, comparing it on the one hand with Anglo-Saxon and on the other with contemporary French, and checking all our conclusions by means of the development of the Germanic languages in general. Such a study, devoted to a period of English during which the direct influence of French in other respects (on the vocabulary, for instance) was almost *nil*, ought to give us some idea of the native tendencies which our language was bound to follow. *A priori*, it might reasonably be maintained that foreign syntax is not likely to be intensely operative so long as a language shows such an independence of outside influences as to keep its vocabulary pure. May it not be that, after all, the direct effect of French in modifying our syntax has been greatly exaggerated? We must all admit the possibility, but there is not a living scholar who has the right to dogmatize on the subject. For myself, I am inclined to think that we shall find out some day that in syntax, as in other respects, the chief linguistic result of the Norman Conquest for a couple of centuries was indirect, and came from breaking down the literary tradition of Anglo-Saxon, and so allowing our language to disintegrate (let us say rather, to advance) with more rapidity than would otherwise have been the case. At all events, we must have a study of Transition syntax, and it must take especial heed of Late West Saxon, and in particular of those texts which are

admittedly written in an artificial literary dialect, maintained with an effort long after it had ceased to accord with the speech of common life.

For the period of fully established Middle English, — in particular the fourteenth century, — we must *a priori* admit a great deal of French influence on our syntax. Here, however, the amount of work to be done is so great that it may well stagger the most sanguine. We must give steady heed to the great dialects, for what is true of one is not necessarily true of another. The poets of the so-called Chaucerian School — say from 1350 to 1450 — will require and repay most careful scrutiny, since they are in the direct line which leads down to the standard syntax of our own day.

Next come the dark ages — dark, that is to say, to the philologist because scandalously neglected, with two or three brilliant exceptions. It is not in the matter of syntax alone that the long stretch from 1450 to 1550 is a No Man's Land. In almost every respect this vastly important lapse of time has been ignored by the linguistic scholar. The ordinary outfit of the Anglicist may be described as consisting of a knowledge of Anglo-Saxon, of the language of Chaucer, of Elizabethan English, and of the speech of the present day; and too often, especially in the case of foreigners, the last two items are omitted from the account. We take a leap from Chaucer to Queen Elizabeth. Yet the dark period from 1450 to 1550 is full of instruction. Many a phrase or idiom that one thinks of as Middle English turns up in the obscure writers of the sixteenth century, and we have also, in this period, the privilege of inspecting the beginnings of that great outburst of linguistic splendor which characterizes the Elizabethan Age. And the middle period presents phenomena of its own. We see the French influence giving way to a tendency to that excessive Latinization which crowded the vocabulary of England with barbarous sesquipedalian words, not destined to maintain themselves. The neatness and simplicity of Chaucerian diction disappear, and the gorgeous licenses of Elizabethanism do not yet exist. In some writers, too, there is a good fund of colloquialisms, — of incalculable value to the investigator of our modern syntax. A forbidding period this to the æsthetician, — but full of lessons for the historical student of letters, as well as for the philologist. For the syntactician it abounds in prizes; some day he may awake to their whereabouts; at present, he seems hardly aware that they exist at all. Let it be added that a knowledge of Middle English by no means fits a man to read the works of this period intelligently. There is, unfortunately, a prevalent misconception on this point.

Of Elizabethan syntax — the next article in our programme — something has already been said by anticipation. We need not dwell upon it; for everybody knows the significance of the period.

More or less work has been done here, but mostly on Shakespeare, and none of it in any way final.

We have now reached the Modern Period, in which, if we have few scientific investigations, we have at all events our own knowledge of the rules. Our programme, however, will be heinously incomplete if we pass over the eighteenth century — the age of prose and reason. For this time there are, of course, no treatises whatever (I mean, by modern investigators); for it has been tacitly assumed that there is nothing to treat. Since, however, there must be some means of getting from the license of the Elizabethans to the prim positiveness of the lore that our children learn at school, it behooves us to trace the establishment of the somewhat rigid dogmas that hold sway nowadays, and we may expect to find what we are after in the age whose shibboleths were correctness and urbanity. Once more we shall recognize the potency of French and Latin, this time as regulating forces rather than as temptations to innovate.

Thus I have drawn up, roughly, to be sure, but with exactness enough for our purpose, a programme for that series of Syntactical Studies the lack of which is the greatest desideratum in the whole circle of English linguistics.

I forewarned you that three quarters of an hour would not be long enough even to enumerate all the problems with regard to the English language which we and our philological progeny may hope to settle within the next hundred years, and all the desiderata which we and they may undertake to supply. I have said nothing, for example, of the modern dialects, which, after serving as a parade-ground for harmless and sometimes useful amateurishness for a century or two, have just begun to attract scientific attention. Few of us have had the fortitude to spend our days and nights over the masterpiece of the chalcid-centric Ellis, but everybody can consult the Dialect Dictionary, and there is hope for the years to come. It is, to be sure, a bit depressing to find that the author of a very recent article in a journal of the highest class has apparently never heard of this conspicuous and indispensable book, and depends for his English material on the flimsy complications of Wright and Halliwell. But we are used to this kind of thing, and must not let our hearts be troubled overmuch. The dialects of our own country, too, are receiving some notice, and light is gradually being shed on the interesting and delicate subject of the English language in America. Unfortunately much energy is still wasted in polemics with regard to alleged Americanisms and counter-irritating Britishisms. But the fray is less noisy than it used to be.

To phonetics pure and simple I have referred only by the way —

since the subject is apart, and presents its own set of problems, not specifically confined to the English language.

Word-order, formal stylistics, the limits of prose rhythm, the æsthetic value of vowel and consonant combinations, minor foreign influences, slang and technical jargon, the comparative vocabularies of different writers or schools or periods, sexual and social distinctions in phraseology, the complicated and delicate syntax of vulgar English as opposed to the idiom of the polite, artificial influences of every kind, the speech of children, the rise and spread of individualisms, brogues and broken English of all sorts, — such are some of the problems on which one would like to dwell, but which I must pass by with a bare mention.

It is impossible, however, to close without adverting to one or two questions of immediate practical interest. We are always tempted to regard philology as a thing apart, and we are of course quite justified in taking this attitude among ourselves. Linguistics as an independent discipline — philology for philology's sake — needs no defense or assertion in an assembly like the present. But we must not forget that, in one of its aspects, linguistic study may — nay must — be pursued as ancillary to the study and practice of literature and artistic expression. Applied Philology is not, strictly speaking, a part of my theme. Still, the interests of Pure Philology are too closely bound up with this to allow us to shut our eyes to the facts. If the student of literature, or the student of style, or the aspirant to the honors of writing or speaking, cannot command the services of good philology, he will have recourse to bad, — and the world is full of false brethren and redolent of science falsely so called. The study of language and the study of literature must go hand in hand. No doubt every one of us will lean more or less in this or that direction; but it is vitally necessary that every linguist should cultivate the study of literature, and equally essential that the professional literary scholar should build upon a sound and stable foundation of philology. To divorce the two disciplines, and still more to set one up in opposition to the other, will be disastrous to both. These are commonplaces, no doubt, but, in this country at all events, they are truisms which it is our duty to proclaim till the rising generation in our universities shall cease to regard them as paradoxes.



SECTION G—ROMANCE LANGUAGES

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(Hall 5, September 24, 10 a. m.)

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR PAUL MEYER, Collège de France, Paris.
PROFESSOR HENRY A. TODD, Columbia University.
SECRETARY: PROFESSOR E. E. BRANDON, Miami University.

BEGINNINGS AND PROGRESS OF ROMANCE PHILOLOGY

BY PAUL MEYER

(Translated from the French by Prof. T. Atkinson Jenkins, University of Chicago)

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THE first Universal Exposition of which I have any recollection is that of Paris, in 1855. It was called an *Exposition universelle de l'Industrie et des Beaux Arts*, and the building constructed for it in the Champs-Élysées was named the *Palais de l'Industrie*. In those days only tangible and visible things were exhibited. As the products of the mind could not be set forth in material forms, no opportunity was given them of appearing among the exhibits.

In 1878, at the third universal exposition at Paris, the idea of providing for purely intellectual productions was carried out. The method, commonly adopted since, was that of congresses and conferences, and those of 1878, while not including all branches of knowledge, comprised some widely different fields of thought. This innovation was at first not very successful: the congresses of 1878 were few in number and poorly attended. I confess that I for one did not even know of their existence. But in 1889 the germ had developed. At the exposition of that year there were no less than sixty-nine congresses; at that of 1900 they numbered one hundred and twenty-seven. Among these, however, there was none for philology nor for the history of literatures. I remember that several persons expressed to me their surprise that no one at Paris had thought of forming a congress which should bring together the many scholars of all nations who were pursuing the scientific study of the Romance languages. I can hardly claim to have offered these

persons a very satisfactory explanation. The real reason was that the congresses were to be held, as at St. Louis, during the vacation period, and the gentlemen upon whom the duty would have fallen of planning a meeting of "Romanists" had the weakness to prefer, at that time of year, the country or the seaside to all the congresses in the world. Now, however, I cannot help regretting our indolence. A congress for Romance philology in all probability would have been presided over by the man who was then rightly looked upon as the foremost of French Romance scholars, Gaston Paris, and we should have expected from him an address full of ideas and facts concerning the history and the future of the science to whose advancement he had so liberally contributed.

Forty years ago, when G. Paris and I were merely hopeful young men, it was still possible for a single person to cover the whole range of Romance studies, but to-day the field has become so extended that such an achievement is no longer a possibility. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to sketch in outline the progress of a science whose limits seem to recede in proportion as one attempts to attain them.

If I were asked who was the first in the Latin world to take an interest in the languages of Latin origin, I should not hesitate to reply, Dante. The great Florentine in fact possessed a fairly correct knowledge of French and of Provençal — of the *Langue d'Oïl* and the *Langue d'Oc*, to use his own expressions. He had carefully considered the linguistic variety of Italy, and had proposed for the dialects of the peninsula a system of classification which is yet in a large measure acceptable. But the object he had in view, which was the creation of a general language which should receive contributions from all the Italian dialects, was chimerical, and several centuries were to elapse before linguists began to study languages as they are, with no other idea than to describe them accurately and to write the history of their inevitable changes.

The Italian philologists, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, devoted a good deal of labor to the study of their language. Among these, a few had enough of the historical sense to be curious as to its origins, and some of them by intuition even reached the truth on some important points. Maffei, for example, saw in Italian the continuation of the Vulgar Latin of the Romans. But none of them embraced in one view all the Latin idioms, or made any effort to point out the relations which connect them with each other and with their common source. Still more remote in the minds of these scholars was the idea that it would be interesting to include in their researches idioms which had not been made illustrious by literary achievements.

A somewhat wider conception of the science of language appeared in 1821, when Raynouard published his *Grammaire comparée des*

langues de l'Europe latine dans leurs rapports avec la langue des troubadours. But the very title of this book shows that the work was intended to be the demonstration of a preconceived idea; all its conclusions were necessarily vitiated because they were subordinated to an erroneous theory. In fact, Raynouard's leading idea was that between Latin and the various Neo-Latin tongues there had existed an intermediate stage; this he called, using the term in a special sense, the *langue romane*. According to his theory, this language had developed in close succession to Latin all over Latin Europe; but, while it was preserved by a miraculous exception in the south of France, everywhere else it had undergone the special modifications which led to the formation of French, Italian, Spanish, etc.

The point of departure for this conception, which after all is not so radically false as it may seem, is an unfortunate interpretation of the expression *Romana lingua*, which, in Latin writings of the ninth and tenth centuries and even later, is used to designate a language quite different from the Classic Latin, but one whose relationship to the ancient Roman idiom was clearly understood at the time. By *lingua romana*, or *lingua rustica romana*, people understood in every Romance country nothing more nor less than the vulgar speech as opposed to literary or grammatical Latin. The use of the same expression in different countries did not in the least imply that the *lingua romana* was everywhere the same. People of that time cared little for such a question. Raynouard, finding that the poets of the south of France often gave the name *romanz*, or *lenga romana*, to the language they employed, argued that the name being the same, the language must be the same, and persuaded himself that during a period of some length the people of the Latin West had spoken the language of Provence, his native region.

Herein lay his error. On the other hand, we cannot doubt that there was a stage between the Classic Latin and the Romance languages: this is a fact long since recognized. But the intermediate stage, generally designated as Vulgar Latin, had no closer connection with the Romance of South France than with that of other regions. A good many years were to elapse before the study of Vulgar Latin — I mean of that small part of it that we can ever really know — was undertaken in a methodical way.

Nevertheless, Raynouard's work, in spite of its fundamental error and in spite of a thousand mistakes and confusions in matters of detail, was by no means useless, for its author may be termed in a certain sense the precursor of Diez, and to Diez belongs incontestably the honor of having founded the comparative grammar of the Romance languages.

Diez, as one may conclude from his writings, and as he appeared to me forty years ago when I visited him in Bonn, was a modest and

cautious man not given to generalities, a sagacious observer attentive to details, a linguist skilled in grouping facts and in deducing their consequences, carefully avoiding hazardous theories, and preferring to treat only those problems whose solution he believed he had found. His *Grammatik der Romanischen Sprachen*, first published in 1836-43, thoroughly revised in the second edition (1856-60), and again improved in the third (1869-72), has been the foundation both of the general and of the special study of the Romance languages. Standing at the entrance of the main avenues of Romance philology, this work has been, to all those who have aimed to deal thoroughly with any part of this science, the reliable guide who starts you upon the right path, and who, if he does not accompany you to the end of your journey, at least travels long enough at your side to prevent you from going astray. Of course one cannot say that Diez found a guide of this sort in Raynouard, but it is not a bold supposition that the idea of a grammar of the Romance languages was suggested to Diez by the essay — imperfect as it is — of his predecessor. This conjecture finds additional support in the fact that Diez's earlier works dealt chiefly with Provençal literature, and, in those days, the almost unique source of Provençal studies was the *Choix des poésies originales des troubadours*, the sixth and last volume of which contained the *Grammaire comparée des langues de l'Europe latine*. Moreover, Diez took pleasure in saying that he considered himself the pupil of Raynouard. This was putting it rather strongly, for to write successfully a grammar of the Romance languages, as Diez understood the task, the author must needs be familiar with ideas and methods which as yet were unknown outside of the small circle of German philologists in which they had originated. In this case other influences than those of Raynouard were needed, and, although the subject was of special interest to the Latin peoples, it was only in Germany that a work of this kind could have been planned and executed. Comparative grammar is a science of German origin, and one which remained for a long time the property of German scholars. It was in 1816 that Bopp had given us the first sketch of a work of this kind in his treatise on the Sanskrit conjugation system as compared with that of the Greek, Latin, Persian and Germanic languages. The first edition of the Comparative Grammar of the Indo-European languages, upon which in a way Diez's work depended, had begun to appear in 1833. Grimm's German grammar, in which, for the first time, the phonology of a group of related idioms was treated, dates from 1819.

These works were little known outside of Germany. In France there had been created in 1852, at the Paris Faculty of Letters, a course in comparative grammar which was placed in charge of an elderly Hellenist of German extraction. This course, which I myself

followed in 1858 and 1859, was indeed wretchedly poor. It consisted in a treatment of general grammar as the subject was understood in the eighteenth century. It was only in 1865 that comparative grammar was properly taught at Paris. In that year, Minister Duruy transferred to the Collège de France the chair which had existed, more in name than in fact, at the Sorbonne, and intrusted it to Mr. Bréal, who had studied in Germany under Bopp and under Albrecht Weber, and who still occupies this chair.¹ In England and in Italy, the teaching of comparative grammar dates from about the same time, being inaugurated in those countries by two men equally eminent, but widely different in qualities and methods, — Max Müller and Prof. Ascoli.

Diez seems to have felt Bopp's influence only indirectly, but Grimm's grammar acted upon his ideas in a decisive way. He was in fact a "Germanist" before becoming a "Romanist." At the University of Bonn he taught mostly Germanic philology. His courses in Romance philology were slimly attended and were subordinate. The general principles which he was to apply to the comparative study of the Latin tongues were ready to hand in the grammar of the Germanic languages, which was already founded upon a scientific basis. The statement of this fact in no way operates to diminish Diez's merit. The difficulties which he had to overcome were enormous. The laws of phonology and of inflections are much more complicated and less apparent in the Romance languages than in the Germanic languages, and, on the other hand, the materials which Diez had to make use of in his work were far more defective and less reliable than those upon which Jakob Grimm had worked. In the case of Old French and Old Provençal, whose monuments go back to the ninth and tenth centuries, he was compelled to compose his grammar from texts few in number and in a majority of cases poorly edited. For the popular idioms, the *patois*, texts were in most cases not to be had. It need occasion no surprise, therefore, if at this distance we discover numerous gaps in his work; we must rather admire the sagacity which enabled him to use to such wonderful advantage the defective materials with which he was forced to be satisfied.

The first edition of Diez's grammar was little known outside of Germany. In France, a man of keen intelligence and unusual breadth of view, but a man of letters rather than a linguist, J. J. Ampère, was the first to use it, in 1841. In writing a rather superficial book on the history of the formation of the French language,² he condensed

¹ He has just resigned. His successor is Prof. Meillet, well known for his various essays on Slavonian and Armenian languages. (Dec. 1905.)

² *Histoire de la formation de la langue française*, 8vo, 1 vol. In 1869 appeared a second edition, to which I was persuaded to add a number of footnotes in which I endeavored to correct the more obvious mistakes.

into one chapter all that he found concerning the French language in the first volume of Diez's grammar. The result was far from satisfactory. Ampère knew very little about Old French, and took no pains to assimilate the rigorous method of his model. The personal observations which he inserted here and there in his often inaccurate abridgment of Diez's doctrine were well calculated to deter his readers from referring to the original. Under such circumstances we can hardly be surprised that the value of the grammar was underestimated in France. French scholars continued, therefore, to publish books on the origins and history of the French language in which the same general questions were brought up time after time, — no one apparently having an inkling of the right way to approach such questions, — and works in which a learning, in some cases very sound but ill directed, exerted its energies without leading to any definite results. Among these were the *Essai philosophique sur la formation de la langue française* by Edélestand du Méril (1852), and the three volumes on the *Origines et formation de la langue française* (1853-57) by Albin de Chevallet, books which were still-born, little read in their day, and without influence. At the same time the only two chairs of French philology that existed in France — those of the Collège de France (founded 1852) and of the Ecole des Chartes (1847) — were held by professors who knew no German. Littré himself, who contributed so much by his articles in the *Journal des Savants* and by his dictionary to the progress of French philology, and who had not the excuse of not knowing German, as he translated several German books into French, — even Littré seems never to have used Diez's grammar. He had some acquaintance with the *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Romanischen Sprachen*, which he drew upon liberally for his dictionary, as the Belgian scholar, Auguste Scheler, had done before him in a *Dictionnaire étymologique du français* (first edition, 1862). The methodical study of the Romance languages in France was destined not to begin until after the publication of the second edition of Diez's grammar, about 1860. The appearance in 1862 of Gaston Paris's book, *Sur le rôle de l'accent latin dans la langue française* (his thesis at the Ecole des Chartes), marks the beginning of a new epoch.

In Italy, the application of the methods received from Germany was made a little later than in France; the first works of Professor Ascoli employed them with signal success. In Portugal, F. A. Coelho introduced the same methods in the study of his native tongue (1872). Spain also entered the same path, only much later.

We must not imagine that even in Germany the movement toward the scientific study of the Romance languages, so brilliantly begun by Diez, made rapid progress immediately. For many years Diez was the sole representative not only of Romance philology as a whole but

also of that branch of it which he had specially studied, — Provençal philology. One by one, however, professors of Germanic languages — Adalbert von Keller, W. L. Holland, Konrad Hofmann, Karl Bartsch — offered courses in Old French and Old Provençal. On the other hand, the teaching of English philology was often coupled with that of Romance philology, with the result that in 1859 a magazine was founded by Ferdinand Wolf and Adolf Ebert “für englische und romanische Litteratur.”

It may be noted further that in Germany the study of literature was decidedly more popular than the study of language. The example of Diez was followed rather slowly. As regards Old French literature, for example, an influential initiative was that of L. Uhland, who, in 1812, in an essay now famous, directed attention to the French epic poems (*chansons de geste*).¹ Acquaintance with the Old French epics and with the romances of the Round Table was soon recognized as indispensable to any one who intended to study thoroughly German medieval poetry.

The second edition of Diez's grammar showed that great progress had been made since the first, but it owed little to works published after the date of this edition. The various changes and additions made by the author were the fruits of his own researches: what others had discovered was comparatively little. The third edition, which appeared from 1869 to 1872, is less personal. In the period between 1860 and 1870, centres for Romance studies had been formed in Germany and elsewhere; works of value had appeared, and the utmost the master could do, enfeebled as he was by age, was to introduce into this third edition a portion of the results obtained by his successors, all of whom might have called themselves his pupils, although few of them had been actually present at his lectures.

If, in the year 1904, nearly half a century after the second edition and thirty-five years after the third, we examine Diez's grammar from the heights now reached in our knowledge of the Romance languages, there are two facts which will strike every impartial observer. The first is that the rules established by Diez are still for the most part valid; his doctrine remains practically whole and sound. The second is that there are serious deficiencies in the work. Certain very important questions of a general character are not dealt with at all; various Romance territories are incompletely explored; the geographical extension of linguistic phenomena is not indicated with precision; the notation of sounds is often too vague, and the history of their changes is at times neglected.

To pass these deficiencies in review is to realize the fact that the greater part of them could hardly have been avoided half a century

¹ In Fouqué's *Musen*, first year.

ago, and also to appreciate the immense progress which has been accomplished in the last thirty or forty years in working the domain which the master had so brilliantly explored.

The Romance languages are nothing else than Latin modified differently according to times and places. But to what Latin do we refer? To the Vulgar Latin, assuredly, to Raynouard's *langue romane*, which was at first almost homogeneous throughout the Roman Empire. Diez was convinced of this fact, and all that he says on the subject in the first part of his grammar is very sensible; it is evident, however, that he had the lexicographical elements more in view than matters of grammatical structure. But he deliberately refrained from any attempt to tell us how and under what circumstances the local changes occurred which have transformed Vulgar Latin into the infinite variety of the Romance idioms. Here was a question which had been much debated, and one to which various solutions had already been proposed. Some believed that Latin had undergone profound changes through contact with Germanic or Slavic languages at the period of the invasions in the fifth century, and comparisons with chemical compounds were made which conveniently veiled the weakness of the historical and linguistic arguments invoked. This was the opinion put forward by Muratori and upheld by Littré, forty or fifty years ago. Others held, with greater probability, that the local variations of Latin must have existed in an even more remote period, and that we must attribute the first changes to the linguistic habits of the Celts, Iberians, Ligurians, etc., of Gaul, Spain, and Italy, — habits of which these populations had not been able to rid themselves in learning to speak Latin. This is the theory once defended, with more energy than weight of proof, by Fauriel. It has since been revived and supported with more definite arguments by eminent linguists, among whom it is sufficient to name Prof. Ascoli. But Diez was concerned with facts that could be proved; he had no great liking for questions whose answers involved too large a proportion of the hypothetical. Rather than to continue debating these doubtful questions, what was needed, if the historical method was to be employed, was to reduce as much as possible the space still vacant between Latin as it was known in the classic authors — that is, written Latin, which had not greatly changed since the first century — and the Romance languages, which did not make their appearance before the ninth or tenth centuries. In this vacant space there was the Vulgar Latin, about which very little was known.

On still other subjects Diez had left work for his successors. History and geography touch philology on several sides; these sciences mutually aid and support one another. At first this was not well understood. To what boundaries did the Roman conquest

carry with it the use of Latin as the every-day speech? And, within these limits, in which countries was the language of the conquerors the only language in use at the fall of the Empire? In what regions did the aboriginal language persist, and to what extent?

Again, taking our stand at the present day, let us draw a map of the Romance world of Europe. Let us determine the frontiers which separate it from Germanic, Slavic, and other languages. This can certainly be done, as we are working with living idioms. But when these limits are once drawn, in which countries may we say that Latin has developed there *in situ*? In which territories has Romance gained ground, and what circumstances have determined this gain? What ground outside of these boundaries has been lost? For certain territories, notably for those of the Roumanian language, these investigations meet with serious difficulties; thanks to recent works, however, these obstacles are in process of removal.

These are some of the questions which Diez's grammar left unsettled and which have been studied during the last forty years, usually with success. We shall now take up these problems and see what has been accomplished toward their solution.

A knowledge of Vulgar Latin, the common source of the Romance idioms, is of the greatest importance for Romance studies. But how difficult it is to get together any certain facts about this unsettled language, which differed less according to locality than according to the persons speaking it! We are compelled to scrutinize the testimony — often obscure — of the Latin grammarians, of the inscriptions, and of the writings of the early Middle Ages — public and private records, written laws of the Germanic invaders, formularies, etc. There is no doubt that these texts contain numerous traces of the vulgar tongue, but it is not an easy task to disentangle them. Among the frequent barbarisms and solecisms met with, there are many which are due only to the ignorance or inattention of the copyists, and from which we can conclude nothing as to the vulgar tongue of the period. The criterion by which we distinguish among these errors those which are to be attributed to vulgar usage is of course furnished us, on the one hand, by our knowledge of Classic Latin, and, on the other, by what we know of Romance from the early texts (and they are few!) of the ninth and tenth centuries. But when we have assembled all that such documents can tell us about Vulgar Latin, we note many gaps (for example, as to the conjugation system), and these we are powerless to fill with anything but more or less probable conjectures.

This difficult study was first prosecuted with signal success by a scholar then very young, but who more than any one else was qualified to undertake it both by his scientific training (he was a pupil of Diez and of Ritschl) and by the rare sagacity with which

he was endowed. The work of Hugo Schuchardt on the *Vokalismus des Vulgärlateins* (1866-68) is perhaps the work most original in plan and most fruitful in results that has appeared since Diez's grammar. The extent of the author's researches was far greater than the title promises, for one may find in these three volumes not a few facts and views which deal not only with the vowels but also with the consonants, and even with certain general characteristics of the Romance languages. This is not apparent at first, for the work is extremely rich in content and the exposition is at times intricate. The result is that more than once ideas have been put forward as new that one may find presented at some length in this work. The necessity of referring constantly to the third volume, which is the complement of the first two, is burdensome. These unimportant defects might easily be removed in a second edition, a revision which has been awaited for a long time, but which the author, absorbed in linguistic explorations of the widest range, seems very little inclined to give us. Since the publication of the *Vokalismus*, various essays on Vulgar Latin have appeared, and the materials which enable us to study this intermediate phase between Classic Latin and the Romance languages have accumulated. It is a question, however, whether many well-demonstrated facts have been added to those which Prof. Schuchardt collected some forty years ago.

Our present knowledge enables us to be clear on at least one point, namely, that we find in rudiment in Vulgar Latin most of the main features which distinguish the Romance languages from the Classic Latin: the simplification of the declensions and conjugations, the almost complete suppression of the neuter gender, the tendency to drop the first post-tonic vowel in certain proparoxytones, the extension of various forms by analogy, the generalization of several suffixes, various new combinations of words, the simplification of the syntax, the impoverishment of the vocabulary, the development of new sounds, etc. One result of these facts is that the hypothesis according to which the greatest changes occurred at the time of the invasions of the fifth century falls to the ground. We may readily concede that changes are oftenest observable at that period, but they were in existence long before. In fact, many years before Schuchardt, August Fuchs, a philologist who died prematurely in 1867, had demonstrated in the clearest manner that the formation of the Romance languages was in no way the result of accident, but that between them and Latin there was no solution of continuity, and that the transition was supplied by the Vulgar Latin of which they are the continuation. These ideas are now of course commonplace. It has been known for a long time that while the barbarian invasion introduced into the Romance vocabulary a large number of foreign terms, it exercised no appreciable influence on Romance grammar.

It was only by notably weakening classic culture that the invasions hastened the arrival of the vulgar idioms to the dignity of written languages.

The question as to within what limits and to what degree the Roman Empire was Latinized probably will never be answered in a complete and entirely satisfactory way. The fact itself, which we must needs accept as certain, is apparently paradoxical. Peoples who were by no means uncivilized, the Celts, for example, and especially the Etruscans, were brought in three or four centuries to the point of giving up their own language and adopting that of their conquerors. How is this to be explained? In our day, the substitution of one language for another seems not to take place so rapidly. But the fact is undeniable nevertheless. The problem attracted the attention of various scholars, among whom we may note Budinszky¹ and Jung,² who examined and arranged the all too scanty evidence handed down to us by the ancient authors. But another question immediately arises. It is beyond doubt that the barbarian invasions greatly reduced the Latin-speaking territory, notably in northern Africa, on the eastern and northern shores of the Adriatic, in Switzerland, along the Rhine, and perhaps in England. But in other directions Romance — for it would no longer be correct to say Latin — recovered a part of the lost territory, and even spread over regions where Latin had never before penetrated. During this period of propagation and differentiation of the Romance idioms, numerous events occurred, both in medieval and in modern times, whose investigation offers many difficulties to the philologist and to the historian.

On the other hand, it is relatively easy to determine the boundaries of the present Romance-speaking world. For the past thirty years, various scholars have devoted themselves to this task, and, thanks to the researches of Messrs. Kurth,³ Kiepert,⁴ This,⁵ Horning,⁶ Zimmerli,⁷ and Ascoli,⁸ the boundaries of the large Romance group of Western Europe have been accurately fixed. In some cases, these investigators have discovered varieties of Romance speech in process of extinction, and even some which are but recently extinct. An

¹ *Die Ausbreitung der lateinischen Sprache über Italien und die Provinzen des römischen Reiches.* Berlin, 1881.

² *Die romanischen Landschaften des römischen Reiches.* Innsbruck, 1881. See G. Paris's review of Budinszky's and Jung's books, in *Romania*, xi, 599.

³ *La frontière linguistique en-Belgique et dans le nord de la France.* Bruxelles, 1895.

⁴ *Völker-und-Sprachenkarte von Deutschland und den Nachbarländern im Jahre 1866.* Berlin, 1866. (Reprinted several times.) *Special-Karte der deutsch-französischen Sprachgrenze.* Berlin, 1871.

⁵ *Die Deutsch-französische Sprachgrenze in Lothringen.* Strassburg, 1887-88.

⁶ *Die ostfranzösischen Grenzdialekte zwischen Metz und Belfort,* in *Französische Studien*, vol. v.

⁷ *Die Deutsch-Französische Sprachgrenze in der Schweiz.* Bâle, 1891-99.

⁸ *Archivio glottologico italiano*, vol. i. 1873.

instance in point is the Ladin, or Friulan, a former prolongation of which has been noted in Istria and the neighboring territory, in localities where at present the vernacular is Italian or a Slavic dialect.¹ A few years ago, M. Bartoli, an Austrian subject, revealed the former existence in northern Dalmatia of an idiom, now quite extinct, which seems to have been the connecting link between the Friulan and the Roumanian.² For the Roumanian groups north and south of the Danube, the search for linguistic boundaries, like that for ethnic origins, is complicated and obstructed by political prejudice. But even in this case precise information is accumulating, thanks to the zeal of learned explorers, among whom we should mention in the first rank G. Weigand, editor of the *Jahresbericht des Instituts für rumänische Sprache*.

Thus on various subjects relating to the history if not to the formation of the Romance languages — subjects which Diez had scarcely touched upon — the works of scholars continue to multiply. The time has come now to ask how and in what spirit the labors of the master have been taken up and continued. But the laborers have been so numerous that it is hardly possible in this place to give each one his proper mention.

It was during the period from 1860 to 1870 that were formed the principal university centres where the new doctrine was to be sifted and completed. Germany, with its elastic university organization, soon took the lead as to the number of chairs. In 1870 Romance philology was taught in Germany by perhaps a dozen professors or *privat-docenten*. Quite a number of these, to be sure, were required to give a part of their time to teaching English or Germanic languages and literatures. Since then, all the universities one by one have been provided with special professors for the Romance group. In France, the Ecole des Hautes Etudes, founded in 1867 by Minister Duruy, had from the beginning a chair of Romance philology, which was entrusted to Gaston Paris. Soon after this (1869), G. Paris, at first temporarily and then permanently (1872), replaced his father in the chair of Early French language and literature at the Collège de France. The teaching of G. Paris in these two institutions attained from the start a high degree of efficiency, and exercised a most favorable influence on the progress of Romance studies. Many teachers of Romance languages and literatures in France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, Roumania, and even in the United States, are proud to be counted among his pupils. G. Paris, while guiding the history of literature into new channels, had at the same time assigned himself the task of rewriting, in the

¹ See Ascoli, in *Archivio glottologico*, x, 447; Cavalli, *ibid.* xii, 255.

² *Ueber eine Studienreise zur Erforschung des Altromanischen Dalmatiens*. Wien, 1899.

greatest detail, the historical phonology of the French language. The edition of the French versions of the *Vie de Saint-Alexis* (1872), the essential parts of which are his personal work, shows how far he was then in advance of his contemporaries in his knowledge of Old French. But he was never satisfied with this work of his youth. For many years he treated in great detail the subject of French phonology at the Collège de France. The fragments of these lectures which he published in *Romania* and elsewhere (on the "close" *o* in French, on the development of Latin *c*, etc.), are sufficient evidence as to the depth of his researches on this difficult subject. I know that certain portions of the great work that he planned on Old French grammar were ready to print at the time of his death (1903); perhaps it will be possible some day to publish them. We recognize the impress of the master's method in the works of several of his pupils. I shall only cite, because they are among the earliest, the book of Charles Joret on Latin *c* in the Romance languages (1874), and that of Arsène Darmesteter, a scholar prematurely lost to science, on the formation of compound words in the French language (1875). These are works which completely replace the corresponding chapters of Diez's grammar, but which nevertheless cannot be considered definitive, so abundant is the material ready to the hand of him who has eyes to see it. When M. Joret's book appeared, with more than four hundred pages of close print devoted to a subject which in Diez's work occupies a few pages, it might have been supposed that the material was exhausted. Not so; more recent researches have developed and completed in various directions the work of M. Joret.

In Italy, the establishment of Romance studies on a scientific basis dates from the foundation of Prof. Ascoli's *Archivio glottologico italiano* (1873). It was a rare piece of good fortune that these studies were then undertaken by a scholar who was a veteran in linguistic research, who was entirely at home in the various fields of Indo-European philology, and who moreover was endowed with a breadth of view and a power of expression which would have placed him in the first rank in any other field of human knowledge. Prof. Ascoli's *Saggi ladini*, which occupy the first volume of the *Archivio glottologico* and overflow into later volumes, are a model description of an idiom whose infinite varieties cover a considerable territory and which has left traces in regions where to-day it is extinct. It may be said that in this section of Romance philology, aside from a few useful remarks by Diez, nothing had been done. The limits of the language spoken to-day by the populations of the southern parts of the Grisons, of the Tyrol, and of northeastern Italy, had not been determined; still less was there any suspicion of the existence of a former wider extension of these dialects, whose territory is now greatly

contracted by the pressure of German from the north and of Italian from the south. Printed texts exist for only a part of this Ladin territory; for other regions it was necessary to obtain specimens and to outline the grammar of each valley, so to speak, before proceeding to a general account. This great work was the starting-point for a whole series of special studies of smaller scope, local grammars, texts, etc., with the result that the Ladin dialects are now among the best known in the whole field of the Romance languages. In Prof. Ascoli's severe school have been trained a Pleiades of philologists, among whom it is enough to name Count Nigra, Messrs. D' Ovidio, Rajna, Ive, De Lollis, Guarnerio, Parodi, Salvioni, and Pieri, scholars who will soon complete for us the work of describing in detail the various spoken dialects of Italy.

If time permitted, I might show how the study of the literary language of Italy, the Tuscan, has been revived and renewed by the introduction of the new methods. But as I am forced to confine myself to indicating the salient features of the successive phases in the history of Romance philology, I shall now review in a few words what the generation which followed Diez has accomplished for the study of the folk-idioms, the *patois*. What I have just said about the *Archivio glottologico* brings me naturally to this subject.

The first philologists who made the Romance languages their study gave their attention almost exclusively to the languages which we may term official, to those which now serve as the organs of literature and of government. Raynouard, for example, treated only Old Provençal, the language of the troubadours. It does not seem to have occurred to him that the folk-speech of southern France, or, in particular, the *patois* of Provence, which was the every-day language of his youth, might be worthy of study. Even in Diez's grammar the treatment of the *patois* is superficial and incomplete. And yet there is no reason why the grammatical peculiarities of a literary language should possess more interest than those of an unwritten one. Time brought a change of attitude on this subject, as was to be expected, and for some thirty years past several experienced linguists have turned their attention to the once-neglected *patois*. The study of a living tongue has one notable advantage over that of a written language—the possibility of a greater degree of precision. Only in a living tongue is it possible to distinguish those fine shades of sounds of which writing gives us no hint. We are all aware that the Latin alphabet, even when improved by additional signs, is powerless to represent the vast variety of sounds used in Romance speech. We know that most of the letters of the alphabet have, as we say, several pronunciations—they often express very different sounds. As long ago as the thirteenth century, a Provençal grammarian attributed to the *e*, *a*, and *o* two distinct

sounds, for which he used the terms "wide," or "open" (*larc*) and "narrow," or "close" (*estreit*). The same differences are found in nearly all the Romance idioms; they are distinguished with more or less uniformity in modern orthography, but not so in the ancient documents. Diez, who had studied phonology from the written texts, paid little attention to these differences. He always speaks of the letters as if the signs which we employ to represent pronunciation, unsatisfactory as they are, oftener than not, had a constant and well-determined value. The study of *patois* has accustomed philologists to trust to the ear more than to the eye, and to note variations which formerly were passed over. To this new method of investigation and to the study of the *patois* themselves we owe an immense progress in the study of languages in their early periods. We have become more exacting in the definition of phonological facts. We are no longer satisfied with the often vague and uncertain information furnished by the spelling, but try to determine as accurately as possible the sounds that the spelling aimed to represent. Very frequently the answers to such inquiries are to be found in the *patois*, while as to the vocabulary, it is the *patois* alone which enable us to fix the meaning of a great many words. Moreover, we have gained from this method a more correct estimate of the enormous variety of Romance speech. In many regions the local idiom has never been written down, or, at least, it is inaccessible in its earlier forms because of lack of documents. This statement applies to a large part of Romance Switzerland and to important regions in Italy, France, and the Spanish peninsula, without mentioning the Roumanians of Macedonia. In a word, the specimens of ancient Romance supplied us by the texts are few and far between. The stages intermediate between different varieties are missing, and, as a whole, the older forms of Romance are accessible to us in only a fragmentary way. The *patois* alone enable us to fill these gaps. Of course some discretion is needed here, and we must not imagine, as some philologists of our day have fancied, that all the phonetic facts observed in the *patois* are of equally ancient date. Quite to the contrary, a large number of these phenomena are modern: new facts appear with each generation, and it is the function of criticism to distinguish the old from the new. Here is a great field of research in need of exploration, and the need is all the more urgent in the case of the *patois* because they are subject to rapid change and are gradually disappearing under the pressure of the official languages.

In Italy this branch of study has been pushed farther than elsewhere, not only because, for historical reasons, the Italian *patois* have shown a remarkable vitality, and hence lend themselves more readily to investigation, but also because there was at Milan a scholar who gave this kind of linguistic research a vigorous impulse

— I mean Prof. Ascoli. I need not repeat what I have already said of him. In Switzerland — that is, in Romance Switzerland, for in German Switzerland the work is already nearly completed — the exploration of the local dialects is going on methodically and persistently under the direction of competent men.¹ In Belgium the same labor is well under way.² In Spain, and especially in Portugal, there are some active workers, but they are few in number.³ In France laborers are not wanting: it has been a long time since we began to collect information on the folk-dialects. The earliest *patois* dictionaries date from the eighteenth century, but many of these works exhibit more zeal than method. Too much time was lost in etymological researches which were premature, and in the pursuit of imaginary dialectic boundaries, instead of concentrating effort upon the collection and exact notation of linguistic facts. However, progress has been made in the last twelve years. Some excellent works have been published, among which it will be sufficient to cite those of M. Joret on the Norman *patois*, of Abbé Devaux on those of northern Dauphiné, of Abbé Rousselot on a *patois* of the Charente, of M. Gilliéron on the *patois* of France in general.⁴ This branch of Romance studies has grown some offshoots even beyond the Atlantic: we have not forgotten the work of Prof. A. Marshall Elliott, of Johns Hopkins University, on Canadian French. Only recently a society was founded at Quebec to promote the same studies.

Sciences originally foreign to each other often have unforeseen points of contact, and may at times exercise a mutually favorable influence by lending each other their particular methods. Thus it is that the branch of Romance philology which deals with the *patois* has greatly profited, and will profit still more in the future, by the progress made in a science somewhat new, — general phonology or general phonetics, — a science which in America as well as in Europe has zealous advocates. Here it will be enough to mention the names of A. Melville Bell in America, Prof. Sweet in England, Profs. Sievers and Viëtor in Germany, Abbé Rousselot and M. Paul Passy in France. The phonologist or phonetician differs from the linguist in that he does not concern himself either with the origin of languages or with their history: he works with the idiom spoken at the present

¹ See the annual reports (1899 and following years) of the committee appointed to compile a glossary of the *patois* of Romance-speaking Switzerland, and the *Bulletin du glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande*, edited by the members (Messrs. Gauchat, Jeanjaquet, Tappolet) of that committee.

² The *Société litgeoise de littérature wallonne* is preparing a dictionary of the Wallonian dialect.

³ Gonçalves Vianna, author of several essays on Portuguese phonetics, and Leite de Vasconcellos, the editor of the *Revista Lusitana*, deserve special mention.

⁴ See the *Bibliographie des patois gallo-romans*, by D. Behrens, 2d ed. Berlin, 1893.

day. He borrows processes of investigation from physiology and from acoustics and examines closely the mechanism of the voice; he analyzes sounds and determines the conditions under which they are produced; also, he inquires into the best ways of denoting these sounds to the eye. Wherever it proves useful, he takes advantage of the phonograph, and he will use this instrument more and more as it is brought nearer perfection. Thanks to the researches of the phoneticians, we may learn how one sound passes over into another, changes which the linguist observes but does not explain. In particular, we see that in the transmission of language from one individual to another — for example, from parents to children — the likelihood of change is very great, for we know that it is only after innumerable corrections that children finally are taught to speak like those with whom they are in daily contact; and this observation throws a clear light upon the origin of the present variety in Romance speech. More and more, linguists must train themselves to utilize the delicate and ingenious methods of the phonetician.

Real scholars are disinterested persons. As a rule, they pursue no purely practical ends, and consider themselves sufficiently paid for their pains when they have succeeded in increasing the sum of acquired knowledge. They act upon the axiom which is found at the beginning of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: "All men have a natural desire for knowledge." I am quite sure that most of those who carried Romance philology to the heights it has now attained never thought that their discoveries would have practical applications for the modern languages; and yet there is no doubt that many of the results obtained through the efforts of the philologists will not remain mere scientific curiosities, but will have some influence on the teaching of the Romance languages and upon the way these languages are written. As to teaching, we can easily understand that the introduction of historical matter into grammars, even those of elementary grade, will supply the explanation of many an apparent anomaly, and will make the subject less dry. Grammar will become more interesting, because an appeal will be made to the intelligence rather than to the memory. As to orthography, the benefit will be no less real. Everybody has been struck by the irregularities which are so numerous in the most widespread languages, in French as well as in English. The fact is that the official spelling is a mixture of notations introduced at very different periods and in an absolutely unsystematic way. Some spellings aim to represent the prevailing pronunciation; others — and these are in the majority — reproduce an antiquated pronunciation; finally, some pretend to indicate the etymology. Many propositions have been made to do away with these inconsistencies, or, at least, to reduce their number by means of a general revision, but the advocates of change have always encountered the

same time-honored objections from those who held sway, or thought they held sway, over these matters of language. But the opposition is weakening, and will weaken more and more in proportion as sane ideas on the relations of the spoken tongue to the written language shall become familiar to the public, and it is to be hoped that some day each of what we may call the national languages will be provided with an improved system of spelling. I do not say that these systems need be strictly phonetic, like that proposed for English by A. Melville Bell, in which each sound, simple or compound, is denoted by a single symbol: this is neither practicable nor really useful. But the improved spelling should be logical, the same sound should not be expressed in three or four different ways, and the same symbol should not be applied to different sounds. When that time comes it will be possible, thanks to a branch of teaching which at present does not exist,—orthoëpy,—it will then be possible I do not say to fix the language once for all, but at least to retard its tendencies to change. Philologists have in fact ceased to look upon language as a living being which develops according to its own laws. We must not be deceived by metaphors which at times may be used to clothe an idea with an outward form. It is now perceived that the will of man often interferes, intentionally and arbitrarily, with the transmission of language, especially in those countries and periods where literary culture has become a common possession. The complete knowledge of a language, whether we are speaking of the vocabulary, the forms, the syntax, or the sound-system, is no longer gained solely by unconscious imitation of others speaking, as is true in the case of languages which are not cultivated: this knowledge is obtained through the instruction given in the schools, and as regards the sound-system (that is, the pronunciation) this instruction up to this time has not had a solid foundation, because an irregular and inconsistent notation of sounds cannot serve as a guide for pronunciation. I might cite a large number of French words in which the pronunciation has been vitiated by the ambiguity of the spelling. For example, some pronounce *anguille*, *camomille*, and often *oscille*, *scintille*, *vocille*, with the palatal *l* as in *fille*, while the true pronunciation is *anguile*, *camomile*, *oscile*, *scintile*, *vocile*, with the ordinary *l* as in *file*. These are mistakes due to the double value of the group *ille* in the French official spelling: not having been corrected by school-teachers, they have become, or threaten to become general. This is one example out of a thousand which show that the teaching of pronunciation is possible only in countries which possess a perfectly regular and definite system of orthography.

Nothing is born from nothing, *nihil ex nihilo*, said the ancient sage. The sciences fructify each other and furnish the elements of

new sciences which in this age of world-wide activities come into existence, one may almost say, every day. Romance philology came into being under the influence of the works of Bopp and of Grimm, who gave comparatively little thought to the Romance languages; in its turn, Romance philology aids in the formation of new branches of science and helps to satisfy new needs.

PRESENT PROBLEMS OF ROMANCE PHILOLOGY

BY HENRY ALFRED TODD

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IN undertaking to discuss, in accordance with the programme of the Congress of Arts and Science, the present problems of the Romance languages in their linguistic as distinguished from their literary aspects, it will be proper to consider briefly at the outset the province of philology in its relations on the one hand to linguistics and on the other to literature.

It is well understood that the term philology is commonly used on the continent of Europe with a wider application than among speakers of English. Like the history of all the other disciplines, the process of adjustment between the development of the science of philology and its corresponding nomenclature has been a slow and somewhat tardy one. Without delaying to pass in review the various learned endeavors that have been made to define the place and function of philology in the domain of the humanities,—some have even argued that the range of philology is coextensive with this broad domain,—it will be sufficient here to emphasize the existence of a tendency at the present time which, so far as I am aware, has not before been specifically pointed out—to understand and deal with philology as the mediatory science which, being concerned at once with speech as the vehicle of human thought and with literature as the embodiment of human speech, applies the data of linguistics to the elucidation of literature. Thus the philologist is interested in the phenomena of human speech only incidentally as natural phenomena; primarily and ultimately he is concerned with these phenomena as manifestations, either linguistic or literary, of human thought. The scholar who investigates the sounds of the human voice as physical and physiological products is a phonetician; he becomes a philologist only when, as phonologist, he applies the data of phonetics to the study of the historical development of the sounds of human speech. Similarly, in the prosecution of distinctively literary study, the work of the philologist begins precisely where the process of linguistic elucidation, in its broadest sense, becomes

requisite. Provided no such elucidation is required, as is the case for the most part in the study of modern literature, the work of investigation and appreciation may safely be relegated to the literary historian; while, on the other hand, a discussion of the literary origins and relations of an Old French epic poem, for example, is so conditioned by the inherent and antecedent problems and obscurities of its linguistic form, and depends so largely upon the correct apprehension and solution of such difficulties, that a literary investigation of this order is rightly regarded as belonging, to a large extent, in the domain of philology proper. Thus it may be seen how it happens that no practical difficulty arises in the delimitation of the functions of a chair of Romance Philology from those of a chair of Romance literatures, where both are so fortunate as to exist side by side in the same university; and how it comes about that the line of demarcation is substantially the chronological line that divides the literature requiring, by reason of its archaism, linguistic interpretation and elucidation, from that embodied in forms current and familiar, and that this chronological line of demarcation will vary from literature to literature with the varying stage of archaism exhibited in the respective languages concerned. The poetry of Dante, to use a conspicuous illustration, will thus belong predominately to the chair of literature, while the authors of the corresponding period of French literature will as naturally fall distinctly to the province of philology. If so much may serve to suggest the mutual relations of philology and literature, a few words will suffice to indicate the nature of the service it is incumbent on philology to render in the practical teaching of language. Here it is interesting to observe that the function of philology is far more constant and pervasive than in the literary field, inasmuch as it concerns itself with the entire doctrine of language as the vehicle of thought. On the side of language as what may be called an artificial acquisition, the philologist finds himself at every point the coadjutor of the *Sprachmeister* or language-master. In the popular mind, indeed, there exists no very clear distinction between philologist and language-master, while even in the curriculum of the higher education there is sometimes found an unfortunate confusion of ideas as to the proper function of *sprachmeisterschaft* and philology, each in its relation to the other; especially when, as often happens, both orders of instruction must be united in the person of one and the same professor. Let us use an illustration. Given the problem of explaining the French construction *Il fait cher vivre à Paris*. The *language-master* will proceed by expounding this locution as equivalent to *Vivre à Paris fait cher*, while the *philologist* will maintain that, so far as construction is concerned, *Il fait cher vivre à Paris*, historically considered, is the precise analogue of *Il fait beau temps à Paris*, *cher vivre* being, like

beau temps, the object of the transitive verb *fait*. As between language-master and philologist, where lies, pedagogically, the truth? Primarily with the language-master, and only remotely with the philologist, whose complicated and unpractical business it will be to explain the psychological process by which the historical truth ceases to be the grammatical truth and an illogical transformation occurs by which things *are* (instead of *are not*) what they seem; or, otherwise expressed, it is not pedagogically sound for the philologist to expect the language-master to begin his doctrine of the French negation, for example, by setting forth the historic fact that *je n'irai pas* means *I shall not go a step*. It is, on the contrary, no unimportant task of the philologist to warn his incipient doctors of philosophy against confusing the legitimate functions of language-teaching with the historical elucidations of philology.

Passing to the specific subject of the present paper — the present problems of Romance philology — it is proper to premise that the word *problems* used to indicate the objects still to be accomplished by Romance scholarship, after the extensive progress that has just been so ably set forth by our honored guest, Professor Meyer, will here be understood not so much in its philosophical as in its current meaning. The philosophical problems of the study of language — the ultimate problem of the origin of human speech, together with the various subsidiary problems affecting, for example, the relations of language to thought or the burning question whether the laws of speech-development are irrefragable — the question of the *Jung-grammatiker* — belong to the domain of general linguistic science, while the problems pertaining distinctively to the domain of Romance studies, and still remaining to be solved, are rather of the nature of what the Germans call *Aufgaben* — tasks to be accomplished by patient research and skilled investigation. Such a view of the situation naturally takes for granted that the fundamental problem of Romance linguistics, that of the origin of the Romance languages, has already been conclusively resolved. However persistent and elaborate may be the endeavors of sciolists — continued down even to our own days — to prove that, in their origin and make-up the Romance languages are predominately Celtic, or Greek, or Basque, or Heaven-knows-what, and however skeptical, antecedently, may be the natural attitude of the serious beginner in Romance philology whose preliminary studies have been conducted by over-credulous and incredible etymologizers, no demonstration of linguistic origins has ever been more complete and beautiful than that of the unbroken development of the Romance idioms from the Latin folk-speech.

From this starting-point of the Latin folk-speech it is natural to begin the survey of those practical problems of Romance philology

which it is our object to consider. Without making the fruitless attempt to define with precision the point at which Latin philology ends and Romance philology begins, and without stopping to emphasize the exceeding importance to the Romance scholar of keeping in touch with the methods and results of the older science and of bearing constantly in mind the unity and continuity of the Roman tradition, it must be said that notwithstanding the great amount of careful work bestowed on it alike by Latinists and Romance investigators, the underlying question of *quantity and quality* in the folk-Latin vowel-system still presents a number of baffling enigmas. It is true that the prevailing belief at present is that differences of quantity in the Latin vowels were primitive and inherent, and that only later did qualitative differences so develop in the folk-speech that the long vowels became close and the short vowels open. But various modifications of this conservative opinion are conceivably correct, such for example as that the vowels of the Latin system had become very anciently open and close without appreciable or characteristic quantitative distinction, and that the Latin poets and prosodists, in order to conform their versification to the quantitative system of their Greek models and masters, conventionally treated and came to regard their close vowels as long and their open vowels as short; while the folk-speech, being unaffected by the tenets and practice of the grammarians, continued the previous conditions of the Latin vocalism. At least a curious sidelight on such a possibility, as exhibited in the influence of the Greek on the Latin grammarians, is thrown by the fact, which has long been known to the initiated, that the practice of the Latin grammarians of calling a vowel followed by two consonants "long by position," was due to their misapprehension of the Greek nomenclature, which, inasmuch as the *syllable* was long in which stood a vowel so situated, naturally designated its doubtful vowel as long $\theta\epsilon\sigma\epsilon\iota$, that is, "by hypothesis," or, in the equivalent Latin phraseology, "by supposition." Thus the early Roman grammarians, by their misunderstanding and mistranslation of a Greek technical term, introduced an erroneous conception of Latin quantity, for the correction of which the Latin grammarians of the present generation are chiefly indebted to the new science of Romance philology, — a science which, by demonstrating that the number of consonants following a Latin vowel affected not its actual but only its "supposititious" quantity, effected for Latin scholarship the signal service of setting on its feet the highly important and zealously cultivated doctrine of "hidden quantities."

Whether or not it will be possible for the future to establish with certainty the chronology and the mutual relations of quantity and quality in early Romanic speech, may be doubted. Indeed, our

entire knowledge of the Latin folk-speech rests on facts so meagrely forthcoming or on inferences so subject to revision that it is no wonder the contingent of scholars who are active in their investigation of it are divided into opposing camps, — those who minimize and those who tend to magnify the degree of difference between what it is convenient to call book-Latin and the language of the unlettered people; — those, on the one hand, who are ready in general to accept as sufficiently established well-nigh the entire series of forms and phenomena deduced inferentially from the testimony of the Romance languages, and those, on the other, who strenuously object to this somewhat presumptuous procedure, alleging that the only trustworthy data are those afforded by documentary evidence of Latin origin. As to the degree of divergence between book-Latin and folk-Latin, it would appear that thus far the point of view has been too prevailingly that of the investigator who would fain discover, boldly confronting one another, two strongly characterized idioms; whereas the truer view, to be made more clear, I believe, by scholars of the future, is manifestly that of a fundamental and substantial unity underlying a diversity of phenomena characteristic, not of two opposing modes of speech, but of a multiplicity of influences interacting with varying intensity among all classes of the people.

By the side of the problems of the Latin folk-speech should be placed the question of the survival in the Romance languages of traces of the speech of those pre-Latin races on whom the Latin was imposed by conquest and colonization. Here the interesting task of discovering possible indications of pre-Roman influences is rendered peculiarly difficult by the tenuity of our real knowledge of the languages concerned; so that whether we seek for Oscan and Umbrian traces in central and southern Italy, for Gallic traces in north Italy and France, or for Iberian influences in the Spanish peninsula, we find ourselves thrown back for the most part on scanty inferences and surmises. Accordingly, notwithstanding the profound and ingenious disquisitions on this subject, conducted chiefly by Ascoli and by Meyer-Lübke, it still remains delightfully problematical whether even so generally supposed a Celtic trait as the *û*-sound for Latin long *u* prevailing throughout north and south France, Piedmont, Genoa, and Lombardy, and in the direction of the Grisons and the Tyrol, is certainly to be attributed to such a source. For the nasal vowels, which appear over approximately the same territory with the addition of Portugal, the probability of primitive Celtic influence is perhaps somewhat more assured. As to the possible traces of Oscan and Umbrian in Italian, two or three consonantal developments are all that in the present state of knowledge can be referred to those dialects; while for the Iberian influence on the

Spanish probably the only plausible instance is the partial disappearance of the labials, as in *humo* < *fumus*, *hembra* < *femina*.

Quite another question than this of the traces of the pre-Latin influences in Romance speech is that of the very obvious infiltration into the Romance languages of stocks of words chiefly from Celtic, Germanic, and Greek sources, in regard to individual examples of which more or less uncertainty prevails. For the somewhat numerous Greek examples the list drawn up by Diez in the first volume of his grammar has long since been subjected to revision and excision. For the identification of the astonishingly few Celtic words that survive in Romance speech the problem consists in determining, if possible, the presumable forms which would theoretically correspond, for the period of their adoption, with the Romance forms deducible for the same period; while for the immense stock of Germanic words naturalized on Romance soil, the task of the present, as admirably begun by Th. Braune in a series of elaborate articles in the *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie*, and by W. Bruckner, in his *Charakteristik der germanische Elemente im Italienischen*, is to assign these each to its proper Germanic dialect and to the period of its introduction into Romance speech.

Of still more pressing urgency for the student of Romance philology is the question of the origin, delimitation, and influence of the Romance dialects and *patois*. Here it is essential to start from the fundamental notion that the *patois* is not a side degeneration from a central norm, not a corruption of a form of speech more perfect than itself because spoken by compatriots more favorably situated and hence linguistically more fortunate. On the contrary, it is precisely because each *patois* is for the most part the natural and undistorted evolution of its own local antecedents, that the *patois* assumes, at least theoretically, to the philologist the place of primary importance in the scale of speech-development. Not till a comprehension of the natural processes of evolution as exhibited in the local *patois* has enabled the philologist to form a just opinion of the groundwork of the language he would study is he in a position to estimate correctly the effects of the interplay of social and political forces which result in lifting a *patois* to the literary plane of a dialect, and the dialect, in turn, through a gradual, prolonged, and infinitely complex process of development, to the consciously exalted status of a highly cultured and national language of civilization.

If such, expressed in the most general terms, be the process upward of *patois* and dialect, what are the distinctive problems confronting the Romance scholar as to the discrimination and delimitation of *patois*? Within the broad domain of a national speech it must be accepted as true that no indigenous inhabitant is unable to com-

municate by word of mouth with any of the permanent neighbors surrounding him. From this point of view there is no delimitation of *patois*, and accordingly, from this point of view, the only logical method of procedure in determining the characters of a given speech is either to signalize all the phenomena appearing collectively at a certain point of territory, or else to follow out and designate the expansion of a given single phenomenon throughout its territorial extent. But considered in the light of actual conditions the facts are not so certain nor the problem so simple, since, in the domain of dialectology, the question "Who is my neighbor?" exhibits precisely the complexity set forth in the parable, and, as a matter of fact, the existence is discovered of more or less clearly defined speech-barriers, determined by political, social, industrial, and commercial conditions, as well as by topographical conditions, which insist that account be taken of them. However, it is rather the nature than the delimitation of speech-phenomena that signifies in philology, and the problems of the present for the student of Romance dialects have to do with the analysis and coördination of such phenomena more urgently than with their distribution.

In the investigation of the Romance dialects and *patois*, the present march of progress is led by the gigantic undertaking of Gilliéron and Edmont, entitled the *Atlas linguistique de la France*, launched a few years since in response to the programme set forth by Gaston Paris in the following words:

"Il faudroit que chaque commune, d'un côté, chaque forme, chaque mot, de l'autre, eût sa monographie, purement descriptive, faite de première main, et traitée avec toute la rigueur d'observation qu'exigent les sciences naturelles."

To any one unacquainted with the plan of this monumental work a word of explanation here will be welcome. Including in its scope the entire Romance-speaking portion of France, together with the outlying speech-territories properly belonging to it, the promoters of the *Atlas linguistique* have established at approximately equal distances from each other six hundred and thirty-nine stations, at each one of which M. Edmont has collected and recorded phonetically, with the utmost possible accuracy, the linguistic facts, that is to say, the *patois* equivalents of words and phrases, corresponding to a uniform series of questions prepared by M. Gilliéron. These results are systematically exhibited in a succession of charts, of which something less than four hundred have already appeared, while it is estimated that the completed work will require a total of some eighteen hundred charts to set forth the material collected by M. Edmont in an itinerary of four years devoted to this work. To indicate by a single illustration the class of material afforded, we may choose the record of the *patois* equivalents of the word *honey*-

bee. Here we find graphically presented, so as easily to be included at a glance, not only the rare survivals of the Latin *apis*, and the abundant modifications of its regular diminutive *apicula*, but also such other diminutives as *avette* for **apitta*, and such periphrases as *mouche à miel*, with the various diminutives *mouchette*, *mouchatte*, *mouchotte*. The advantage of having such series of facts as these, systematically grouped and presented with so great a degree of richness and fullness, needs no comment. Moreover, it can never be foreseen in what new directions the immense array of material can be judiciously utilized. Who, for example, would be likely to look to such a source as this for light upon the vexed question of the position of the tonic accent in French? Yet, the indications of this atlas would appear to lend support to the theory of some distinguished scholars that in French the tonic accent has been to a large extent transferred to the initial syllable. Apropos of such a problem it may be remarked here, by way of transition to the consideration of phonetics in their relation to Romance philology, that Gaston Paris, in his later years, was accustomed to relegate the question of the French tonic accent to the query-box of the future, when the testimony of the mechanically perfected phonograph and of other scientific appliances may presumably be relied upon to furnish a trustworthy answer. If, perchance, the experimental appliances of the future shall corroborate in this regard the apparent results of the *Atlas linguistique*, then it will remain for the Romance philologist to compare these results with those of Gaston Paris's epoch-marking *Rôle de l'Accent Latin*, with a view to determining the significance of so astonishing a break in the historic continuity of development. In any case, the deference of Paris for the applications of modern physical science in the domain of phonetics, and his recognition of the existing need of the most rigorous accuracy in applying the physical science of phonetics to the historical problems of phonology, is characteristic of the growing consciousness on the part of scholars that the methods of the historical sciences must continue wherever possible to be brought into even closer correlation with those of the experimental sciences, if results worthy of the present period are to be attained. At the same time it gives occasion for emphasizing the fact that, as at present understood, the science of phonetics has already become so highly specialized a department of linguistics, and requires aptitudes, gifts, and training so unusual on the part of its devotees, that the day cannot be far distant when individual chairs and laboratories of phonetics, in emulation of the provision made for the Abbé Rousselot at the Collège de France, will require to be established in our universities in order to maintain the standards of university work on a level with the needs of the situation. Surely the recent brilliant work of Rousselot and his school in throwing light on the

most recondite problems of speech-enunciation by the skillful manipulation of ingenious mechanical appliances, and the interpretation of their data, has abundantly demonstrated the unforeseen practical and theoretical possibilities of development in what was not long since an inconspicuous branch of knowledge. So that it has now become the task of the experimental phonetician not only to register accurately the length, pitch, intensity, and rhythm of speech-sounds, but also to analyze those motions of the organs of speech which are invisible to the eye and to determine scientifically those physiological and phonetic changes which are imperceptible to the ear. It has thus become possible on the one hand to clear up many theoretical uncertainties, and on the other to introduce a remarkably successful corrective treatment for those suffering from peculiar difficulties, defects, and abnormalities of speech, not to mention the aid afforded in the ordinary acquisition of foreign sounds.

The important subject of morphology — which should naturally next engage our attention — must be slighted here, with the remark that its problems, in the last analysis, are in the main to be solved by tracing the effects of the operation of analogy; and that, inasmuch as the verb, with its multifarious forms and categories, affords the richest opportunities for the exercise of this potent and far-reaching influence, it is in the doctrine of the verb-forms that most still remains to be accomplished in the way of morphological investigation in the Romance languages; and that the same statement is likewise largely true of the problems of word-formation may be strikingly illustrated by calling attention to the great number of enigmas that a few years ago were satisfactorily elucidated by Gustav Cohn in his treatise on the *Substitution of Suffixes in Old French*.

In approaching the topic of Romance syntax, — syntax! long accounted the dryest and most forbidding of subjects by reason of the woodenness and artificiality with which it has commonly been treated in the past, — how shall we be able in brief space sufficiently to set forth the wealth and delightsomeness of interest that attaches to the elucidation of the manifold delicate problems of this domain? Just as the field of Greek syntax has been made to blossom as the rose by a Gildersleeve, and that of Latin syntax by a Hale, so that of the Romance languages has been not only most successfully, but also most delightfully, cultivated by a Tobler. Here Diez, to be sure (more truly than in his already antiquated *Phonology and Morphology*), still continues to be the guide, philosopher, and friend of the neophyte in Romance syntax. But for an introduction to the lofty avenues and difficult byways that open invitingly to the more fully initiated, unfailing recourse must be had to the subtle and erudite professor of Berlin. For many years, from the cathedra of his

renowned university, Tobler has continued to give forth a series of contributions to the learned literature of Romance syntax such as have transformed the whole complexion of many of the procedures and methods of this study. From being too often a field for the arbitrary or inherited dicta of observers who delight in the formulation of purely metaphysical distinctions, Tobler has made of Romance syntax a richly cultivated demesne in which the application of the comparative method and the substitution of psychological for metaphysical data, have combined to produce a body of sound doctrine suited to command the admiration and gratitude of the entire race of philologists. Yet such is the boundless extent of the domain included in Romance syntax that, far from exhausting any department of the subject, Tobler's greatest merit, perhaps, consists in having pointed the way to the solution of manifold problems that still await the application of his methods and the utilization of the data so abundantly furnished by him. It cannot, however, be said that the force of his teaching and the stimulus of his example have yet borne the fruit that might have been hoped for, in equipping a body of young disciples for the continuance and spread of his peculiar work. Much less have the results of his investigations found sufficient recognition in the more popular treatises on the subject intended for practical instruction; and there is perhaps no field of philological research in which there is so urgent a call for promising recruits equipped with the historical spirit and fitted by training in historical methods, to carry on the tradition of the highest and best scholarship. Fortunately, the recently completed third volume of Meyer-Lübke's comprehensive grammar of the Romance languages presents in systematic form, in connection with much that is original, the best and most significant results of Tobler's teaching in this field.

When we arrive at the branch of lexicology, with its practical embodiment in the work of lexicography, we find ourselves face to face with an enormous output, the material of which it will be largely the task of the future to correct, to amplify, and to recast. Without adverting to the monumental *Dictionarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis* of Du Cange, dating, like the etymological dictionary of Ménage, from the seventeenth century, it will be interesting to us to see how the great *Etymologisches Wörterbuch* of Diez was virtually recast in the *Lateinisch-romanisches Wörterbuch* of Körting. While the profoundest of scholars, Diez was the most unpractical of men, and this latter fact is strikingly exemplified in the disposition and arrangement of his *Etymological Dictionary*. Nothing, indeed, could well have been more inconvenient and vexatious. The work was divided into two volumes, the first containing the words common to at least two of the three leading groups of the Romance languages, while the second volume was divided into three parts, under which

were ranged respectively the words found in only one of the three groups. The intended method of consulting the dictionary would appear almost ludicrous were it not so cumbrous and exasperating, for in view of the provokingly slow and difficult process of finding what was wanted, the balked and baffled inquirer might well have been reminded, in his extremity, of the famous culinary recipe for preparing jugged hare, which begins, "First catch your hare." Indeed, "First catch your word," might appropriately have been the motto on the title-page of this indispensable thesaurus.

The mode of procedure was as follows: For any Romance word the etymology of which was to be sought, the inquirer must first determine, if possible, the etymological equivalent, in Italian, because the Italian form was the one given preference in the alphabetical arrangement. In case, however, there were no Italian equivalent, the word might perhaps be found ranged under its own proper form. This recourse failing, the word in question must be sought in the second volume, under the group to which it belonged; if, for example, it chanced to be Roumanian, it was to be looked for in the Italian group; if it were Provençal, in the French group; if Portuguese, in the Spanish group. If at this point the quest again failed, recourse was to be had to a very meagre index of words treated out of their alphabetical order in the body of the work. Not until all these resources had failed was the unsophisticated seeker brought face to face with the etymological dilemma which inevitably forced him to determine, as to him seemed best, to which of the two great classes of words systematically omitted by Diez the missing vocable belonged, — whether to the class of words accounted by Diez, in his etymological wisdom, to be of altogether *obvious* etymology and hence not worth the trouble of elucidation, or on the other hand to that very different class of words whose etymology was *unknown* to Diez, and which were accordingly incapable of elucidation. And even so the luckless wight was still left in uncertainty whether the object of his quest was not after all treated by Diez, because the great dictionary was well known to contain, hidden in one or another of its many out-of-the-way corners, a generous store of etymologies that defied all the succession of appliances so uningeniously devised for their discovery. As successive editions of the work were called for, Diez was naturally expostulated with as to the disposition of its material, but to no avail. And it was not until a despairing admirer, Jarník of Prague, produced in a separate volume, and under a single alphabet, an absolutely complete index to the *Etymologisches Wörterbuch*, that the incomparable wealth of this great monument was placed adequately at the disposal of scholars.

Only a few years later the true and final solution of the question

as to the best disposition of material for an etymological Romance dictionary was given by Gustav Körting, in his *Lateinisch-romanisches Wörterbuch*, which, considering the fact that no one had ever before utilized such a disposition, was, in spite of, or rather indeed because of, its extreme simplicity and convenience, and notwithstanding the defects of its execution, an innovation of the utmost advantage to etymological scholarship.

This disposition consists in making a *lemma* of the Latin or other etymon, under which are ranged all its Romance representatives, with such discussion of each as circumstances call for. All the etyma, of whatever source, are ranged under a single alphabet, and every word treated, in whatever place and under whatever form, is indexed for immediate reference to its etymon. The first and greatest utility of this arrangement is that it gives the inquirer instantaneous information as to whether the word in question is treated at all in the work, and, if so, gives him immediate reference to its etymon and the accompanying discussion.

The present task, then, of Romance etymology is to evolve and coördinate the material for an immense expansion and extension of the idea of Körting's *Wörterbuch*, with application of the widest and most accurate scholarship to the formidable, nay, inexhaustible task. Instead of being limited to the literary languages, the dialects and the *patois* should be subjected to similar treatment, until, in the course of time and with the progress of scholarship and the accumulation of its results, the foundations may be laid for a *magnum opus*, which may be brought out under auspices in some respects similar to those of the great European academies which coöperate in the production of the stupendous *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*.

But such a work would still represent only one of the phases of Romance lexicography. The time is already ripe for the complete overhauling of the great national defining dictionaries of the various Romance languages, such as Littré's dictionary of the French language, to mention only the one that stands foremost and best. The type of the work here to be done is admirably indicated in the *Dictionnaire général* of Darmesteter, Hatzfeld, and Thomas. Another monumental undertaking necessarily calling for mention here is the Old French dictionary of Godefroy very recently completed in ten quarto volumes under the auspices of the French Government. Notwithstanding its immense value, probably no great dictionary was ever published that fell so far short of the ideals of such a work. This fact constitutes a pressing incentive to the goodly company of Old French scholars throughout the world to labor consciously and constantly for the amelioration of a work to which they are already so deeply indebted and which only the combined efforts of all who are in a position to contribute to it can bring to a

state of approximate perfection. Its counterpart for the Old Provençal, the early *Lexique Roman* of Raynouard, in six octavo volumes, is now undergoing revision and expansion at the hands of a most competent lexicographer, E. Lévy, but here again, it should be the common aim of all Provençal scholars to furnish helpful contributions. Such an appeal as this is all the more appropriate since in connection with the undertakings here enumerated there unfortunately exists no organized corps of readers and helpers such as does such important service for the Oxford Dictionary of English. Particularly should attention be given in all such work to the importance of semantics, to which so great an impulse has been imparted by the stimulating work of Michel Bréal. Probably no note of caution is necessary here against the repetition of the subversive and astonishing procedure of a recent extensive dictionary of the English language which consisted in throwing overboard all recognition of the logical and historical development of meanings for the purpose, I was about to say of establishing, but must rather say of setting up, an arbitrary arrangement of meanings in the presumed or the imagined order of their prevalence in the language at the present moment.

Of the culminating function and office of philology in applying the data of linguistics to the elucidation of literature, it remains to say what may appropriately be said in the few allotted moments. I refer to the crowning application of all the results of philological knowledge to the classification of manuscripts and the constitution of texts in accordance with the approved criteria of scientific criticism, and to the adequate presentation, interpretation, and elucidation in published form of the literary production of the past deemed worthy of preservation. Some conception may be formed of the extent of the field when it is pointed out that in Old French manuscripts alone, not to speak of the wealth of Provençal, Italian, and Spanish, there is preserved a greater amount of material than the entire surviving body of Greek and Latin literature combined. While it is not denied that the intrinsic value of much of this material is scarcely demonstrable, it remains true that a considerable part both of that which has been already published, and of that which still awaits publication, has a very decided significance either as pure literature or as a manifestation of the development of human thought and of human culture. Some of it, indeed, is destined as pure literature — epic, lyric, dramatic, imaginative, narrative — to maintain forever a high place in the records of the race. To Romance philology belongs the custodianship and exploitation of this rich heritage. Much that is of permanent value has already been accomplished. Without the faintest *soupçon* of adulation, but only as a simple statement of the fact, it deserves to be said that the work of Paul Meyer in unearthing,

exploring, analyzing, comparing, classifying, describing, abstracting, and appraising the unknown wealth of Romance manuscript literature in the libraries, monasteries, and châteaux of France, Italy, and England, and in publishing the results of his investigations in scientific form for the benefit of scholars, not to speak of much accomplished in other directions, has far surpassed the similar work of any other man. Much of the vast store of data thus made available to the philologist and the literary historian still remains to be utilized, and will furnish the rising generation of Romance scholars with an almost inexhaustible supply of information for the further prosecution of their researches.

Concerning the great body of Italian, French, Provençal, Spanish, Portuguese medieval literature that has already seen the light of day, the point of fact that must here be emphasized is that only a comparatively small part of it, namely, that which has been published in the past twenty-five years or so, has been edited in accordance with the critical standards of modern scholarship, especially as embodied in the canons of textual criticism involved in the classification of manuscripts and the scientific constitution of texts. There is, by way of example, no critically constituted text of so important a poem as the Old French *Roman de la Rose*, and even the preliminary work of paving the way, amid the multiplicity of widely scattered manuscripts, for the preparation of such an edition has, if undertaken, never been carried out. In this direction lies an immense amount of useful work for the scholars of the present and the future.

But still another phase of the work to be done in this direction is becoming one of the most interesting and characteristic manifestations of present-day philological scholarship. This consists of the successive reworkings by the original editor, aided by the critical acumen contributed by the world's best scholars, of texts critically constituted at the outset. The most notable recent examples of this are to be seen in Foerster's successive editions of the works of Chrétien de Troyes, in which through a long series of years the editor has brought to bear, stroke upon stroke, the resources of his almost incomparable critical scholarship upon the problem of perfecting to the utmost possible degree the condition of his chosen texts. Yet so highly developed has become the critical training of a number of his colleagues that the contributions of the latter to these ameliorations, through the learned periodicals, have become scarcely less numerous and important than those of the editor himself. So that what may be called, at least in degree, a new manifestation of critical scholarship — that of the coöperative amelioration of philological work — has become a recognized condition of the times.

Of that domain of philology which covers the investigation of obscure literary sources, and the tracing of literary influences through

channels not directly open to the literary historian as such, this is not the place nor is there now the time, to speak. It remains in conclusion — not because either the students of language or the students of literature need to be reminded of it, but only to satisfy the consuming sense of the fitness of things — to signalize what has been announced as the ruling idea of this entire Congress of Arts and Science, namely, the ultimate unity of knowledge in all fields, and especially, as coming home with peculiar force to the philologist, the underlying unity that binds together in indissoluble significance the phenomena of speech as the vehicle of human thought and of literature as the embodiment of human speech.

SECTION H — GERMANIC LANGUAGES

SECTION H—GERMANIC LANGUAGES

(Hall 3, September 24, 3 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR GUSTAF E. KARSTEN, Cornell University.

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR EDUARD SIEVERS, University of Leipzig.

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THE RELATION OF GERMAN LINGUISTICS TO INDO-GERMANIC LINGUISTICS AND TO GERMAN PHILOLOGY

BY EDUARD SIEVERS

(Translated from the German by Rudolph Tombo, Jr., Columbia University)

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IF we wish to understand and estimate properly the present and future problems with which a given scientific discipline may at any time be confronted, it is advisable to turn at the very outset from the present to the past, for a correct estimate of what has been accomplished in a certain field and proper directions for future efforts can be acquired only by means of a critical examination of the historical development of the science in question. Moreover, this historical method seems to be demanded especially where we have to deal with the determination of the reciprocal relations of two or more branches of science, which, in spite of possible differences in problem, viewpoint, and method, are nevertheless in the very nature of things constrained to aid each other, according as one is at any given time in advance of the other.

German linguistic science, which we are to consider to-day, maintains such reciprocal relations more particularly in two directions. In the same way that the German language is a member of the Germanic family and also of the great Indo-Germanic group of languages, so, too, German or Germanic linguistic science constitutes an integral part of comparative Indo-Germanic linguistics. On the other hand, German linguistics is none the less closely interwoven with German

philology, — using the word in the customary German sense, — whether we lay the chief stress upon the criticism of form or that of matter. German linguistics is intimately associated with still other fields of knowledge, but the limited time at my disposal will not allow me to discuss such wider relations.

The sciences of Indo-Germanic linguistics, German philology, and Germanic linguistics arose practically at the same time, leaving out of consideration, of course, early sporadic and uncertain efforts that were more or less amateurish. In the year 1816, Franz Bopp, with his *System of Conjugation in Sanscrit compared with those in Greek, Latin, Persian, and Germanic*, laid the foundation for the science of Indo-Germanic linguistics, which since then has assumed such splendid proportions. In the same year appeared Karl Lachmann's famous treatise on *The Original Form of the Poem of the Fall of the Nibelungs*, which was followed in rapid succession by his editions of the *Nibelungenlied*, of Hartmann's *von Aue Iwein* of the poems of Walther von der Vogelweide and of the works of Wolfram von Eschenbach, editions that were to serve for many years as unexcelled models for the critical treatment of Middle High German works of poetry. And finally, in 1819 and 1822, respectively, there were published the first and second editions of the first volume of Jakob Grimm's immortal German grammar, the monumental work upon which all Germanic linguistics science rests, and whose rich treasures, in spite of the most zealous efforts, have not been exhausted even at the present day.

The intellectual talents of the three scholars mentioned were as dissimilar as the fields in which they labored. Of the three, Jakob Grimm and Franz Bopp possess the greatest similarity. In both we admire an equal wealth of fancy and native intuition, which enabled them to make use of even the most minute details and to discover an intellectual or historical bond for facts apparently unrelated. On the other hand, Lachmann appears as the incarnation of a carefully discriminating critic, and as the master of restrained and methodical thought. These qualities he exhibited in his efforts to reconstruct a poorly preserved text by supplying all the delicate touches of the author, as well as in attempts to establish literary-historical relations or to clear up the historical genesis of the text and its contents.

From both the positive and the negative standpoints, Jakob Grimm's activity and personal position were for a long time representative and authoritative on the question of the relation of German linguistic science to Indo-Germanic linguistics, on one hand, and to German philology on the other. The older grammar of the East in accordance with its "philological" leanings had pursued linguistics only as a means to an end. In the pursuit of semi-anti-

quarian interests it had concerned itself with the collection and publication of linguistic peculiarities and eccentricities, while it endeavored at the same time to establish a standard of usage for literature and the conversation of the educated classes. With the advent of Bopp and Grimm, however, investigations of the linguistic elements were conducted for their own sake. Henceforth the question no longer turned solely on the "Is" and the "Shall," but new and more important questions arose, as for example, "How are we to apprehend existing forms, where are we to seek their origin, and how has the individual element been developed from the original forms which we must establish?" It was this new range of questions that raised the old descriptive "grammar" with its normalizing tendencies to the rank of a "science of language."

This series of questions also contains the germ of the elements which constitute the similarity as well as the dissimilarity between Grimm and Bopp. The latter, from the first, boldly attacked the ultimate questions which linguistic science felt permitted to put. First, he turned his attention to the explanation of Indo-Germanic linguistic forms and sought to establish these by the comparative-speculative method on the basis of the great variety of forms found in individual dialects. Jakob Grimm, however, advanced with greater caution and more distinctly along the lines of historical development. To be sure, he also occasionally grappled with general glottological problems, yet his main interest was directed to the narrower field of Germanic, and accordingly he concerned himself more directly with the accurate determination of linguistic resemblances and differences and their historical development. In Grimm's work, too, considerable prominence is given to the philological element, as is clearly demonstrated by his extensive collection of authentic and historically arranged material taken directly from the preserved linguistic sources. Bopp had turned his attention first to the Indo-Germanic system of conjugation, and when, in 1819, Grimm appeared on the scene with the first part of his German grammar, he also dealt only with inflections, although he approached the question from an essentially different standpoint. Only three years later, however, in 1822, he adopted a new course, which brought in its train far-reaching results, for in the new edition of the first volume of his grammar he prefaced the consideration of Germanic inflections with a complete and systematic investigation of the conditions of Germanic phonetics. This, indeed, was the first systematic attempt in the history of grammar and of the science of language to introduce the new discipline of historical-comparative phonetics, which is now the basis for all formal studies in comparative linguistics, since without its aid a systematic comparison of inflectional forms is impossible.

The science of comparative linguistics has been drawing steadily away from Bopp's goal and from his method of explaining what he termed the "organism of the Indo-Germanic languages," for it has come to recognize in ever-increasing measure the futility of attempting to solve the problem with the insufficient means at its disposal. To be sure, we owe Bopp an everlasting debt of gratitude for having by his comparisons established definitely and for all time the relationship of the individual Indo-Germanic languages, which had previously been only darkly suspected. And yet if we consider the actual mode of comparison, we shall find the historical method as applied by Grimm to be of far greater significance for future research than Bopp's divinatorial mode of procedure, which caused him to advance by leaps and bounds. To whatever extent Grimm's method may have been displaced by stricter present-day requirements in individual instances, we must not forget that it was preëminently he who gave the initial impulse in a number of important points. It was Jakob Grimm who first insisted upon the strictest historical control of all related material, and upon the most complete induction as prerequisite for the comparison of less intimately associated linguistic forms and for the consequent reconstruction of primitive Indo-Germanic forms, which is indispensable even at the present day. It is to him we owe the conviction that no material should be compared in a wider circle, unless its history within the individual languages and families of languages has been carefully and unquestionably determined beforehand. It is to him, again, that we are indebted for the gradual development of Indo-Germanic linguistics into a history of the individual families of languages and their subdivisions.

For a long time the influence of Indo-Germanic linguistics upon Germanic linguistics was not so prominent as the impulse given by Jakob Grimm to the development of Indo-Germanic linguistics itself, an impulse that in reality goes back to Bopp. In those days, as in the case of Jakob Grimm, Germanic linguistics contributed more than it received in return. To be sure, Grimm was familiar with the investigations of Bopp and his successors in the general Indo-Germanic field, yet he employed their results with a certain reserve, which ended by isolating Germanic grammar, as it were, from comparative Indo-Germanic linguistics. The first generation of Germanic scholars after Grimm and Lachmann seldom overstepped the narrow bounds of their limited subject. This may be attributed, in part at least, to the circumstance that the structure of Germanic grammar as erected by Jakob Grimm seemed to be so firmly established that no necessity was felt for securing additional support from a great distance. The most important consideration, however, was that the pupils of both Grimm and Lachmann were interested in philology rather than in the

actual science of grammar or linguistics, their attitude being influenced partly by personal inclination and endowment and partly by the strict discipline of Lachmann's school.

The earliest attempt to establish an *entente cordiale* between the fields of linguistics and philology dates from the end of the seventh decade of the nineteenth century. On the literary side the movement was introduced in Germany by Wilhelm Scherer in his *History of the German Language* (*Zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache* — 1868), with its wealth of ideas and imagination. The book was hailed with outspoken admiration by some, and met with determined opposition by others. This latter attitude may be attributed in part to the fact that in the field of comparative linguistics — particularly under the leadership of August Schleicher and Georg Curtius, who were joined as far as methodology is concerned by William Dwight Whitney — a more sober mode of observation had begun to make itself felt, which left less room for the kind of free speculation to which Scherer was so partial. On the other hand, it was not without significance that the interest in linguistic matters in general, which was spreading rapidly at that time, had attracted a number of rising Germanic scholars, especially at Leipzig, to the school of comparative linguistics, scholars who had not yet fallen under the influence of Scherer's book and his mode of thought, but who, like those of their contemporaries that devoted themselves more exclusively to linguistics, were guided rather by the cool and clear precision of their teacher Curtius.

Through the common labors of this Leipzig group of young linguists and Germanic scholars, there arose during the seventies the school of Young Grammarians (*Junggrammatiker*), so-called from a casual jest made by Zarneke. The most pronounced characteristic of this school is the strong emphasis it lays upon methodology and the doctrine of principles, thus furnishing a striking contrast to the often desultory method adopted by Scherer. It is hardly fair to the Young Grammarians to look upon their efforts, in the light of the many heated controversies into which they were drawn, as being expended mainly in outside disputes. The real characteristics of this circle, on the contrary, must be sought in their attempts to free themselves from a certain narrowness of doctrine represented in their own teacher, Georg Curtius. It was this identical circumstance that led finally to a scientific estrangement between Curtius and his pupils — an estrangement really no less remarkable than the contrast between the tendencies of the Young Grammarians and those of the newly arising linguistic science, which were, almost simultaneously, connected with Johannes Schmidt and August Fick.

If from the generally accepted standpoint of to-day we look back at the linguistic methods of research more or less universally current in the sixties and early seventies, we must admit the existence of

certain pedantry in the field at that time. A considerable number of old doctrines — of which some had been established *a priori* in a period when language-research tended to be philosophical and speculative, and of which others can be traced back to exaggerated conceptions of the antiquity of the Aryan languages, especially of Sanskrit, and to the uncritical acceptance of doctrines of the old Indian grammarians — were accepted at their face-value and transmitted without investigation from generation to generation. (As examples I need only cite the doctrine of the priority of the *a*-sounds over the *e*- and *o*-sounds, or of all explosives over spirants; the doctrine of *guna*; or the theory of the distribution of the Indo-Germanic languages on the basis of a genealogical tree, etc.) Above everything else, however, these investigations were based solely on the written word, which was duly “analyzed” and with the aid of all manner of little strokes divided and subdivided into roots and the most varied forms of derivative and inflectional suffixes, etc. But no attention whatever was paid to the psychology of language, which unites the smaller particles into the finished word, nor to the psychic processes which control the transmission and transformation of human speech. Moreover, no one attempted seriously to throw light on the phonetic aspects of linguistic changes established on paper by calling into requisition an aid of the utmost importance, that is, the comparative study of the phonetic phenomena of living languages.

It was naturally not to be expected that a sudden improvement could be made in these conditions. Long conflicts have been necessary before the new ideas and methods, which have been so widely promulgated, especially since the seventies, could become adjusted and secure more universal recognition. But at the present time scarcely any essential difference in methods exists, and it is probable that all language-investigators to-day employ in practice the methods first adopted by the Young Grammarians, even though a certain antipathy may be felt here and there for the name of the movement and although in theory opposition against certain of their principles still exists.

To this transformation in linguistic conceptions and methods Germanic linguistics, as we should expect, has contributed its due share. While the older science of language had concerned itself primarily with the written forms of the earlier and most ancient language-periods, the Germanists, like the Romanists and Slavists, by reason of the fact that their linguistic sources reach directly into the present, have from the very beginning been concerned also with the study of living languages and dialects. Hence, necessarily, their attention has also been directed to the psychological side of language-structure and language-development, which can be investigated successfully only on the basis of the living language. We

cannot, accordingly, attribute to mere chance the circumstance that the two most important principles in modern linguistics as opposed to the older science were first emphatically announced by those scholars who were investigating living dialects. I refer in the first place to the doctrine of the regularity of sound-correspondence and sound-development in that portion of language the transmission of which is purely mnemonic, in other words, to what has been called — the choice of terms is not a particularly happy one — the doctrine of the absolute constancy of sound-laws. In the second place I refer to the doctrine of the complete equality of those new linguistic forms which are created in the absence of purely mnemonic transmission by means of definite psychological processes of assimilation, that is, what we call formation by analogy, or through association, or explain as form-transferences, leveling, etc. Nor should we forget that the demand for a strictly phonetic treatment of problems of sound-development was first made and carried out in practice by the Germanists. Comparative linguistics is indebted especially to the Germanic and Slavic scholar Karl Verner for his important incorporation of the doctrine of accent in the history of sound-development. And finally, comparative language-study is indebted to Germanic linguistics for the one systematic treatise on the methodology of language-investigation which is recognized as the complete expression of the ideas now generally accepted. I speak of the methods proclaimed by Hermann Paul in his *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte*, and it is these methods which, unconscious as the act may be, in practice helped to regulate the research even of those language-investigators, who, opposed to the theoretical discussion of general principles, prefer to base their methods, as it were, on the foundation of individual instances.

From all that has been said, we see that the history of comparative and Germanic linguistics furnishes an excellent illustration of a mutual borrowing of methods and ideas, and the more active this interchange became, the more bountiful was the harvest of the joint intellectual labors.

If we next turn our attention to the relation between Germanic linguistics and critical German philology, we shall find that the conditions are very similar, except that the mutual diffusion of the two sets of ideas has not been so complete and productive as in the case of German linguistics and comparative linguistics. This circumstance is readily explained on general as well as on historical grounds.

The representatives of Germanic and of comparative linguistics are inherently brought into more intimate contact by the common tendency and the common goal of their labors: the only difference lies in the breadth, the number, and the peculiar character of the subjects treated. Both strive to throw light on the history of lan-

guage, and both employ the historical-comparative method. Language-history on the whole is really synonymous with language differentiation, and it is furthermore characteristic of this language differentiation that only a limited portion of common language property resting on the older basis of greater unity is ever handed down to the younger, more strongly specialized linguistic divisions.

Again, it is self-evident that conditions possessed in common, even in later periods, are prerequisite for drawing conclusions about earlier forms. The language-investigator conducting his researches along historical lines must from the nature of things begin in every case with the common element and determine its originality. Not until this preliminary investigation has been completed can he turn with the expectation of ultimate reward to the comparative examination of differences in form and structure and their history. The fact that both activities must frequently be combined in practical detail work, the more so the more delicate and detailed the form the problems take, has nothing to do with the matter in hand. Moreover, the student of language seeks to recognize common elements in forms which have been proved not to be original, and to differ from one another, by drawing conclusions from the similarity of changes about the similarity of the processes — mainly psychical — that have produced the changes. Going still another step further, from the similarity of those processes he can draw conclusions as to the normalcy of the changes under consideration — a matter which depends upon the similarity of the psychical organization of the various peoples and speakers. It is this latter similarity, finally, which alone can give to the investigator of linguistic conditions the necessary faith in the correctness of his views and explanations. This much is therefore established, that the scholar who approaches the study of language from the historical-comparative standpoint is compelled to work chiefly with that portion of the language which we may designate as the collective attainment, or, at least, as the collective possession of the speaking masses. It is entirely different with the critical philologist, for whom language represents primarily only that fraction of the general conception of language which has been preserved as literature — literature in the widest sense of the term. In one respect, therefore, he conceives of language as the means of expression for certain thoughts and contents which he investigates. On the other hand, so far as he takes any interest whatever in form, he regards language partly as the foundation upon which the various artistic forms of human speech are erected, partly as a means of differentiation between individuals or between stages of art. Disregarding the question of content, this is equivalent to the statement that the philologist must be attracted in language primarily by the production of the individual, just as the student of

language should be attracted by the collective production of the masses.

Of course the philologist must also occasionally resort to comparisons, at least whenever he wishes to individualize artistically; and if his comparisons are to be correct, he, too, must follow the historical method. But the historical conclusions drawn from his sources and the differences established, no matter whether they be differences of individuals or groups, do not, as in the case of the student of language, serve him primarily in the determination of connections, — even if only in the general psychology of language-change, — but, conversely, they aid him in his separation of elements, and in detaching the individual from the general. Or if he be attracted more directly to the general, he will turn rather to fields of language-aesthetics than to those of language-psychology.

An exaggerated conception of this tendency is of course fraught with manifold dangers. The one-sided philologist, particularly, who does not know how to profit by the viewpoint and the methods of the language-investigator, will neglect a series of methods which would aid him in his researches, and moreover he will be apt to regard observed facts in a false light, because they appear to him as unconnected dots and not as links in a definite chain of development.

The corresponding dangers which confront the one-sided linguist lie in the opposite direction. Without the necessary philological control, he is apt to regard separate elements as too closely related and to see connections and possibilities, the acceptance of which would be absolutely prohibited by philological determinations. Moreover, inasmuch as his whole method of investigation leads him first of all to the search for direct courses of development, such as are furnished in rich measure by the natural speech of every-day life, it will not always be easy for him to follow the zigzag path of development produced by the influence of individual forces and by the intentionally artistic development of the written language.

It has been amply demonstrated that a mutual *rapprochement* and an interchange of ideas and methods is absolutely essential to the satisfactory progress of both philology and linguistics. While the philologist needs the science of language for the broadening of his horizon in general linguistic matters, the linguist, conversely, cannot get along without philological criticism in the arrangement and accurate determination of his material of comparison.

The general recognition of the necessity for this union, evident as it would seem to be in theory, has been slow to gain ground in practice. The linguists have made the earliest and most vigorous efforts in this direction. To be sure many sins may still be committed here by the individual; in principle, however, the modern science of language does demand that all its representatives be philologists

at least to the extent of employing only such material as can endure the test of philological criticism. Philology, the older and prouder sister-science, has on the whole been less eager to comply with the demands which linguistic investigation was forced to establish, and even at this day the number of philologists who, to their own detriment, renounce the employment of linguistic aids, or who on general principles — regarding it as incompatible with their dignity — refuse to come to an agreement with the science of language, is not insignificant. Yet in this respect, also, the last few years have witnessed a decided improvement, especially in the field of German philology.

As we know, German philology rests on the shoulders of Karl Lachmann just as German linguistics rests upon those of Jakob Grimm. For the former, therefore, so far at least as Lachmann's influence reaches, his conceptions of linguistic matters have remained authoritative. This is more particularly true of the estimate of the German language and its development from the Middle High German period to the present day, that is, of those very periods of the German language which by reason of their youth and the secondary character of their idioms were of relatively less interest for linguistics.

Having begun as a disciple of the school of classical philology, Lachmann naturally took it for granted that in the classical works of Middle High German poetry we have an artistic language, which, produced as it was for a definite purpose in a limited circle of the highly cultured, differed essentially from the ordinary language of the common people. Interested in this higher artistic language alone, Lachmann applied the whole force of his incomparable sagacity to its restoration in its original purity and to giving each and every individual Middle High German poet his due. The dialects of the common people had no attraction for him nor for many others: they were regarded as ordinary and crude, and wherever they cropped out occasionally in literature, they were looked upon as disturbing intruders.

It is scarcely astonishing that in the light of such an attitude the scientific study of German dialects of the middle as well as of the modern period should have been neglected so long, in spite of the brilliant labors with which Johann Andreas Schmeller inaugurated this discipline at an early time. The reaction, however, was bound to come, and it did come, even before Lachmann's death, from the philological side. For it was discovered that in the poetic literature from Middle German territory, to which but little attention had formerly been paid, dialectical material plays an entirely different rôle from the one it plays in the classical poetic productions of Upper Germany upon which Lachmann based his theories. His doctrine of the unity of the Middle High German language, at least in its strict inter-

pretation, thereby received its deathblow, and it could be saved only in somewhat modified form for a portion of Middle High German literature, to be sure, however, the most valuable part. But here again contradiction soon set in, plainly influenced by the higher value that linguistics ascribed to the dialects as such, since these very dialects furnished more suitable and accordingly more valuable material for their special purposes of investigation. Thus Hermann Paul taught that in the middle period of German there was no artistic language of poetry differing in principle from the dialects. He stated that no poet hesitated to make use of his own dialect, and claimed that the small number of differentiated dialectical forms to be found in the classical poetry of Upper Germany, or more especially in the rimes of the poets, was due to the fact that the separation into dialects in Upper Germany had not at that time advanced far enough to leave plain traces behind in the technique of rime.

Thus another extreme view was established and occasion furnished for a lively and protracted controversy between the two camps, of which one exaggerated the philological and the other the linguistic elements.

In the end neither of the extreme views was accepted in its entirety, but, as in so many other cases, the truth was found on middle ground. The partial agreement that has been secured in this important question is the happy consummation of the satisfactory settlement reached between philology and linguistics, especially through the model labors of Carl Kraus and Konrad Zwierzina. Both of these investigators proceeded, to be sure, from the strictly philological side, but, on the other hand, in explaining complicated conditions, they have not disdained the aid given by modern dialectology. We may, therefore, now regard it as certain, that the Middle High German poets of the classical period were really no mere naturalists so far as their language was concerned. Their idioms were real artistic dialects, only in a different sense from that of Lachmann. Nor can we any longer speak of a ruling unity, but only of more or less striking resemblances; and the degree of these resemblances depends primarily upon the relationship of those dialects to which the various poets belong. The languages employed by the poets, accordingly, also rest upon the dialects, but the poets do not present these dialects in their entire purity, inasmuch as they are prone to omit all forms that would appear too strange to the auditor speaking another dialect. The artistic character of the languages employed by the various Middle High German poets is therefore mainly negative, consisting rather in the avoidance of what is not regarded as generally accepted than in the inclusion of linguistic forms from another dialect for the sake of unity. It cannot, of course, be denied that there is a certain tendency toward generalization even under these

conditions, which beside the knowledge of neighboring idioms presupposes also a conscious regard for the linguistic sense of foreign individualities. Indeed, in some respects a positive departure from the every-day speech of the home must be admitted especially in the regulation of the vowels of unaccented syllables, upon the study of which sufficient stress has not been laid in the past. At all events, we are dealing not with a definitely established attempt at adjustment, but rather with one that was actively at work in Middle High German times and that has not ceased even in our day, although for centuries, in conscious struggle against the constantly outcropping dialects, unceasing efforts have been directed towards the real unification of the new artistic language, which we have come to call the New High German literary language.

My present task does not call for a more detailed description of this infinitely complicated process. I must content myself with having indicated, by the aid of an example selected at random, how philology and linguistics have had to learn, one from the other, in order to clear up the historical development of a considerable province of the German language, namely, the subsidiary forms employed in literature. On the whole, the philological viewpoint has unquestionably vindicated itself, as is readily understood if we recollect that we are dealing with the history of more or less artificially developed idioms. But there are reasonable grounds for doubting whether without the opposition of German linguistics — which demanded a new and thorough investigation of the entire problem — German philology would have succeeded in freeing itself so quickly and so completely from the ban of the old inherited doctrines that were accepted without the slightest attempt to establish their correctness. In this regard German philology, therefore, owes a debt of gratitude to German linguistics, just as the latter is indebted to the former for the impulse given in the struggle to correct its conceptions about language-development in general.

We may admit that the service which linguistics has rendered philology in the solution of the problem of the literary language has been in part rather indirect or negative in character. Nevertheless, positive assistance has been rendered at this point just as it has in the influence of linguistics in other places, which I cannot discuss here, and we may anticipate a continuation of this attitude in the future. Indeed, unless I am greatly mistaken, linguistics will be called upon to place at the disposal of philology in one of its most special fields of activity, that of critical separation, new aids of fairly sweeping importance.

The assimilation of the ideas which Karl Verner's pioneer investigations of Germanic word-accent had brought to linguistics, has claimed the attention of students of language for a considerable

period, and thereby turned their attention more or less away from a similarly energetic investigation of sentence-accent, which is no less important. Only in recent times have more determined efforts been made to solve the problems of sentence-rhythm and of sentence-melody, or, to be even more general, of language-rhythm and language-melody. Although we may not have advanced beyond the initial stages in this particular field, it at least seems certain that the key to the understanding of these language-phenomena has been discovered.

All this, to be sure, most directly concerns linguistics. Yet these more recent investigations of accent assume added significance when we recall that the individual speaker — especially if he be an author, and no matter whether he be writing in verse or prose — is under the ban of certain rhythmic-melodic conceptions, which unconsciously influence his choice of expressions. This influence is so strong that an author's individual production, often even his entire work, assumes a more or less plain, yet easily recognizable characteristic rhythmic-melodic impress. In language-melody especially, the personal peculiarity of the individual author usually finds clear and definite expression, and it therefore becomes an important factor in the separation of unrelated portions of a preserved text. Personal observation conducted along these lines for several years convinces me that there is no phase of philological criticism which may not receive new light from this source, whether we are dealing with the selection of different versions of a text and the accurate determination of linguistic and metrical forms or with the most complicated problems of higher criticism. The methods to be employed in the investigation and application of the individual rhythmic-melodic standards are difficult indeed and have been determined only in small measure. Years will no doubt pass by before empirical proof of the validity of this thesis can be established in detail. Yet even at this day we may express the fond hope that the evidence will be forthcoming, thus proving anew that philology and linguistics will attain the best results only if they advance faithfully hand in hand towards the solution of common problems.

PROBLEMS IN COMPARATIVE GERMANIC PHILOLOGY

BY HERMANN COLLITZ

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LIKE other branches of philology, and in fact almost every line of human knowledge, the study of the so-called "Modern Languages" has arisen from humble beginnings, and has originally served purely practical purposes. A characteristic feature, however, of the study of modern languages lies in the fact that it seems to experience greater difficulty than any other branch of philology in outgrowing the elementary stage. It derives its origin from the desire to acquire a living language for the sake of conversation or correspondence, or in order to be able to peruse literary works written in that language. The aim of the study, accordingly, was the practical command of the language in question, and to this very day it seems to be the prevalent opinion in England and the United States that, as regards the study of French and German, our colleges and universities have done their duty, if they convey to their students a practical command of these two languages.

Under these circumstances stress must be laid on the fact that this popular view entirely misses the real object of modern philology. We shall have to say that a modern language, no less than any other language, becomes an object of scientific research only after the practical acquirement of the language has been accomplished, and that, on the other hand, for the purpose of research work in case of a modern language, no greater amount of practical knowledge is required than, for example, in case of Latin, or Greek, or Sanskrit. There is, for instance, no reason why a scholar who has little or no practice in German conversation should not furnish valuable contributions to the history of the German language.

I am making this statement, not in order to recommend a superficial acquisition of German, — for a thorough practical knowledge of the language certainly remains desirable, — but in order to emphasize the necessity not to lose sight of the higher aims of the study of living languages. From this point of view I should say that it is

essential to regard every modern language as a product of historical growth, or, in other words, of evolution; to investigate the relation which exists between the "modern" shape of a language, and its earlier stages, and to trace the connection, if it can be traced, between the development of the language (in its various stages) and the history of the people by whom the language is spoken. From Modern German we have to turn to Middle High German and Old High German and further to the Primitive Germanic and the Indo-European period. We ask what changes the German language has undergone from one epoch to another and try to explain the evolution of the language in connection with the changes which have occurred in the literary, social, and political life of the German people.

Needless to say that from our standpoint the traditional distinction between "modern" and "ancient" languages is of little consequence. For languages like Middle High German, Old High German, Anglo-Saxon, etc., are dead languages, just as much, or even more than Latin and Greek. And yet the study of these languages cannot be separated from that of Modern German, English, or Norse, any more than it is possible to understand (scientifically) the modern Romance languages without reference to Latin. Nor are we justified in calling, for example, Latin as contrasted with German an "ancient" language. German, if traced back to the Indo-European parent speech and regarded as a language gradually transformed from what it was at that early period, is scarcely less ancient than Latin. The customary distinction between ancient and modern languages is simply a remnant from the elementary stage of modern philology. But I am spending perhaps too much time in trying to refute popular misconceptions, which are not shared by representative scholars in philology. Let us, therefore, take up some questions, which cannot be said to lie so much in the beaten path as the preceding remarks.

Historical grammar cannot expect to accomplish its task sufficiently by paying attention to the earlier stages of the present languages, only so far as these stages have been handed down in literary works. In the case, for example, of Modern German it is true that we are able to trace its history back more than one thousand years by the aid of Middle and Old High German. But we must not overlook the fact that our records of Old and Middle High German are incomplete. Not all of the dialects existing at those periods are represented in what remains of Old and Middle High German literature, and it would be erroneous to believe that even in the most favorable instances (say, for example, in the case of Otfried's language in Old High German or that of the Swabian poets in Middle High German) we possessed the vocabulary or the grammar of a single dialect completely. Difficulties increase when we attempt to throw light on the history of the German language in the period preceding the Old

High German time. Here direct tradition abandons us almost entirely. For the Gothic language, the first Germanic language to receive — by the translation of the Bible — a written literature, is obviously not the direct ancestor of Old High German. It is at this point that the comparative study of the Germanic languages has come to our aid.

The close relationship existing between the various Germanic languages and dialects necessarily presupposes an epoch in which there was found, instead of the various dialects, only one more or less uniform language. This is the language which we designate by terms like "Early Germanic" or "Early Teutonic," or "Primitive Teutonic." I have said that this language was "more or less" uniform. It is a well-known fact that dialectical variation is inseparable from the life of languages, and it would be erroneous to imagine that there had ever existed in the history of the Teutonic languages a period of absolute uniformity. But it is also a fact that, the further we follow the development of the Teutonic dialects back into the past, the more we notice the dialectic varieties, on which their difference at present rests, diminishing. We therefore arrive, almost necessarily, at a period when every one of these dialectic varieties is reduced to uniformity. How then can we reconcile this apparent contradiction?

In addition to dialectic variation we find in the life of languages a process which we may call dialectic convergence. We find, in other words, that certain changes, which at first are individual or local, gradually spread over a larger area and finally are universally adopted. It is possible, therefore, that dialectic variations may have existed in cases in which we now find in all of the Germanic languages a uniform transformation of certain Indo-European sounds, while we naturally would ascribe to Early Germanic the uniform sound found at present (or at the beginning of our direct historical tradition).

The fact that dialectic changes always spread gradually must account for another line of differences that we neglect in reconstructing a uniform Germanic period. There are many instances where the Old Germanic dialects differ in this way, that one or some of them preserve a sound in its oldest form, while in others the sound has been altered. We take it for granted that Early Teutonic possessed in most cases the sound in its oldest form, while of course the possibility always exists that the dialectic variation reaches back in its beginnings into the Primitive Teutonic period.

We may have to admit then that the uniform "Early Germanic" period which we reconstruct has probably never existed precisely in this form. Yet we shall maintain that there was in the life of the Germanic languages a period exhibiting very nearly the form of speech which we call Early Germanic, and that our mistake consists at the utmost in ascribing to one and the same age the features which

actually belonged to consecutive periods, periods, however, not far distant in time.

The attempts systematically to restore the Early Germanic period are of rather recent date. However valuable the services are which Jakob Grimm in his *Deutsche Grammatik* (that is, "Germanic" Grammar, not "German" Grammar) has rendered to Germanic philology, there was no attempt on Grimm's part to restore the Early Germanic period or any other of the lost periods in the history of the Germanic languages. He has been satisfied in his great work with giving parallel grammars of the principal Germanic languages, especially those which have served as literary languages. And nothing more could we expect at Grimm's time, since at that period, even in comparative Indo-European philology, no attempt had been made to reconstruct the Indo-European parent speech. It was reserved for August Schleicher to urge for the first time the necessity of reducing the various Indo-European languages to a common basis which he called the "Indogermanische Grundsprache." Now Schleicher might have been expected to apply this point of view to the Germanic languages, and to try to reconstruct in his *Compendium*¹ the Primitive Teutonic grammar. Schleicher indeed mentions here and there the "Deutsche Grundsprache." Actually, however, with him as with his predecessors, the Gothic language has to serve as representative of the earliest period of the Germanic languages.

Yet the course taken by Schleicher for the Indo-European naturally led to attempting the same for the Germanic languages, and when in 1870 in his preface to a reprint of Grimm's grammar,² Wilhelm Scherer stated that to adapt Grimm's work to the needs of our time would mean first to reconstruct the Germanic parent speech, he probably voiced an opinion which was gradually becoming more general among philologists.

There followed, a year afterwards, an attempt to reconstruct the Early Germanic vocabulary, by a scholar whose work in Indo-European lexicology forms a counterpart of Schleicher's work in Indo-European grammar. I am referring to August Fick's *Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-European Languages*, which in the second edition (Göttingen, 1871) contains a comprehensive chapter on the Germanic vocabulary.³ It is not a mere accident that the recon-

¹ Schleicher's *Compendium der Vergleichenden Grammatik der Indogermanischen Sprachen* was first published (in two volumes) in 1861 and 1862.

² *Deutsche Grammatik*, von Jakob Grimm. Erster Teil. Neuer vermehrter Abdruck. Berlin, 1870. The reference is to p. xxvii.

³ *Vergleichendes Wörterbuch der indogermanischen Sprachen*, von Aug. Fick. 2 Aufl., Göttingen, 1871. ("Zum Wortschatz der germanischen Spracheinheit," pp. 685-924.) As regards the progress made in Fick's dictionary in the method of reconstruction I may refer to my review of the fourth edition in *American Journal of Philology*, vol. xii (1891), pp. 293-309. This subject as well as similar historical and methodological questions has also been touched upon in my review of Paul's *Grundriss der germanischen Philologie*, in the *Modern Languages Notes*, vol. viii (1893), nos. 2, 3, and 4.

struction began with the vocabulary. For it is obvious that the vocabulary of the Gothic language, consisting, as it does, almost exclusively of words contained in our fragments of the translation of the Gothic Bible, must contain more gaps than the Gothic grammar, and cannot therefore be regarded as representative of the Early Germanic period. In the third edition of Fick's *Comparative Dictionary* (in 1874), the Germanic vocabulary appeared in enlarged form as a separate volume. The author this time availed himself of the assistance of Adalbert Bezzenberger, who in an appendix to the volume also contributed a discussion of some phonetic problems of the "Germanische Grundsprache." Many other contributions towards restoring this "Grundsprache" have since followed, of which it may suffice to mention here the systematic works by Kluge (in Paul's *Grundriss*),¹ Noreen,² Streitberg,³ and Bethge (in Dieter's *Laut- und Formenlehre*).⁴

While Jakob Grimm and his immediate successors were inclined to judge the Early Germanic period almost exclusively by the standard of Gothic, there has been during the last thirty years an increasing tendency to discredit in this respect the reliability of Gothic and to lay stress on alleged earlier features preserved in Old Norse, Anglo-Saxon, Old High German, and other Old Germanic dialects. No doubt formerly the authority of the Gothic language was in some respects overrated. An obvious instance of this kind is found, for example, in the phonetic changes which go under the name of "Verner's Law." For it has been proved by Verner⁵ that the so-called "grammatical change" between spirant and media was found in the Germanic parent speech and has been preserved in most of the older Germanic dialects, while in Gothic its traces have been, at least in the verb-system, almost entirely obliterated. In other cases, however, the testimony of the Gothic language has been, in my opinion, rejected without sufficient reason. I am referring especially to two phenomena; first, the alleged Early Germanic vowels *e* and *o*, in whose place we find in Gothic (except before *r* and *h*) the vowels *i* and *u*; secondly, the instances in which Old Norse and the West Germanic languages are supposed to have preserved final vowels which are not found in Gothic.

¹ *Vorgeschichte der altgermanischen Dialekte*, von Friedrich Kluge. Sonderabdr. aus der 2. Aufl. von Paul's *Grundriss der germanischen Philologie*. Strassburg, 1897. The first edition had been published in 1889.

² *Utkast till Föreläsningar i Urgermansk Judlära*, av Adolf Noreen. Upsala, 1890. A German translation (with additional material), entitled *Abriss der Urgermanischen Lautlehre*, has appeared, Strassburg, 1894.

³ *Urgermanische Grammatik*, von W. Streitberg. Heidelberg, 1896.

⁴ *Laut- und Formenlehre der Altgermanischen Dialekte*, herausgegeben von Ferd. Dieter. Leipzig, 1900. (The first half volume, containing the phonology, was issued in 1898.)

⁵ *Zeitschr. f. vergl. Sprachf.* vol. 23, p. 108 (reprinted in Karl Verner, *Afhandlinger og Breve*, Copenhagen, 1903, p. 16).

Since both questions have a bearing on the reconstruction of the Early Teutonic language, and since, as far as I can see, all Germanic philologists at present agree in not admitting the primary claim of the Gothic language, it may be worth our while to enter upon a more detailed investigation.

Let us consider first the case of West Germanic (and Norse) *e* and *o*. We are concerned here with the phenomena which Jakob Grimm designated as "Vokalbrechung" (that is, vowel-fraction), namely, with the fact that the Gothic vowels *i* and *u* are frequently represented by *e* and *o* in the other Germanic languages, as,

Goth. *niman*, *nimip*, *nimam*.

O. H. G. *neman*, *nimit*, *nemam*; or,

Goth. *hulpun*, *hulpans*.

O. H. G. *hulfun*, *gi-holfan*.

Jakob Grimm took it for granted that Gothic in these cases exhibited the older forms and that the vowels *e* and *o*, found in Old High German and the other Germanic dialects, were of a more recent date. He was unable, however, to say why in some cases *i* and *u* were retained and in other cases altered in West Germanic and Old Norse. The credit of furnishing a satisfactory explanation of the "Brechung" belongs to Adolf Holtzmann, who in 1841¹ explained the change as a form of "Umlaut," depending on the vowel of the next syllable. Gothic *i* and *u* remain unchanged before syllables containing the vowel *i* or *u*, but they are changed to *e* and *o* before syllables containing *a* or *o* or one of the diphthongs *ai* and *au*. Therefore Goth. *nimip*, *filu*, *budun*, *hulpun* = O. H. G. *nimit*, *filu*, *butun*, *hulfun*; but Goth. *niman*, *budans*, *hulpans* = O. H. G. *neman*, *gi-botan*, *gi-holfan*. Only before *n* + Cons., the Gothic vowels remain unchanged also in the other Germanic languages, *e. g.* Goth. *bindan*, *bundun*, *bundans* = O. H. G. *bintan*, *buntun*, *gi-buntan*.

This simple rule explains the change between *i* and *e* and between *u* and *o* in the verb completely, with the exception of one case which I shall mention later on. As regards the declension, the rule cannot be applied without assuming a number of secondary changes due to analogy. Yet the number of exceptions is not greater than with the other theories that have been advanced in order to explain the phenomena of "Brechung."

This "a-Umlaut" is, in Holtzmann's opinion, the oldest kind of "Umlaut" (*i. e.* mutation) found in the Germanic languages. He further remarks that the *a* after liquids in final syllables does not affect the stem-vowel. The *o* in O. H. G. *fogal* is not due to the

¹ Holtzmann's article *Ueber den Umlaut* appeared first in the *Heidelberger Jahrbücher*, and was later on published as a separate pamphlet. His views are more easily accessible in his *Alteutsche Grammatik*, Leipzig, 1870.

following *a* of the O. H. G. word, but it is derived from forms which have also in Gothic the vowel *a* or *o* in the final syllable, *e. g.* Gothic *fuglos* = O. H. G. *fogala*.

Holtzmann's theory had been almost universally accepted when towards the end of the sixties the discovery of the "European *e*"¹ put a sudden stop to it. Holtzmann as well as Grimm — and, in fact, philologists of their time generally — were of the opinion that the Germanic languages possessed originally, like the Sanskrit, only three short vowels *a*, *i*, and *u*, and had remained, as regards their vowel-system, in an earlier stage of development than, *e. g.* Greek and Latin. But now it was shown that, *e. g.* the *i* in Goth. *niman*, was not directly derived from the *a* of Sanskr. *namāmi*, but corresponded more nearly to the *e* in Greek *νέμω*, and that the *i* in Goth. *itan* had passed through the stage of the *e*, as seen in Greek *ἔδω*, Lat. *edo*, etc. Nothing more natural than to assume that the forms to be presupposed for Goth. *niman* or *itan* had been retained in O. H. G. *neman* and *ezzan*.

The latter opinion has remained to the present day the current view in Germanic philology, and hence the Gothic vowel-system is generally believed to be in many respects more recent than that of the other Germanic languages. For we should have to infer that, *e. g.* Modern German words like *nehmen*, *essen*, would still exhibit earlier vowels than the corresponding verbs in Gothic. A theory leading to such consequences could not have attempted to rival Holtzmann's view, were it not that the latter has failed to explain an important exception, in which apparently *i* is found as a regular vowel of "ablaut" before a following *a*. In attempting to prove, therefore, that Holtzmann's hypothesis is correct and preferable to the current view, it will not suffice to show that this hypothesis is not necessarily in conflict with the "European *e*," but we shall have to account also for the exception which Holtzmann has left unexplained.

As regards the European *e*, the inference on our part of course is that forms like Goth. *niman*, *itan*, have passed through the stage of **neman*, **etan*. The transition, however, from *e* to *i* has taken place in the Primitive Teutonic period. Old High German itself, as well as the other Old Germanic languages, presupposes forms like *niman*, *itan*. This is shown by the fact that under favorable conditions, *i. e.* without a following vowel or when followed by one of the two vowels *i* or *u*, the *i* appears also in Old High German (*e. g.* *nimis*, *nimit*). Only in case the next syllable contained an *a* or *o*, or one of the diphthongs *ai* or *au*, this *i* became *e* through *a*-Umlaut.

Parallel to the relation of *i* to *e* is in the Germanic languages that of *u* to *o*. In some respects, however, the matter is somewhat simpler

¹ As regards the discovery of the European *e*, compare especially F. Bechtel, *Die Hauptprobleme der indogermanischen Lautlehre seit Schleicher*, Göttingen, 1892.

in the case of the latter vowels, and I consider it therefore advisable first to examine the relation between *u* and *o* before proceeding further with the *i* and *e*. Germanic *u* is of twofold origin, because it corresponds (1) to Indo-European *u*, *e. g.* in the preterite plural and past participle of the second ablaut-series, *i. e.* in forms like Goth. *budun*, *budans*. Also in words like *juk* "yoke," *ufar* "over," etc. (2) Another *u* is developed before or after syllabic liquids or corresponds to an Indo-European weak vowel. Here belong the *u* found in the third and fourth ablaut-series, *e. g.* Goth. *hulpun*, *hulpans*, O. H. G. *wurtun* (= Mod. Ger. *wurden*), Goth. *numans*; and the *u* of nouns like Goth. *wulfs* "wolf," *hund* "hundred," *guma* "man," and many others.

Both varieties are treated in the Germanic languages in exactly the same manner. In Gothic they both remain *u*, except before *r* and *h*, where they are changed (or "broken" according to Grimm's terminology) to a vowel which was probably pronounced *o*, but, curiously enough, is spelled *au*, *e. g.* Goth. *waurpun* (= Mod. Ger. *wurden*), *tauahun* (= Mod. Ger. *zogen*). In Old High German both are treated in accordance with Holtzmann's rule, *e. g.* *zugun*, *gi-zogan*; *wurtun*, *gi-wortan*.

The twofold origin then of the Germanic *u* stands in no connection with its twofold form (*u* and *o*) in the Germanic languages. And there is no reason why we should not regard the *u* of Goth. *juk* as identical with that of Lat. *jugum*, Greek *ζυγόν*, Sanskr., *yugam*. The *o*, therefore, of O. H. G. *joch* must be regarded as a later substitute for the Gothic vowel.

As regards the relation between *u* and *o* in Germanic, the opinion advocated here is probably the one which is at present shared by the majority of scholars. It is true that here and there we still meet with the doctrine of an Early Germanic *o*, preserved in West Germanic and changed in Gothic to *u*. This doctrine, however, finds no support in the *u*- and *o*-vowels themselves, but is based on the parallelism of the *i*- and *e*-vowels; the supposition being that if O. H. G. *e* is older than Goth. *i*, it would seem rational to regard O. H. G. *o* as older than Goth. *u*. I am for my part willing to admit that the vowels *e* and *o* in West Germanic are strictly parallel. But the conclusion I would draw from this fact is a different one. If it is possible to regard West Germanic *o* as a more recent vowel than the Goth. *u*, the problem may be solved by regarding West Germanic *e* as more recent than the Goth. *i*. Let us return then to the vowels *i* and *e*, in order to see whether the latter theory can be sustained.

Like Goth. *u*, Goth. *i* also has a double origin; for it corresponds (1) to Indo-Eur. *i* in the preterite plural and past participle of the first ablaut-series, *e. g.* Goth. *bitun*, *bitans*, and in words like *i-s* "he" = Lat. *is*, *fisks* = Lat. *piscis*, *widuwo* = Lat. *vidua*; (2) to

Indo-Eur. *e* in the infinitive and present of the third, fourth, and fifth ablaut-series, as well as in the past participle of the fifth ablaut-series, *e. g.* Goth. *bindan*, *niman*, *ga-nisan*, *binda*, *nima*, *ga-nisa*, *ga-nisans*. Also in words like *ik* = Lat. *ego*, *fimf* = Gr. *πέντε*, and many others.

As far as Gothic alone is concerned, no difference is perceptible between the two varieties. They are treated exactly alike and are, *e. g.* both changed to *ai* (probably a peculiar spelling for *e*, suggested by the later Greek pronunciation of the diphthong *ai*) before *r* and *h*; *e. g.* *taihun*, preterite plural, and *taihans*, past participle of *teihan* "to declare," *bairan* "to bear," *faihu* = Ger. *Vieh*, etc.

So far, then, the vowels *i* and *u* would appear to be parallel. There remains, however, in Old High German and in other Old Germanic dialects one peculiar instance, — the one I have had to mention above as an unexplained exception from Holtzmann's rule, — in which the distinction between Indo-Eur. *i* and *e* appears to have been preserved. We find in Old High German in the past participle of the fifth ablaut-series the vowel *e* instead of Goth. *i*, *e. g.* *ginesan* = Goth. *ga-nisans*. This *e* is regular and in accordance with Holtzmann's rule. In the past participle of the first ablaut-series, however, Goth. *i* remains unchanged in Old High German, contrary to Holtzmann's rule; *e. g.* *gi-bizzan* = Goth. *bitans*. Since in the former case we find in the cognate Indo-European languages the vowel *e* (= Sanskr. *a*), *e. g.* Greek *véομαι*, Sanskr. *nasate*, and in the latter case the vowel *i*, *e. g.* Lat. *findo*, Sanskr. *bhid*, it looks, indeed, as if here an Indo-European distinction had been preserved.

Let us grant for a moment that Old Norse and the West Germanic languages, as whose representative we have selected Old High German, are sensitive enough to distinguish before an *a* of the following syllable between Gothic *i* = Indo-Eur. *e* and Goth. *i* = Indo-Eur. *i*. How shall we account for the fact that the same distinction is in other, and, it would seem, quite similar cases utterly lacking? The preterite present verb O. H. G. *weiz* = Goth. *wait* follows the first ablaut-series in forming the past participle, *gi-wizzan*, and retains the vowel *i* also in the infinitive, *wizzan*, and the present participle, *wizzanti*. The preterite, however, shows in addition to *wissa* (also *wista*) the form *wessa* (and *westa*). Nouns like O. H. G. *nest* = Lat. *nidus* (Indo Eur. *ni-sdo-s*), O. H. G. *wer* = Lat. *vir* (Sansk. *vira-s*), furnish additional proof that Holtzmann's rule applies to Indo-Eur. *i* no less than to Indo-Eur. *e*.

It follows that the exception from Holtzmann's rule, found in forms like *gi-bizzan*, *gi-wizzan*, etc., must be explained without regard to the Indo-European distinction between *i* and *e*. The line, moreover, on which the explanation is to be sought is clearly indicated by other Old High German forms. Of the preterite present verb *bi-darf* we find in Old High German the infinitive *bi-durfan*, whose irregular

u (instead of *o*) is clearly due to the plural *bi-durfun* and the subjunctive *bi-durfi*. The *i*, therefore, of the infinitive *wizzan* may be explained as due to the plural *wizzun* and the subjunctive *wizzi*, an explanation which we shall naturally also apply to the participles *wizzanti* and *gi-wizzan*. Granted that *gi-wizzan* is due to the analogy of the plural *wizzun* and the subjunctive *wizzi*, the explanation of the participle *gi-bizzan* can no longer be doubtful. Its *i* is due to the analogy of the plural *bizzun* and the subjunctive *bizzi*.

But why should in the first ablaut-series the participle *gi-bizzan* adopt the vowel of the preterite plural *bizzun*, while in the second ablaut-series the participle *gi-wortan* is not influenced by the plural *wurtun*? I believe that I am able to give a satisfactory answer to this question, and I think that the answer, if it be correct, will prove to be of some interest, as it would lead to the result that to a certain extent analogical changes depend on definite laws just as much as phonetic changes.

We are concerned in the case under discussion with a law which regulates the ablaut in West Germanic (or more precisely in Norse and West Germanic) in such a way as to require a harmony or an equal balance between the grade of the infinitive or the present tense and that of the past participle. We may say in a general way that Holtzmann's rule does not affect the past participle, unless it can affect also the infinitive and certain forms of the present tense. To be sure, if we adopt this wording we shall have to except the cases in which the infinitive and present are formed with the suffix *-j-* (e. g. O. H. G. *sitzan*, "to sit"), since these particular presents have no effect on the past participle. We have to remember, however, that the suffix *j* is found only with verbs whose preterite plural has the vowel *e* or *o*, so that an analogical influence of this vowel on that of the past participle would be out of question. But in order to avoid exceptions of this kind it is preferable to restrict our law to those ablaut-series in which we have in Gothic (and in Primitive Teutonic) one and the same vowel in the preterite plural and the past participle, i. e. to the first, second, and third series. The law then may be formulated thus: "Wherever the preterite plural and the past participle had originally one and the same vowel admitting of the application of Holtzmann's rule, this rule has taken effect only when it could also affect the infinitive and the plural of the present tense. If, however, the present tense shows in the plural the same vowel as in the singular and in the infinitive, the past participle will retain the vowel of the preterite plural and not be modified by Holtzmann's rule."

From our point of view, then, we shall divide the first three ablaut-series into two groups, which may be distinguished as *simple* and *complex* forms of ablaut.

To the former belong: (1) the first ablaut-series, *e. g.* O. H. G. infinitive, *bizzan*, present singular, *bizzu*, plural, *bizzum*; preterite singular, *beiz*, plural, *bizzum*, participle, *gi-bizzan*. (2) The verbs with nasal + cons. of the third ablaut series, *e. g.* O. H. G. *bintan*, *bintu*, *bintam*, *bant*, *buntum*, *gibuntan*. The verbs of this class are of course excepted from Holtzmann's rule for the reason that this rule does not apply to vowels followed by nasal cons. They belong, however, in this connection, since they would naturally affect analogical tendencies in the general system of the ablaut.

The second group consists of (1) the second ablaut-series, *e. g.* O. H. G. infinitive, *ziohan*, present singular, *ziuhu*, plural, *zioham*, preterite singular, *zoch*, plural, *zugum*, participle, *gi-zogan*. (2) The verbs with liquid + cons. of the third ablaut-series, *e. g.* O. H. G. *werdan*, *wirdu*, *werdam*, *ward*, *wurtum*, *giwortan*.

If I have succeeded in removing the obstacles which seemed to be in the path of Holtzmann's rule concerning the West Germanic *e*, we are entitled to maintain that in regard to the vowels of radical syllables the Gothic vocalism may on the whole be regarded as representative of the Primitive Teutonic period. I venture to believe that many of my colleagues will share with me a feeling of relief on account of the fact that we are no longer obliged to regard the simple and perspicuous vowel-system of the Gothic language as a secondary outgrowth of the complicated vocalism of the West Germanic languages.

Our attempt to sustain, with regard to radical syllables, the primary claim of the Gothic language, will find an appropriate supplement in the contention that with final syllables matters are similar in that here, too, the Gothic language deserves to be reinstated in the position which it formerly held.

It is little more now than half a century ago that Rudolph Westphal¹ succeeded in discovering the laws on which in Gothic the treatment of vowels and consonants in final syllables depends. As regards the vowels his opinion may briefly be stated thus, that in final syllables original short *a* and short *i* are lost, while short *u* remains. For example, in the *a*-declension Goth. *wulfs* = Sanskr. *vr̥ka-s*, Gr. *λύκο-s*, and in the *i*-declension, Goth. *gasts* = Lat. *hostis*; but in the *u*-declension Goth. *sunus* = Sanskr. *sūnú-s*. It is scarcely necessary to add that, in Westphal's opinion, Gothic was the oldest representative of the Germanic languages, and that the vowels lost in Gothic were lost also in the other Old Germanic dialects. For about twenty years these views remained unchallenged. *They were shared, *e. g.* by Wilhelm Scherer in his well known *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache*

¹ *Das Auslautgesetz des Gothischen*, *Zeitschr. für vergl. Sprachforschung*, vol. II (1853), pp. 161-190.

(Berlin, 1869). Soon afterwards, however, we meet with a growing tendency to find the vowels which are lost in Gothic still preserved in other Old Germanic dialects, — especially Old Norse and Anglo-Saxon, — and in the most recent works on Germanic philology the statement is made that the original vowels of final syllables are to a large extent preserved in the oldest Norse inscriptions, and here and there in the old West Germanic dialects, so that Westphal's law would be valid only for Gothic and not for the Primitive Teutonic period.

This modern view may impress us as if it was not intended to be taken seriously. For every one who is accustomed to look at the various Germanic languages from a comparative point of view must recognize that the two languages supposed to have retained most of the original vowels are the ones in which, as a rule, final vowels are treated more recklessly than in the other Old Germanic dialects. For it is especially in Old Norse and in Anglo-Saxon that we observe in final syllables the dropping of Gothic short vowels, the shortening of Gothic long vowels, and the contraction, followed by shortening of Gothic diphthongs. Is it credible, then, that these languages should have retained short vowels which had been dropped in Gothic?

To be sure, the contention is that the alleged pre-Gothic vowels are found not in regular Old Norse, but in the oldest Norse Runic inscriptions, those which are supposed to exhibit the so-called "Primitive Norse" language.¹ But let us not be misled by the term "Primitive Norse" with its suggestion of the Primitive Teutonic language. It is true that in the oldest Runic inscriptions Old Norse appears in a more ancient form than in the regular literary language, and the difference in age may amount to several centuries. Yet it is hardly probable that the language of the oldest inscriptions can be claimed to be as a whole more ancient than, *e. g.* Old High German. The language of the inscriptions points to a period when the Norse languages were no longer in contact with Gothic, but were undergoing or rather had undergone the same phonetic and inflectional alterations which we are accustomed to designate as "West Germanic." We find, *e. g.* that Goth. *i* and *u* have been changed before a following *a* (in accordance with Holtzmann's rule) to *e* and *o*, and that the diphthongs *au* and *ai* have been contracted to *e* and *o* respectively.

The majority of the alleged pre-Gothic vowels in "Primitive Norse" can be divided into two groups. On the one hand, we have the vowels which appear before the final *æ* of the nominative, and which are claimed as old thematic vowels. It seems to me that these

¹ The more important ones of these inscriptions are given — with references — in the Appendix of Ad. Noreen's *Altisländische u. Altnorwegische Grammatik*, 2d edition, Halle, 1892. Compare also the articles by Moebius, *Zur Kenntniss der ältesten Runen*, in the *Zeitschr. f. vergl. Sprachf.* vol. xviii (1869), and xix (1870), and F. Burg, *Die ältesten nordischen Runeninschriften*, Berlin, 1885.

vowels, especially the short *a*, which is frequently found, compare with the secondary *a* of O. H. G. forms like *acchar* = Goth. *akrs*, *fogal* = Goth. *fugls*, or *eban* = Goth. *ibns*. The existence, in the Runic inscriptions, of a secondary or pleonastic *a* must be admitted even by the most ardent champions of their antiquity in cases like *warait* (instead of *wrait*) "wrote," or *-wolafa* (instead of *-wolfa*) "wolf." I trust we may be permitted to extend this theory to forms like *Holtingar*, *Dagar*, etc.

A second group of vowels, claimed to represent Early Teutonic conditions, is found in final position without following *x*. We are concerned here partly with a short *a*, supposed to have been lost in Gothic, and partly with a long *o*, supposed to have been shortened in Gothic to *a*. In neither case have I been able to convince myself that the claim is justified. As it would be impossible in this place to discuss the whole question at length, I will at least briefly examine, with regard to final vowels, one of the oldest and most important Runic inscriptions, namely, that of the golden horn of Gallehus or Tondern. This inscription, I trust, will suffice for our purposes, containing, as it does, examples for the various categories indicated above. The inscription reads:

Ek Hlewagastir Holtingar horna tawido, i. e. "I Liugast the Holting have made the horns."

In *Holtingar* "the Holting" (*i. e.* either the son of Holt, or coming from a place called Holt), we have a typical example of the alleged thematic *a*. I prefer, as I have said before, to regard the *a* as a secondary vowel, developed from the voice of the sonant *x*. It would amount to nearly the same if we said that the *a* serves as a glide from the consonant group *ng* to the final *x*.

It is hardly possible to make so definite a statement in regard to the *i* in *Hlewagastir*. Our first impression, no doubt, is that here and in the form *Saligastir*, found in another Runic inscription, the form *-gastir* corresponds exactly to Lat. *hostis*, and preserves in its final syllable the vowel lost in Goth. *gasts*. This naturally was the opinion of the Norse scholars, to whom we are indebted for the theory of pre-Gothic vowels on the Norse Runic inscriptions, a theory which in the first place was based on the form *-gastir*, of the golden horn. When many years ago, through my late friend, Hoffory, I became first acquainted with the oldest Norse inscriptions, it was again the form *-gastir* which appeared to me to form the most convincing proof for his contention that the language of some of the Runic inscriptions was more ancient (if not in date, at least in its grammatical condition) than Gothic. In the mean time, I have often had an opportunity to study the Runic inscriptions again, and the more I have become familiar with them, the more I have lost my faith in their alleged pre-Gothic character. One after the other the forms which were claimed

to be remnants from the Primitive Teutonic period appeared to yield more naturally to a different explanation, until *-gastix* remained as the only instance in which there is at least the semblance of greater antiquity than in the corresponding Gothic form. I have no doubt, then, that in this case, too, appearances are deceptive; and whether or not we are able to explain the *-i-* with certainty: we are hardly warranted in ascribing, on account of this form, a Primitive Teutonic character to the language of the Runic inscriptions.

For the present I would suggest the following explanation. It is perhaps not necessary to identify *-gastix* with Goth. *gasts*. We must remember that *-gastix* only occurs as the second member of compounds, and that compounds belonging to *i*-stems sometimes follow the *ja*-declension. To be sure, Gothic has no compounds in *-gasteis*, but it has, e. g. the adjectives *af-haimeis* and *ana-haimeis* belonging to the *i*-stem *haims*. If this explanation be correct, Runic *-gastix* would be in Latin not *hostis*, but * *-hostius*.

The next form to claim our attention is the accusative *horna*, which I have translated by the plural "horns," while it is generally regarded as a singular, corresponding to Gothic *haur̥n*. But we must remember that near Gallehus not one, but two, golden horns were found. Both were adorned with figures in the same style, and evidently belonged together, but only one of them had an inscription. Hence the inscription was probably meant for both horns. There may have been three horns originally, intended perhaps to decorate the wall of a festival hall in such a way that the larger one — with the inscription — hung in the middle, and a slightly smaller one on each side. But even if the number amounted from the outset to not more than two, the artist might have spoken of them as "the horns." There is no reason, then, to regard *horna* as a pre-Gothic form, since the nominative-accusative plural of *haur̥n* in Gothic is *haur̥na*.

Finally we have to examine the preterite *tawido*, a form which in my opinion sheds a clearer light on the language of these inscriptions than any one of the words with which we have concerned ourselves so far. The current interpretation is that the form *tawido*, which finds a parallel in *faihido* and similar Runic preterites, appears as a very old form, not only as compared with the Old Norse weak preterites in *-ða*, but also as compared with the corresponding Gothic forms. As the ending of the first person singular of the Gothic weak preterite is *-da* (or in other cases *-pa* and *-ta*), this view may seem at the first glance unobjectionable. And yet it betrays clearly its origin from a time when the comparative study of the Germanic languages stood in its first tentative stages. For the ending *-ða* of Literary Old Norse cannot be identified with the Gothic ending *-da*, because the latter would have to appear in Old Norse as *-ði*. This may not only be inferred from cases like Goth. *hana* = O. N. *hani*, Goth. *ǵadar* = O. N. *ǵaðir*,

Gothic. *haitans* = O. N. *heitinn*, but is obviously seen in the third person singular of the weak preterite, which actually has the ending *-ði*, corresponding regularly to the Goth. third person in *-da*.

A better explanation both of the Runic and the literary forms of the Norse preterite has been advanced some thirty-five years ago by the late Professor Konr. Gislason.¹ In his opinion the ending *-ða* of the Old Norse preterite is to be explained from an earlier form *-dau* whose diphthong finds a parallel in that of the Gothic first person subjunctive *-dedjau*. The mutual relation of the vowels is exactly the same as in the case of the numeral 8, O. N. *atta* = Goth. *ahtau*. The ending *-do* of Runic forms like *tavido* stands midway between the Gothic and the regular Old Norse form in that it shows the diphthong *au* contracted to *o*, but not yet shortened to *a*. The ending is in accordance, therefore, with the general character of the language of the "Primitive Norse" inscriptions, which occupies a position intermediate between Gothic and the language of Old Norse literature, but at the same time shares all the characteristic peculiarities of the Norse branch.

I have, for my part, no doubt that Gislason's theory is correct, and have stated this many years ago.² Finding, however, that the authors of Old Norse and Germanic grammars and handbooks continue to disregard Gislason's view, I may be allowed briefly to review the points which seem to me to furnish an almost mathematical proof of his theory.

First. The inflection in Old Norse of the weak preterite is peculiar in that here the first person singular indicative and the third person singular indicative have a different ending, while in Gothic, Old High German, and, in fact, in almost every Germanic dialect (except Old Norse) the ending of the first and third persons is the same.

Secondly. The inflection in Old Norse of the weak preterite is further more peculiar in that the ending of the first person singular indicative agrees with that of the first person singular subjunctive, and the ending of the third person singular indicative with that of the third person singular subjunctive, while in Gothic (and more or less so in the other Germanic languages) the endings of the indicative and the subjunctive differ both in the first and in the third person.

Thirdly. If we compare the endings of the first and third person of the Norse preterite with those of the first and third person (indicative and subjunctive) in Gothic, we experience no difficulty in identifying — in accordance with the laws governing the change of final vowels — these endings in the first person singular subjunctive and in the third person singular indicative and subjunctive.

¹ *Aarbøger for nordisk Oldkyndighed og Historie*, 1869, pp. 126–130.

² Compare my article on the origin of the weak preterite, *American Journal of Philology*, vol ix (1888), p. 56.

If we combine these three points it follows that in the first and third person singular the Old Norse preterite presents a mixture of indicative and subjunctive endings, in such a way that in the third person the two endings have become identical by regular phonetic transformation, while in the first person the ending of the subjunctive has been adopted for both moods.

A word remains to be said about the pre-Gothic vowels supposed to have been retained in Anglo-Saxon. We are concerned here with a theory advanced in an important article in the fifth volume of Paul and Braune's *Beiträge*¹ by a well-known scholar whom we are fortunate enough to have with us at this meeting. His contention is that original *i* in final syllables, which is regularly dropped in Gothic, has been retained in Anglo-Saxon after a short stem-syllable, while it was lost after a long stem-syllable. For example, A. S. *wini*, "friend"=Goth. *ga-wins*, and A. S. *stedi*, "place"=Goth. *staps*; but A. S. *wyrm*=Goth. *waurms*, and A. S. *giest*=Goth. *gasts*.

I have no objection to the fact that in Anglo-Saxon the appearance of final *i* depends on the quantity of the stem-syllable. But I am not convinced that the *i* contained in forms like *wini*, *stedi*, can be traced back to the Primitive Teutonic and Indo-European periods. I rather believe that we have here a new ending of recent date, due to the analogy of the *ja*-stems. This seems apparent from the fact that the final *i* of the above and of similar forms goes hand in hand with the loss of the old *i*-declension and with the confusion of *i*- and *ja*-stems. Not even to the Gothic language is this confusion entirely unknown; but there the process is seen only in its very beginning and in the inflection of adjectives rather than of nouns. Old High German is less conservative than Gothic, but has kept the *i*- and *ja*-declensions separate, at least in the case of nouns, and has accordingly introduced forms like *wini*, *stedi*, only sparingly. Frequently, however, do forms of this description appear in Old Saxon, where the old *i*-declension is becoming extinct. In Anglo-Saxon, finally, where the last trace of the *i*-declension has disappeared, the apparent preservation of the final *i* has become a definite rule.

We observe in several instances that inflectional differences which at first had nothing to do with quantity are at a later date made to depend on the quantity of the stem-syllable. In Gothic grammar we have, e. g. the rule that feminine *ja*-stems with a short stem-syllable (like *sunja*, *halja*) have in the nominative singular the ending *-ja*, while *ja*-stems with a long stem-syllable (like *bandja*) form their nominative in *i*. Yet actually we are in this case concerned with two

¹ Ed. Sievers, *Zur Accent- und Lautlehre der germanischen Sprachen*. III *Zum vocalischen Auslautgesetz: Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur*, vol. v (Halle, 1878), pp. 109-163.

different inflectional classes (the *ya-* and the *i*-declension of Sanskrit grammar), and it is obvious that the difference could not have originally depended on the quantity of the stem-syllable. I am inclined to believe that in the West Germanic languages, especially in Anglo-Saxon, the difference between the old *i*-declension and the old *ja*-declension has been regulated in a similar way.

I cannot help feeling that most of the problems on which I have touched here ought to have been discussed at greater length and with more detail. I shall feel satisfied, however, if my remarks have left the impression that it is worth while to examine further these and similar questions. The comparative grammar of the Germanic languages is still a field in which an earnest and painstaking worker may count on a rich harvest, and I venture to hope that work in this field will be pursued with growing interest and lasting results in the United States.

REFERENCE WORKS ON INDO-EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY

(Prepared through the courtesy of Professor Carl D. Buck of Chicago University)

A brief list of the most important general works for the study of Indo-European Comparative Philology in general and of the historical grammar of the several Indo-European languages. (See also the bibliographies under the other language sections; here are cited mainly historical grammars, etymological dictionaries, etc.) Only the works of a more general character are mentioned, no attempt being made to cite the countless important books and articles dealing with special problems.

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WORKS OF REFERENCE ON ROMANCE PHILOLOGY

(Prepared through courtesy of Professor Henry A. Todd)


FOR the scholar already well versed in philological methods, the best survey of the present problems of Romance philology is given in W. Meyer-Lübke's *Einführung in das Studium der romanischen Sprachwissenschaft*, Heidelberg, 1901, 12mo, pp. 214. This brief treatise contains classified bibliographical lists of the most important works and periodical publications, and a certain amount of elementary discussion, but, despite its title, is in the main too advanced and abstruse to be used with advantage by the uninitiated. Much the same must be said of G. Gröber's monumental *Grundriss der romanischen Philologie*, Strassburg, 1888, and following years, large 8vo., 2 vols., in parts. (A new and thoroughly revised edition of volume I was begun in 1905.) This strictly scientific work is published with the coöperation of some twenty-five of the most competent specialists, and for the trained scholar is the most valuable presentation, at once systematic and collective, of the fundamentals of the subject.

More available for the beginner, though of a different scientific value, is G. Körting's *Encyclopädie und Methodologie der romanischen Philologie*, Heilbronn, 1884-88, 3 vols. 8vo., and the same author's *Handbuch der romanischen Philologie*, Leipzig, 1896, 1 vol. 8vo. Although a "gekürzte Neubearbeitung" of the *Encyclopädie*, the *Handbuch* is largely a distinct work. Apart from its more recent bibliographical information, it is scarcely to be compared with its prototype for general usefulness.

Important as are the bibliographies contained in all the above-mentioned works, they by no means meet the needs of the student who is undertaking to make original contributions to Romance scholarship. The task of discovering what, if anything, has already been published on a given subject of investigation calls for careful and patient search. A brief indication of the mode of procedure may here be given. Without considering the earlier bibliographical sources, it will be sufficient for the present purpose to call the learner's attention to the classified and, as far as possible, complete bibliography, undertaken as a regular annual supplement to the *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie*, edited by G. Gröber, since 1877. To determine what has been published throughout the world on any specific subject since that date, the student's best recourse is to follow year by year, under the appropriate classified rubric, the list of titles and references, down to the latest published supplement. Unfortunately, owing to the vast labor involved in the compilation, indexing, and publication of these supplements (in recent years the number of entries averages between three and four thousand), the *Zeitschrift* bibliography is several years in arrears. For the most recent period, accordingly, the best recourse is to the very full but unclassified monthly lists of the *Litteraturblatt für germanische und romanische Philologie*, edited by O. Behaghel and F. Neumann, since 1880. Of the numerous other current bibliographical aids the most important is the *Kritischer Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der romanischen Philologie*, edited since 1890, by K. Vollmöller, aided by a large number of special contributors. The *Jahresbericht* is also considerably in arrears.



DEPARTMENT VI
HISTORY OF LITERATURE



HISTORY OF LITERATURE

(Hall 6, September 20, 4.15 p. m.)

SPEAKERS: PROFESSOR JAMES A. HARRISON, University of Virginia.
PROFESSOR CHARLES M. GATLEY, University of California.

LITERARY VITALITIES

BY JAMES ALBERT HARRISON

[James Albert Harrison, Professor of Teutonic Languages, University of Virginia, since 1895. b. August 21, 1848, Pass Christian, Mississippi. L.H.D. Columbia University, 1886; LL.D. Washington and Lee University, 1896; LL.D. Tulane University, 1904. Professor of Latin and Modern Languages, Randolph Macon College, Virginia, 1871-76; Professor of English at Washington and Lee University, 1876-95; Associate Editor of the Century Dictionary, Standard Dictionary, and Handy Political Anglo-Saxon Dictionary. Member of the American Philological Association, Modern Language Association, American Historical Association. Author of *A Group of Poets and their Haunts*; *History of Spain*; *The Virginia Edition of Edgar Allan Poe's Works*; *Life and Letters of Edgar Allan Poe*; *Life of George Washington*; and other works.]

Licht, Liebe, Leben.
— HERDER'S *Epitaph*.

IN the land of Goethe the feet of the pilgrim traveler do not often wander to a more charming spot than Weimar, still, as in Goethe's day, the capital of an intellectual grand-duchy, nestling among the green Gotha hills where the frolicsome Ilm shoots in and out of its bed of silver and makes music in the ears of the poetic traveler; and in this quaint and charming Old German town, redolent of Goethe and Schiller and Wieland and Herder and Liszt, no spot is encircled with pleasanter associations than the ancient Stadt-Kirche where Herder, the teacher, friend, and pastor of Goethe, officiated for forty (?) years and spoke forth his beautiful German to crowds of intelligent citizens, eager to catch light from his illumined lips.

One day the great thinker, speaker, author, the noble friend, the eloquent interpreter of *Die Stimmen der Völker*, the venerable figure beloved of the Weimar school-boys and girls, did not appear as usual in the *Kanzel* at the right-hand end of the church.

All over Weimar it was whispered, "Herder is dead!"

Outside the church, in the modest *Platz* surrounding the house of God, arose in after years a stately figure of the poet-critic holding in his hand a scroll on which three words only were inscribed:

Licht, Liebe, Leben.

When I first saw these words on the slab covering Herder's tomb, inside the church, they seemed to me, like bits of that wondrous chemical, radium, to become positively luminous in the twilight dimness of the old church; and they have shone in my memory as self-luminous bodies ever since.

When I was called upon by the Committee of the International Congress of Arts and Science to prepare a short paper on the vital principles, ideas, and methods underlying modern literature and all literature, I could not get these words out of my mind; they lay phosphorescent there, unquenched by any substitute I could devise to take their place.

LIGHT, LOVE, LIFE, rang in the writer's ear with incessant and insistent murmur as the characteristic, the indispensable, the absolutely essential key-words of the theme.

In the city of Weimar itself "light" had been the last word of the expiring Goethe: may it not have slipped into the august sufferer's memory at this supreme hour from the scroll of Herder, and thence into the heart of the civilized world as its literary bequest and watch-word, gathered from the lips of two of its finest representatives?

The vitality of all literature is supremely dependent upon the mass of light in it. Without *light* it is mere darkness. A moment's contemplation of the great historic literatures — Oriental, Greek, Germanic — will settle this beyond a peradventure: each is a well of light from which, on lonely heights of Himalaya, of Judæa, of Parnassus, of Apennines, of Saxon hills and Anglo-Saxon uplands, the forebears and forerunners of the Indo-Aryan and Semitic races have kindled their fires and lighted their lamps and started on their torch-bearing Panathenaic Procession down the ages.

The light crystallized in a literature may be as manifold as that into which a prism of clear glass dissects the blended ray that pierces the eye-hole of the heliostat — the one indispensable thing being that it be light: moral, intellectual, æsthetic. It is a significant fact that the basic beginnings of all the greater modern literatures go back to some fountain-source of moral light — some Bible — some divine or semi-divine book recognized as the supreme logos of some Divine Being. The Vedas, the cosmic theogonies, St. Jerome, Ulfilas, Cyril, Luther, the King James Version mark moral milestones all along the literary highways; and each is a *milliarium aureum*.

The mass of this moral light permeating the literatures of civilization has been very great and has proved to be the antiseptic, the anti-toxin, that has kept them from rotting. The intense vitality of the Hebrew Scriptures, of the mighty words of Luther, of the creed and catechisms drawn from Christian, Confucian, or Buddhistic sources, reveals a root-principle that has sunk deep into the sub-soil of human nature, and draws from it exhaustless stores of strength and

breath and life laid up in these moral springs. The history of literature teaches that the moral fountain-sources of the mental civilization of the race are the richest, the deepest, the strongest, the most enduring of all — the Albert and Victoria Nyanza of this mighty flood-tide of the Nile that pours its streams in fertilizing currents down through the intellectual Abyssinias and Egypts of the race, and turns them from deserts into gardens of beauty. In the same sense in which, in Herodotean phrase, ancient Egypt was "the gift of the Nile," is the germ, the dawn, the early daylight of the literatures of humanity the "gift" of the moral nature. Nations sloughed up in superstition or in sensualism too dense to transmit the piercing ray of the moral intelligence, have never developed even the beginnings of a literature. Nations on the contrary that slumbered out and through their sensualism, nations in whom the moral sense was active, alert, alive, restless, nations of conscience, of awakened moral intelligence, among whom "Seekers after God" arose early and labored late, whether they labored under the starlit dome of Mesopotamia, among the Judæan hills, in the stoa of Zeno or the Academy of Plato, earliest developed both literary substance and literary form: their crude imaginings and cruder yearnings assumed gradually imperishable forms, and wrought themselves into hymns, dramas, idylls, "wisdom" literature, classically expressed codes or utterances that have come on down from the remotest ages, and remind us of the unquiet search after the Invisible, the Intangible, the Ideal, the wonder-working Blue Flower of the infinite distances.

In the vital trilogy of Herder's epitaph the second word is *Liebe*; out of this word — Love — flashes the second fundamental of all literature. Without fancifully or fantastically twisting the word, it pours its hidden and yet obvious meaning into the ear, as heat, even as the first word signified *light* in all its limitless connotation.

Heat is the condition that renders all animal, all intellectual life possible, enduring, immortal. After the life is withdrawn, after the heat is gone, no embalming process can keep the mummy alive: it is, and remains, a mummy, a mass of bitumenized dust, pulseless, inarticulate, dead.

A literature that has no heat, no heart (only the *r* differentiates the one word from the other), is a literature that has already been reduced to the state of a mummy, motionless, staring, petrified, a bit of bitumen, a handful of salts. Tons of life-symbolizing scarabs hung about its neck would not recall one vital pulsation.

All the literatures that possess this ineffable charm of heat, of Love, live, as the divine Eros lives, in the act of hovering over the lips of the earthly Psyche. Why is it that those chance couplets and stanzas and epigrams of the anonymous Greek Anthology live, when massy epics and long-drawn-out tragedies uncoil their unwieldy

lengths before the literary paleontologist, fossilized, calcareous, dead? It is because these immortal cries of Ancient Hellas glow with inextinguishable fire, gleam like burning coals, are surcharged with human heat and passion and yearning, as the opal is surcharged with radiancy. Instantly such lines, such meters, such epigrams yield up their prismatic glory to the sympathetic soul that feels in them the heat still glowing, the soul still fired with immortal youth, the deathless pang, the eternal music. Sappho, Simonides, the imprisoned Danaë still speak from unperishing palimpsest or papyrus because of the *Love* that was in them, mystic, inexplicable, beyond the definition of philologist or rhetorician, simply *alive*, and just as much so to-day as in that measureless yesterday when Herodotus read his great prose-poem to assembled thousands at the Grecian games.

The essential characteristics indeed of this great literature on which I have just touched are the mass of Light, and the mass of Love, of Heat, of heart in it; it could never have lived these three thousand years and have been *κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί* which it is, without this supreme central vitalizing principle. And men dip into it again and again as they dip their faces into a clear pool of crystal water, for refreshment, for sustenance, for regeneration, for the divine restfulness that flows from contact with any living thing that has ozone in it.

What living thing can grow without the light? What living thing can grow without heat? What living thing can grow without — Life?

Herder's passionate devotion to his contemporaries, to the young Goethe, to the wide fields of many literatures in which he was versed, to the many-fountained well-springs of young vigor and national strength which he found in the ballad-poetry of the nations, shows that the word *Leben* was even more essential to his trilogy, as expressing the concentrated essence of his creed, than the other two, fundamental as they, too, were.

And of Life what better definition is there than the simple word *Shakespeare*?

At this magic word there springs into being a world shading down from superhuman to infinitesimal, filled with creatures that laugh and sing and breathe and play, so full of life that Life itself might be deceived, creatures breaking spontaneously into smiles or tears, creatures from whom the life's blood starts at the prick of a needle, gay, sad, pungent, witty, argumentative, deathless clowns or dying gladiators, men and women and children torn from palace and hut, from throne and cobbler's stool, from field and Fairyland, chattering, suffering, loving, hating, the incarnate imagery of Life itself. All this busy multitude streaming in endless panorama from the quartos and folios as out of prison-gates, an airy infinitude of souls new-born into the tumultuous century of Tudor and Stuart, but belonging to all time, the children of Shakespeare: how they stream, and dance, and

flash, and live and die before us, men of the twinkling eye, women whimsical as the wind, deep, true, tender, comical as Vanity Fair itself! Shakespeare is Life.

Simplest of biographies is his: lived, wandered, acted, wrote, married, — died; almost anonymous, living and dying only three hundred years ago, almost before our faces, yet little or nothing known of him after all the laborious research of a "Century of Praise"; like all the greater things of nature herself — mountains, oceans, sky; like many of the greater things of the spirit, nameless — the first chapters of Genesis, the Book of Job, Ruth and Esther, the Beowulf, the Nibelungen Lied, the Edda, the Roland Song, the Cid Campeador. More puissant than the magicians of the Pharaoh himself, a waft of Shakespeare's wand evokes the charmed idyll of Rosalind and Arden Wood, Titania and her train, Miranda's fairy isle, the deep things of Hamlet and Macbeth, and the ancient worlds of Cæsar, Coriolanus, and Cleopatra: Lear with his wild hair, or that gorgeous picture of Old Venice rising like an exhalation from the sea fantastically bright: this man, of many men and women and children compact, with much of Homer and Dante in him, with more of Aristophanes and Molière, a bit of Cervantes; here and there, the smile of Chaucer on his lips, the tear of Boccaccio jewelizing his eye — this man Shakespeare, was all this encyclopedically. And yet more: he was *himself*, the unique, "der Einzige." By reason of the life that was in him he lives as that wondrous Panathenaic Procession in its triumphal march around the frieze of the Parthenon lives, as the mighty battle sculptures of Pergamon and Ægina live, as those great splashes of deathless color live that writhe into shape and humanize themselves in the vaulted ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, among the cosmic scenes pictured on the walls of Parma, Florence, the Doge's Palace.

Contrast the definitions of Life and of Existence: the one is found in the vivid ruins of Rome and Athens, so full of life to-day that one can instantly reconstruct out of them great fragments of two remote worlds and fill the spaces of Colosseum and Acropolis with worshiping, or with spectacle-loving multitudes; the other is found in those tragically silent, sad, speechless temples and pyramids and obelisks and sphinxes of hundred-gated Thebes, of Luxor, and Karnak, and Memphis, and Ghizeh.

The one lives even in its death; the other is death, even in its gigantic, in its immeasurable existence.

Herder's watchword therefore covers the third indispensable element in any literature or literary work — Electricity. The Pygmalion myth comes to life in every true literary masterpiece. "Speak!" said Michael Angelo as he stood before Donatello's statue of Saint Mark outside the old church in Florence.

What does not *speak* in literature, and speak from age to age and

from one generation to another, must be mute, still, speechless, dead: there is no life in it.

II

In a recently printed essay, equally characterized by brilliant gifts of exposition and sound common sense, the lamented John Fiske points out suggestively the differences between the old and the new method of writing history. He passes in review a number of celebrated names — Herodotus and Thucydides, Curtius and Mommsen, Hume and Gibbon, John Richard Green and Freeman — and touches graphically on the methods, the environment, the capabilities of each — Herodotus the historian, traveler, geographer, kindled with the poetic sense that an Orientalized Greek could hardly escape, anticipating Gibbon and Freeman in studying on the spot the scenes he was depicting; Thucydides, the historian of institutions, filling the mouths of Pericles and the Athenian generals with golden sentences such as Shakespeare ventured upon in his psychological dramas; Curtius and Mommsen, born and reared in an environment unsympathetic to the perfect mastery of such subjects as Athenian democracy and Roman institutions; Hume, the narrow, though luminous Scotch specialist, viewing history from the heights of Edinburgh Castle; Gibbon, the all-grasping, the all-comprehending, hyphening together the new and the old method with hooks of steel; Freeman, with his vast sweep yet limited vision, utterly unmindful of anything but geography and politics; Green, the masterful, the many-sided, instinct with life, and viewing History as Life itself in all its phases and mazes and colors and complexities, dwelling as lovingly on a literary or a social episode, a bit of landscape, the discussions of a club, the effects of a great Whig or Tory dinner-party, or the architecture of a quaint old English town, as on a great election, a burning political question, a night in the House of Commons, or the fatal obstinacy of George III: all drawn within his encyclopedic gaze as parts of an organic whole no part of which he could afford to neglect.

Needless to say to which of these men Fiske awards the palm: Gibbon and Green are the men whom he reverences with fondest admiration, the men whom he sets up before the new historical student as his exemplars.

The methods of the New History are those of the New Literature.

Georg Brandes, the Scandinavian critic, in his remarkable work on *Literary Tendencies in the Nineteenth Century*, has philosophically grasped one side of the subject: the angler after "tendencies," fishing in the muddy and obscure waters of many contemporaneous European literatures, finds interesting "drifts," "currents," "eddies," setting in here and there, slowly drawing the intellectual forces of con-

temporary England, France, and Germany in a certain defined direction as astronomers tell us the Milky Way is being drawn across the heavens to some unknown immeasurably distant pole-star or central sun. Streams and currents of Classicism and Romanticism and Euphuism and Symbolism, and what not, criss-cross each other in this many-colored sea; intermingle, blend, separate, start afresh on new voyages of elective affinity, cohere, dissolve, vanish.

All this is wonderfully fertile in suggestiveness: the true student will enter the labyrinth with the proper clue, will seize or select "a tendency," saturate himself with its phenomena, study, analyze, microscopically examine, completely master it if possible.

How interesting, for instance, to collect and study the Prefaces to celebrated works as they lie before us in early and late editions of English masterpieces; revealing the authors' most intimate thoughts about their work. A Preface is the authors' card of introduction to the master of the household. Seen through spectacles of such clear glass, Dryden or Wordsworth take on a new aspect.

Or the study of the Great Odes, the monumental Elegies, the conversational or the psychological Drama, the soul of Shakespeare concrete in his works, this or that movement in Elizabethan literature, the lyric of the Stuarts, the insweep and out-sweep of the complex, mutually interacting currents (which are to the literary historian what Demosthenes' action!—action!—action! is to the orator).

The beginning and the end of the last hundred years have seen a remarkable advance—indeed, a revolution—in the "method" of studying literature. Bits of actual research such as Johnson's *Lives of the Poets* were rare indeed in the eighteenth century, but they exerted a powerful if silent influence in bringing about this revolution. How charmingly original and instrumental in reëstablishing cordial relations between France and Germany was Mme. de Staël's *De l'Allemagne!*

One fancies Herodotus talking with the priests of Memphis as the eloquent Frenchwoman stands beside Goethe and Schiller and interrogates them on the mysteries of German transcendentalism.

"Institutions are the lengthened shadows of men," said Emerson. Literatures are the personal expression of nationality. A nation is a musical instrument—a harp, a viol, a pipe-organ—whose musicians are its great writers or speakers. When it has refined itself into some exquisite speaking-tube, into some *vox humana* of a thousand strings and subtleties, it utters itself in Euripides, in Lope or Calderon, in Schiller or Milton, and the quality of its music is as distinguishable as the voice of Jacob.

Therefore it is, that nations must be conceived, from a literary point of view, as huge ethnic documents, to be studied all around, inside and out, intensively and extensively, magnified units as sharply

individualized as crystals of star, or rhomb, or diamond structure. Ignorance of this fundamental fact evoked the absurd sentimentalizing of Châteaubriand over the American Indians, the Voltairean criticism of Shakespeare, the maunderings of Rousseau over "the state of nature," the powdered and periwigged Greeks and Romans of Racine. Knowledge of its essentiality has given us Matthew Arnold, analyzing the delicate spiritualities of French wit and style, Carlyle, Germanized to the finger-tips in the deep sea of Teutonic transcendentalism, poetry, history, Ruskin, a cinque-cento Italian born out of his time, expressing in pigment-like English the radiant thing that Raphael's cherubs see, Sainte-Beuve thrilling with an almost orchestral fullness of knowledge of the literatures he discusses, FitzGerald and his Persians, Max Müller and his multifarious Orientalism.

Contrast these living items of the Newer Criticism snatched from a hasty *résumé* of the nineteenth century, with the dead items, the dead methods, the dark and inarticulate gropings that went before and did duty for literary criticism. It is like comparing crisp sentences out of the *Laokoön*, or the charming interpretations of Winckelmann on Greek art, with the over-emphatic archæology of *The Last Days of Pompeii*. No true lover of either Boccaccio or Longfellow, of either Wagner or Wolfram, would place the *Decamerone* and *The Tales of a Wayside Inn*, or *Parsifal* and his interpreter alongside of each other.

Set in its larger framework of ethnic environment, therefore, each human, each literary document must be studied as the gem in the rough and in the *bezel*, as well, — on the finger of the wearer, as well as blazing on the outstretched forefinger of Time, one of the world's masterpieces.

The vast psychology of Egypt lies momentarily dreamlike, enchanted, subterranean, entombed — hundreds of feet under the shovel or the scalpel of excavator or psychologist: no plummet has yet reached these frozen depths or unlocked their deep-sea recesses: the 500,000,000 of mummies answer not. But will it remain so forever? The fixed stare of pyramid and sphinx, and obelisk and pylon, monumentally calm, the glazed eyeball of King and Queen and Pharaoh, will one day fill with light and life and love; to these, too, Herder's beautiful words will become applicable and change to three beautiful worlds teeming with motion, radiance, and vitality. Egypt will speak as Greece has spoken and its speech will become a thing of joy.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LITERARY STUDIES DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

BY CHARLES MILLS GAYLEY

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THIS inquiry demands a review, in the several countries concerned, of the materials and methods of the science: *first*, of the development of the disciplines contributory to it, viz., the theory of art in general, and the history of art-criticism; the theory of that branch of art called literature, and the history of applied poetics; the advance of philology, material and historical, — especially as affecting the literary expression of individual and society; *second*, of the conceptions successively springing from the development of these disciplines — conceptions to which correspond the successive canons of literary judgment; and *third*, of the efforts after a scientific mode of critical procedure, which have empirically issued in the canons of literary method. The inquiry demands also an historical treatment. The order should preferably be by national divisions, not only because such arrangement is obviously most simple, but because it involves in the process the interrelation of critical tendencies, and leads in the result, at the close of the century, to a discipline both cosmopolitan and comparative, but independent, which subsumes disciplines precedent and canons æsthetic or instrumental, which fortifies itself with materials and methods of approach supplied by other sciences social, biological, and psychological, and which itself may properly be called literary philology. It will, from this order of research, appear that while at the end of the eighteenth century philology was gathered from the ends of the earth and established as encyclopedic; and the criticism of art systematized as historical, — by the middle of the nineteenth century, encyclopedic philology has borne *linguistic*, and by the end *literary* philology, both of them historical in aim after the tendency of Wolf and Winckelmann, but both also comparative in method after the ideal of Herder.

Since it will be impossible for us in the brief time at my disposal to present the whole substance of this inquiry, I shall first outline for you the stages of development which appear to be common to

the nations most significant in the history of literary science, and indicate a few of the leaders of each period of advance; I shall then read in detail some portion of the treatment of individual countries; and finally, I shall attempt to characterize the literary science which they have together assisted to construct.

I. THE GENERAL STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

While chronological limits can never be definitely assigned to literary movements, and while the movements in cross-section of Germany, England, and France do not exactly jibe (since often one is, in some degree, the resultant of conditions precedent beyond the national border), it appears that in general the Preparatory Period of the present tendency of literary study ended about 1795-1800, and was *reconstructive* of the contributory disciplines; that the Second Period embraced the first thirty years of the nineteenth century, and was *romantic* in theory, *encyclopedic* in method; that the Third Period, the *historico-philosophical*, is still existent; but its representatives have, on the one hand, wandered temporarily into non-social, and therefore unreal by-paths and magic woods, heights Parnassian, hyper-æsthetic, hedonistic; they have, on the other hand, availed themselves more or less of the genetic, dynamic, eidographic methods of modern science, and so developed in all the countries under review a system of *comparative inquiry* by means of which a science of literature, or literary philology, bids fair to be established.

In the *reconstructive* period, Winckelmann, Kant, Herder and Lessing, Goethe and Schiller led in Germany; Bentley (as far back as 1697), Burke, Hogarth, Lord Kaimes, Hume, the Wartons, Hurd, Cowper, Goldsmith, Tyrwhitt and Pye, Macpherson and Percy were among the pioneers in England; in France the prophets were Perreault (1668), Diderot, Rousseau, Buffon.

The *romantic and encyclopedic* period in German criticism was stamped by the genius of Wolf, Boeckh, Solger, the Schlegels, and others of whom I shall speak; the English period was that of Wordsworth and Coleridge, Bowles, Leigh Hunt, Lamb, Hazlitt, and Shelley; the fates of France were in the hands of Mme. de Staël and Châteaubriand, Baour-Lormian, Stendhal, Hugo, Cousin, Michelet, and others.

The *historico-philosophical* period in Germany I shall describe in detail; the Grimms, von Humboldt, and Bopp are in the lead, Hegel, Carriere, and others; in England, there is the age of Henry Hallam, of Carlyle, De Quincey, and Macaulay (later of Morris, Ruskin, and Arnold, from whom by combination and permutation are descended Pater and Symonds); in France we find Villemain, St. Marc Girardin,

the liberal and Saxon-minded Sainte-Beuve, and the reactionary Nisard; also Taine with his entrancing, but no longer convincing, literary biology.

In connection with the present or *comparative* stage of study, names will later be passed in review. Since I have already in certain chapters of a volume entitled *Methods and Materials of Literary Criticism* (Gayley and Scott, Boston, 1899) described the movement of poetics during the earlier part of the century, I may be pardoned if I frequently avail myself of the treatment there accorded to that portion of the subject.

II. IN REPRESENTATIVE COUNTRIES

A. Germany

1. From 1760 to 1795, literary study in Germany was undergoing a process of reconstruction preparatory to the labors of the romantic school. In that country, the art aspect of modern literary criticism proceeds from Winckelmann. He, in his early treatise on the *Imitation of Greek Works of Painting and Sculpture*, shows himself a disciple of the Swiss school of Bodmer and Breitinger, who were themselves influenced by the nature poetry of Thomson (1739) and undoubtedly by the battles between moderns and ancients in France and England (1688-1700). Winckelmann's *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums*, published in 1764-65, is the earliest of its kind worthy of mention, for such treatises as Winckelmann himself knew of, Monier's *History of Art*, for instance, and Turnbull's *Ancient Painting*, lack breadth of knowledge and artistic acumen. Winckelmann's especial merit is that he was the first to apply the historic method to the study of the fine arts. His revelations concerning the principles of Greek art had an influence that did not stop with Lessing and Goethe; it has extended even to our time. We should, of course, remember that Winckelmann's conclusions are drawn rather from the study of Greek art — and even with that his acquaintance was limited — than from the study of art in general. Still, Hegel is justified in saying of him: "Winckelmann was inspired by the contemplation of the ideals of the ancients to such a degree that he has awakened a new sense for the appreciation of art, has removed such appreciation from the point of view of common aims and a mere imitation of nature, and has set us to seeking the idea of art in the works and history of art. Winckelmann is to be regarded as one of the men who have been able in the realm of art to open for the spirit a new organ and entirely new fashions of contemplation." Upon succeeding conceptions of literature, his doctrines have had a direct bearing. Like our English Bacon one hundred and fifty years before, Winckelmann drew his conclusions from actual contact with the

facts; also like Bacon, who is the founder of literary history, this founder of the history of art calls for the *genetic* method of critical study, — by cause and effect, movement, social or other, external influence, relation, change, decay, and revival. He recognizes, too, as Mr. Bosanquet has pointed out, the various *phases* of expressiveness within the beauty of plastic art, — the conflicting claims of beauty and expression, and their partial reconciliation.

Much that is most practical in the æsthetic theories of Hegel and Schelling, of whom we shall later treat, derives from Winckelmann. What Winckelmann did for the criticism of art during the period of reconstruction, Lessing was doing for German literary criticism. He formulated a system theoretical and historical, and applied it. Even though the first part of *Laocoon* (1766) was written to contest Winckelmann's assertion of the spiritual composure of Greek statuary and of the possibility of making the limits of painting as wide as those of poetry, Lessing himself derives to some extent from Winckelmann. But even more than by him, Lessing was influenced on the one hand by Burke, Hogarth, and Lord Kaimes, on the other by the father of æsthetics himself, Baumgarten. The premises of Lessing's dramatic theory, as well as those of his æsthetics, may be called into question, but for all that, his *Hamburgische Dramaturgie* and his *Laocoon* have influenced succeeding criticism more than any works since that time.

In the year 1764 appeared Kant's first contribution to æsthetics, *Observations on the Feeling of the Sublime and Beautiful*, not at all influenced by Winckelmann's past work of the same year, and, of course, not by the *Laocoon*, which was still on the desk of its writer. Kant, like Lessing, turns here to Burke for his inspiration. So also in his *Critique of Judgment* (1790), a work which is epoch-making in the history of poetics. Three streams of theory converge in this critique: the English and German æsthetico-critical, — Burke, Kaimes, Reynolds, Hogarth, Baumgarten, Lessing, Winckelmann; the English abstract-sensationalist and individualist, — Bacon, Locke, Shaftesbury, Berkeley, Hume; and the continental abstract-rationalist, — Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and the Baron von Wolff. Kant's æsthetic doctrines were made concrete and popularized by Schiller, especially those of the æsthetic semblance, and the relative effects of sublimity and beauty upon the beholder. Bearing the impress of Schiller and Goethe (who also adapted and modified Kant), the Kantian æsthetic has passed not only into popular poetic theory, but into the dialectic of Schelling and Hegel.

Space prohibits more than a passing mention of the sources of Goethe and Schiller. While the first of these in no place systematically develops a theory of poetry, the genesis of his theory and the course of his opinions are not difficult to discover. His æsthetic descent is not, as Mr. Bosanquet thinks, from Lessing, Winckelmann, and Kant,

by way of Schiller, but rather from Lessing and Winckelmann by way of Herder. For though Goethe was profoundly influenced by Schiller's interpretation of Kant's doctrine of the harmony of the moral and the natural orders in the realm of the æsthetic, he was rather confirmed in the course of his own development than converted to any alien way of thinking. As to his utterances on poetics, while his *Deutsche Baukunst* (1773), his contributions to *Die Horen* (1795-96), and his *Der Sammler und die Seinigen* (1798), are in general restricted to the plastic arts, the conclusions there reached concerning the *characteristic* (typical or significant) and the *individual* apply as well to music as to poetry. It is in his *Conversations*, in his *Letters*, his *Wahrheit und Dichtung*, his *Sprüche*, and occasional poems, that the course of his theory and its relation to details are especially to be sought. Schiller's service to poetics is performed in his *Briefe über die Ästhetische Erziehung der Menschheit*, *Anmuth und Würde*, and *Ueber naïve und sentimentale Dichtung* (1795-96). His ordering of the æsthetic feelings, his theory of the play-impulse, his contrast between the poetry of simplicity and that of reflection, while they derive in one way or another from Lessing, Winckelmann, and Kant, possess the color and vitality of their poetic exponent.

The theories of Schiller and Goethe, enriched by reciprocal suggestion and criticism, have a direct bearing not only upon the poetics of the philosophers who succeeded them, — Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, — but upon the poetry of Germany, and indirectly (through Coleridge, Wordsworth, Herbert Spencer, Arnold, and Ruskin) upon the poetics and the poetry of England. Since the appearance of Schiller's *Ueber naïve und sentimentale Dichtung* and Goethe's *Deutsche Baukunst*, the dogmatic strife between ancient and modern poetics has given place to an inquiry into the development of the æsthetic consciousness and its relation to the history of artistic creation.

The part of Herder in this movement toward a broader correlation of literature and art, especially in the way of developing the genetic or historical idea, cannot be overestimated. His writings abound in suggestions of laws of literary growth, as might be expected in the case of one in whom the historical sense was so highly developed, — who was indeed the pioneer, though under the influence of Rousseau, of the doctrine of evolution. He carried the idea into "the regions of poetry, art, religion, and finally into human culture as a whole. . . . By his work on language, *Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache*, he may be said to have laid the first rude foundations of the science of comparative philology and that deeper science of the ultimate nature and origin of language." As for the field of poetics, in 1768 he called for a scientist who should do what Winckelmann had done for classical art. And he himself helped in no insignificant way to found the historical or comparative science of literature,

which is even now reaping the fruition of the long labors of the nineteenth century.

To the dawning period of romantic poetry and poetics, Jean Paul Richter also rendered service. His contribution proceeded from a combination of idealism and naturalism, — the latter an outgrowth of his unaffected love of beauty, color, and radiance in the real world. His *Vorschule der Ästhetik* appeared in 1804, the year after Herder's death.

The period of reconstruction reached its climax during the decade 1790–1800. The theory and history of art had advanced in *content* from the formal to the significant; and in *method* from the provincial and traditional to the inductive. Poetics and literary criticism had abandoned in theory the particular judgment for the universal; and in practice the conventional for the natural and expedient. In linguistic philology and literary history the comparative method had at least found its prophet, Johann Gottfried von Herder.

2. *The Period of Romanticism and Allerleiwissenschaft.* Exactly in the middle of the decade 1790–1800 fell the publication of a work that was to vivify philology with the spirit of science as well as of romance. This was the famous *Prolegomena to Homer*. The author, F. A. Wolf, had earlier still, in 1786, asserted the independence, totality, and relativity of philology, as a study in its own right, covering not alone the languages of the Greeks and Latins, but their literatures, and all else that might serve as the exponent of their human nature, their life, philosophy, and law, their history, religion, and art. But by proving, or trying to prove, in 1795, that Homer was not a single poet, writing according to art and rule, but a name which stood for a golden age of the true spontaneous poetry of genius and nature, Wolf furthered even more vitally the interest of mankind in popular poetry, in the beginnings of art and institutions. In his *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* and his *Prolegomena to Homer*, all histories of literature since his time have their roots of method, *cultur-geschichtlich*, and generic, and interpretative. It is interesting to note here that as the æsthetics of Lessing and Kant drew their inspiration from English sources, so also the philological conception and method of Wolf. They are anticipated and undoubtedly suggested by Bentley's *Dissertation upon the Letters of Phalaris*, 1698. And this, as Professor Jebb has said, is the earliest model of the new criticism which by a scientific method was to bring accurate philological knowledge into relation with historical research.

From 1795 to about 1850 the *Alterthumswissenschaft* of Friedrich August Wolf reigns in philology, and in the literature affected by philology, I mean literary criticism, and literary history as well. In 1807 the Olympian Boeckh began to lecture at Heidelberg, in 1811 he was in Berlin; and from then on proceeded the Spiritual Recon-

struction of the Past, over the shades of which our own Professor Gildersleeve in his *Oscillations and Nutations* sheds a melodious tear. Boeckh lived and lectured until 1867; and not until ten years after his death was his famous *Encyclopædia and Methodology* published. It may be said by the specialists of the later portion of the century that there is no science of antiquity, no unity of studies — but at the bottom of our hearts we still believe that there is such a science, there is such unity: we say that they are not, because in the more modest and necessary zeal for a little we have fallen away from the whole ideal. We do not see the forest for the trees. Few may handle the *Encyclopædia* of Boeckh to-day; but no literary historian can traverse the methods of Boeckh, and of his master, Wolf, — can be complacently topographical, or rigidly synchronistic, or garrulously biographical, or flatly magisterial, — without falling foul of every critic — encyclopedic or not — to whom there is a drop of method in the quill.

History by movements, by types, and only then by countries, lives, or schools, — that is our legacy from the science of antiquity and the methodology of all the sciences. Bernhardt, Teuffel, Karl Otfried Müller, Ribbeck, Ebert, Nicolai, Susemihl, Schanz, Christ, Urlichs, Blass, Krumbacher, — and in more modern literary history, ten Brink, Wackernagel, Carrière, Scherer, Menzel, Diez, Tobler, — they have all followed such strands of the comprehensive method as they could, and in so far as they have followed, have achieved fulfillment.

In poetics and literary criticism the movement which succeeded the reconstruction of Lessing, Herder, and Schiller was in no slight degree indebted for its origin to Solger's *Vorlesungen über Aesthetik*. This philosopher took as his central theme Fichte's principle of *Æsthetic Irony*: the mood of the artist, that impels him to represent things eternal in terms of the phenomenal and evanescent. This is the keynote of romanticism in literature — the individual mood, the urgency of impulse, the spirit ideal and universal, — the poem pitifully inadequate, actual, particular, the creation of man's hands, through which spirit escapes, but in escaping endows the mortal with the nimbus of immortality. Construing this principle — the inevitableness and still the irony of the artistic struggle — as dependent upon the caprice of the artist, Wilhelm von Schlegel, in his *Briefe über Poesie*, 1795, in the periodical named *Athenäum*, founded, in company with his brother Friedrich, 1798, and especially in his *Lectures on Dramatic Literature*, 1809–1811, established in Germany the *Romantic School of Poetics*. To this movement, Ludwig Tieck and others contributed; and from France there came by way of Mme. de Staël's intimacy with Wilhelm von Schlegel a confluent stream of Rousseauism and the cosmopolitan ideal. The Oriental studies of

Wilhelm and the publications of his brother, the *Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, 1808, and the lectures on the *History of Oriental and Modern Literature*, 1815, enriched not only the romantic character, but the *alterthumswissenschaftlich* method or aspiration of the period. By the æsthetic teachings of the *Romantiker*, Germany was cultivated to a taste for Spanish and English drama as opposed to the formal and so-called classical productions of France and Italy. Hence the admirable Shakespearian criticism which, beginning in the earlier part of the century, continued well into the latter half; the impulse imparted by Tieck and Wilhelm von Schlegel abode in Gervinus, Kreyssig, Elze, Ulrici, and Delius, and still lives in the *Jahrbücher der deutschen Shakespeare-Gesellschaft*.

During this period of scientific expansion, the philosophical æsthetic movement is represented, in addition to Solger, by Schelling and Hegel. Mr. Bosanquet, in his *History of Æsthetic*, tells us that Goethe and Schiller had developed the Kantian æsthetic, "limited by abstraction and subjectivity into an objective, concrete content, which grows with the life and mind of man." Hegel tells us that the true line of succession ran from Schiller to Schelling. "Science," he says, "attained its absolute standpoint in Schelling's philosophy, and although art had previously begun to assert its particular nature and dignity in relation to the highest interests of humanity, yet it was now that the actual notion of *art*, and its place in scientific theory, were discovered." Schelling treats of beauty as the objective and necessarily historical expression of divinity as uttering itself through man. Hegel begins with the human side of this utterance, and shows how in the stages of symbolism, classicism, and romanticism, man's subjectivity tries to express itself in proper content and form, vaguely striving to suggest the thought by crude and uncouth shapes in primitive symbolic art, uniting the thought and the objective form in classical art, and in romantic breaking the bonds of actual necessity and yearning toward a spiritual manifestation. Hegel's æsthetic is subjective-objective, both philosophical and historical. His idealism has influenced, positively or negatively, all æstheticians and critics from his time down. His arraignment of the theory which would limit the scope and aim of art to imitation is of the utmost importance in the history of criticism as well as of art itself. By an utter misapprehension of Aristotle's theory of imitation, which carefully distinguished between the useful arts (or handicrafts) and the fine arts, saying that art imitates the processes of nature in the former, and an idealized or glorified nature in the latter, nearly all writers on æsthetics from Lord Kaimes down, — Batteux, Diderot, Baumgarten, Moritz, — even to the time of Winckelmann, had apprehended art as a more or less exact copy of the face of things: so that nature being considered perfect, art could be but an apologetic

duplicate; or nature being regarded as imperfect, art could but reproduce the imperfection of actuality. From this misconception Winckelmann and Lessing had broken away, — and Herder, by identifying the Beautiful with the True and the Good, had extended the scope of the artist even when imitating natural beauty. Kant, Goethe, Schiller, and Schelling had carried forward the theory of art as a selective and idealizing process; but it remained for Hegel to lift the discussion altogether out of the realm of the dubious, by demonstrating that art is nature, to be sure, but nature carried to a degree where the object of imitation becomes ideal, the imitator an exponent of the spiritual, and the process creative; the material, therefore, though actual, and consequently limited in possibility, supplements by suggestion that which it fails to express. The one-sidedness of the romantic school, the insufficiency of the principle of Artistic Irony or Caprice, became evident under the flood of light poured upon æsthetics by Hegel. Round Hegel's theory of art in general, and of its evolution, discussion still centres. And round his *Die Poesie* most subsequent German writers on poetry, accordant or divergent, revolve. This is true even of such anti-Hegelians as Schopenhauer, who either borrow their ideas from Hegel, or owe their virility to the intensity of their antagonism.

During this romantic and encyclopedic term, æsthetic criticism passes, then, from the view of art as abstractly objective to that of art as both subjective and objective in its nature; not an incidental or capricious but a necessary exponent of nature and of thought, and an indispensable factor in the history of civilization. The critical method derived from philology has passed from the empirical to the scientific; philology itself is no longer instrumental merely to other disciplines, but independent both in material and discipline. Poetics and literary history have passed from the inspirational to the social and national point of view, and from the magisterial to the dynamic and generic or eidographic method of approach and arrangement.

3. The third period may be called the *Historical-Philosophical*: it is characterized by a series of movements corrective of the extremes that had preceded.

With Jakob Grimm in 1829, philology leaves the void of *Allerleiwissenschaft*, and, discovering German grammar, centralizes, then radiates, and last irradiates: becomes, in fact, a comparative science with a definite subject and a well-defined aim. Bopp, likewise, between 1833 and 1852 makes of grammar a comparative science; and is followed by Schleicher in 1862, and others in the comparative study of the Indo-Germanic languages. W. von Humboldt died in 1835, but his researches into the influence of language construction upon intellectual development (published 1836–40) add a wonderful significance to this decade of comparative philology. In the history

of literature, too, the corrective movement finds its leaders. Between 1812 and 1835 the brothers Grimm labor to collect German myths and folk-lore, and by that road to penetrate to the origins of poetry. From their day literary history has been a comparative science, and its methods at least genetic. What Bacon had forecast, and Herder dreamed, was now a fact.

In poetics, the philological and theoretical streams, the former represented by such men as Boeckh, Paul, Elze, Steinthal, and the latter by men like Hegel and F. T. Vischer, unite; and the result in the middle of the century is such a work as Carriere's *Das Wesen und die Formen der Poesie*; in the latter part such works as Gerber's *Die Sprache als Kunst*, and the treatises of Wackernagel, Scherer, von Gottschall, as well as of Gröber, Tobler, Körting, and the lions of later methodology.

In all forms of literary scholarship, the principle of specialization begins to obtain. Hence the revival of Latin studies under Lachmann and Ritschl, the revision of special texts, and the systematization of epigraphy. Hence following in the wake of Boeckh's *Meters of Pindar*, the metrical studies of Rossbach, Westphal, J. H. H. Schmidt, and others to the present day; and in modern versification the investigations of Schaffer, Sievers, Kluge, Köberstein, Diez, Zarncke, and many more. Hence the flood of commentaries on Plato's theory of art and Aristotle's *Poetics*; on the former the well-known treatises of Ed. Müller, and Rüge, Justi, Reber, Raabe, and von Jan; on the latter, the editions and monographs of Ueberweg, Bernays, Biese, Döring, Reinkens, Teichmüller, Bekker, Vahlen, Susemihl, and half a hundred others — each sharpening his teeth, and tantalizing his appetite with the *μίμησις*, and *κάθαρσις* and the *τούτων* or *τοιούτων παθημάτων*. Hence in like manner the seminars, the doctor's dissertations, and the journals of archæology and every kind of philology, — of art and every kind of literary study, — every shade or shadow or shred of substance or of ghost. Hence, too, the schools of archæology at Athens and Rome — living monuments to the prophetic soul of Winckelmann.

In Germany, as in other countries of Europe and in America, the upshot of the literary tendencies and the disciplines so far maintained has been a comparative science of literature, — or, as I have elsewhere called it, literary, as distinguished from linguistic, philology. Of this when I have carried to its threshold, in some such manner as with Germany, the literary provenience of one or two other countries, I shall more especially speak.

B. In England

1. *The Preparatory Period.* To trace the modern movement of literary studies in England we must on the philological side turn

back to Bentley's reply to Boyle concerning the genuineness of the so-called *Letters of Phalaris*. This is the forerunner of all antiquarian and medieval researches contributory to the development of historical method during the last one hundred and fifty years.

On the poetic side we must go back at least as far as 1739. With Thomson's poem, *Edward and Leonora*, in that year, and Joseph Warton's *Enthusiast, or The Love of Nature*, 1740, the romantic movement began to gather strength. Warton called for a return to sincerity of observation and sanity of description. What may be called the literary courage of the emotions received a beneficial impetus from Dodsley's *Collection of Old Plays*, published in 1744,—and again in 1746, from Joseph Warton's Preface to *Odes on Several Subjects*. Poetry was now fairly embarked on the romantic stream. In criticism, too, the Wartons, Goldsmith, Young, Gray, Collins, Cowper, and Hurd are regarded by all as representatives of the eighteenth century transition from the romanticism of Sidney and Bacon to that of Wordsworth. But it must be remembered that not only in these writers, but in Dryden and Dennis, as well, and differently in Addison, were present the germs of our present critical principles and methods. Be that as it may, Hurd's *Letters on Chivalry and Romance*, 1762, Blair's *Critical Dissertation on Ossian*, 1763, Thomas Warton's *History of English Poetry*, 1774–81 (in which he acknowledges the receipt of Gray's outline for the history), in 1781 the second volume of Joseph Warton's *Life and Genius of Pope*, and in 1797 his edition of that poet's works,—these productions completed the preliminaries of the attack upon the school of "correctness." In 1798 followed the brief and telling Preface to the first edition of the *Lyrical Ballads*, and in 1800 the famous Preface to the second edition. In the latter Wordsworth, save where he exploited untenable theories of his own, succeeded in setting clearly before the world the strength and the claims of the romantic return to imagination and nature; a return that was to affect the principles and methods of poetics as emphatically as it had already affected those of poetry.

We must not fail to estimate the reconstructive influence exercised meanwhile by the writers of treatises upon æsthetics. Of these the first was Burke, whose *Sublime and Beautiful*, 1756, told not only directly upon æsthetic speculation in England, but also indirectly through the influence of Lessing and Kant, and their successors in æsthetic criticism: the Schiller of the *Ästhetische Briefe*, and the Goethe of the *Sammler* and the *Deutsche Baukunst*. For to Burke, Lessing was indebted in the *Laocoon*, 1766, and Kant in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 1790. Other English æstheticians were Kaimes (*Elements of Criticism*, 1762), Hogarth (*Analysis of Beauty*, 1753), Hume (*Later Dissertations*, 1757), and Reynolds (*Papers on the Idler, Discourses on Beauty*, 1758–59); and these likewise influenced Lessing, Kant, Schil-

ler, and Goethe. Also to be considered is the effect of the impetus given to historical and comparative research by Winckelmann's *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums*, 1764, by Stuart's *Antiquities of Athens* (two years earlier), and by other works on the archæology, literature, and art of the northern as well as the southern nationalities of Europe. Nor should the return wave of romantic interest from Germany be ignored. The outward movement proceeded from the early work of the Wartons, 1740–60, from the revival of Shakespearian scholarship, Gray's interest in northern literature, Macpherson's *Ossian*, 1762, Percy's *Reliques of Ancient English Poetry*, 1765. The movement returned from Germany in Bürger's *Lenore*, in the works of Herder, Jean Paul, Wieland, and, later, of the Schlegels, Tieck, and the Romantiker. That the English romantic revival owes anything to Bodmer (1721) and the German critics of the Swiss school is not probable, for they had no disciples in England; indeed, they themselves drew their inspiration largely from English poetry. Nor did it begin with Rousseau (whose influence shows itself as early as with Goldsmith), for Rousseau's *Nouvelle Héloïse* did not appear till 1760. It would appear not unlikely that most of this romantic inspiration—later carried by France and Germany into sentimentalism—issued in England from Thomson, 1739, Samuel Richardson, 1740, and Lillo (*George Barnwell*, 1731); in France from Marivaux and Prévost, 1731,—but that both schools had in turn derived it from the sentimental comedy of Sir Richard Steele (*The Funeral*, 1702, *The Lying Lover*, 1703, *The Conscious Lovers*, 1722), and of Addison (*The Drummer*, 1715). The creative literature of the century must, therefore, evidently, be regarded as a background to poetic theory. The numerous editions of older authors, collections of early poetry and drama, histories of types and periods of art, biographies of authors, translations of and commentaries upon the ancients, such as Tyrwhitt's and Pye's editions of Aristotle's *Poetics*,—the effect of all these, also, upon critical theory and practice, cannot be ignored though here but mentioned.

Under Johnson criticism had learned to set itself an object and to move toward it. The followers of the Wartons had, on the other side, attempted to deepen the study of theory and to widen the course of method. They had revived the poetic tests of nature, passion, and imagination, and had put into practice the elementary principles of historical method, genetic and comparative.

2. The second stage in this modern development of English poetics, criticism, literary history, is clearly attained by the opening of the nineteenth century. So far as theory is concerned, the dominant movement of the period, the romantic, had been gaining momentum ever since 1739; it had reached its culmination as a movement of revolt in 1798; as a movement of positive and practical

influence it still continues. Divisions into periods are arbitrary. The classical and the romantic movements in one form or another are perennial; they flow through periods. Viewed synthetically, the whole century in English literary history is, indeed, a period of reconstruction. But, more narrowly considered, the period is, as in Germany, encyclopedic and romantic. Its beginning is marked by the organization of criticism which attended the establishment of the *Reviews*, — in 1802 the *Edinburgh*, and in 1809 the *Quarterly*, — soon to be followed by *Blackwood's* and the *London Magazine*. Hitherto criticism had carried the authority of the writer only; and the labor of criticism was generally an avocation, or, at best, secondary to some regular profession. But the judgments of the *Edinburgh* and the *Quarterly* were known to proceed from one or other of a coterie of acknowledged scholars and men of letters, to represent the opinions and policy of the coterie and the best ability of the writer. Criticism, accordingly, was, at the beginning of the century, organized as a profession by the *Edinburgh*, under the editorship of Jeffrey, with the collaboration of Sydney Smith, Brougham, Scott, Leslie, etc.; by the *Quarterly*, under the editorship of Gifford, with the collaboration of Scott, Southey, Lockhart, etc.; by *Blackwood's Magazine*, under Wilson, Lockhart, Hogg, and Maginn; and by the *London*, under Lamb, Hazlitt, and De Quincey.

The history of criticism in the early part of this century may be considered systematically as follows: (1) *The Enunciation of the Romantic Principle*: Wordsworth, Coleridge's earlier writings, Scott in the *Edinburgh*, etc. It may well be debated whether Coleridge as well as the *Edinburgh* reviewers did not take Wordsworth's apotheosis of rustic passion and speech too literally; but it was the extreme construction placed upon certain of Wordsworth's pronouncements, apparently untenable and really non-essential, that brought into prominence his advocacy of principles indubitably vital — the common principles of romantic poetics. His distinction between imagination and fancy, his search for a psychological basis of poetic principle, and his advocacy of the comparative and genetic methods of literary study are contributions to the science of criticism. (2) *The Classical Reaction*: the *Reviews* — Jeffrey, Gifford, Lockhart, Southey, Wilson, etc. But here we must discriminate between the impressionism and narrow prejudice of a Gifford (the nadir of personal criticism) and the reactionary but altogether more catholic and philosophical traditionalism which, in spite of occasional spleen and error, characterizes Jeffrey. *Blackwood* follows, to some extent, the lead of the older *Reviews*, but Wilson's temper frequently prompts to liberal appreciation; while Lockhart (even if he did commit the diatribe against Keats) deserves credit as a master of critical biography, and displays neither the caprice of

Wilson nor the malignity and retrogressive bigotry of his editor in chief. (3) *The Establishment of Romantic Criticism*. First, Bowles, whose criticism of Pope's poetry, prefixed to his edition of that poet's works, 1806, gave rise to the controversy with Campbell and Byron (Campbell's *Essay on Poetry*, 1819; Byron's *Letter to John Murray*, and *Observations upon Observations*, 1821; Bowles's *Invariable Principles of Poetry*, 1819, and *Letters to Byron and Campbell*, 1822). Second, Coleridge, who, in his treatment of the progress of the English drama, states the comparative method excellently and attempts to put it into practice. Though his criticism was destined to germinate and bear fruit in younger writers, it was in itself a disappointment. Vague, *a priori*, unapplied, it fails because the speculations which inspired him — speculations of Lessing, Kant, Schelling, Schiller, and especially of Jean Paul — were not systematized by him; because, also, the principles were not drawn by him from the practice and history of poetry, nor scientifically tested by the social and poetic practice of the day. (*Lectures on English Poets*, 1808, 1812; *Biographia Literaria*, 1817.) Third, Campbell (*Lectures on Poetry*, 1810; *Specimens of the British Poets*, 1819-48). Fourth, Leigh Hunt, in criticism a direct descendant of the Wartons and Spence, in temperament, of Goldsmith; he in turn influenced his contemporaries Hazlitt and Lamb, and probably both Carlyle and Macaulay, the leaders of criticism in the next generation (*Critical Essays*, 1805; *What is Poetry?* 1844; *Wit and Humor*, etc.). Fifth, Charles Lamb, unique in sympathetic insight, a forerunner of Pater. Sixth, William Hazlitt, the ally of Coleridge in the contention that poetry should be judged not by some standard of the critics, but by the criterion of poetry — poetry universal and in the abstract (*Round Table*, 1817; *Characters of Shakespeare's Plays*, 1817; *English Poets*, 1818; *English Comic Writers*, 1819; *Dramatic Literature of the Reign of Elizabeth*, 1821; *Table Talk*, 1821-22). Seventh, Shelley, whose *Defence of Poetry*, 1821, provoked by T. L. Peacock's *Four Ages of Poetry*, recalls the best of Sidney, Bacon, Wordsworth, and Coleridge and anticipates Carlyle's gospel of poetic significance and Pater's of rational æsthetic delight.

3. The next stage in the development of literary science is marked first by various attempts at an *Historical Method*. These began with Henry Hallam, and were continued by Carlyle, De Quincey, and Macaulay. Of Carlyle it may be said that his services are rather in the theory of criticism than the practice; but both in theory and practice his keynote is "historical": poetry is history vitalized; the poet is the outcome of his own history and the history of the nation. Carlyle taught the significance of poetry, the interpretative function of criticism, and advocated a method of research at once genetic and comparative. His influence in the systematization and limitation of

modern criticism has been immense, and has by no means begun to exhaust itself. It affects rather the matter than the manner, and is more a philosophy than an æsthetic of poetry (see *Miscellanies*, *Goethe*, etc., *Lectures on Heroes*, *History of Literature*). In their recognition of national literary development and in their familiarity with German literature Carlyle and De Quincey were sympathetic; but as regards the appreciation of German literature De Quincey is more insular than Carlyle, and as regards literary history, while Carlyle would discover the bearing of the poet's ethical significance, De Quincey is concerned with that of his literary characteristics. Macaulay, who knew not Germany, and with all his biographical industry never learned the comparative method, represents the "personal" wing of the historical school. He is judge and advocate combined. He derives from Samuel Johnson, Gibbon, Jeffrey, Hallam, and Hazlitt.

These tentative efforts at historical procedure (thwarted, of course, by imperfection of material and of method) are succeeded in the latter half of the century by a movement which has for its purpose the investigation of principles and the establishment of a scientific basis for poetic and artistic appreciation. The leaders, among others, are John Stuart Mill (*System of Logic*, 1843, etc.; *Thoughts on Poetry and its Varieties*, etc.), Herbert Spencer (*Social Statics*, 1851; *Psychology*, 1855, etc.; *Philosophy of Style*, 1852; *On Gracefulness*, 1854), G. H. Lewes (*Problems of Life and Mind*, 1874-79, etc.; *Principles of Success in Literature*), and Bain (*The Emotions and the Will*, 1859, etc.). Later still in the century valuable service has been rendered to the cause of scientific æsthetic, and hence to that of literary science, by the researches, psychological, physiological, etc., of Darwin, Grant Allen, Sully, Gurney, and the studies philosophical and historical of Caird in his exposition of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, Bosanquet, whose *History of Æsthetic* stands easily first, Butcher, who has given us the most subtle of modern interpretations of Aristotle's æsthetic theory, Jowett in his introductions to Plato's *Dialogues*, Knight, Baldwin Brown, W. P. Ker, R. P. Hardie, and others.

By the earlier of the scientific teachers Morris, Ruskin, and Arnold were more or less affected. But Morris and Ruskin confined themselves principally to the æsthetics and economics of the plastic arts, while the æsthetics and didactics of poetry were the immediate concern of Matthew Arnold. Arnold did for the comparative method of literary criticism what Ruskin tried to do for art-criticism. A combination and modification of the qualities of Ruskin and Arnold (by omission of the economics of the first and the didactics of the second) appear in the essays of Walter Pater, who, with Symonds, may be regarded as the leader of the hedonistic school. But Pater's

chief characteristic is his desire to interpret and reproduce the author; Symonds's, to show the historical relations of poetry and art.

Among contemporary critics there is evident a right tendency in theoretic criticism to regard poetry both as absolute and relative: to test the absolute æsthetic worth by reference to the laws of nature and thought, the poet's own conception of these and of his poetic function in interpreting them, — the poet's aim; to test the relative worth of a poem by reference not to the standard of some preferred, so-called classical or romantic school, but with reference to the particular movement of which it was part, and to the social, the inherited, the artistic, and the individual conditions of the age that have contributed to that movement and have affected the individual. And in method the tendency has fortunately been, with the best writers, more impartial, comparative, genetic, psychological, sometimes with a view to recording, sometimes interpreting, sometimes to teaching. As a result, something like artistic criticism has occasionally been produced. Credit in this regard is especially due to Arnold, Pater, Symonds, Gurney, Stephen, Saintsbury, Gosse, and Dowden. In the treatment of literary types, the palm for scientific performance must be given to A. W. Ward and E. K. Chambers — both historians of the English drama; and to C. H. Herford for his *Literary Relations of England and Germany in the Sixteenth Century*. In the history of English poetry, unfortunately, little that is methodical has been done by English-speaking writers. Morley's *English Writers* promised well, but comes only halfway down. Courthope's *History of English Poetry* is not yet finished, and has been severely handled by the philologists. Garnett and Gosse's *History* is especially valuable for its social illustrations and its dynamic and biographical methods of treatment.

That I have not in this survey said anything of the contribution to literary science made by the students of linguistic and purely historical science proceeds by no means from oversight, but from the limitations of space. To mention a few like Donaldson and Mure for Greek in the first half of the century, and Mahaffy, Jebb, and Haigh for the latter half; or like Cruttwell, Nettleship, Simcox, Sellar, Munro, Mayor, Conington, Ellis, Mackail, and Tyrrell for the Latin, is simply invidious, therefore I desist. A catalogue, imperfect at that, of scholars in modern philology and literary history would be similarly unavailing. And to attempt, anywhere in this sketch, any estimate of the influence of the methods of political historians such as Stubbs, Freeman, Bryce, *et id omne genus* for England, — Curtius, Mommsen, and Grote for Germany, — though absolutely requisite to a complete investigation of the subject, would be madness.

Of the contribution of England to the present condition of literary

science, I shall speak when we come to consider the common outcome of the movements of the nineteenth century.

C. In France

1. The remote forefather of the modern spirit in French criticism was Perrault, who in his *Parallèle des Anciens et des Modernes* (1688–1697) attacked that part of Boileau's doctrine which advocated imitation of the classics as the best imitators of nature. Thus was begun a controversy concerning the relative merits of classic and contemporary literature which not only weakened faith in the infallibility of Boileau's principle, but resulted in a wide extension of the field of criticism. With Perrault there gained currency the poetic canon of naturalism and the critical method of relativity; the first of which took form under the hand of Diderot, while the second culminated on the one hand in the extreme individualism of Rousseau, and on the other in the comparative and historical methods of Mme. de Staël, Villemain, Sainte-Beuve, and Taine.

The immediate predecessors of the literary philology of the nineteenth century in France were Rousseau, Buffon, and the encyclopedists of the eighteenth century. Rousseau's condemnation of civilization in his *Discours* of 1750, on the ground that it corrupted morals and natural freedom, must have awakened critics to the advisability of studying art and poetry in their social relations. Buffon's *Discours de Réception* of 1753 developed an essentially modern and philosophical argument for the intrinsic individuality of style, purely romantic in tendency. Diderot, much of whose critical work first appeared in *Les Feuilles de Grimm*, makes there, and in the prefaces to his plays (*Père de famille* and *Le fils naturel*), an effort toward emancipation from the classical conventionalities. "Everywhere," as Professor Saintsbury has said, "there is to be perceived the cardinal principle of sound criticism; that a book is to be judged, not according to arbitrary rules laid down *ex cathedra* for the class of books to which it is supposed to belong, but according to the scheme of its author in the first place, and in the second to the general laws of æsthetics; a science which, if the Germans named it, Diderot, by their own confession, did much to create." He made the return to nature in his poetics, and attempted to do so in his dramas — giving us not mere types, but actual characters. For the strictly defined tragedy and comedy of the former epoch he substituted the play of the *bourgeoisie* — the *drame* or melodrama. This movement was, of course, assisted by the vogue of Marivaux's *comédie larmoyante*, and by sentimental novels, such as his *Marianne*. And the same movement was further advanced by J. J. Rousseau's advocacy, in his *Lettre à D'Alembert*, in 1758, *Sur les spectacles*, in which he censures the theatre of the day, with its sentimental and imaginative ad-

ventures, and insists upon the cessation of spectacles based upon the afflictions of noble and royal characters, upon the introduction of popular interests and individualities, and the manifestation of a desire to teach, to moralize.

An entirely different movement characterizes the poetics of another precursor of the romantic school, André Chénier (1762-94). His æsthetic was at once imaginative and traditional. Though possessed of a natural idealism, this did not lead him to disregard the models of antiquity. He was a "humanist," but of the natural kind, not the literary, like Ronsard. His principal contribution to poetics proper was the *Poëme de l'invention*. It would appear that, all things considered, the romantic movement was not without obligation to him; — but his influence is perhaps most evident in the refined or rational romanticism of the *Parnassiens* of the latter part of the nineteenth century.

2. To the *Romantic Period* of French poetics the transition was made by Madame de Staël and Châteaubriand.

(1) Madame de Staël's *De la littérature considérée dans ses rapports avec les institutions sociales* (1800) reminds one of Gibbon's essay on the *History of Literature* and of Shaftesbury's doctrine of cosmopolitan culture. Like the former, the authoress attempts to show that literature is an affair of the spirit and can proceed only from conditions of freedom and progress; and, like the latter, to encourage her fellow countrymen to assimilate the best that is offered by other nations and literatures. By her *De l'Allemagne* (1813) she introduced German literature into France, as De Quincey and Carlyle were soon to introduce it into England. Her influence over Wilhelm von Schlegel, who "became the interpreter of Germany to her eager and apprehensive mind," has been already noticed. Italy and England also were conquered by her; and it was in no slight degree that she prepared the way for the romantic movement. "She advanced criticism," as Professor Dowden has put it, "by her sense that art and literature are relative to ages, races, governments, environments. She dreamed of an European or cosmopolitan literature in which each nation, while retaining its special characteristics, should be in fruitful communication with its fellows." With her contemporary, Châteaubriand, we enter upon a revival of medieval religious and æsthetic sentiment, his most important critical work being the *Génie du christianisme* (1802). In this he calls for a sentimental, romantic, but spontaneous and modern, treatment of life. And with practical result. It may, indeed, be said that together, these two, Madame de Staël and Châteaubriand, effected the overthrow of the skeptical, atheistic, and unscientific interpretation of literature and art; they shattered the autocracy of classical models and abstract rules; they introduced the appeal to the imagination and the senses; they revived

the spontaneous and artistic characteristics of medieval lyricism, and Christianized nature and man for the purposes of literature.

During this season other forces, also, had been working to hasten the advent of a romantic poetics and a comparative criticism. In 1801 Baour-Lormian conveyed to his countrymen by the *Poésies Ossianiques* the flavor of Macpherson; and later (1812) Creuzé de Lesser added to the medievalist revival by the publication of his *Table ronde*. In 1799 Sénancour had produced his melancholy *Réveries*; and after the death of Joubert, 1825, appeared a collection of those lyric rhapsodies in prose, the *Pensées*. In 1811, stirring the very pool of romance, Ginguené published the beginnings of his *Histoire littéraire de l'Italie*, begun in 1802. Historical and philological studies subversive of tradition were meanwhile prosecuted by Fauriel and Raynouard, and minor critics were feeling their way toward a comparative and psychological method. "Foreign life and literature," says Dowden, by whom these phenomena of change are duly noted, "lent their aid to the romantic movement in France — the passion and mystery of the East; the struggle for freedom in Greece; the old ballads of Spain; the mists, the solitudes, the young heroes, the pallid female forms of Ossian; the feudal splendors of Scott; the melancholy Harold; the mysterious Manfred; Goethe's champion of freedom, his victim of sensibility, his seeker for the fountain of living knowledge; Schiller's revolters against social law, and his adventures of court and camp." There were also changes in language and form, "of which Hugo and Sainte-Beuve were the chief initiators."

The way for the poetics of Hugo was still further prepared by Henri Beyle (Stendhal, 1783-1842), whose chief contributions to criticism were his *Histoire de la peinture en Italie* and the *Racine et Shakespeare*. His method was both comparative and psychological, and in his habit of characterizing the poet by his *milieu* he was the precursor of Taine and Brunetière. "In temperament," as Saintsbury has pointed out, "religious views, and social ideas, he was a belated philosopher of the Diderot school. But in literature he had improved even on Diderot, and very nearly anticipated the full results of the romantic movement. . . . In his *De l'amour* and in his novels he made himself the ancestor of what has been called successively realism and naturalism in France." Stendhal merits the serious attention of the literary historian.

The history of criticism during the rest of the romantic period may be conveniently treated under the following movements, both contributory to the theory of poetics rather than to critical method.

(2) *The Romantic Revolution in the Drama*, effected by Victor Hugo's *Preface to Cromwell*, 1828, and his *Hernani*, 1830. Hugo definitely discards the "unities," declines all artificial limitations,

and asserts that art should represent the whole truth, no matter what kind of æsthetic emotion may result.

(3) *The Philosophical and Comparative Discipline* of Cousin (1792-1868). This thinker's *Du vrai, du beau, et du bien* was the result of a reaction from the sensationalism of the eighteenth century. His studies were first made in the wake of Reid and the Scotch philosophers; but after a visit to Germany in 1817 he became a follower of the German idealists. Though, with Levêque and Jouffroy, a member of the school of *spiritualistes*, and called an eclectic, he was the most enthusiastic advocate in France of German philosophy. His influence upon French poetics is not to be underestimated. Nor is that of Michelet (1798-1874), whose philosophy, like Cousin's, shows the influence of Herder and Hegel; nor that of Edgar Quinet, the bosom friend of Michelet and a sympathizer in his æsthetic views.

3. The movement succeeding the early romantic is the *Scientific-Historical*. This was headed by Villemain, who, in his *Tableau de la littérature au moyen âge*, in the *Tableau de la littérature au XVIII^e siècle*, and in his lectures, applied a method of inquiry which observed the social, biographical, genetic, and comparative aspects of the literary phenomenon. The resulting criticism was characterized by impartiality, sanity, and a scientific decisiveness far in advance of that produced by preceding critics. Villemain was seconded by Saint-Marc Girardin and Sainte-Beuve, the latter probably the greatest critic of the century. Sainte-Beuve incorporates the romantic, historical, social, and psychological attempts of his predecessors and contemporaries under a new method, at once more logical, more scientific, and more imaginative than theirs — a method which has been justly called the naturalistic.

In the double paper on Châteaubriand (*Nouveaux Lundis*, 21, 22 Juillet, 1862), Sainte-Beuve expounds in detail his method of literary criticism. Starting with the author of the work, the critic studies him zoölogically, as it were, with reference to his race and habitat. He traces his family history, seeking in the parents (especially the mother), the brothers and sisters, and even the children, the secret of his peculiar individuality. From the family he passes to "le premier milieu," the group of friends and contemporaries who, like a literary family, shared in the author's aims and ambitions. The utterances of the author's enemies and admirers also furnish clues. The result of this method of study, which places the author in his environment of heredity and influence, is the discovery of some characteristic by which, as a label, his peculiar talent may be designated.

Though Sainte-Beuve calls his method naturalistic, he does not claim for it a place among the exact sciences. The day will indeed come, he thinks, when the great families of genius and their principal

divisions shall be accurately determined; but men in their moral nature are so complex that the critic cannot hope ever to treat them just as he would animals or plants. Criticism must forever remain an art, demanding, like the art of medicine, a special tact or talent in those who practice it. The method of Sainte-Beuve is rather English (that of experience and individual circumstance) than French (that of system and abstraction). His mother was English; he was himself brought up on English books; he especially admired Bacon, with whose prophetic enunciation of the scope and function of literary history he was acquainted, and whose comparative method he himself attempted to apply. He has, more than any other foreign critic, affected the course of English literary philology in the nineteenth century — and affected it for good. His special disciple is Matthew Arnold. Of Sainte-Beuve's work an admirable estimate has been given by Dowden. The latter says that, "wandering endlessly from author to author in his *Portraits littéraires* and *Portraits contemporaines*, Sainte-Beuve studied in all its details what we may term the physiology of each." His long research in "his most sustained work, *Port-Royal*, led him to recognize certain types or families under which the various minds of men can be grouped and classified." So, also, in his *Causeries du Lundi* and the *Nouveaux Lundis*. "They formed, as it were, a natural history of intellects and temperaments. He did not pretend to reduce criticism to a science; he hoped that at length, as a result of numberless observations, something like a science might come into existence. Meanwhile he would cultivate the relative and distrust the absolute." To estimate a work, he studies the personality of the author, his conditions, his inherited qualities, his education, life, everything that can be ascertained concerning him. Thus he aims to discover the key to the secret of his literary utterances. This is the method, according to Professor Dowden, "which has best served the study of literature in the nineteenth century." It is largely the method of Matthew Arnold, whose success, however, hardly equaled that of Sainte-Beuve, his master.

That a reaction against liberal methods should set in was of course to be expected. In this case the movement was headed by Nisard, who, with his followers, reverted to an abstract, authoritative, and individual standard, attempting to test the literary product in question by that. Nisard applies to each literary product a three-fold test: (1) The ideal of the nation; (2) the ideal of the language; (3) the ideal of humanity. While believing that knowledge and taste are essentially relative, of the individual and the environment, he holds that the critic may contribute to the general onward movement of culture by expressing sincerely and forcibly his opinion as if it were absolute; for the object of criticism is to regulate the

intellectual pleasures of each age in turn, and to deliver works from the tyranny of *chacun son goût*. The criticism of Nisard is tonic, but too intensely, therefore narrowly, national. As a philosophical phenomenon it is the æsthetic outcome of the positivism of Comte.

The present period of criticism in France includes the movement of art for art's sake, whose representatives, de Vigny, Théophile Gautier, Théod. de Banville, Leconte de Lisle, Sully-Prudhomme, etc., are called the *Parnassiens*. This movement is characterized by a revolt against the excesses of the romantic school, and a revival of a more philosophical and rationalistic theory of inspiration. It cultivates accuracy in form, and aims in an æsthetic fashion at sculptural and picturesque effects of style. Its doctrines may, in fact, be compared with the much more refined æstheticism or hedonism of Walter Pater.

The period includes, also, important developments in scientific criticism; the esthopsychological of Hennequin, the naturalistic (historically objective) of Taine, the national and eidographic of Brunetière, the social of Guyau. Taine started out by being frankly and flatly scientific. Literature, he said, is a natural product whose characteristics are to be investigated and recorded, like those of trees and flowers. Criticism is thus a kind of botany applied to human works, and the efforts of the critic are devoted to determining the literary system or organism which is made up of the productions of a given period or nation. Within such a system, when it has been found, will be arranged the authors and their works according to the dominant characteristic of each. The literary activity of any member of such a system is shaped by three influences: (1) The race, or the influence of heredity and temperament; (2) the environment, political, social, and physical; (3) the moment. This threefold formula has vitally affected the literary studies of the nineteenth century. For long it was in everybody's mouth. It is a fact, however, not generally known that the formula did not originate with Taine at all. He derived it beyond a peradventure from Hegel's *Æsthetik*, vol. 1, p. 20: "Sodann gehört jedes Kunstwerk seiner Zeit, seinem Volke, seiner Umgebung an." Brunetière, who adds to the three conditions specified by Taine the element of individuality (*Evolution des Genres dans l'Histoire de la Littérature*, vol. 1, p. 22), was also anticipated by Hegel (*Æsthetik*, vol. 1, p. 45): "Denn das Kunstwerk um seiner zugleich materiellen und individuellen Natur willen, geht wesentlich aus besonderen Bedingungen der mannigfachsten Art, wozu vorzüglich Zeit und Ort der Entstehung, dann *die bestimmte Individualität des Künstlers* und hauptsächlich die technische Ausbildung der Kunst gehören, hervor."

It has been shown by Professors Brunetière and Dowden that while Taine's theory has had enormous influence in shaping the destinies of the materialistic movement — an inevitable reaction

against the over-personal temper of the romantic school, — it was neither sufficient nor capable of securing the adherence in practice of its chief advocate. It exaggerates the local, the temporary, the animal. It pretends to be scientific and impartial, but is in reality deductive and magisterial. Still M. Taine has by his famous *History of English Literature* taught literary historians to regard literature as a social and historical phenomenon, and critics to use the objective method as at least a component part of the system of appreciation.

In his article on *La Critique littéraire*, in *La Grande Encyclopédie*, M. Brunetière states with clearness his view of the function of criticism. It is threefold, (1) to explain, (2) to classify, (3) to judge. By explanation is meant description, analysis, and comment. The critic must explain the author, whose character is not always an analogue of his book, but he must not stop with the author. Others have helped write the book. The author's contemporaries are his collaborators. Other books have influenced him. He lives in a particular moment or phase of the evolution of the *genre* to which his work belongs. A part of the explanation, therefore, consists in placing the work in its *milieu*, national and international. To perform the work of classification criticism needs sound principles of three kinds: (1) *Scientific*, analogous to those of natural history; (2) *Moral*, establishing an ethical hierarchy without identifying morals and art; (3) *Æsthetic*, measuring the work of art by the absolute quantity that it expresses. Furnished with these principles, criticism, as a mode of classifying, would become scientific. Finally, criticism is under obligation to pass judgment; for a work of art, while it is a record to be explained and classified, is also a poem or statue better or worse than some other poem or statue. Distinct from the object of criticism is its function. According to Brunetière the function of criticism is to act on public opinion, on authors, and upon the general direction of literature and art. By maintaining literary traditions criticism perpetuates from age to age the literary consciousness of the nation.

In his *Evolution des Genres dans l'histoire de la littérature* (1890) this admirable scholar sketches the rise and development of the spirit of modern criticism from its beginning in Italy in the period of the Renaissance. It came into existence as the result of two causes: (1) The rediscovery of the classics; (2) (following Burckhardt's *Civilization in Italy*) the growth of the sense of personality. The first led to philological criticism of a pedantic kind, the second to rivalry and envy, and so to criticism in the sense of fault-finding. When criticism passed over into France, laying aside its pedantry and its satire it became at first strictly literary, then in turn æsthetic, philosophical, historical, and scientific. Of Brunetière's view of literary growth as following the biological analogy I shall have

a criticism to offer in the remarks upon comparative literature with which this paper will conclude.

To Brunetière's insistence upon the individual element as contributory to the creation of the literary organism, I have already referred, showing that in Germany he was anticipated by Hegel. But even in France the doctrine was enunciated with great clearness before Brunetière's statement of it. This was one of the services performed for literary philology by Emile Hennequin, a follower of Herbert Spencer, — who in *La Critique scientifique* (1888) attempted to put criticism upon a scientific basis. Hennequin's method, which he terms *Esthopsychologie*, is in some respects similar to that of Taine. It differs from Taine's in attaching less importance to the race, and in throwing emphasis upon the individuality of the author and his power to create an environment for himself. The purpose of criticism, according to Hennequin, is not to evaluate the work of art, nor yet to determine the means by which it is produced, but to show the relation of the work to the social and psychological characteristics of the artist whom it reveals. "His method of criticism," remarked J. A. Symonds, "may be defined as the science of the work of art regarded as a sign."

Of the contributions to theoretical or applied poetics of a notable host, I cannot here speak. Suffice it to acknowledge the manifold genius of the critic, Edward Scherer; the philological and historical contributions of Gaston Paris, Darmesteter, Petit de Julleville; and the excellent researches into literary movements and types conducted by MM. Pellisier, Albert, Ampère, Desnoiresterres, Léon Gautier, Jeanroy, Faguet, Bédier, Lenient, and Jusserand. At the present moment, special attention is directed to the late Joseph Texte's revival of the comparative or cosmopolitan ideal in literary history advocated long ago by Rousseau and adopted by Mme. de Staël, Villemain, and Sainte-Beuve; and to the social æsthetics of Guyau. These will be mentioned when I come to speak of comparative literature.

The reaction against romanticism in dramatic theory and practice instituted by Emile Augier and Alexandre Dumas, I have unfortunately no time to discuss. It is as realistic as that of the *Parnassiens* is æsthetic. The minor French school of poetry, their creeds and affectations, *les décadents*, *les symbolistes*, etc., will have no permanent effect.

Of the development of literary studies in two or three other countries, especially Italy, Russia, and America, I had intended to treat, but this discussion is already longer than it should have been. Let us advance at once to the possibilities of literary study, as scientifically conducted, to-day.

III. THE OUTCOME IN A LITERARY SCIENCE

The movements of which I have spoken merge in what is frequently, with more or less definiteness of meaning, styled comparative literature, or the comparative study of literature. In order to present the significance of these terms, and to decide whether they convey the idea to be expressed, I must be permitted to recapitulate some portions of an inquiry, entitled "What is Comparative Literature?" published by me in the *Atlantic Monthly* for July, 1903. Comparative literature, as now cultivated, is, in the first place, understood of a field of investigation,—the literary relations existing between distinct nationalities: the study of international borrowings, imitations, adaptations. And to recognize such relations as incidental to national growth is of the utmost importance—social as well as literary: (Gaston Paris, Texte, Arnold, Goethe.) This attention to literary relations is, of course, the consequent of the study of literatures as national: first the history of each literature; then the historic relations between literatures. That in turn is naturally followed by the synthesis in literature as a unit. "The nineteenth century," says M. Texte, "has seen the national history of literatures develop and establish itself: the task of the twentieth century will undoubtedly be to write the comparative history of those literatures." "The scientific view of literature," says Brandes, "provides us with a telescope of which the one end magnifies, and the other diminishes; it must be so focused as to remedy the illusion of unassisted eyesight. The different nations have hitherto held themselves so distinct, as far as literature is concerned, that each has only to a very limited extent been able to benefit by the productions of the rest." Here, again, the way had been marked out by Arnold, when he advocated the comparison of literary classics in one language, or in many, with a view to determining their relative excellence, that is, to displacing personal or judicial criticism by a method more scientific. I am aware that this conception of the study concerns its method and purpose rather than its field. But I mention it here because it implies a more comprehensive and deeper conception underlying all these statements of the material of comparative study: *the solidarity of literature*. And that is the working premise of the student of comparative literature to-day: literature as a distinct and integral medium of thought, a common institutional expression of humanity; differentiated, to be sure, by the social conditions of the individual, by racial, historical, cultural, and linguistic influences, opportunities, and restrictions, but (irrespective of age or guise), prompted by the common needs and aspirations of man, sprung from common faculties psychological and physiological, and obeying common laws of material and mode, of the individual, and of social humanity.

From this conception of the material as a unit, scholars naturally advance to the consideration of its development, the construction of a *theory*. If a unity, and an existence approximately contemporaneous with that of society, why not a life, a growth? "We no longer have to examine solely the relations of one nation with another," says one, "but to unfold the simultaneous development of all literatures, or, at least, of an important group of literatures." It is the task of comparative literature, according to another, to find whether the same laws of literary development prevail among all peoples or not. The internal and external aspects of literary growth, Mr. Posnett announces to be the objects of comparative inquiry; and accepting as the principle of literary growth the progressive deepening and widening of personality, — in other words, the contraction and expansion of Arnold and Texte, — with the development of the social unit in which the individual is placed, this author finds a corresponding differentiation of the literary medium from the primitive homogeneity of communal art, a gradual individualizing of the literary occasion and an evolution of literary forms. Mr. Posnett's method is perhaps impaired by the fact that he regards the relation of literary history to the political rather than to the broader social development of a people, but he certainly elaborates a theory; and it is the more instructive because he does not treat literature as organic, developing by reason of a life within itself to a determined end, but as secondary and still developing with the evolution of the organism from which it springs. In this theory of institutional growth result also the methods of Buckle and Ernst Grosse, which may be termed physiological and physiographical; and the physio-psychological of Schiller, Spencer, and Karl Groos; and the method of Irjö Hirn, and Guyau, which combines the social and psychological in the inquiry into the art-impulse, its history and its effect; and that of Schlegel and Carriere, who, emphasizing one side of Hegel's theory, rest literary development largely upon the development of religious thought. In M. Brunetière, on the other hand, we have one who boldly announces his intention to trace the evolution of literary species, — not as dependent upon the life of an organism such as society, but in themselves. He frankly proposes to discover the laws of literary development by applying the theory of evolution to the study of literature. When he details the signs of youth, maturity, and decay which the type may exhibit, and the transformation of one type into another — as, for instance, the French pulpit oration into the ode — according to principles analogous in their operation to the Darwinian struggle for existence, survival of the fittest, and natural selection, we become apprehensive lest the parallel be over-worked. If M. Brunetière would only complete the national portion of his history, or, at least, try to substantiate his theory, we should

be grateful. He has, however, enunciated one of the problems with which comparative literature must grapple, and is grappling. Does the biological principle apply to literature? If not, in how far may the parallel be scientifically drawn?

That leads us to still a third conception of the term under consideration. Comparative literature, say some, is not a subject-matter nor a theory, but a *method of study*. With the ancients it was the habit of roughly matching authors. The method has existed ever since there were two pieces of literature known to the same man; it has persisted through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance; and it is alive to-day. Its merits and defects are those of the man who uses it. To others the comparative method means the attempt to obtain by *induction* from a sufficient variety of specimens the characteristics, distinguishing marks, principles, even laws of the form, movement, type, or literature under discussion. (Carriere, Freytag, Aristotle.) In the discipline under consideration historical sequence is just as important as comparison by cross-sections. The science is called "comparative literary history" rather than "literature compared," by French, German, and Italian scholars, not for nothing. The historian who searches for origins or stages of development in a single literature may employ the comparative method as much as he who zigzags from literature to literature; and so the student whose aim is to establish relations between literary movement and literary movement, between author and author, period and period, type and type, movement and movement, theme and theme, contemporaneous or successive in any language, nationality, clime, or time. The comparison is not alone between diverse national literatures, but between any elements involved in the history of literature, or any stages in the history of any element. There have been, within my own knowledge, those who would confine the word literature to the written productions of civilized peoples, and consequently would exclude from consideration aboriginal attempts at verbal art. But students nowadays increasingly recognize that the cradle of literary science is anthropology. The comparative method therefore sets civilized literatures side by side with the popular, traces folk-lore to folk-lore, and these so far as possible to the matrix in the undifferentiated art of human expression. Such is "comparative literature" when used of the work of the Grimms, Steinthal, Comparetti, Donovan, Talvj, or Ernst Grosse. The term is also properly used of the method of Taine, which in turn derives from that recommended by Hegel in the first volume of his *Ästhetik* (the appraisal of the literary work in relation to *Zeit, Volk, und Umgebung*), and of the method of Brunetière so far as he has applied it, for it is in theory the same, save that it purports to emphasize the consideration of the element of individuality. But that the method is susceptible of widely varying inter-

pretations is illustrated by the practice of still another advocate thereof, Professor Wetz, who, in his *Shakespeare from the Point of View of Comparative Literary History*, of 1890, and in his essay on the history of literature, insists that comparative literature is neither the literary history of one people, nor investigations in international literary history; neither the study of literary beginnings, nor even the attempt to obtain by induction the characteristics of *Welllitteratur*, its movements and types. While he accepts the analytical critical method of Taine in combination with the historical and psychological of Herder, Goethe, and Schiller, he insists that the function of comparative literature is to determine the peculiarities of an author by comparison with those of some other author sufficiently analogous.

A survey of courses offered in European and American universities and of the practice of our American philological journals and associations shows that the academic conception is as I have stated it: comparative literature works in the history of national as well as of international conditions, it employs, more or less prominently, the comparative method, logical and historical, it presupposes, and results in, a conception of literature as a solidarity, and it seeks to formulate and substantiate a theory of literary development whether by evolution or permutation, in movements, types, and themes. With these main considerations it is but natural that scholars should associate the attempt to verify and systematize the characteristics common to literature in its various manifestations wherever found; to come by induction, for instance, at the *eidographic* or generic qualities of poetry, — the characteristics of the drama, epic, or lyric; at the *dynamic* qualities, those which characterize and differentiate the main literary movements, such as the classical and romantic; and at the *thematic*, the causes of persistence and modification in the history of vital subjects, situations, and plots. As to the growth, or development, of literature, our survey shows that two distinct doctrines contend for acceptance: one, by evolution, which is an attempt to interpret literary processes in accordance with biological laws; the other, by what I prefer to call permutation. Since literature, like its material, language, is not an organism, but a resultant medium, both product and expression of the society whence it springs, the former theory must be still in doubt. It can certainly not be available otherwise than metaphorically unless it be substantiated by just such methods — comparative and scientific — as those of which we have spoken.

Much of this comparative method has been anticipated in theory; but not so much in discipline and fact. The solidarity of *literature* was long ago announced by Bacon. And he was not the only fore-runner of the present movement. In one way or another the solidarity of literature, the theories of permutation or of evolution, sometimes

crudely, sometimes with keen scientific insight, were anticipated by Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, Italians of note all the way from Dante, Scaliger, and Sidney down. If these writers and their main contributions to the science could be cited, it would be seen that they do not discredit, but confirm, the scope and hope of the science of to-day. They testify to the need of a science in the nature of things. They perform their service by anticipations in detail of a discipline that could not be designated a science until the sciences propædæutic thereto had been developed. Advances in historical method, in psychological, sociological, linguistic, and ethnological research have, now, furnished the discipline with an instrument unknown to its forebears in critical procedure; and with fresh and rich materials for illumination from without. The conception of literature as a unit is no longer hypothetical; the comparison of national histories has proved it. The idea of a process by evolution may be unproved; but that some process, as by permutation, must obtain is recognized. We no longer look upon the poet as inspired. Literature develops with the entity which produces it,—the common social need and faculty of expression; and it varies according to *differentiæ* of racial, physiographic, and social conditions, and of the inherited or acquired characteristics of which the individual author is constituted. The science of its production must analyze its component factors and determine the laws by which they operate. By a constant factor are fixed the only possible moulds or channels of expression, and, therefore, the integral and primary types, as, for instance, within the realm of poetry, the lyric, narrative, and dramatic. By the presence of other factors, both inconstant, these types are themselves liable to modification. I refer, of course, to environment, that is to say, to the antecedent and contemporary condition of thought, social tendency, and artistic fashion; and to the associational congeries called the author. So far as physiological and psychological modes of expression may be submitted to objective and historical analysis, so far as the surrounding conditions which directly or indirectly affect the art in which the author works, and the work of the author in that art, may be inductively studied, and their nature interpreted and registered in relation to other products of society, such as language, religion, and government, so far is the discipline of which we speak legitimately scientific. And as rapidly as experimental psychology, anthropology, ethnology, or the history of art in general, prove their right to scientific recognition, they become instruments for the comparative investigation of the social phenomenon called literature. It is thus that the literary science, just now called comparative literature, improves upon the efforts of the former stylistic or poetics, largely traditional or speculative, and displaces the capricious

matching of authors, the static or provincial view of history, and the appraisal lacking atmosphere.

While this science must exclude from the object under consideration the purely subjective element, and the speculative or so-called "judicial" (*me jndice*) method from criticism and history, it need not ignore or disregard the unexplained quantity, — the imaginative. Its aim will be to explore the hitherto unexplained in the light of historical sequence and scientific cause and effect, physical, biological, psychological, or anthropological, to reduce the apparently unreasonable or magical element, and so to leave continually less to be treated in the old-fashioned inspirational and ecstatic manner. We shall simply cease to confound the science with the art. The more immediate advantages of the prosecution of literary research in such a way as this are an ever-increasing knowledge of the factors that enter into world-literature and determine its growth, — its reasons, conditions, movements, and tendencies, — in short, its laws; and a poetics capable not only of detecting the historical, but of appreciating the social accent in what is foreign and too often despised, or contemporary and too often overpraised, if not ignored. The new science of literature will in turn throw light upon that which gave it birth; it will prove an index to the evolution of soul in the individual and in society; it will interpret that sphinx, national consciousness or the spirit of the race, or, mayhap, destroy it. It will in one case and in all assist a science of comparative ethics. The new discipline brought to the study of all kinds of writing a scientific objectivity and the historical method. It has taken up into itself what is objective and historical of the older stylistic: it aims to reject or confirm former theories, but on purely scientific grounds. It is the transition from stylistic to a science which shall still find room for æsthetics, but for æsthetics properly so called, developed, checked, and corrected by scientific procedure and by history.

Before the day of modern psychology, anthropology, linguistics, and the comparative sciences of society, religion, and art, literature was not possible to be studied either in relation to its antecedents or to its components. Otherwise our study would long ago have been known as comparative philology, a name improperly usurped by the linguistic branch of the philological discipline. Such indeed is the name by which Professor Whitney would have called the comparative study of the literatures of different countries had the discipline been prosecuted as a science when he wrote. Such was the conception of Wolf and Herder. The modern science of literature is a reaffirmation of that aspect of philology — the literary — which, both because it was dependent upon, and eclipsed by, the development of linguistics, has long ceased to be regarded as philology at all; save in Germany, where philological seminars have dealt not only with the

phonology and history of language as they asserted themselves, but also as of old with whatever concerns the literary side of language as an expression of the national, or more broadly human spirit. Since all study of origins and growth, whether of one phenomenon or more than one, must be *comparative* if scientifically conducted, it is not necessary to characterize the literary science, of which we speak, by that particular adjective. More methods than the comparative enter into it, and it is more than a method; it is a theory of relativity and of growth; and its material is vertically as well as horizontally disposed. The literary study of to-day, based upon the sciences of which I have spoken, and conducted in the scientific method, is literary philology — nothing more nor less: it stands over against linguistic philology or glottology; and it deals genetically, historically, and comparatively with literature as a solidarity and as a product of the social individual, whether the point of view be national or universal. The new discipline is already the property and method of all scientific research in all literatures, ancient or modern, not only in their common but in their individual relations to the social spirit in which they live and move and have their being. The more we develop this discipline, the more rapidly will each literature in turn seek its explanation in literary philology; and of such is the future of literary studies in the twentieth century.

SECTION A — INDO-IRANIAN LITERATURE

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(Hall 8; September 24, 3 p. m.)

CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR MAURICE BLOOMFIELD, Johns Hopkins University.

SPEAKER: PROFESSOR A. V. W. JACKSON, Columbia University.

OUR INTEREST IN PERSIA AND THE STUDY OF HER HISTORY, LANGUAGE, AND LITERATURE

BY A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON

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TO-DAY when all eyes are turned toward the East watching the struggle for supremacy between Japan and Russia, the interest in the Orient and its development is greater than ever before. As an Eastern nation, therefore, Persia merits our attention, but she has also peculiar claims upon our interest which it is the purpose of this address to emphasize.

Of all the great historic nations which came into contact with Greece and Rome, Persia alone has maintained her independence to the present time. Her monarchs have been rulers for three thousand years, and her shah, sitting upon the Peacock Throne at Tehran, may boast his claim to sovereign sway as inheritor of Jamshid's kingly rule in the legendary past of Iran and as successor to the sceptre of the Median Deïoces and the crown of Cyrus the Great. The story of the foundation of a mighty empire by the conquering arm of Cyrus and its development by the organizing hand of Darius is rich in historic interest. The struggle with Greece, the first signs of Persian decadence under Xerxes and Artaxerxes, the blow struck by Alexander, which overthrew the Achæmenian throne, furnish fruitful themes for its historian to discuss. If there were time to dilate upon the period of Parthian rule which followed, I might account for the hatred for Persia felt by Rome and summed up in

Horace's *Persicos odi, puer, apparatus* or discuss his graphic image of the Parthian horsemen turning to launch showers of deadly arrows upon the Roman legions; or again, I might picture the fall of the Sasanian power in the seventh century of our era and the rude awakening from their dream of establishing once more a world-empire. This was caused by the Arab conquest of Iran, the most momentous event in Persia's history. I am compelled to pass over the causes which led to this event and the far-reaching effects which it produced, even if I tried to crowd the history of a thousand years into a day, nor is there time more than to call attention to the magnificence of the Persian capital at Isfahan under Shah Abbas, the contemporary of Queen Elizabeth and of Henry IV of France, whose munificent rule and the luxury of his successors are described by the European travelers, Herbert, Olearius, and Chardin, who visited his court. The centuries which followed, and likewise the present, contain lessons for the statesman, historian, and philosopher.

In the realm of religion Persia has played an important rôle — a rôle not wholly laid aside. Her ancient national creed, Zoroastrianism, was one of the great religions of the East, and its remarkable analogies to Judaism and Christianity have long engaged the attention of biblical students. Outside of these two faiths it would be difficult to point to another religion which has a higher ethical code, considering its antiquity, or a clearer grasp of the ideas of right and wrong, than Zoroastrianism; or one which holds before its believers a more exalted image of divinity than Ahura Mazda (Ormazd) or inculcates a firmer doctrine of the responsibility of man to his Maker, or so exalted a hope of the coming of a Saviour, a bodily resurrection, a general judgment, and a future life with rewards and punishments for the immortal soul, as taught in the *Avesta*, the sacred book of ancient Iran.

From the earliest times when King Shalmanesar of Assyria placed colonies of Israelites in certain cities of the Medes, there have been more or less close relations between the Jews and the Persians. The prophet Isaiah calls Cyrus the Great "the anointed of the Lord" and His "Shepherd," and Darius gave orders for the temple at Jerusalem to be rebuilt. Xerxes and Artaxerxes, the former under the name of Ahasuerus, are renowned as kings in the Bible, and the scenes of the apocryphal books Judith and Tobit are laid partly in Persia. No study of the infancy of our Saviour, either in theology or in art, can be complete without a reference to the Magi, for one or all of these Wise Men from the East came from Persia, according to old-time traditions and legends. To-day, moreover, the gospel of Christ is being preached within the borders of Persia by self-sacrificing missionaries, one of whom this very year sealed his faith with his blood.

In the early Christian ages a phase of Zoroastrianism, known as Mithraism, penetrated into the Roman world and spread so widely that in many parts of Europe altars were set up and cave temples built to celebrate the mysteries of the Persian divinity Mithra and to glorify this personification of light, the sun, and truth. Furthermore, the system of Manichæism, which sprang up on Persian soil, was powerful enough for a time to compete with neo-Platonism and Christianity for the religious and intellectual supremacy of the Roman Empire.

Persia to-day is Muhammadan, having accepted Islam in the seventh century, at the time of the Arab conquest, but here again she has played a prominent part, because she is the chief representative of the Shiite sect which acknowledged Ali as the successor of Muhammad in opposition to the orthodox Sunnites. Within the last seventy years, moreover, a new religious movement, eclectic in character and known as Babism, has sprung up in Persia and assumed such proportions as to menace the progress of Muhammadanism in Iran and to attract attention even in the Occident.

In the domain of art and architecture Persia is thought to have borrowed largely from Assyria and Babylon in ancient times, and later from Greece, Rome, and Byzantium, and in more recent days from China and even the West; nevertheless she has added so much and made the importation so characteristically her own creation as to command attention in all histories of these subjects. Our knowledge of the artistic condition of Iran during the Median period is extremely limited. Regarding architecture at that remote era we have to rely solely on the account which Herodotus gives of the magnificent walls at Ecbatana, colored in rainbow hues, and supplement this by the description in the book of Judith, or again we must reproduce the picture which Polybius gives of the temple of the Persian Artemis at Ecbatana, the walls of which were covered with plates of silver and gold. These structures have all vanished long since, except one or two bases of columns and capitals of pillars, and there remains not a trace of Median sculpture at Hamadan, which was the ancient Ecbatana, save one, and even its claim to so great an antiquity has been questioned. This is the great stone lion outside the city. Although it is broken, battered, and prone on the ground, its outlines are lifelike and artistic, and show what the Persian sculptor could accomplish in ages past.

The art and architecture developed under the Achæmenian kings, between the sixth and the fourth century B.C., can boast of having brought forth some of the grandest monuments produced by the Aryan race. The ruins of ancient Pasargadæ and Persepolis find their superior in grandeur only at Athens and Rome. The remains at the ancient city of HATHRA, and perhaps also the huge

foundation stones and fallen columns of the great temple of the Persian Diana at Kangavar,¹ furnish the student with specimens of Parthian architecture; while the sculptured grottoes of Tag-i Bostan, and the bas-reliefs at Hajiabad, Shapur, and Naksh-i Rostam, are the best examples of Sasanian art. If we are interested in Persia's later architectural achievements under Islam, we shall find examples of the Muhammadan style everywhere from Tehran and Meshed to Shiraz, or from the Blue Mosque at Tabriz to the turquoise domes and slender minarets of Isfahan.

In ceramic art Persia has long enjoyed a high renown. Fragments of porcelain with the exquisite *reflet d'or* are dug up among the ruins of ancient Rai near Tehran, and the tiles of Isfahan, with their delicate shades in color, are masterpieces in decorative faïence; while the art of the Persian potter is familiar to every reader of Omar Khayyam. In metalware the graceful shape of the vessels of copper and hammered brass appeals to the eye as one makes a tour through the bazaars, and the filigree work in silver and gold or the traceries on a damascened sword present a delicacy of outline that tells of a high artistic sense. In the weaving of rugs and carpets, with their careful blending of colors and variety in pattern and design, the Persians bear away the palm. The embroidery done by the women is equally attractive, and the delicate meshwork in their veils is often so fine that it must try the eyes that make it, as much as the eyes it hides. Brocaded silks, gay saddle-cloths, lacquered pommels, pen-cases, book-covers, trays, and artistic specimens of antique armor are among the Persian products which have called forth admiration from the time of Jamshid till to-day. In the art of painting Persia has little to show, for the influence of Islam is not favorable to the pictorial arts, but in calligraphy, the art of beautiful handwriting, Persia is unsurpassed. Penmanship is cultivated as a fine art, and some of the specimens of *nastalîk* script interlaced into a monogram or of arabesque woven into intricate patterns in carpets or traced about the domes and portals of mosques, are unrivaled in the world. Music cannot be called a Persian art, but it may be mentioned in comparison with Oriental harmony and in contrast to the West.

It may seem surprising to hear that even in science and philosophy the world owes something to Persia. This indebtedness is chiefly to the great philosopher-physician Ibn Sina, better known in Europe under the name of Avicenna, who flourished about A.D. 1000. His medical system was originally adopted from the Greek, but was Orientalized, and it spread then over the East, finding its way to Europe through

¹ Modern Kangavar is the same as the classical Konkobar, and kindred to a presumable Avestan form *Kanha-vara, "Enclosure of Kanha." Isidorus of Charax, *Mansiones Parthicae*, § 7, mentions the temple at Konkobar. I visited the ruins on my journey from Hamadan to Kermanshah.

the Moors of Spain. So well was Avicenna's *Canon* known in the fourteenth century that Chaucer refers to its author familiarly in *The Pardoner's Tale*, on the subject of poisoning, and even uses the technical word *fen*, by which the sections of the *Canon* are designated. In metaphysics, moreover, Ibn Sina's fame as a thinker is known to every student of scholastic philosophy, because his writings, which were influenced by Aristotle and neo-Platonism, found their way to Europe through the so-called Arabian philosophy of the Moors, became widely known through translations, and exercised a strong influence on Scholasticism. Persian Sufism also, with its transcendental ideas, although not the result of Persian thought alone, presents many interesting analogies to European mysticism of the Middle Ages, in whatever manner we may seek to explain the likenesses. In the realm of science, furthermore, Nasir ad-Din of Tus in Khorasan was an astronomer who enjoyed a great reputation in the East,¹ and many of us call Omar Khayyam "the astronomer-poet of Persia," without recalling the fact that he wrote also an algebra. In the department of history and chronology the name of Mirkhond may be mentioned with praise, and I may add that a number of the Eastern medieval writers whom we think of as Arabs were really Persians, but chose the language of their conquerors as a vehicle to express their thoughts.

The student of social institutions, political economy, and science of government may learn something also from the code of the *Avesta*, or better still from the organization of the Persian Empire by Darius. His system of administration by satraps, his distribution of taxes among the provinces, his management of financial problems, fixing the ratio of silver to gold at a precise figure, and his encouragement of agriculture, as enjoined by Zoroaster, may be mentioned as single illustrations. The contrast between the present and the past of Iran in these respects is no less instructive, and the hand of a Darius, if not of a Cyrus, is needed once more if we are to have a *Persia rediviva*.

Nothing has been said thus far regarding the language of Persia, and our interest in that study. The discovery and translation of the *Avesta* by Anquetil du Perron marked a new era in philology as well as in the study of religion, and the decipherment of the cuneiform inscriptions of the Achæmenian kings by Grotefend and Rawlinson added a chapter to the story told by Herodotus, corroborating the facts of ancient history previously known from other sources, and throwing fresh light on the monuments of the past. The researches into the Middle Persian or Pahlavi texts and inscriptions, supple-

¹ See the sketch by my friend, Professor Paul Horn, *Was verdanken wir Persien?* in *Nord und Süd*, Heft 282, p. 289, Breslau, 1900, to which I am indebted for several suggestions.

mented by a knowledge of the Modern Persian and its dialects, and still further elaborated by a study of the coins and gems, have helped to place Iranian linguistics on as firm a basis as that of any other group of languages and materially to further the science of comparative philology. The Modern Persian, moreover, with its admixture of Arabic and loss of inflections, both due to the Muhammadan conquest, offers an interesting linguistic parallel to English with its leveled case-endings, analytic structure, and vast infusion of Romance words due to the Norman-French invasion. In the matter of linguistic purity and the avoidance of foreign words in a national epic, the Persian poet Firdausi, author of the *Shah Namah* (A.D. 1000) affords an excellent parallel to the English poetic chronicler Layamon, author of the *Brut* (A.D. 1200); the one is as free from Arabic words, which later became popular, as the other from elements derived from the Norman-French.

Our own vocabulary to-day owes something to Persia. So common a word as *van*, used in moving furniture, is an abbreviation of *caravan* (which has been etymologized in the folk-speech as "carry-van") and is as much Persian as the name *shah* itself, or his *tiara*. The same is true of the words *paradise*, and *Peri*, *magic*, and *bakhshish*, which have a history as old as the *Avesta*. The Persian term *bazaar* is current in English, and *shawls*, *sashes*, *awnings*, *turquoises*, and *taffeta* are standard articles in our linguistic supply as well as in the business market. Products so generally common in America as the *orange*, *lemon*, *melon*, and *peach* (the latter word having come through the medium of the French from the Latin *malum Persicum*, "Persian apple") are Iranian in name as well as in origin. The vegetable *spinach* is Persian, and *asparagus* traces its lineage apparently through the Greek ἀσπάραγος ultimately to Avestan *sparegha*, "shoot, stalk."¹ The list of our linguistic indebtedness to Persia might be increased by adding a score or more words, like *julep*, which is really an arabicized form of the Persian *gulab*, "rose-water," *hazard*, applied to taking one chance in a thousand (Pers. *hazar*), while *gul* and *bulbul* are familiar to every one who reads poetry about the nightingale and rose of Persia.²

The title of Persian literature to a place among the great literatures of the world is a recognized one, and it is perhaps in this domain that she can make the greatest claim upon our interest. In antiquity and compass Persian literature may rank behind its cousin, the Sanskrit of India, and its monuments may not date so far back as the Egyptian, Assyrian, and Old Babylonian, nor may its compositions make pretensions to rival the Psalms in loftiness, nor its style to match the

¹ This vegetable has gained much by being transplanted to the West, if I may judge by the asparagus which now grows in Persia.

² For a list of Persian words in English consult the appendix to Skeat, *Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*.

Greek in classic beauty, but this is equally true of any other Oriental literature. Persian literature has special claims of its own, and these are such as to allow it to rank high when compared with ancient models, and assign it a position of distinction in the line of epic, lyric, and descriptive poetry, when judged by modern standards.

Viewed in its broadest sense, the literature of Persia comprises all the literary monuments of Iran conceived as a national entity, and covers a period of more than twenty-five centuries. From the fact that "the book of records of the chronicles," according to Esther (vi, 1), was brought and read before King Ahasuerus, or Xerxes, we may infer the existence of annals, chronicles, and historical accounts, which were written and kept long before the days of Xerxes.

The *Avesta*, our oldest book in Iranian literature, is of importance chiefly because of its religious character and the light which it throws upon the conditions of early Media and Bactria; but some of the epic passages in its *Yashts* show that there must have been even earlier some sort of national literature in the form of annals or chronicles, lays or ballads, legends or mythical stories, traces of which survive in the *Shah Namah*, or Persian Book of Kings. The *Avestan Gathas*, or Psalms of Zoroaster, moreover, ring with the voice of a prophetic soul inspired by the greatness of his calling, and this lends a literary tone to the force of these metrical compositions. The Old Persian inscriptions have already been alluded to, and mention has been made of our interest in these rock-cut records of the great Achæmenian kings. Even the sober Pahlavi, or Middle Persian literature, twice turns aside from its sacerdotal, scientific, or exegetical style of composition to give us an early instance of the Eastern biographical and historical romance, the *Karnamak*, or Gest of King Ardashir Papakan, and the *Yatkar*, or Battle of the Zoroastrian crusader Zarir.

Most interesting is the Modern Persian literature. This sprang up a century or more after the Arab conquest, as a revival of the old feeling of national pride and an effort to recall the lost glory of Iran then gave rise to a kind of literary renaissance. The names of the earlier poets of this era, like Rudaki and Dakiki, might be mentioned as worthy of praise, but we pass them over to pay homage to Firdausi, the Father of Persian Song, who wrote before the date A.D. 1000, and cast into the mould of undying verse the annals of Persia down to the Arab invasion. This work, a poem of 60,000 couplets, he called *Shah Namah*, Book of Kings; it ranks as a world-epic and entitles him to his proud name *Firdausi*, Poet of Paradise. His last poem, on the romantic story of the passion of Potiphar's wife Zulaika for the youthful Joseph, though written in old age, is a masterpiece and full of fervid imagination, while his panegyric and his satire on his patron but deceiver, Mahmud of Ghazni, is unsurpassed in power

of expressing eulogy and scorn. The last years of Firdausi were unhappy ones, marred by a failure to meet with a suitable acknowledgment of his true greatness, and tinged even by a suspicion of heresy imputed to him by reason of the sympathy shown toward the fire-worshippers in his epic. He died almost in exile, and this pathetic fact inspired the pen of the English poet Edmund Gosse to write *Firdausi in Exile*. Not to mention translations, and adaptations or versions of episodes in the *Shah Namah* which have been made in continental tongues, I may call to memory Matthew Arnold's *Sohrab and Rustum*, one of the finest pieces of epic narrative in the English language, which is based directly on Firdausi's tragic incident of the death of Sohrab by the hand of his father Rustum in mortal combat on the battlefield.

To speak of Persian poetry is to mention the name of Omar Khayyam, who flourished about A.D. 1100 and whose *Rubaiyat* has become an English classic through FitzGerald's memorable version of the quatrains. Editions, translations, commentaries, and appreciations of Omar in England, America, France, and Germany, number legion, and the study of this Persian poet has become so much a cult as to lead to the foundation of Omar Khayyam clubs in London and in Boston.

Less known in the Occident, but deserving a wider reputation than he has in the West, is Nizami (A.D. 1141-1203), a Persian master of the romantic epopee. As an example of his narrative and descriptive power, I may mention his poem on the fatal love of the sculptor Farhad for Shirin, the lovely favorite of King Khosru. The monarch was aware of the artist's secret admiration; desiring to call forth new miracles from his chisel, as well as secure from him a work of lasting practical value, he promised the enamoured sculptor the hand of Shirin as a reward for his carving, provided he would also cut a channel through the lofty rock of Bisitun and lead the water to the plain beneath. The love-inspired artist accomplished the feat, but sacrificed his life in the task, for he threw himself down from the rock to destruction on hearing a false report that his beloved Shirin was dead. No more touching bit of narrative poetry is to be found than in Nizami's account of the tragic tale.

Familiar to every one interested in literature are the names of Sa'di and Hafiz. Sa'di's long life extended over most of the thirteenth century, and his experiences enabled him to combine the moralist with the poet. In his two best works, the *Gulistan* and the *Bostan*, Gardens of Roses and Perfumes, we have wise matter commingled with rich verse, and his short poems thrill with a human touch, while some of his stories and sayings are distinctly humorous. Hafiz deserves still greater fame. He died at Shiraz towards the end of the fourteenth century, and his tomb is pointed out, not far from Sa'di's, outside

the city of nightingales and roses. Hafiz is a poet's poet and one of the world's greatest lyrists; some acquaintance with his exquisite odes belongs to true culture.

If there were time, I should like to discuss the metaphysical poet Jalal ad-Din Rumi, of the thirteenth century, and the mystic Jami, who lived two centuries later, and to draw a comparison between their verses and the mystic poetry, sensuous imagery, and transcendental symbolism of the seventeenth-century English poets Donne and Crawshaw, or the *Purple Island* of Phineas Fletcher. Space also forbids me to include in the list dozens of minor names from Abu Said ibn Khair, an author of quatrains who died in 968, or Kamal of Isfahan, 1200, to the prose of the late Shah Nasir ad-Din's diary of his journey to Europe in 1889. Among the curiosities of Persian literature, moreover, is a culinary poet, Bushak of Shiraz and Isfahan, who lived in the fifteenth century and whose verses in praise of the cuisine would delight the heart of a gourmand; or again the clothes-poet, Mahmud Kari of Yezd, in the sixteenth century, whose lyre responded to the *Sartor Resartus* theme of robes and garments. Though the times to-day do not favor a poet's birth nor foster the cultivation of the Muses, the Persian race has not forgotten how to sing, and a renaissance of the poetic art may come perchance some day with a new order of things.

Little space remains for adding a few words about the influence of Persia on our own poetry. In the earlier ages Persia was little known to England except as a name, yet Chaucer alludes to Persian blue, "pers," in the *Prologue*, and "robes de pers" occur in the French original of the *Romaunt* which Chaucer translated. Marlowe has Persian names and Persian scenes in his *Tamburlaine*; and Shakespeare alludes to Persian attire in *King Lear* and to a Persian prince in *Merchant of Venice*, as well as to a voyage to Persia in his *Comedy of Errors*. Milton, besides making other allusions, summarizes the earlier history of Persia in his *Paradise Regained*, and Shelley recalls the pillared halls of Persepolis in a passage in *Alastor*. Byron's *Giaour* and Landor's *Gebir* hark back to the old Zoroastrian faith of Iran, and Matthew Arnold and Edmund Gosse have already been cited as falling under the spell of Firdausi. A dozen other instances of Persian influence on English poets might be cited, the best known being Tom Moore, whose *Lalla Rookh* fills the senses with the melody and perfume, color and beauty, tenderness and tremulous ecstasy, which is associated in imagination with the East.

In the realm of English prose, two volumes of *Persian Tales* were widely read in Europe in the latter part of the eighteenth century, and the so-called *Arabian Nights* are really largely Persian. The inimitable Persian novel, *Hajji Baba of Isfahan*, by Morier, is so thoroughly Oriental that Persians who read English mistake it for

a serious composition and take umbrage at some of its amusing accounts. One of our contemporary American writers, Marion Crawford, selected Zoroaster to be the hero of a pseudo-historical novel. A dozen more of examples would occur to mind if I had chosen to go outside of English and speak of the influence of Persia upon French, German, and other European literatures, but enough has already been said.


In conclusion and by way of summary I would emphasize again the value of Persian studies in the lines of history, religion, and sociology, art, architecture, and archæology, language and literature, and incidentally in philosophy and science. I venture also to express the hope that America may be led further to emulate the example of France, England, Germany, and Russia, in encouraging investigation in these particular branches of study relating to Iran and the Land of the Lion and the Sun.


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